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This dissertation analyzes early attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to integrate 
Zeku (Tsékhok) County, an ethnically Tibetan, pastoral region located in southeastern 
Qinghai/Amdo, into the People’s Republic of China.  Employing county-level archival 
materials, it argues that during the immediate post-Liberation period, Party leaders 
implicitly understood both the administrative and epistemological obstacles to 
transforming a vast multiethnic empire into a unitary, socialist nation-state. For much of 
the 1950s it therefore employed a “subimperial” strategy, referred to as the United Front, 
as a means to gradually and voluntarily bridge the gap between empire and nation. 
However, the United Front ultimately lost out to a revolutionary impatience that 
demanded immediate national integration and socialist transformation, leading in 1958 to 
communization, democratic reforms and rebellion.  Despite successfully identifying the 
tensions between empire and nation, and attempting to creatively resolve them, empire 
was eliminated before the process of de-imperialization and nationalization was 
completed.  This failure occurred at both the level of policy and narrative, leaving 
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INTRODUCTION: EMPIRE AND AMDO 
 
On March 10, 2008, the first in a string of anti-state protests broke out in Lhasa, 
the capital of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.  Initially, the disturbances were described 
as the largest in China’s Tibetan regions since a series of demonstrations had shaken 
Lhasa between 1987-1989.  However, it soon became evident that this comparison was 
inadequate.  Like the demonstrations two decades prior, the 2008 protests began with 
confrontations between Tibetan monks and state security forces and then rapidly spread 
to the lay community.  And like two decades earlier, the protests quickly turned violent.  
Unlike the 1980s, however, in 2008 the unrest was not limited to Lhasa and its environs.  
Instead, the protests spread across the Tibetan Plateau and beyond.  Over the spring and 
summer of 2008, and in the form of more sporadic protests and a worrying spate of self-
immolations that continue to this day, the epicenter of this Tibetan opposition to the 
Chinese state has settled in the eastern portions of the Tibet Plateau, the regions Tibetans 
traditionally refer to as Kham and Amdo.  In retrospect, it may now be appropriate to 
deem this more recent uprising to be the largest anti-state disruption since a series of 
rebellions broke out in eastern Tibet in the mid to late-1950s, eventually leading to the 
Dalai Lama’s 1959 flight into exile.1 
                                                
1 For an independent analysis produced within China of the causes of the 2008 unrest, see Gongmen Law 
Research Center, "An Investigative Report into the Social and Economic Causes of the 3.14 Incident in 
Tibetan Areas." Fools Mountain: Blogging for China. http://blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/06/02/an-
investigative-report-into-the-social-and-economic-causes-of-the-314-incident-in-tibetan-areas (accessed 




In February 2008, one month before the first demonstration, I arrived in Xining, 
the capital of Qinghai Province and gateway to the Tibetan regions of Amdo.  I was there 
to conduct research on Amdo’s recent history, already a sensitive proposition that would 
be made more complex by the protests and the state’s response to them.  Yet, by 
rendering transparent the rupture between the Chinese state’s narrative of national unity 
and the reality on the ground, the unrest reinforced the underlying question that shaped 
my research agenda; why has the Chinese state, now sixty years after “Liberation,” been 
unable to effectively integrate Tibetans into the multiethnic Chinese nation?  At first 
glance the question seems simplistic and the answers obvious.  In fact, although each 
were spurred by specific local, regional and global conjunctures, to a large degree the 
Tibetan uprisings have been framed within the wider context of the debate over the 
international status of Tibet; namely whether or not Tibet historically has been an 
“integral” part of China or a wholly independent state.  However, this framework 
presupposes that both China and Tibet are themselves innate, single and enduring entities 
and that their status in the past is immediately relevant and transferable to the present.  In 
essence, employing modern conceptions of national sovereignty to describe what were 
pre-modern imperial relationships, advocates on both sides of the “Tibet Question” argue 
over whether or not Tibet should be part of China.  However, rather than assuming 
                                                                                                                                            
2008. The only monograph-length study of the 2008 “national uprising” is Warren W. Smith, Tibet's Last 
Stand? : The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China's Response (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). A 
broad analysis of the unrest with a focus on the self-immolations that have recently occurred across the 
Tibetan Plateau (2011-2012) can be found in a special edition of “Hot Spots Forum,” Carol McGranahan 
and Ralph Litzinger eds. “Self-Immolation as Protest in Tibet.” Cultural Anthropology. 
http://culanth.org/?q=node/526 (accessed on April 13, 2012).  On the 1987-1989 disturbances, see Barnett’s 
contribution to Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds., Authenticating Tibet : Answers to China's 
100 Questions (University of California Press, 2008).  See also Ronald D. Schwartz, Circle of Protest : 
Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), and the essays by 
Schwartz, Barnett, Havnevik and Sperling in Robert Barnett and Shanir Akiner, eds., Resistance and 




Tibetans resist because they are not Chinese, more useful and historically grounded are 
avenues of inquiry that explore processes, strategies and problematics of state and nation 
building.  In other words, how have Chinese state builders tried to integrate different 
Tibetan regions into the modern Chinese nation and, as demonstrated by uprisings in the 
late 1950s, 1980s and 2000s, why has this nation-building project been largely 
unsuccessful?  
This study explores some of the strategies and narratives through which 
twentieth-century nation builders have sought to transform a variegated, segmented and 
vertically organized imperial formation into a horizontally integrated, multinational 
nation-state.  While hopefully addressing broader issues in the development of the 
Chinese nation-state and its limits, the geographic and temporal focus of this study is 
quite narrow.  The core explores the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts between 
1953-1958 in the Zeku Tibetan Autonomous County (Tib. Tsékhok) to negotiate this 
transition from empire to nation.  Until quite recently, non-Han regions have largely been 
considered peripheral (both geographically and conceptually) to the development of 
modern China.  However, these regions make up over half of the territory of the present-
day Chinese state.  Moreover, they are fundamental to the CCP’s own vision of the 
socialist (and now post-socialist) Chinese nation.  Therefore, far from marginal, exploring 
county-level state and nation building in an ethnic minority area helps explicate at the 
most local level the still largely unexplored processes by which an imperial formation 
became China.  Often informed by the disciplines of anthropology and geography, there 
have been several studies that have investigated the consequences of CCP rule, both 




and dislocations of the “reform era” (1978-present), for the various non-Han peoples of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).2   However, this study is unique in employing 
extensive county-level archival materials to explore the Party’s formative state and 
nation-building efforts in a “minority nationality area.”   
One of the first entries in the Zeku County Party Archives introduces the region 
by noting, “Zeku County is […] very high and extremely cold, the people who live here 
are ten tribes (buluo) of various sizes, purely Tibetan, who engage in pastoralism as their 
main pursuit.”3  In a sense, this represented the boundaries of what in 1953 was definite, 
what seemed indisputable.  Party cadres were of course aware that Zeku was purely 
Tibetan and almost totally pastoral, that it was at high elevation (averaging nearly 11,500 
ft. above sea level) with an extreme climate (the average yearly daily temperature hovers 
                                                
2 Monographs include Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion : The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in 
Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); Kerry Brown, The Purge of the Inner Mongolian 
People's Party in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1967-69 : A Function of Language, Power and Violence 
(Kent: Global Oriental, 2006); Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese : Ethnic Nationalism in the People's 
Republic, (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991); Melvyn C. 
Goldstein and Cynthia M. Beall. Nomads of Western Tibet : The Survival of a Way of Life. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990); William R. Jankowiak, Sex, Death, and Hierarchy in a Chinese City 
: An Anthropological Account (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Ralph A. Litzinger, Other 
Chinas : The Yao and the Politics of National Belonging (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); 
Charlene E. Makley, The Violence of Liberation : Gender and Tibetan Buddhist Revival in Post-Mao China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Erik Mueggler, The Age of Wild Ghosts : Memory, 
Violence, and Place in Southwest China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and David 
Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia : Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). See also the edited volumes by Stevan Harrell, ed., Cultural Encounters on 
China's Ethnic Frontiers, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995) and Melissa J. Brown, ed., 
Negotiating Ethnicity in China and Taiwan (Berekely: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, 1996).  The Han are the ethnic/national (minzu) designation for the people generally referred to 
in English as Chinese.  The state currently recognizes fifty-six nationalities.  Of the fifty-six, the Han make 
up approximately 92% of the population.  On the minzu classification project, see Thomas S. Mullaney, 
Coming to Terms with the Nation : Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). 
 





around 32°F/0°C).4  They knew that it was materially poor, its infrastructure primitive, 
communications difficult, education levels low, and industry nonexistent.  They arrived 
with a rudimentary knowledge of the region’s demographic make-up that split Zeku’s 
inhabitants into ten large tribal groupings.5  They had identified many of the leading 
secular and religious figures and had established working relationships with several.  
However, beyond this not much was sure.  When in 1953 Party operatives were deployed 
into the Zeku grasslands this was the challenge which they faced— transforming an alien, 
tribal and backwards corner of the South Qinghai Plateau into an integrated component of 
“New China.”   
Today, Zeku County remains a sparsely populated pastoral region located in the 
southeastern portion of Amdo.  Covering a region roughly the size of France, Amdo is 
sometimes referred to as northeast Tibet.  This claim, however, is problematic as it 
suggests a unified and recognized Tibetan polity of which Amdo is one part.  
Historically, however, this has rarely if ever been the case.  In fact, never has Amdo been 
a singular distinct state nor, as is commonly claimed by exile Tibetans and their 
supporters, a “province” of Tibet.  In fact, the region has long been subject to a dizzying 
array of political formations and numerous overlapping spheres of authority, both secular 
and religious, that defy compartmentalization within modern discourses of sovereignty 
                                                
4 Zeku Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., Zeku Xian Zhi, Qinghai Sheng Di Fang Zhi Cong Shu (Beijing: 
Zhongguo xian zhen nian jian chu ban she, 2005). Hereafter cited as Zeku Xianzhi.  Zeku’s yearly average 
temperature ranges from 28.6°F-36.3F/-2.4°C-2.4°C.  The temperature drops below freezing between 164-
207 days per year. 
 
5 Even this was not entirely settled.  One of the earliest population charts (1952) lists eleven tribes. 
However, by 1953 the Myikya had been recognized as one of the three tsowa that make up the Shawonar 
Tribe. Zeku County People’s Government Committee Archives (hereafter cited as ZCPG) 1, 2-3; ZCPC 2, 
97.  See also Chapter Four n. 120.  See Appendix A for a list of Zeku’s tribes and their leadership at the 




and the nation-state.  Instead, Amdo is probably best thought of as one of three major 
“ethno-linguistic” regions of the “greater ethnographic Tibet,” the others being Kham to 
Amdo’s south (sometimes called southwest Tibet) and Central Tibet, or Ü tsang.6  
However, even a definition that refers to Amdo as a Tibetan ethnographic zone is 
problematic as the region is home to a variety of Tibetan, Mongolic, Turkic, and Sinic 
peoples.  Today, the bulk of Amdo, including Zeku County, lies in Qinghai Province with 
the remainder falling into Sichuan and Gansu Provinces. 
For this study I conceive of Amdo as having been broadly part of an imperial 
formation with China-based imperial cores for much of the past millennium.  As should 
become clear, this is not to suggest that the imperial center exercised direct control over 
Amdo, nor am I claiming that its influence in Amdo was uniform over space and time.  
However, I hold that the broad parameters of an imperial relationship existed through 
distinct compacts between imperial centers and a multitude of local ruling institutions, 
secular and/or religious.  While tensions were often present and considerable gaps in 
imperial oversight not uncommon, over the longue durée these relationships were 
relatively stable and mutually reinforcing.  This framework will not satisfy everyone and 
it is certainly only one of many ways to understand Amdo’s past.  For example, at various 
times many of Amdo’s elite actors may have maintained imperial-style relationships with 
other centers of power, both those in Amdo (such as with Mongols) and elsewhere (in 
particular Central Tibet).  Others might prefer to view Amdo’s various political 
groupings within the framework of what Geoffrey Samuel has termed a “stateless 
                                                
6 Emily T. Yeh, "Tibetan Range Wars: Spatial Politics and Authority on the Grasslands of Amdo," 
Development and Change 34, no. 3 (2003): 508, especially n. 7; Toni Huber, "Introduction: A Mdo and Its 
Modern Transition," in Amdo Tibetans in Transition : Society and Culture in the Post-Mao Era, ed. Toni 
Huber (Leiden: Brill, 2002), xii-xviii; Fernanda Pirie, "Segmentation within the State: The Reconfiguration 




society,” “decentralized polities, often with strong tribal elements.”7  More recently, 
certain scholars have proffered the idea of Zomia, suggesting that the “the highlands of 
Asia, from the western Himalayan range through the Tibetan Plateau, and all the way to 
the lower end of the peninsular southeast Asian highlands, [be considered] as a political 
and historic entity significantly distinct from the usual area divisions of Asia.”8  
Nonetheless, I believe my approach is useful for at least two reasons:  Firstly, it helps 
dissuade us from overly positivistic methods of approaching the past.  This is particularly 
important in as politically charged context as Tibet in which the political status of what 
were pre-national political formations have come to serve as a proxy for the present-day 
debate over Tibet’s international status.  Secondly, it seeks to explicate one of the central 
problematics of post-imperial Chinese state and nation building: the transition from 
empire to nation.   
 
Empire and China 
The literature on empire is almost as old as empire itself.  Historians and political 
theorists have exhausted countless wells of ink, typewriter ribbons and toner cartridges 
defining empire, detailing their conquests, explaining their operations, and perhaps most 
                                                
7 Geoffrey Samuel, "Tibet as a Stateless Society and Some Islamic Parallels," The Journal of Asian Studies 
41, no. 2 (1982): 215. Comparing Tibetan Buddhism to Sufi and Shi’a forms of Islam, Samuel argues that 
the importance of the charismatic lama has served as a decentralizing force throughout Tibetan history. See 
also Huber, xvii. 
 
8 Jean Michaud, "Editorial -- Zomia and Beyond," Journal of Global History 5, no. 02 (2010): 187. 
Michaud is paraphrasing William van Schendal who in 2002 proposed the idea of Zomia as a way to 
disrupt traditional area studies and the national borders that define them and bring attention to what he sees 
as a distinct, but marginalized transnational Asian highlands.  Zomia has received its most prominent 
exposure in James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed : An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 
Asia, Yale Agrarian Studies Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). For a recent discussion of 





recurrently expounding upon the decline and fall of empire.9  In the modern era, the focus 
on imperial decline was initially spurred by the long period of decolonization and what 
appeared to be the eclipse of empire by the inexorable rise of the nation-state.10  More 
recently, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the post hoc recognition that the 
twentieth century’s self-styled foremost enemy of imperialism may itself have been an 
imperial formation galvanized a new era of interest in empire.11  However, the overall 
effect of the preoccupation with imperial decline and collapse has been twofold.  On the 
one hand it has helped conceal the more enduring successes of empire in ruling over vast, 
diverse populations for lengthy periods of time.  As Karen Barkey argues, “Telling 
history backward with the knowledge of the end has affected our understanding of the 
possibilities of empire, as we have searched for a unidirectional explanation from rise to 
decline.”12  Secondly, it has fed into a “teleology” of the nation-state in which the nation 
                                                
9 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World : Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 
1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 12-19; D. C. B. Lieven, Empire : The Russian Empire 
and Its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) 7-26.  For a very useful historiographic review of 
the “modern” western-language literature on empire, see Lieven’s bibliography, especially 445-449.   
 
10 The publication of Edward Gibbons’ multivolume opus The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is 
often cited as the forbearer of modern studies on imperial decline. For a discussion of the literature on 
imperial decline and an analysis of the problematics of the decline paradigm, see Karen Barkey, "Changing 
Modalities of Empire : A Comparative Study of Ottoman and Habsburg Decline," in Empire to Nation: 
Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric 
Van Young (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 168-173. 
 
11 Mark R. Beissinger, "The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire," Post - Soviet Affairs 11, no. 2 (1995): 149. 
Examples of the new focus on empire spurred by the collapse of the Soviet Union include the edited 
volumes by Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen, eds., After Empire : Multiethnic Societies and Nation-
Building : The Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1997); Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations : Empire and Nation-Making in the 
Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Karen  Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, The 
End of Empire? : The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1997).  
 
12 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference : The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4.  This is demonstrated by the treatment of the Soviet Union 




inevitably supplants empire as not just the dominant but also the most natural, desirable 
and legitimate form of political organization.13  In this framework empire becomes the 
famous “prisonhouse of nations,” the subjugator of “long-repressed primordial national 
consciousness.”14 
This study also examines the transition from empire to nation, in this case from 
the Manchu Qing Dynasty and its imperial predecessors to the People’s Republic of 
China.  Rather than posit the inevitable defeat of the old empire by the forces of 
nationhood, I argue that the transformation from imperial formation to Chinese nation has 
been contested, constructed, negotiated, and ultimately incomplete.  Of course, I am not 
the first to note China’s rocky transition to nationhood.  For much of the twentieth 
century the seeming inability of the post-imperial order to reconfigure itself as a modern 
Chinese nation-state was a subject of considerable anxiety for both Chinese intellectuals 
and outside observers.  Lucian Pye has famously argued that the problem of nation 
                                                                                                                                            
universally condemned as an empire.  The general consensus now appears to be that the Soviet Union was 
an empire and therefore it broke up.  However, it is also routinely referred to as an empire precisely 
because it did break up.”  In “Persisting Ambiguity of Empire,” 155.  For a partial list of studies that in the 
wake of the Soviet collapse began to refer to the former superpower as an imperial formation, see Ronald 
Grigor Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, 'National' Identity, and Theories of Empire," in A 
State of Nations : Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and 
Terry Martin (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 58 n. 3. 
 
13 Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayah, and Eric Van Young, "Introduction," in Empire to Nation: Historical 
Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayah, and Eric Van 
Young (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006 ), 2; Ellen Comisso, "Empires as Prisons 
of Nations Versus Empires as Political Opportunity Structures," in Empire to Nation: Historical 
Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayah, and Eric Van 
Young (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Suny, “Empire Strikes Out,” 27-28; Peter 
C. Perdue, "Empire and Nation in Comparative Perspective: Frontier Administration in Eighteenth-Century 
China," Journal of Early Modern History 5, no. 4 (2001): 301. 
 
14 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past : Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). The phrase “prison-house of nations” was coined in 
1839 by the Marquis de Custine in reference to the Russian Tsarist Empire.  It has since been used to 
describe polities as diverse as the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires, the USSR, Yugoslavia and the post-





building in twentieth-century China was the problem of transforming a civilization into a 
nation.15  While not entirely without merit, this conclusion is also a function of a 
particular lacuna in both the popular memory and, until recently, scholarly treatment of 
China’s past.  Even while being widely lauded as the world’s most enduring imperial 
formation, what in fact made the “Chinese Empire” an empire was largely left unsaid.  It 
was expansive, it was centrally organized, and it was ruled by someone whom we refer to 
as an emperor.  But what was imperial about the Chinese empire was assumed far more 
often than explicated.  This can partially be attributed to the forces of nationalism that in 
pursuit of their nation-building enterprise, in the words of Peter Perdue, have found it 
necessary. to “erase empire.”16  In the process, they have helped to reify the “Changeless 
China” paradigm that seemed to help explain Chinese backwardness and inability to be 
national while at the same time occluding empire behind a façade of Confucian 
normative behavior and dynastic cycles.  However, even scholars (generally of other 
parts of the world) who have otherwise conducted exacting and nuanced studies of 
empire have frequently treated China as an unchanging exemplar of a certain type of 
empire— often comparing the Han Dynasty (2206 BCE-220AD) with the somewhat 
                                                
15 Lucian W. Pye, "How China's Nationalism Was Shanghaied," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 
no. 29 (1993).  Peter C. Perdue, "Where Do Incorrect Political Ideas Come From?  Writing History of the 
Qing Empire and the Chinese Nation," in The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China, ed. 
Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 188. 
 
16 Peter C. Perdue, "Erasing Empire, Re-Racing the Nation: Racialism and Culturalism in Imperial China," 
in Imperial Formations, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (Santa Fe, NM: 
School for Advanced Research Press, 2007). See also Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Nationality and Difference 
in China: The Post-Imperial Dilemma," in The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State : Japan and China, 
ed. Joshua A. Fogel, Encounters with Asia; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 229-
230; and Joseph W. Esherick, "How the Qing Became China," in Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives 
on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayah, and Eric Van Young (Lanham, 





cotemporaneous Roman Empire and then rarely revisiting “China” to see if the 
description still fits their definition of empire, and if so in what ways.17  
Thankfully, in recent decades historians have largely jettisoned static and insular 
models of Chinese history.18  In the process, they have also begun to locate the imperial 
in imperial China.  This is particularly the case for studies of the Manchu-led Qing 
Empire (1636/1644-1912).  Rather than viewing the Qing as the last dynasty in China’s 
more than two millennia of imperial history, practitioners of what has been referred to as 
“new Qing studies” approach the Qing as a composite, multi-ethnic empire led by a 
Manchu royal house operating under its own cosmological conceptions of sovereignty 
and identity and positioned in the larger world of early modern Eurasia.19  In particular, 
scholars have begun to pay close attention to the non-Han Chinese segments of the 
                                                
17 Recent examples include Lieven; Charles Tilly, "How Empires End," in After Empire : Multiethnic 
Societies and Nation-Building : The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, ed. 
Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and Alexander J. Motyl, 
Imperial Ends : The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001). 
 
18 This movement was most clearly announced in Paul Cohen’s 1984 state of the field survey Discovering 
History in China in which the author exhorted historians to reject western-determined paradigms and 
instead create a “China-centered History of China.” Cohen was reacting against a once hegemonic 
historiography led by proponents of modernization theory that had long presented China’s pre-“western-
impact” past as cyclical, hermetic, homogeneous and essentially changeless. Paul A. Cohen, Discovering 
History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984). 
 
19 Foundational works in this Manchu turn include Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror : History 
and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Mark C. Elliott, 
The Manchu Way ; the Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001); James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass : Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing 
Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, The 
Last Emperors : A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998). See also the edited volume by Millward et al and Rawski’s important 1996 “Presidential Address” 
to the Association of Asian Studies in which, echoing Cohen’s call for a “China-centered approach,” she 
urged her cohort to take a “Manchu-centered perspective […] in reassessing the Qing Empire.”  Evelyn 
Sakakida Rawski, "Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," The 
Journal of Asian Studies 55 (1996) 833. David Farquhar’s 1978 article, “Emperor as Boddhisattvah in the 
Governance of the Ch’ing Empire,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 38, no. 1 (1978), is often cited as 





empire and the Qing’s recognition, toleration, manipulation, and “simultaneous” 
dominion over vast, diverse and largely discreet sets of ethnocultural “constituencies.”20  
As such, these scholars have begun to rediscover what in fact made the Qing Empire an 
empire. 
 The meaning of empire is hardly stable or universal.  However, the definition 
most cited in recent scholarship is probably the one favored by Michael Doyle.  Doyle 
writes, “Empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies 
over the effective sovereignty of other political societies.”21  While Doyle’s definition is 
useful, at times it seems both too broad and too restricting.  On the one hand, Doyle’s 
formula is so expansive that one wonder if all forms of domination by one “political 
society” over another are indicators of empire.  Even Doyle’s caveat that empires 
“include more than just annexed territories, but they encompass less than the sum of all 
forms of international inequality,” still leaves us with a wide range of possibilities.22  On 
the other hand, Doyle’s emphasis on “effective control” suggests that the imperial center 
(often referred to as the metropole) is able to dominate imperial possessions (often 
referred to as peripheries) to a degree that I will argue is not an intrinsic constituent of 
imperial formations.   
Nearly all writers on the subject, including Doyle, agree that the exercise of 
empire involves both coercion and cooption.  The question, therefore, seems to lie in 
                                                
20 Crossley, Translucent Mirror, 38. 
 
21 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 19.  Emphasis added. 
 
22 Ibid., 19, 45. Doyle does not contend that effective control is achieved by military force alone. Instead, 






determining what type of control is “effective.”  Doyle, who is mainly interested in the 
noncontiguous European colonial empires of the early-modern and modern periods, 
comes from a long line of theorists for whom empire, and its extension imperialism, is 
inseparably marked by military, economic and/or social domination and exploitation.23  
He writes, “employ[ing] a range of rewards and punishments,” “the agents of empire 
shape, formally or informally, the political life of the subordinate periphery.  Those 
agents control both the domestic and the foreign issues that affect the populations subject 
to imperial rule. […] They control effective sovereignty.”24  Citing Doyle, Ronald Suny 
states this more simply, “I consider empire to be a particular form of domination or 
control, […] more precisely a composite state in which a metropole dominates a 
periphery to the disadvantage of the periphery.”25 
                                                
23 Lieven, 25.  Doyle and many others define imperialism as “the process of establishing and maintaining 
empire” (19).  However, particularly in the hands of Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars imperialism came to 
represent economic domination, with or without direct political control. More recently, influenced by 
Edward Said’s Orientalism and similar texts, scholars have tended to focus on the impact of western 
imperialism in the cultural and discursive spheres.  Finally, following the work of post-Marxist scholars 
Micahel Hardt and Antonio Negri, a school of though has come to see the new order brought on by 
gobalization as a form of de-territorialized empire in which markets, international oranizations and 
transnational entities form a new basis of imperialism. Thus, imperialism has come to have a life even 
without empire.  Carol McGranahan is not alone in taking this to its logical extent, declaring that 
imperialism “connotes the direct or indirect external influence, control or domination by one polity and 
people over another.” Carole McGranahan, "Empire out of Bounds: Tibet in the Era of Decolonization," in 
Imperial Formations, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Perdue Peter C. (Santa Fe, NM: 
School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 175 (Italics added).  On the evolving meanings of 
imperialism, see Lieven, 17-25; Charles S. Maier, Among Empires : American Ascendancy and Its 
Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 48-59. 
 
24 Doyle, 45. On Doyle’s concept of “effective sovereignty,” see 30-34.  Using the Roman Empire as one 
of several historical examples, Doyle quotes William Harris who says of Rome’s conception of empire, 
“they usually thought of it not as being the area covered formally by annexed provinces, but rather as 
consisting of all the places over which Rome exercised power.”  Leaving aside for the moment whether or 
not a state’s concept of itself as or as not an empire is immediately relevant, the question remains the 
degree to which power needs to be exercised for it to be considered part of the empire. 
 
25 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union," in Lessons of Empire : 
Imperial Histories and American Power, ed. Craig J. Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore 





However, within recent scholarship on empire there has emerged a branch that 
argues against formulas that define empire primarily in terms of relationships of 
domination.  Instead, this literature “stresses the limits of imperial power, the 
compromises with local and regional systems of authority, and commercial networks 
upon which imperial stability depends.”26  In this study I follow theorists such as Charles 
Tilly and Karen Barkey who understand empire not as the “effective control over the 
sovereignty of another political society,” but in terms defined by the reciprocal 
relationship between imperial elites and the elites of multiple, distinct peripheral 
polities.27  From this perspective, Tilly provides perhaps the most useful definition of 
empire.  He writes,  
An empire is a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect 
rule.  The central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each major 
segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates two major elements of indirect rule: 
(1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the government 
of each segment; and (2) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy 
considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of 
compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center.28   
 
Importantly, as Tilly notes, empires do not rule subordinate societies directly but instead 
rely on the mediation of intermediaries, often local elites who “use existing practices, 
                                                
26 Craig J. Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, "Introduction," in Lessons of Empire : 
Imperial Histories and American Power, ed. Craig J. Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore 
(New York: New Press, 2006), 1.  
 
27 Alexander Motyl also defines empire in this manner.  However, he is both more structuralist than either 
Tilly or Barkey and the one most concerned with explaining not the successes of empire but their inevitable 
collapse.  
 





understandings and relationships to extract the requisite minimum tribute, military 
support, and loyalty for the center’s benefit.”29  Within this framework, Barkey explains,  
[…] the imperial state does not have complete monopoly of power in the territory 
under its control.  It shares control with a variety of intermediate organizations 
and with local elites, religious and local governing bodies, and numerous other 
privileged institutions.  To rule over vast expanses of territory, as well as ensure 
military and administrative cooperation, imperial states negotiate and willingly 
relinquish some degree of autonomy.30 
 
Noticeably, coercion is not absent from this formula.  After all, empire is predicated on 
unequal and hierarchical political relationships.  Both Tilly and Barkey acknowledge that 
empires generally expand through the military conquest of existing polities.  Yet rather 
than domination, they identify flexibility and internal variance— each itself a product of 
the uneven absorption of imperial domains— to be central components of imperial 
formations.  Barkey therefore refers to empire as a “‘negotiated’ enterprise where the 
basic configuration of relationships between imperial authorities and peripheries is 
constructed piece meal, creating a patchwork pattern of relations with structural holes 
between peripheries.”31  
In stark contrast to Doyle who speaks of empire as a point on a spectrum of 
“differing weights of power,”32 Tilly asserts,  
                                                
29 Ibid., 4.  
 
30 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 10. Italics added. 
 
31 Ibid., 1. See also Perdue, “Empire and Nation,” 285-286; Maier, 31. 
 
32 Doyle, 42. Doyle situates empire on the far end of a continuum that ranges from diplomacy, 
interdependence, dependence, sphere of influence and finally empire. Doyle contrasts empire with 
hegemony, which in his definition indicates control over “foreign policy” but not “domestic policy”—
which, oddly enough, is not unlike the “suzerainty” China was said to have been granted over Central Tibet 
by the Simla Convention of 1913, nor the letter (if not necessarily the reality) of the relationship between 
the Dalai Lama’s regime and the Chinese Communist Party as outlined in 1951’s “Seventeen-point 




Empire has proved to be a recurrent, flexible form of large-scale rule for two 
closely related reasons: because it holds together disparate smaller-scale units 
without requiring much centrally-controlled internal transformation, and because 
it pumps resources to rulers without costly monitoring and repression.33 
   
In such a system, the metropole does not necessarily dominate “to the disadvantage of the 
periphery,” as Suny argues.  Instead, at least in the case of more enduring empires, to 
varying degrees both the imperial center and peripheral elites can be beneficiaries of 
empire.  This might occur through the actual accumulation of resources (those sent 
upward as taxes and tribute and/or downward as rewards and bribes), military support for 
the center and protection for the peripheral polity, or through the exchange of titles and 
ritual practices that recognize and reinforce both the universal sovereign and local 
authority.  In their own recent study of empire, Jane Burbank and Frederic Cooper note, 
“Violence and day-to-day coercion were fundamental to how empires were built and how 
they operated.  But as successful empires turned their conquests into profit, they had to 
manage their unlike populations, in the process producing a variety of ways to both 
exploit and rule.”34  I would argue that Burbank and Cooper’s “profit” should not be 
thought of simply in terms of resource extraction.  Instead, imperial centers might benefit 
in multiple ways, from military collaboration to the awe and majesty that comes with 
receiving professions of loyalty from disparate peoples and polities over a vast 
                                                                                                                                            
Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon : China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997). 
 
33 Tilly, 4. 
 
34 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History : Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.  See also Anthony Pagden, "Imperialism, Liberalism and 
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geography.35  In this framework, the actual ability to exert direct influence over an 
imperial segment might at times be secondary to the appearance of compliance.  
 Whether demanding “effective control,” or as with Tilly and Barkey allowing for 
the exercise of considerable local autonomy, most agree that empire is by definition 
dependent on the maintenance of differentiated and unequal segments.36  Particularly in 
the European maritime empires, this might mean a “binary split into colonized and 
colonizer.”  However, this “European colonial framework” is only one subset of empire.  
More often, “an empire could be an assemblage of peoples, practicing their own religions 
and administering justice in their own ways, all subordinated to an imperial sovereign.”37 
Barkey writes, “this is why, first and foremost, we need to conceptualize empire in terms 
of one center with many differing political authority relationships between the center and 
the pieces of the imperial domain.”38  Ideally, these “assemblages” are vertically 
integrated through “distinct compacts,” not horizontally connected to the other imperial 
                                                
35 For example, Robert Crews argues that the relationship between the Tsarist state and its diverse Muslim 
population was not always or even primarily antagonistic.  Instead, it was mutually reinforcing as Muslims 
relied on the state to regulate social and religious life among and within Muslim communities. Taking 
empire, or in this case “emperorship,” even a step further from a preoccupation with domination, Pamela 
Crossley writes of the Manchu Qing, “The cultural orientation of most (not all) individuals in facing the 
emperorship was of little importance.  All that mattered was that emperorship was affirmed to be good, that 
the emperor was a unique point of integration between the present and the past, between the supernatural 
powers and the human world, and among the varieties of culture within the realm.”  Robert D. Crews, 
"Islamic Law, Imperial Order: Muslims, Jews, and the Russian State," Ab Imperio, no. 3 (2004); and 
Crossley, “Nationality and Difference” 140. 
 
36 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 10; Esherick, Kayah and Van Young, 6-7; Suny, “Empire” 25 and 
“Lessons” 73; Alexander J. Motyl, "Thinking About Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building : 
The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires," in After Empire ed. Mark Von Hagen 
and Karen Barkey (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 20-21; Ann Laura Stoler and Carole 
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Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 11. 
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segments.  Empire is therefore often visualized as a “hub-and-spoke network” in which 
each segment is connected to the imperial center but not each other.39  As a result, 
normatively speaking no “imperial society” is possible except where elites from multiple 
segments participate in the institutions and practices of the imperial center.40  Barkey 
continues, 
Empires, then, are complex formations that do not form one “national” 
community, but rather multiple networks of interaction, different communities 
with varying institutions and state-domain compacts.  This is what empires strived 
for— they governed over diversity by creating conditions whereby differentially 
incorporated communities remained separate in their development.41   
 
Tilly adds that it is precisely the segmented nature of empire that allows for rapid 
imperial expansion, “because it combines military conquest with political co-option, 
absorbing existing systems of rule into webs of tribute and military alliance. […] By the 
same token, however, empires can collapse spectacularly.”42 
The hub-and-spoke model is perhaps most neatly exhibited by the Ottoman’s 
millet system in which the empire’s population was administratively organized around 
“ethnoreligious distinctions.”43  However, difference can be maintained without such a 
                                                
39 Ibid., 9-10. See also Crossley, “Nationality and Difference,” 12, 38; Esherick, Kayah, and Van Young, 
7-8; Miles Kahler, "Empires, Neo-Empires, and Political Change: The British and French Experience," in 
The End of Empire? : The Transformation of the Ussr in Comparative Perspective, ed. Karen Dawisha and 
Bruce Parrott (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 287. 
 
40 For example, see Philippe Forêt on the Qing’s Inner Asian capital of Chengde. Philippe Forêt, Mapping 
Chengde : The Qing Landscape Enterprise (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000). 
 
41 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 11. 
 
42 Tilly, 4. 
 
43 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 12. See also Barkey, “Changing Modalities of Empire.” For a collection 
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formalized structure.  Burbank argues that by distributing differentiated privileges and 
legal rights to its various segments, “The tsarist state kept control of a polity containing 
extraordinary degrees of cultural difference without creating comprehensive 
classifications coherently organized around religion, ethnicity, territory, or language.”44  
The Qing Empire attempted to maintain difference through a variety of strategies, 
including physical separation, differing legal and administrative codes, and by applying 
different symbols and rituals of rulership to its various ethnocultural communities.  
Pamela Crossley thus employs the hub-and-spoke metaphor to illustrate what she refers 
to as Qing “simultaneity,” its simultaneous dominion over varied, distinct 
“constituencies” under the universal institution of the emperor.45   
The enforcement of difference however should not be confused with a 
commitment to equality.  Instead, as with the Ottoman, Russian and Qing examples, 
difference was often predicated on legal distinctions that disadvantaged certain segments 
                                                
44 In Stoler and McGranahan, 23.  The authors are paraphrasing Burbank’s argument from the same 
volume.  See Jane Burbank, "The Rights of Difference: Laws and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," in 
Imperial Formations, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (Santa Fe, NM: 
School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), especially 82-83. 
 
45 Crossley, Translucent Mirror, 12, 38.  While the hub-and-spoke model is useful, it should be noted that 
the Qing’s various segments interacted far more than it suggests.  For example, considerable seepage 
occurred in frontier zones such as Amdo where the Qing’s imperial segments met and overlapped.  
However, this mixing was also a direct result of imperial ideology (as in the relationship between Tibetan 
Buddhism and the Qing’s Mongol population) and policy (as in state-sanctioned financial networks 
between Han traders and the Qing’s Muslims domains in what is now called Xinjiang). See Uradyn E. 
Bulag, "Going Imperial: Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism and Nationalisms in China and Inner Asia," in 
Empire to Nation : Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph  Esherick, 
Hasan  Kayali, and Eric Van Young (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 262-263; Millward, 
Beyond the Pass; Perdue, “Where do Incorrect Political Ideas Come From?” 182-183; Gray Tuttle, Tibetan 





of the empire in relation to others.46  Nor should the “politics of difference” be mistaken 
for the championing of pluralism.  As Burbank and Cooper note,  
For many empires, loyalty, not likeness, was the goal; recognition of difference—
particularly local leaders who could manage ‘their’ people—could enhance 
maintenance of order, collection of taxes or tribute, and military recruitment.  
[…].   Difference could be a fact and an opportunity, not an obsession.47   
 
Moreover, toleration of difference was only one strategy of incorporation available to 
empires.  On the other end of the spectrum were imperial ideologies and civilizing 
missions that emphasized assimilation and homogenization.48  In truth, for most empires 
the choice between policies of difference and those of acculturation was not a zero-sum 
equation.  The longevity, flexibility and variegated nature of successful empires meant 
that they might employ variations of both strategies, often simultaneously.49  This was 
certainly the case for the Qing, which in its northern and northwestern domains enforced 
policies of separation and differentiation while along its southern and southwestern 
frontiers pursued an uneven strategy of administrative standardization and acculturation 
(gaitu guiliu).50  
                                                
46 For example, see Crews and Burbank (Russia); Braude and Lewis (Ottoman); and Dorothea Heuschert, 
"Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols," The International History 
Review 20, no. 2 (1998) (Qing).  As such, in some cases revolts against the imperial center might not have 
independence as their goal but instead the accrual of certain rights and privileges enjoyed by other 
segments of the empire.  
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Thus, although empire is defined by difference this does not mean that empires 
necessarily embrace diversity as part of their imperial ideologies at all points and in all 
places.  Nonetheless, Barkey notes,  
Once the multifarious settlements between state and different communities 
diminish and stabilize, and standardized relations apply to all segments of 
imperial society, we are not talking about empire anymore, and have moved on 
toward an alternative political formation, perhaps on the way to the nation-state.51   
 
Rarely, if ever, has this level of simplification been successfully realized across the 
entirety of a former empire.  Instead, when we talk about the transformation from empire 
to nation, we are generally speaking of the breakup of the old imperial polity into some 
manifestation of its component parts, often re-imagined as the liberation of enduring and 
self-evident nations.  While there remains considerable disagreement on the exact 
genealogy of the nation, none but the most devoted nationalist would argue that nations 
represent some eternal community or primordial essence.52  What is important here, 
however, is recognizing the fundamental dissimilarities between empire— in which 
diversity, inequality and inclusion are definitive components— and the nation-state 
(whether “imagined” as an ethnic or civic nation)— which seeks to enforce uniformity, 
equality and exclusion.  Burbank and Cooper articulate this cleavage well, 
Empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power 
extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they 
incorporate new people.  The nation-state, in contrast, is based on the idea of a 
single people in a single territory constituting itself as a unique political 
community.  The nation-state proclaims the commonality of its people—even if 
the reality is more complicated—while the empire declares the non-equivalence 
of multiple populations.  Both kinds of states are incorporative—they insist that 
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people be ruled by their institutions—but the nation-state tends to homogenize 
those inside its borders and exclude those who do not belong, while the empire 
reaches outward and draws, usually coercively, peoples whose difference is made 
explicit under its rule.53 
 
Put more plainly, Suny writes, “While empire is inequitable rule of something different, 
nation-state rule is, at least in theory if not always in practice, the same for all members 
of the nation.”54   
In the many cases in which multiple nation-states have emerged (no matter how 
contested) from the ashes of empire— the Ottoman and Hapsburg being particularly oft-
cited examples— these states can define themselves against the old empire as enduring, 
self-evident nations freeing themselves from imperial shackles.  However, where 
attempts have been made to reconstitute the geographic and demographic diversity of the 
old empire as a new political community, the discursive relationship with empire is more 
complex.  Rather than running against empire, the political calculus has to be 
reconfigured in a way that obfuscates the imperial nature of the former polity.   
 
The history of the construction of the modern Chinese nation-state provides a 
useful example.  The narrative of the end of imperial China and the establishment of the 
republic is one dominated by radicals and revolutionaries who, seeped in the recently 
introduced ideas of social Darwinism and ripe with images of freeing the Chinese people 
from the Manchu yoke, espoused a racialized, irredentist and exclusivist nationalism.  
However, as in the waning years of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires, there were also 
voices from within the multi-cultural imperial elite that sought “to construct hybrid 
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notions of an empire-nation,” essentially eliminating the hub-in-spoke organization for 
horizontal integration.55  By threatening to eliminate the patchwork structure of empire in 
favor of administrative centralization and standardization, in other words making 
majorities and minorities, efforts such as the Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms (1839) and the 
Qing New Policies (1901-1908) may have “delegitimized the central state more than 
strengthened it.”56  Simply put, the narratives available to supporters of an empire-sized 
nation, with all its inherent diversity, were not as convincing or powerful as those that 
preached a more limited nationhood based on arguments of cultural commonalities.  That 
in all three cases exclusivist, racialized visions of the new nation initially won out over 
more pluralistic and inclusive ones highlights the limited resources available to those 
wishing, in Benedict Anderson’s evocative words, “[to stretch] the short, tight skin of the 
nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”57  
Chinese revolutionaries had initially appealed to ancestral commonalities that set 
an aggrieved ethnic Chinese community apart from not only the western imperialists who 
had imposed themselves so aggressively since the mid-19th century, but also other 
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inhabitants of the Qing Empire— most prominently its Manchu ruling elite.58  However, 
soon after the overthrow of the monarchy the newly established Republic of China and its 
champions began to rethink the boundaries of the new nation.  In the main, the victors of 
1911-1912 quickly shunned more narrow definitions of the Chinese nation-state and 
instead chose an expanded national discourse that included all of the lands and peoples of 
the former Qing Empire, what Joseph Esherick refers to as the “Atatürk counterfactual.”59  
However, the determination of early twentieth-century Chinese nation builders to 
retain/reclaim the boundaries of the defunct empire created a near-irreconcilable 
contradiction.  Crossley writes,  
Successive Chinese republics were forced to deal with a state rhetoric that in one 
form or another founded itself on an ideology of heritable Chinese identity.  […]  
this policy narrowed— in comparison to what had been available in Qing times—
the rhetoric that could be used in claiming dominion by the Chinese republics.60   
 
                                                
58 It should be noted that the modern Han ethnicity/nationality was itself still in the relatively early stages 
of formation.  See for example the essays in Thomas S. Mullaney et al., eds., Critical Han Studies : The 
History, Representation, and Identity of China's Majority, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). 
 
59 Esherick “How the Qing became China,” 243, 247-252; Crossley, “Nationality and Difference,” 145-
148; William C. Kirby, "When Did China Become China? Thoughts on the Twentieth Century," in The 
Teleology of the Modern Nation-State : Japan and China;, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005). The reasons for this reversal were multiple but an important consideration was 
the justifiable fear of the encroachment of European and Japanese imperialism into the former dominions of 
the Qing.  See Esherick’s article for a summary of the changing face of late-Qing and Republican-era 
nationalism and nation building.  For more in depth treatments see Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race 
in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the 
Nation : Questioning Narratives of Modern China, Pbk. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
John Fitzgerald, Awakening China : Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996); Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen : Political 
Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); James Leibold, 
Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism : How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes Became Chinese (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mullaney et al; Rhodes etc. 
 
60 Crossley, “Nationality and Difference,” 230.  Rhetoric aside, Leibold adds, “the perception of who was 
Han or could become Han was built on a set of inherited cultural practices and institutions, which while 
flexibly interpreted were limited by social reality.”  In "Searching for the Han: Early Twentieth-Century 
Narratives of Chinese Origins and Development," in Critical Han Studies : The History, Representation, 






In order to explain the new multinational nation, empire had to be erased, most often by 
invoking culturalist and racialist arguments to explain a multiethnic/multicultural Chinese 
nation as something other than the legacy of empire, especially a Manchu empire.61  
However, Esherick notes that during the Republican period (1912-1927), 
The mantra of the ‘five races as one family’ was endlessly repeated, but nobody 
really tried to demonstrate why they constituted a single family; nobody was able 
to show—especially show to the satisfaction of the Tibetans and Mongols—why 
they constituted one nation.62   
 
As far as many (but not all) Mongol and Tibetan elites were concerned, the imperial 
compact made with the Manchu Qing rulers had been severed.  Seeing little stake for 
themselves as minorities in a Chinese-dominated nation (and influenced themselves by 
the stirrings of nationalism), both “Central Tibet” of the 13th Dalai Lama and “Outer 
Mongolia” of the Jebtsundampa Khutughtu quickly proclaimed themselves independent 
of the new republic. 
Gray Tuttle argues that with appeals to nationalism and racial unity having proven 
largely unsuccessful, during the Republican and Nationalist (1927-1949) period, for some 
“Buddhist culture became the glue that could reconnect parts of the Qing empire that had 
disintegrated under the secularly conceived Chinese Republic.”63  In some cases this 
entailed reestablishing imperial-style patronage of Tibetan Buddhist institutions, one 
manifestation of what Uradyn Bulag has alternately referred to as “going imperial” and 
“subimperialism.”  Bulag describes subimperialism as “tapping into the heritage of the 
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former empire’s techniques of rule in the service of nationalism.”64  In other words, 
despite otherwise dedication to the modernizing, secularizing and homogenizing tenants 
of the nation-state, against the powerfully centrifugal forces that threatened to dismantle 
the corpus of the old empire, Chinese state and nation builders were often forced to rely 
on imperial-style strategies to rule over an unwieldy and inchoate post-imperial polity.  
For example, although often derided as a megalomaniacal dream, Peter Zarrow has 
insightfully suggested that President Yuan Shikai’s 1916 attempt to elevate himself to the 
position of Emperor of China was part of a search for “immediately useful techniques of 
rule.”65  Within non-Han territories of the old empire, James Leibold writes, “the GMD 
adopted a pragmatic yet inherently conservative frontier policy rooted in the language 
and administration of the Qing court.”66  These subimperial strategies included granting 
imperial-era titles, financial and political support for religious institutions, maintenance 
of administrative distinction, and indirect rule through local elites.  Noting how these 
imperial-style practices violate the very foundational fabric of the nation, Bulag declares,  
“The repeated turns to the imperial heritage for the nationalist project thus points to the 
profound inadequacy of nationalism as an appeal to different ethnic groups with 
conflicting aspirations.”67   
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When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, it quickly made it 
known that it too considered the near-entirety of the Qing’s geographic and demographic 
expanse to be inseparable parts of the new, socialist nation.68  The challenge, therefore, 
was similar to that of its predecessors; how to transform a diverse, differentiated imperial 
formation into a unified, singular nation-state.  However, the Communist Party had 
resources unavailable to the Nationalists, most noticeably administrative, organizational 
and coercive capacities that would have been the envy of Chiang Kaishek.  As important, 
the CCP had a transformative ideology that at least on paper lent itself more readily to 
inclusivity than did the Nationalists’ appeals to racial and (less often) civic nationalism.  
It has been argued that among Chinese elites and intellectuals Communism owed its 
appeal to its “universalistic similarities to Confucianism.”69  However, in practice this 
transformative project was not packaged within a discourse of socialist universalism.  
After all, the borders of the new state conspicuously ended at the boundaries of the old 
empire.  There was no suggestion that anyone and everyone could be part of the new 
socialist nation.  Instead, declaring that the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu) was the 
“collective creation” of “all of China’s nationalities,” the Party welded and wielded a 
narrative of national unity that was based on essentialized ideas of ethnocultural 
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distinction.70  However, in contrast to the prominent discourses employed by previous 
regimes, the CCP claimed that this unity was the result not of assimilation but of 
“reciprocal amalgamation between nationalities,” “an unavoidable and progressive 
phenomenon.”71  Admittedly, this unity had been damaged by the persistent existence of 
what borrowing from the Soviets the CCP termed “Great Han Chauvinism” (danhanzu 
zhuyi).  Like its counterpart “Great Russian Chauvinism,” Party leaders argued that the 
dominant nationality had exploited less advanced peoples, retarding their social and 
economic development and creating animosity between the nationalities.  Importantly, 
however, only in the Chinese case was great power chauvinism considered to have 
disrupted a preexisting multinational unity.  Unlike the tsarist state, imperial China was 
not a prisonhouse of nations, but instead “had a long history of a unified state (sic).”72  
Membership in the multinational People’s Republic of China was therefore both innate 
and extant, although at the time of Liberation, often unrealized.   
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In this sense, the PRC’s nation-building project was no different than other 
nation-building efforts, an attempt to awaken people to the knowledge that they have 
always been members of a historic, horizontal community.  And like its predecessors, the 
CCP’s minzu (nationality) paradigm of a multinational, unitary nation-state made up of 
(eventually) fifty-six distinct nationalities fundamentally entailed erasing empire.  Rather 
than functioning as the necessary linkages that help define imperial formations, relations 
between the imperial center and local elites were therefore reinterpreted as markers of an 
historical national unity.  Although the nation-state has been identified as the political 
expression of modernity, pre-modern institutions and strategies recast as markers of a 
primordial national essence are often harnessed as symbols of the unbroken and enduring 
nation.  This “aporia” creates what Prasenjit Duara refers to as “bifurcation,” the 
transmission of the past through historical narratives and language that appropriate 
otherwise dispersed histories according to the present needs of the nation-state.73  The 
modern Chinese state has therefore relied on adulterated imperial notions of authority, 
legitimacy and sovereignty to make its claims to being a multiethnic community.  Under 
the CCP this appropriation would be formalized under the moniker “the United Front.”  
 
The United Front between Empire and Nation 
Tilly reminds us that empires generally expand through “the military conquest of 
existing polities, aided by the collaboration (however coerced) of local power-holders 
who retain substantial discretion in their jurisdictions.”74  By the same token, more often 
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than not the end of empire involves the resistance of those same indigenous elites who 
previously had acted as agents of the imperial center.  Even if not elucidated in these 
terms, the Chinese Communist Party implicitly understood and was determined to alter 
these dynamics of empire.  While appropriating the geographic and demographic legacy 
of the Qing, the Party was intent on a different end of empire.  This one was to culminate 
not in disintegration, but in the transformation from empire to nation.   
In its broadest definition the United Front was the theoretical justification and 
bureaucratic method for bringing non-Party and non-proletarian elements into the 
political process and thus defining them (at least for the time being) as allies rather than 
enemies of the Party and the People.  In China, the United Front stretches back nearly to 
the birth of the CCP.  Famously, Lenin had argued that the revolutionary fervor of the 
proletariat in the industrialized, western nations had been dampened by the influx of 
“super profits” that monopoly capitalism earned through the exploitation of the colonial 
and semi-colonial world.  For Lenin and his supporters, the solution was to disrupt the 
flow of these profits (and therefore the ability of the monopoly capitalists to buy off 
segments of the working class) by encouraging national liberation movements.  Lacking 
proletarian bases of their own, Lenin determined that in the colonial world Communist 
Parties should unite with the most progressive, anti-imperialist, bourgeois forces.75  
Famously, under the direction of Stalin and the Communist International, in 1923 the 
nascent Chinese Communist Party formed a United Front with Sun Yatsen’s newly 
reconstituted Guomindang.  Four years later, the always-uneasy alliance ended 
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disastrously for the CCP when Sun’s successor Chiang Kaishek violently purged the 
nationalist movement of leftist and Communist elements. 
From these darkest days at the brink of annihilation, the Communist Party would 
reemerge, and with it the concept of the United Front.  Over the following three decades, 
according to Lyman Van Slyke’s pioneering work, the United Front developed “from 
tactic to strategy to ideology.”76  And to this might be added a bureaucratic institution, 
the Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD).  Van Slyke argues that from a 
purely administrative standpoint the United Front was not a necessity in post-Liberation 
China.  Instead, it was the United Front’s explanatory power to transform Maoist 
understandings of class relations into a bureaucratic framework that made it 
indispensable.  For example, Van Slyke notes that Mao’s theory of contradictions, which 
distinguished contradictions with the enemy (deemed antagonistic) from those among the 
people, necessitated a bureaucratic mechanism be maintained through which the latter 
could be resolved non-antagonistically.77  In other words, the United Front had become 
fundamental to the framework within which the CCP understood its own relationship to 
society beyond its core constituencies. 
Van Slyke’s study is particularly notable for treating the United Front not just as a 
tactic for winning the civil war, but also as a vital component of post-1949 state building, 
“its function […] changing from the isolation of the enemy to the integration of the 
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people in support of the new regime.”78  However, he is mainly concerned with non-Party 
intellectuals, in particular the so-called “bourgeois democratic parties” that had existed 
prior to Liberation and that after 1949 were allowed to continue as minor partners in a 
United Front with the CCP.  Noticeably absent is a discussion of the other main target of 
the United Front, the non-Han peoples that made up only a small fraction of the new 
state’s population but inhabited more than half of its territory.  In an early monograph on 
PRC minority policy, June Dreyer summarizes the rationale for the United Front and the 
place of minority peoples within it.  Dreyer writes, 
Initially, the leadership considered that a transitional, or democratic, stage 
of the revolution would have to be completed before China could progress to 
socialist revolution and finally enter a period of true communism.  During the 
transitional period, those of differing political backgrounds could join in a united 
front against the major enemy of the period, imperialism.  Minority groups were 
considered part of the united front, with the distinction that since they were in 
general more backward than other components, it was anticipated that they would 
remain in the transitional period for a longer time.  In this interim stage the 
administrative skills of a “patriotic upper strata” drawn from the traditional 
minorities elite could be tolerated while a successor generation of properly 
proletarian background was trained.79 
 
What Dreyer is essentially describing is a subimperial strategy of nation building.  
Through the United Front, the Chinese Communist Party not only recognized 
administrative and legal distinction via the establishment of nationality autonomous 
regions but also employed pre-Liberation elites as intermediaries between the Party-state 
and non-Han populations.   
Importantly, it was determined that because of the lingering effects of Han 
chauvinism and the concomitant social and economic backwardness of most minority 
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nationalities, the nationality question would have to be resolved before socialist 
transformation could begin.  In other words, national enmity and discrimination would 
have to be replaced by national unity and equality.  In Amdo, the cumulative effect was 
that the Tibetan nationality en masse was considered to be the victim of national 
oppression, essentially designating internal class divisions as non-antagonistic.  The 
pastoral regions of Amdo, which were considered particularly undeveloped, were 
therefore exempted from the nation-wide political campaigns of the early-Liberation 
period and class struggle was explicitly eschewed in favor of a broad-based inclusivity.  
In fact, there was little initial talk of class-consciousness, a more limited and exclusive 
community that would deny membership to the upper strata.  Instead, effectively defined 
as victims rather than agents of oppression, indigenous Tibetan elites—often the same 
people who had served as local intermediaries under the Guomindang and its allies—
were made leaders of newly established nationality autonomous governments where they 
would continue to form both a filter and a conduit between the masses and the state.  
Thus, the Party’s United Front strategy effectively re-institutionalized the hybrid space 
between empire and nation that had developed since the fall of the Qing Empire. 
However, the United Front was not simply a strategy for managing difference. It 
was considered a transformative methodology of state and nation building, one that was 
fully theorized and integrated into the Party’s own work practices and bureaucratic 
philosophies.  By promoting national equality and economic development within 
designated nationality autonomous areas, minority nationalities would become “masters 
of their own homes” (dangjia weizhu).  At the same time, their “patriotic consciousness” 




nation.  Eventually, “in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its people and of 
the local leaders,” each nationality would make the full transition to socialism.80  These 
mechanics of national rapprochement and transformation operated through a dialectical 
relationship between what in Zeku was often referred to as “consultation” (xieshang) and 
“persuasion” (shuofu).  Just as Mao preached that Marxism could not be dogmatically 
applied to the unique historical circumstances and consciousness of the Chinese 
masses—the so-called “sinification of Marxism”—the Party instructed its cadres to 
proceed from the “special characteristics and concrete conditions” of each nationality 
area.  In fact, students of modern China will recognize an approach that falls squarely 
within the rubric of the famous “mass line.”  The mass line is most often thought of as a 
mechanism for raising the class-consciousness of the Han Chinese peasantry and their 
solidarity with the Party.  Arlif Dirlik adds, that it “was intended to achieve leadership 
rather than domination of the masses.”81  Similar in both rationale and methodology, the 
object of the United Front was not simply domination, but to raise national and patriotic 
consciousness and lead the Tibetans of the South Qinghai Plateau and other minority 
nationalities on a gradual and voluntary path toward national unity and socialist 
transformation.   
Yet, as with the broader mass line, there is little doubt that power relationships 
between the Party and their United Front targets, whether Chinese intellectuals or Tibetan 
headmen, were highly unequal and often coercive.  In fact, despite the United Front 
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tenets of gradualism and voluntarism, national minorities were often under the twin 
pressures of Han chauvinism and revolutionary impatience.  Even while trumpeting its 
dedication to national equality, the Party has consistently considered the Han to be 
China’s most developed nationality, without whose active aid the other nationalities 
could not develop socially or economically.82  Thus even while repeatedly railing against 
Han chauvinism, Bulag writes, “communist ideology mystified and justified Chinese 
national ambition with regard to ethnic minorities.”83  
Nonetheless, the United Front should not be confused for an expedient ruse nor a 
cynical abandonment of the ideals of the Chinese Communist Party.  Instead, as Van 
Slyke argues, by the 1950s “The united-front approach had become an almost instinctive 
element of the Party’s mentality.”84  In fact, among the more remarkable and immediately 
noticeable characteristics of the materials from Zeku County is the earnestness, 
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dedication, and often frustration evident in the Party’s own internal communications 
regarding its role as an institution of both state and nation building.  Borrowing from 
Doyle, ruling over Amdo was not simply a matter of obtaining “effective control” 
because control was not the sole objective.  The Party’s goal in Amdo was not just one of 
state building but also of nation building.  The former arguably could have been 
accomplished primarily through force.  However, as the Party itself would admit, the 
latter was dependent on the deployment of what might be called soft power, a campaign 
for the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people.  Speaking of the multiethnic imaginings 
of the Soviet state, Francine Hirsch writes, “The Bolsheviks did not wish to just establish 
control over the peoples of the former Russian Empire; they set out to bring those people 
into the revolution and secure their active involvement in the great socialist 
experiment.”85  This focus on voluntarism was also central to the Chinese Communist 
project in Zeku, where physical control was a necessary precondition to the realization of 
a grander formula for national unity.  To put it another way, the Party was deeply 
concerned with legitimacy.  However, this was not because it feared or questioned its 
own legitimacy, but quite the opposite, because it was sure that it was the legitimate 
representative of the new nation, a nation that included the pastoral, Tibetan regions of 
the South Qinghai Plateau.  In other words, United Front work was fundamental to the 
manner in which the Party understood its own presence and legitimacy in places like 
Amdo and as such set and reflects its institutional values and practices of sovereignty. 
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Amdo and the Writing of PRC History  
Despite the prominent place specific empires play in competing Chinese and 
Tibetan national discourses on the historical (and therefore current) status of Tibet, 
empire itself is rarely considered beyond Doyle-esque questions of effective control.  
Nowhere is this more plainly evident than in the state-sponsored history penned by Wang 
Jiawei and Nyima Giancain.  Aptly entitled, The Historical Status of Tibet, the authors 
assert, “Tibet was officially incorporated into the Chinese nation” during the Mongol 
Yuan Dynasty (13th-14th Centuries), “a dynasty that featured unprecedented national 
unity.”86  Empire is thus explicitly omitted through the claim that the Mongol Yuan was 
simply one in a string of dynasties that form an unbroken thread in the common history of 
the multinational nation.87     
The counterargument raised by supporters of Tibetan independence is only 
slightly less problematic.  While noting that what we think of as Tibet and China were 
both part of a Mongol empire, empire is engaged only to the point that the Chinese 
national narrative is disrupted by demonstrating the absence of effective sovereignty.  
Instead of a serious investigation of empire, the paradigm of the priest-patron relationship 
(chö-yön) in which the emperor held secular power and the Tibetan lama spiritual 
authority is regularly employed.  Tibetan Buddhism and the priest-patron relationship 
were clearly central and enduring components in imperial relationships between China-
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based empires and Tibetan and Mongol polities. However, just as the Chinese nation-
building project has found it necessary to erase empire, in insisting on an equivalency the 
patron-priest relationship has been appropriated within Tibetan nationalist narratives as a 
mechanism through which to assert Tibet’s enduring national sovereignty. 
Simultaneously an idea of a historical Tibetan polity that mirrors contemporary claims to 
an occupied Tibet is reified.88  This slippage can seep into scholarly work on both Tibet’s 
past and present.  For example, in a sophisticated and thought provoking essay in which 
Carol McGranahan explores Tibet’s twentieth-century experience with what she sees as 
British, Chinese and American post-colonial imperial formations— “one country, three 
empires”— she makes the surprising assertion that “While Tibet was an independent state 
for centuries, its economic, military, political and religious relations with neighbors 
China, India, Mongolia, and Nepal shifted over the years.”  Speaking of the decades 
between the fall of the Qing and the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army, she adds, 
“Tibet was an independent state until it became part of China in 1951.”89  Not only is 
empire obscured, but in the process Tibet is implicitly made into a single, sovereign, self-
evident entity that lost its independence only with its “Peaceful Liberation” by 
Communist forces.  In fact, as described below, not only was Amdo almost certainly 
never part of an “independent” Tibet, including during the period of  “de facto 
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independence” that lasted from 1912-1951, Amdo itself was officially “Liberated” two 
years before PLA troops arrived in Lhasa. 
Although Tibet specialists have increasingly been drawn to the study of post-1949 
Amdo, by and large their focus has been on the ongoing and dramatic cultural, 
intellectual, economic, demographic, ecological, spiritual and political transformations 
that have washed over the region in recent decades.  Like elsewhere in China, these 
changes are often dated from the late-1970s when the Deng Xiaoping regime began 
implementing its program of “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang).  Under the pressures 
of China’s oft-cited “economic miracle,” the impact of globalization, the launch in 2000 
of the Great Western Development Campaign (xibu da kaifa), and particularly since 2008 
an increasingly tense political and ethnic environment, over the intervening decades if 
anything these pressures have intensified.  While several studies firmly contextualize 
present-day Amdo within the physical and epistemological violence of the period of high 
socialism,90 there have been no dedicated studies of the period of state and nation 
building that preceded the 1958 Amdo Rebellion.91 
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scholarship.  See for example her monograph The Violence of Liberation : Gender and Tibetan Buddhist 
Revival in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). See also the essays collected 
in the volume edited by Toni Huber, Amdo Tibetans in Transitions (2000), which to a large degree heralded 
the new interest in Amdo as a distinct subject of study.  Other examples include articles by Emily Yeh and 
Fernanda Pirie who have separately written on the consequences of the state’s overlaying of administrative 
boundaries on Amdo’s tribal pastoral regions, and Yangdon Dhondup and Hildegard Diemberger, "Tashi 
Tsering: The Last Mongol Queen of Sogpo (Henan)," Inner Asia 4, no. 2 (2002). There are likewise several 
relevant Ph.D. dissertations currently in preparation, although their focus also tends to be on contemporary 
Amdo. 
 
91 An important exception is Greg Rohlf’s work on state-sponsored agricultural settlement in Qinghai. 
Greg Rohlf, "Dreams of Oil and Fertile Fields: The Rush to Qinghai in the 1950s," Modern China 29, no. 4 
(2003). Bianca Horlemann has written an unpublished paper on the history of Golok between 1950-1970.  
David Goodman has also looked at 1950s Qinghai, but largely as background to the more recent Western 
Development Campaign. See David S. G. Goodman, "Qinghai and the Emergence of the West: 




Given the political sensitivities and difficulties in acquiring source material this 
lack of research into Amdo’s still communicative past is unsurprising.92  In fact, until 
recently the study of twentieth-century China was divided fairly rigidly into disciplinary 
domains.  Wrapped up in contemporary concerns “that needed to explain the mysterious 
and directly inaccessible revolutionary experiment that was such an important part of the 
intensifying Cold War,” Julia Strauss writes, “the People’s Republic was felt to be the 
proper concern of political scientists and sociologists, while the less politically relevant 
Republican period was ceded to historians.”93  Yet almost as soon as the Maoist period of 
high socialism ended, scholarly attention turned to the befuddling but monumental 
transformations that were occurring in the here and now of reform-era China.  As 
importantly, the post-Mao regime steadily (if at times contentiously) relegated the Maoist 
period to the past, a bygone age best left alone.94  Scholars for the most part cooperated, 
understandably drawn to issues of more “contemporary relevance.”95  Thus by the late-
1980s, now seeming more like quixotic experiments than harbingers of social revolution, 
even the viscerally dramatic events that had once fascinated outside observers such as the 
                                                                                                                                            
"The Campaign To ‘Open up the West’: National, Provincial-Level and Local Perspectives," The China 
Quarterly 178, no. 1 (2004). 
 
92 Sussanne Wiegelin-Schwiedrzik refers to communicative memory as “the memory of the 100 years 
people in their respective presents can look back on and to which the three generations that live 
simultaneously can relate with their own experiences.” Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "In Search of a 
Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History," The China Quarterly 188, no. 1 (2006): 1072. 
 
93 Julia Strauss, "Introduction: In Search of PRC History," The China Quarterly 188, no. 1 (2006): 857. 
 
94 Guobin Yang, "Days of Old Are Not Puffs of Smoke: Three Hypotheses on Collective Memories of the 
Cultural Revolution," The China Review 5, no. 2 (2005): 14. 
 
95 Strauss, 857-858; Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, "The Chinese Cultural 
Revolution as History: An Introduction," in The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History, ed. Joseph 





Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to a lesser extent the Great Leap Forward were 
left to their own devices, allowed to be framed by the state with only occasional 
interdiction by scholarly analysis or reinterpretation.96 
More recently, the “depoliticization both inside and outside of China” of the 
Maoist era has allowed historians to fill this vacated space.97  Depoliticization has not 
only led to the increased availability of materials as institutional and personal contacts 
between scholarly communities have developed, but also in new questions and 
approaches as scholars in China and abroad have increasingly freed themselves from both 
Cold War paradigms and the search for explicit “relevance to the country’s current 
evolution.”98  Historians and historically-minded social scientists have now begun to 
complicate and historicize the scholarship of earlier generations that out of both 
expediency and disciplinary dispositions tended to focus on elite politics, social groups, 
and the comparative analyses of political systems.  Benefiting from unprecedented access 
to far more localized and diversified source materials, attention is now being refocused 
on individual agencies, uneven experiences, and varying levels of accommodation 
between state and society.99   
                                                
96 There were of course exceptions.  For example, see Anita Chan’s article on Cultural Revolution 
periodization and factionalism. Anita Chan, "Dispelling Misconceptions About the Red Guard Movement: 
The Necessity to Re-Examine Cultural Revolution Factionalism and Periodization," Journal of 
Contemporary China 1, no. 1 (1992). Amidst other projects, Andrew Walder also continued to reassess 
conventional knowledge of the period. 
 
97 Strauss, 856.  
 
98 Esherick, Pickowicz and Walder, 16. 
 
99 Paul A. Cohen, "Refections on a Watershed Date: The 1949 Divide in Chinese History," in Twentieth-
Century China : New Approaches, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (New York: Routledge, 2003), 29, 33-34.  
Examples of these trends can be found in the edited volumes by Jeremy Brown and Paul Pickowicz, eds., 




This new scholarship has also begun to disrupt the standard periodizations by 
which China’s recent past has thus far been divided, most significantly the 1949 divide 
through which PRC sources neatly separate Chinese history into two dialectical 
categories: before Liberation (jiefangqian) and after Liberation (jiefanghou). 
Revolutionary rupture had also been the primary framework employed by international 
scholars to analyze twentieth-century China, often even causing historians that worked on 
pre-1949 periods to approach their subject through what Esherick refers to as a “teleology 
of revolution,” in which “all history is seen as leading up to 1949.”100  However, in 
reexamining the Maoist period, historians have begun to detect not just historical rupture 
but also important incidences of continuity, particularly between the Nationalist and 
Communist regimes.101  For example, both were intensely modernist and 
developmentalist Party-states, organized upon Leninist-principles, which employed with 
varying degrees of intensity and success a host of similar strategies in their state building 
efforts.  These included mass mobilization, central economic planning, propaganda 
regimes, politicized Party-armies, and the employment of state terror.102  More broadly, 
as Paul Cohn points out, the CCP seemed to have successfully completed the long anti-
imperialist struggle that in various guises had been a preoccupation of China’s political 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 2007); and Esherick, Pickowicz and Walder; and the special issue of The China Quarterly 
edited by Strauss (op. cit). 
 
100 Joseph W. Esherick, "Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution," in Twentieth-Century China : New 
Approaches, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (New York: Routledge, 2003) ,58-60.   
 
101 Brown and Pickowicz, 6.  See also Strauss, 855, 861-862; Esherick, “Ten Theses on the Chinese 
Revolution,” 40-41; Cohen, “Reflections on a Watershed Date,” 29-32.  William Kirby’s 1990 article on 
technocrats in Republican and Communist China is often cited as a milestone study in the reconsideration 
of the 1949-divide. William Kirby, "Continuity and Change in Modern China: Economic Planning on the 
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elite since the mid-19th century.103  A corollary that Cohen does not mention is that in the 
name of anti-imperialism and national unity the CCP reestablished the territorial integrity 
of (most) of the Qing Empire, a goal unrealized by each of the preceding Republican and 
Nationalist regimes.104 
This study hopes to both help confirm and contribute to this larger historiographic 
turn.  In Part One I explore pre-Liberation Amdo first in the context of long-term imperial 
relationships with what for lack of a better term might be referred to as “China-based” 
imperial formations and then the subimperial efforts of Ma Bufang’s “warlord” regime to 
incorporate eastern Amdo into his quasi-state.  In “crossing the 1949 divide,” the 
Communist Party’s United Front efforts in Zeku County can therefore be seen as 
something other than a case of internal imperialism, but part of a longer historical process 
by which the emerging Chinese nation-state has laid claim to the rights and legitimacies 
of its imperial predecessors. 
Part Two provides a county-level case study of the Party’s efforts to negotiate this 
transition from empire to nation.  In addition to detailing the implementation of strategies 
and policies the Chinese Communist Party deployed in its efforts to integrate an 
ethnically non-Chinese area into the Chinese nation-state, the experiences of Zeku 
County bring into question larger narratives of PRC history that for example hold certain 
dates to contain particular significance, including 1949’s Liberation, 1966’s launch of the 
Cultural Revolution, and 1978’s rise of Deng Xiaoping’s reformist leadership.  Pointedly, 
it was not until fall of 1953, a time when much of China had already begun to experience 
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the first stages of socialist transformation, that a permanent Party presence was 
established on the Zeku grasslands.  In fact, rather than a “honeymoon period” as it is 
often described, between 1949-1953 Qinghai experienced a series of large rebellions that 
were put down only through a combination of military might and subimperial 
accommodation.105  If there is a watershed moment in Zeku County and by extension 
across much of Amdo, it was almost certainly not 1949 nor 1966, but 1958 when the 
United Front was discarded, much of the pre-Liberation elite killed or incarcerated, and 
socialist transformation finally implemented.  These are not superficial differences, but 
instead are fundamental to how Amdo’s population experienced “Liberation” and, as 
importantly, how that past continues to be experienced in the context of post-Mao 
reassessments of the Maoist period.   
Although investigations of the Maoist era no longer preoccupy themselves with 
the search for contemporary relevance this of course does not mean that the Maoist 
period is irrelevant.  As explored in the conclusion, this may be particularly true in 
Tibetan and other ethnic minority regions where not only has “depoliticization” not kept 
pace with the rest of China, but the state’s narrative of national integration does a 
particularly poor job of attending to the ruptures experienced well within living 
memory.106  At least in the case of Amdo Tibetans, the United Front was ultimately 
unsuccessful in convincing the disparate populations of a fallen empire that they had 
                                                
105 On the reconsideration of the trope of a “honeymoon period” or “golden age,” see Brown and 
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106 For example, Nimrod Baranovich notes that in the post-Mao period Chinese authors have often been 
able to challenge orthodox narratives of the past.  However, “the liberal cultural policy of the post-Mao era 
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equal stake as minority members of a Chinese nation.  Despite successfully identifying 
the tensions between empire and nation, and attempting to creatively resolve them, the 
moment of crisis between the two could not be averted.  By the late 1950s, the United 
Front, which had advocated a gradual and voluntary process of nation building was 
undone by a revolutionary impatience that preached immediate national integration and 
socialist transformation.  The imperial compact between the central and peripheral elites 
was violently severed before the process of de-imperialization and nationalization had 
been completed.  The result has been the incomplete integration of Tibetan communities 
into the nation-state.  This fissure in the narrative of the nation manifested itself most 
recently in the spring of 2008 and continues to call into question the underlying integrity 





A Note on Sources 
 While there have been several studies that have with varying degrees of focus 
investigated 1950s China in ethnic minority regions, this is the first to make an in depth 
examination of state and national building at the county level.  This has been made 
possible by what I believe is unprecedented access to archival materials from a 
nationality autonomous county.  The material, totaling nearly 2500 individual folios, is 
separated into the Zeku County Communist Party Committee Archives (cited as ZCPC) 
and the Zeku County People’s Government Archives (ZCPG), each covering the years 
between the county’s establishment in fall 1953 and 1960.  Of course the primary sources 
tell a story entirely from the perspective of the Party and state.  We should not assume 
that they accurately reflect the attitudes of indigenous actors, even when quotes are 
directly attributed to local Tibetans.  Nor should it be taken for granted that the reports 
that flowed upward from the district level to the county and then to the prefecture and 
beyond, were necessarily always accurate.  Bureaucracies, in which meeting or not 
meeting the expectations of superiors often determines rewards and censures, contain 
built-in incentives for exaggeration or even fabrication.  This may have been particularly 
true in the hyper-politicized environment of Maoist China.  However, it should be kept in 
mind that these were internal reports and therefore represent the way in which local 
conditions were represented by the Party-state to the Party state.  As such, they are 
reflective of the bureaucracy’s own concerns, goals, logics and internal dynamics.   
 In addition to the archival material, I utilize on variety of secondary sources.  




has been published in China, including official (produced by Party or state agencies) and 
less-often semi-official (published by state publishing houses but not authored by an 
official entity) histories.  This development was in part a response to a series of mandates 
passed down in the 1980s that required each provincial, prefectural and county-level 
administration to produce a local gazetteer (difangzhi).  Either as part of this project or 
parallel to it, a variety of edited series on China’s recent past have also been published.  
These include the Contemporary China series (Dangdai Zhongguo) and corollary Brief 
History of Contemporary China series (Dangdai Zhongguo Jianshi), both of which 
provide post-1949 provincial-level histories; chronologies of major events (dashiji) for 
various institutions, agencies and administrative units; Communist Party organizational 
histories down to the prefectural level (zuzhishi ziliao); and the “official memoir 
literature” known as wenshi ziliao.107  Although each are produced from within a set of 
prescribed guidelines, when taken together they can provide a surprising amount of 
details, sometimes even subtly challenging orthodox narratives. 
Wenshi ziliao, or “Cultural and Historical Materials,” are perhaps a unique form 
of historical remembering, one dictated by the Chinese Communist Party’s conceived 
need to construct and reinforce a particular narrative of historical development.  
Geographically and often thematically organized collections of testimonials published in 
irregular serial editions, from their inception wenshi ziliao were intended as a means to 
break the monopoly of the bureaucratic and cultural elite in the production of history and 
memory.  Before the advent of subaltern and post-colonial studies, wenshi ziliao were an 
attempt to make the dominated classes the agents of history, albeit in a far less theorized 
                                                





manner than found in the post-modern turn.  Of course, wenshi ziliao are in no sense a 
post-modern production.  Instead the motivation was the same modernist, nation-based 
impulses that to this day define the Chinese Communist Party’s nation-building project.  
In fact, the production of wenshi ziliao began as a 1959 fiat issued by Prime Minister 
Zhou Enlai.  In that year of the celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the founding of the 
PRC, Premier Zhou asked those members of People’s Consultative Conferences over 
sixty years old to record their memories of the pre-Liberation period.108   
Although underemployed by western academics, occasionally scorned even by 
China-based scholars, and despite their obviously politicized and carefully selected 
content, as Martin Fromm points out, even from within the relatively narrow confines of 
state orthodoxy the process of “mobilizing memory” has the potential to veer outside 
official narratives, albeit usually in nuanced ways.  Fromm notes that in recalling and 
recreating the past, now in the very different political and social contexts of post-Mao 
China, wenshi ziliao can lay bare the contradictions of the reform era, “which required 
that the new leadership define itself against previous Maoist policies of radical socialism 
while re-affirming the Communist Party’s uninterrupted historical continuity as national 
liberator.”109  As discussed in the conclusion, this project was perhaps doubly 
problematic in minority regions such as Amdo where the Party had to reestablish a 
narrative of national unity without discrediting the violence by which national integration 
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Annie K. Chang, "The 'Wenshi Ziliao' Collection of the Center for Chinese Studies Library, University of 
California, Berkeley," Twentieth-Century China 26, no. 1 (2000): 104; Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese 
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was achieved.  It is unsurprising then that a number of wenshi ziliao collections from 
Tibetan regions of Qinghai, including the Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao (vol. 2), are not 
openly available but are instead published for internal consumption only (neibu).  
Therefore, in a very real sense wenshi ziliao reveal as much about the political 
atmosphere of the period in which they are produced as they do the period that they 
purport to describe.  
In a manner of speaking, wenshi ziliao were intended as a remedy for another 
remarkable Chinese tradition of local historical writing, fangzhi or difangzhi (gazetteers, 
sometimes referred to in English as annals).  Difangzhi are large, multi-authored, edited 
volumes that purport to record the histories, geographies, cultures, important figures, and 
overall character of a particular place and time.  Local gazetteer production emerged as a 
distinct genre as early as the Song Dynasty (10th-13th centuries) and reached its zenith 
during the late-imperial period.  By the end of the Qing Dynasty, more than 56,000 
gazetteers had been produced, stimulated at least in part by the imperial center’s twice 
issuing edicts requiring that each province compile gazetteers.110  These demands 
foreshadowed the post-Mao mandate that all counties and prefecture-level 
administrations produce gazetteers, a project that by 2010 seemed to be finally nearing 
completion.111  While by design modern gazetteers focus on contemporary history and in 
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documentation sur la Chine contemporaine, 1992); Timothy Brook, Geographical Source of Ming-Qing 
History (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988).   
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particular post-Liberation economic development, they follow a similar format to 
imperial-era gazetteers.  Moreover, like gazetteers of the past, these modern editions 
liberally lift data from their predecessors, thus maintaining a degree of historiographical 
and methodological continuity.112   
Regardless of the era, as Eduard Vermeer points out, “That the difangzhi should 
serve the needs of the contemporary government was never questioned: this had always 
been part of the genre, formulated as ‘beneficial to government’ (zi zheng) originally in 
the Song by Liu Wenfu.”113  Nonetheless, particularly when used in conjunction with 
wenshi ziliao and similar sources, not only can a surprising level of regional detail 
emerge, but (as I hope I demonstrate) fissures in accounts of recent Chinese history as 
represented in more coherent narratives can also begin to appear.  This is particularly 
important in a place like Zeku County, where despite a recent renewal of Amdo’s own 
indigenous traditions of local history writing, locally produced-Tibetan language histories 
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have not been produced.  I’ll just add that it is remarkable what can sometimes be found 
if you scour the book markets of Xining, Chengdu and Beijing long enough. 
 
A Note on Transliteration and Nomenclature 
There is currently no standard transliteration system for romanizing phonetic 
Amdo Tibetan.  After much consultation and internal debate, I have therefore decided to 
employ the Tibetan and Himalayan Library’s (THL) Simplified Phonetic Transcription of 
Standard Tibetan, developed under the direction of David Germano and Nicolas 
Tournadre.  As Tibetan pronunciation diverges widely from written Tibetan and 
romanization systems that accurately transcribe Tibetan spellings are often 
incomprehensible to non-Tibetan speakers, the THL system was developed to provide 
both specialists and non-specialists a uniform, readable representation of spoken Tibetan.  
However, the THL system is based on Central Tibetan pronunciation, which is 
incomprehensible to speakers of Amdo Tibetan and vice versa.  Moreover, in employing 
Central Tibetan scholars working on other parts of the Tibetan Plateau run the risk of 
further peripheralizing their subjects while reinforcing a framework of a single Tibet 
radiating outward from Lhasa.  Nonetheless, the alternatives are even less appealing.  For 
example, while perhaps more phonetically accurate, romanization systems found in 
Amdo Tibetan language textbooks such as Modern Oral Amdo Tibetan by Kalsang Norbu 
et al. and Colloquial Amdo Tibetan by Kuo-ming Sung and Lha Byams Rgyal are too 
complex to render them useful to the non-specialist.114  I therefore employ THL’s 
Simplified Phonetic System with the following exception:  Where the initial consonant 
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sound diverges significantly between Central Tibetan and Amdo Tibetan, I employ the 
latter.  For example, I refer to the Hor Qianhu Wagya, not Bagya, and the Shisa Tribe not 
the Chisa Tribe.  While it is tempting to take it a step further and turn Wagya into Waja, 
recognizing the limitless potential for fine-tuning I have refrained from further 
corruptions to the THL system.  A colleague has reminded me that we do not transliterate 
Mao Zedong’s words from his native Hunanese but instead use the now-standard Beijing 
pronunciation.  Of course, the danger is that Amdo Tibetan will go the way of Hunanese, 
becoming a dialect— of interest only to the odd linguist.  Nonetheless, for the time being 
this imperfect solution will have to suffice.   
Full Wylie transliteration of Tibetan spellings, along with Chinese romanizations, 
can be found in Appendix B.  As is now near universal, I employ the pinyin system for 
transcribing Chinese characters.  However, I maintain commonly recognized variations 
for figures such as Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek.  Mongol names are presented as 
found in Christopher Atwood’s Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire.115 
 
Writing about Amdo is made more difficult because of what is often the non-
equivalence of the various topographic names available in Tibetan and Chinese.  For 
example, the Tibetan place name Repgong is not historically coterminous with the 
Chinese county of Tongren, although in practice today they are often used 
interchangeably. These discrepancies can signify not only different spatial arrangements 
but may also carry lingering political implications.  In this study I try to use Chinese 
place names when referring to Chinese administrative units (such as Qinghai Province or 
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Tongren County) and Tibetan when referring to a geography or polity conceived of 
outside Chinese statist frameworks (such as Amdo and Repgong), although the lines are 
not always so clear.  However, throughout I refer to Zeku County (not Tsékhok) to both 
recognize and highlight that by all accounts Zeku/Tsékhok, the administrative region as 
well as the toponym itself, were inventions of the Chinese Communist state without 
historical precedent.  On the other hand, in the interest of readability I at times 
anachronistically speak of entities like “China,” “Tibet,” and “Zeku.”  When possible I 
refer to Tibetan people and tribes by their indigenous names.  However, where the 
sources provide only Chinese renderings and I have been otherwise unable to locate the 
Tibetan spellings (for example the Hor headman Guanjia), I am forced to use the pinyin 
transliteration.  
Lastly, following precedent I refer to Amdo’s Tibetan socio-political groupings as 
“tribes.”116  However, I do so in full recognition that from an anthropological perspective 
the term, which usually connotes segmented groups defined by common ancestry (real or 
imagined), may not accurately reflect Amdo Tibetan society.  Instead, Amdo’s pastoral 
communities are perhaps better thought of as confederated political units organized either 
around what David Sneath in the context of nomadic Inner Asia refers to as “noble 
houses,”117 or under the administration of the monastic corporate estates (Tib. la brang) 
of reincarnate lineages (Tib. sprul sku).  What Chinese sources refer to as tribes (buluo), 
are these larger confederacies, under which normatively are found several tsowa (Tib. 
tsho ba, Ch. cuowa, caowa), sometimes imprecisely translated as clans or small tribes.  
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Within each tsowa are smaller encampments (Tib. ru khor, Ch. quanzi) and finally 
individual households or tents (Tib. sbra, Ch. zhangfang).  However, this neatly nested 
structure almost certainly simplifies and standardizes what was a far more internally 
diversified and inchoate social-political landscape.118  Rather than indigenous categories, 
the division into buluo, tsowa, ru khor/quanzi, and sbra/zhangfang might best be thought 
of as bureaucratic classifications defined by the modern Chinese state— just as categories 
such as zu, bu, buluo, and even quasi-ethnic categories such as fan (often translated as the 
ethnonym Tibetan) had been during the imperial past.119  As this study examines Chinese 
state and nation-building efforts— rather than being a sociological or anthropological 
investigation of Amdo’s pastoral society— I consciously maintain this terminology 
because it reflects the Amdo Plateau from the perspective of the state.  Like sedentary 
states far and wide, the CCP clearly considered pastoral Tibetan tribal society to be 
politically, socially and economically “backward.”  In referring to Amdo as a tribal 
society, Chinese states— past and present— make pastoral society bureaucratically 
legible while asserting its primitivity in need of development by outside forces.120  In 
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Asian Scholars, Honolulu, March-April 2011); Haiyun Ma, "Fanhui or Huifan? Hanhui or Huimin?: Salar 
Ethnic Identification and Qing Administrative Transformation in Eighteenth-Century Gansu," Late 
Imperial China 29, no. 2 (2008): 3.  
 
120 Summarizing post-colonial or “decolonialized” critiques of the historiography of European expansion, 




fact, a central component of the CCP’s state and nation-building project in Amdo 
necessitated disrupting tribal loyalties and replacing them with the logic of the modern 
(socialist) nation-state.  In retaining the term “tribe,” this transformative agenda is 
intentionally emphasized. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
features of the Indian and African past.  In imperial propaganda, they became genetic flaws that made self-
rule for Indians and Africans impossible.” John Darwin, After Tamerlane : The Global History of Empire 
since 1405 (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 15.  There is a lengthy literature on the state’s depiction 
of nomads as primitive and often civilizable.  See for example, Virgina Martin, “Barïmta: Nomadic 
Customs, Imperial Crime,”in Russia’s Orient : Imperial Bordelands and People’s, 1700-1917, ed. Daniel 
R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997; Selim Deringil, “‘The 
Live in a State of Nomadism and Savegry:’ The Late Ottoman Empire and the Postcolonial Debate,” in The 













THE AMDO FRONTIER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYNCRETIC 
NEXUS OF AUTHORITY 
 
On August 27, 1949, vanguard units under General Wang Zhen of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) 1st Field Army 1st Corps “traversed the rarified air of the high 
mountains” that separate Linxia in Gansu Province from Qinghai’s Xunhua (Tib. ya rdzi) 
County.1  A month earlier, having consolidated its hold over China’s Central Plains, Mao 
Zedong had ordered 1st Field Army commander Peng Dehuai to “Liberate” China’s 
northwest provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.  Advancing from the 
ancient capital of Xi’an, Peng’s forces quickly swept westward along the path of the 
Yellow River, capturing Gansu’s capital Lanzhou on August 26.  Now, as part of a broad 
offensive intended to split Guomindang-affiliated armies under several ostensibly allied 
regional commanders, the Chinese Communists were preparing to move on Qinghai’s 
capital en route to Liberating all of Northwest China.2   
                                                
1 Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin Jiefangjun 
Qinghaisheng Junqu Zhengzhibu, ed., Jiefang Qinghai (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987) 5. 
(Hereafter cited as Jiefang Qinghai). Wang Zhen would remain a figure of national prominence until his 
death in the 1990s.   
 
2 Qinghai Sheng Junqu Silingbu and Qinghai Sheng Junqu Zhengzhibu, "Wo Jun Jiefang Qinghai De 
Zhandou Licheng," Qinghai Wenshi ziliao Xuangji 9 (1982): 1-2 and the “Introduction” and fold out battle 
map in Jiefang Qinghai.  See also the various documents issued by Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai and others 
reprinted in Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin 
Jiefangjun Qinghaisheng Junqu Zhengzhibu, eds., Jiefang Qinghai Shiliao Xuanbian (Xining: Qinghai 
Xinhua Chubanshe, 1990) (Hereafter cited as JFQHSLXB), Part 1. See also James Z. Gao, "The Call of the 
Oasis: The 'Peaceful Liberation' of Xinjiang, 1949-1953," in Dilemmas of Victory : The Early Years of the 
People's Republic of China, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul Pickowicz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 




By 4 pm that same afternoon, Xunhua, an ethnically mixed, largely agricultural 
region strategically located on the south bank of the Yellow River, became the first area 
within Qinghai Province to be officially Liberated.3  As if to emphasize the impact of 
Xunhua’s capture, that same day “the Muslim Warlord” Ma Bufang, long the leading 
power broker in northwest China, left the provincial capital of Xining never to return.  
Two days later, General Wang himself arrived in Xunhua and a provisional People’s 
Government was established.  Then, on August 31, a Ma Bufang-affiliated Salar militia 
commander defected to the Communists giving the PLA safe passage across the Yellow 
River and a clear path to the provincial capital.4  Less than a week later, on September 5 
1949, vanguard troops of the PLA’s 1st Corps 1st Regiment entered Xining, “Liberating 
the ancient city of the plateau” and “ending the Ma Bufang family’s long forty years of 
bloody rule in Qinghai, opening a new historical era where the masses of each nationality 
were to become the masters of their own homes.”5  While isolated battles continued over 
                                                
3Xunhua has a large Turkic-speaking Salar population concentrated in its lower altitudes surrounded by a 
sizeable Amdo Tibetan community that populates the mountain valleys that radiate upward from the 
Yellow River.  In 1954 Xunhua County, was rechristened the Xunhua Salar Autonomous County.  
According to one contemporary report, when the PLA entered Xunhua, the “the majority of Salars fled, 
some under the oppression of the Ma bandit ran to the north bank of the Yellow River, took up guns and 
resisted us; however, Tibetans did not flee, but welcomed our army, pulling cattle and leading sheep 
brought as gifts to out army.” In my own interviews, many Salars did indeed report fleeing in advance of 
the PLA’s arrival.  However, Xunhua Tibetans also recalled initial apprehensions and several remembered 
hiding in the mountains as well. See “The 2nd Army Party Committee’s Report on the Experience of 
Implementing Salar and Tibetan Work” in JFQHSLXB, 49. 
 
4 Military histories of the Yellow River crossing report an epic battle somewhat reminiscent of the famous 
Long March-era Luding Bridge Incident.  Unlike Luding, however, under heavy fire PLA troops were 
unable to repair an old bridge and instead crossed the treacherous Yellow River in small boats provided by 
locals.  On the far shore, the PLA’s vanguard troops successfully dispersed Ma’s regular forces while 
inducing the surrender of the local Salar militia. Wei Cong, ed., Xunhua Salazu Zizhixianzhi (Beijing Shi: 
Zhonghua Shuju, 2001), 36; Jiefang Qinghai 5-6, 485.   
 
5 Jiefang Qinghai 1, 485; Deng Liqun, Ma Hong, Wu Heng et al., ed., Dang Dai Zhongguo De Qinghai, 2 
vols. (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991) (Hereafter cited as DDZGQH) vol. 1, 40-1. While the 
capture of Xunhua is depicted as the first event of the Liberation of Qinghai, the offensive progressed on 




the next several weeks and months, and although resistance would not be stamped out for 
several years, Qinghai Province had been officially Liberated.6   
Much of Qinghai remained outside of the direct control of the PLA.  In particular, 
other than the Xunhua beachhead no fighting had occurred south of the Yellow River.  
This included the majority ethnic Tibetan regions that lay hemmed in between the great 
bend of the river and the mountainous border with Gansu Province.  Having crossed the 
river at points further to the north, the PLA instead made its way through the 
comparatively rich agricultural districts that led to the capital.  Yet, in spite of the relative 
isolation and safety afforded by the Yellow River, the indigenous leadership of the area 
that would later become known as Huangnan Prefecture (Tib. ma lho rdzong) was well 
aware of the battles raging to the north and east.  In fact, according to a short Chinese-
language hagiography of the area’s leading Tibetan religious and political figure, as the 
“rumble of the PLA’s cannons liberating the Great Northwest day-by-day approached 
Qinghai,” the 7th Shartsang Lama Kelden Trinlé Lungtok Gyatso, abbot of Repgong’s 
Rongwo Monastery, had regularly sent representatives to Gansu’s capital city to receive 
                                                                                                                                            
then proceeded on to Gandu, Hualong, and Ping’an before finally entering Xining.  However, the 1st Corps 
1st Regiment along with a division of the 2nd Regiment and the 18th Corps 62nd Regiment crossed the 
Yellow River at points farther north in Gansu Province.  These units converged on Minhe from where they 
followed the main Lanzhou-Xining road to Qinghai’s capital.  It was these forces that in fact captured 
Xining.  The bulk of the 2nd Regiment would arrive several days later before continuing north through 
Gansu’s Hexi Corridor and into Xinjiang.  The 1st Regiment would remain in Qinghai where it would form 
the backbone of post-Liberation rule.  See the foldout battle theater maps in Zhonggong Qinghai Shenwei 
Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin Jiefangjun Qinghaishen Junqu Zhengzhibu, 
eds., Jiefang Qinghai Huace, (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1989) (Hereafter cited as Jiefang 
Qinghai Huace) and Jiefang Qinghai 5, 484.  For the Qinghai Military Region Command and Political 
Department’s official narrative of the Liberation of Qinghai, see Qinghai Sheng Junqu Silingbu, 1-12.  
Recollections of various leading participants, including the political commissars of the 1st Corps 1st and 2nd 
Regiments, Liang Hansheng and Wang Enmao, can be found in Jiefang Qinghai. See also Wang Enxu, 
"Ershi Ertuan Zhandou Licheng De Pianxin Huiyi," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuangji 8 (1981): 1-8. 
 
6 Jiefang Qinghai, 7, 12-22; DDZGQH, vol. 1, 42, vol. 2, 365; Liang Hansheng, "Qinghai Jiefang De Lishi 
Huigu," in Jiefang Qinghai (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 33-4; and Li Xibo, "Lu'ershi Zai 




the latest updates.7  Nor did news of Xunhua’s capture catch the rest of the region’s 
indigenous elites unprepared.  On August 27, while Wang Zhen’s fighters were still 
establishing their positions on the Qinghai side of the border, the Tibetan chieftain of 
Xunhua’s Linggya Tribe had already hurried to Rongwo Township to brief Repgong’s 
leading figures.8  
Some days earlier, with the PLA advancing from the east, several tens of 
thousands of jin of wheat collected at the Tongren County military barracks had suddenly 
caught fire.9  Suspecting sabotage and fearing for his personal safety, Tséring Gyel, the 
Ma Bufang-appointed county head, gathered his officials and prepared to flee.  His 
arrangements complete, Tséring Gyel requested an audience with the region’s three 
leading Tibetan dignitaries, the Rongwo Nangso Trashi Namgyel, the zongqianhu of the 
Twelve Tribes of Repgong Gyelwo Dorjé,10 and the chief steward (Tib. phyag mdzod; 
                                                
7 Duojie and Zhao Qingyang, "Aiguo Minzhu Renshi Xiaricang Shengping," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 
(1994): 93.   
 
8 Mark Stevenson, "The Role of the Traditional Tibetan Tribal Leadership in a Mdo Reb Gong (Huangnan) 
after 1949," Paper presented Amdo Conference (Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard 
University: 1997) 2; and Zhaxi Anjia and Duojie, "Tongren Jiefang Qinliji," in Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao 
Jicui: Jianguohoujuan (Xining: Qinghaisheng Zhengxie Xuexi he Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui, 2001): 56 
(Reprinted from QHWSZL v. 11).  The chieftain’s name was Dargyé.   
 
9 Tongren County is an administrative district while Repgong is a more amorphous indigenous spatial 
designation.  For an overview of Repgong as a historical polity, see Sonam Tsering, “The Historical Polity 
of Repgong.” The Tibetan and Himalayan Libary. http://places.thlib.org/features/23751/descriptions/1225 
(accessed May 11, 2012).  The following narrative is an amalgam of several descriptions culled from local 
gazetteers and wenshi ziliao collections.  While passages are individually cited, it should be noted that the 
chronology varies between them.  As the exact timeline is less important then the story arc itself, of which 
the sources are largely in agreement, I have chosen to follow the official chronology as it appears in the 
local gazetteers. 
 
10 See Zeku Xianzhi, 13; Tongren Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., Tongren Xian Zhi, 2 vols. (Xi'an: 
Sanqin Chubanshe, 2001) (Hereafter cited as Tongren Xianzhi), 29; Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou 
Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou Zhi, (Lanzhou Shi: Gansu Renmin 
Chubanshe, 1999) (Hereafter cited as Huangnan Zhouzhi), 24-5; Stevenson, 2-3. Dorjé’s full name in 
Chinese was Duojie Xiangjie.  As is frequent among Tibetans, who rarely inherit family names but often 




Ch. Xiangzuo) of Rongwo Monastery and younger brother of the 7th Shartsang Lama, 
Gélek Gyatso.11  By dint of the charisma of their indigenous positions the three men, 
referred to in PRC sources as the “three-in-one feudal rule” of Tongren County, had 
personal prestige that transcended both statist structures and tribal divisions.12  Now, 
Tséring Gyel reportedly told them, ‘The provincial leaders have ordered me to return to 
Xining, but currently society is in chaos, please will you three be responsible for 
maintaining the area’s law and order, [and] managing the granary [and] trade office, I 
will return when my business is done.’13  The next day, having collected horses, supplies 
and the county’s wireless equipment, Tséring Gyel set fire to the county archives and fled 
with a small coterie of loyal officials, traveling through Guide County and then on to 
Xining.14  The government of Tongren County had ceased to function. 
                                                                                                                                            
Alternatively, he is sometimes simply referred to as the Gyelwo Chieftain (Tib. Gyal wo dbon po; Ch. 
Jiawu hongbao/hongbu) or even datouren (the great headman/chieftain). Meaning something akin to pan-
tribal chieftain, the title of zongqianhu had existed since the Yongzheng reforms of 1728.  However, it 
appears to have only been granted intermittently. See this chapter n. 118 and chapter 2, especially n. 29. 
 
11 Phyak mdzod is often rendered into English as “treasurer” or “steward.”  In his history of pre-Liberation 
Central Tibet, Goldstein translates it as “manager of an incarnate lama’s labrang [corporate estate].” 
Melvyn C. Goldstein and Gelek Rimpoche, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951 : The Demise of the 
Lamaist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 843.  
 
12 According to some sources, it was the Shartsang Lama along with the zongqianhu and Rongwo Nangso 
that formed the “formed the three-in-one feudal rule” of Tongren County. Tongren Xianzhim 923-4.  See 
also Zhao Qingyang, "Tongren Qianhu Jiawu Duojie Pianduan," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 157.  
In this tripartite constellation, Gélek Gyatso can be assumed to represent his brother the Shartsang 
Rinpoche.  The Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou Gaikuang (Overview of Huangnan Tibetans Autonomous 
Prefecture) considers the nangso and chief steward to be subordinate to the Shartsang Rinpoche, 
respectively in charge of secular and religious affairs on the latter’s behalf . "Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou 
Gaikuan" Bianxiezu, ed., Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou Gaikuang, Revised ed. (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe 
2009) (Hereafter cited as HNZZZZZGK), 82. 
 
13 Zhaxi Anjia and Duoji, 55. 
 
14 Duojie, "Jianlin Tongrenxian Renmin Zhengquan Jingguo Pianduan," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 
(1994): 256; Zhao Long, "Yi Tongren Jiefang Jingguo," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 260-1; Zhaxi 




It was several days later that Trashi Namgyel received the Linggya headman at 
the manor of the Rongwo Nangso.  After hearing the chieftain’s report, he and the 
monastery steward Gélek Gyatso quickly organized a meeting of Repgong’s leading 
figures.  In addition to the triumvirate of Trashi Namgyel, Gélek Gyatso and Zongqianhu 
Gyelwo Dorjé, present were the qianhu and baihu (headmen) of the Twelve Tribes of 
Repgong, the region’s eighteen nangchen (leading monastic figures, Ch. Angqin), and the 
heads of Rongwo Monastery’s three dratshang (monastic colleges, Ch. Zhacang), as well 
representatives of Rongwo’s merchants and Bao’an Township.15  Clearly understanding 
that momentous changes were on the horizon, the gathered elites immediately mobilized 
in an attempt to either mitigate the dangers or capitalize on opportunities provided by 
what was quickly emerging as Amdo’s new political order.  In particular, they accepted 
the Linggya chieftain’s suggestion and on August 30 sent a thirty-seven member 
“private” delegation to Xunhua to welcome the PLA.16   
Carrying “grain, horses, felicity scarves (Tib. khata; Ch. hada) and other gifts,” 
the Repgong mission arrived in Xunhua in time to offer their personal greetings to 
                                                
15 Zhaxi Anjia and Duojie, 56.  This account, co-authored by Trashi Namgyel, places the Rongwo Nangso 
at the center of the decision making process. Others emphasize the role of the Shatshang Lama.  See Duojie 
and Zhao, 93-94; Duojie, “Jianling Tongrenxian,” 256.  See also HNZZZZZGK, 85; Zhao Qingyang, "Ji 
Yiwei Yu Dang Zhenxie Hezuo De Haopengyou," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 151; Tongren 
Xianzhi, 709-710; and Stevenson, 2-3.  Bao’an, Repgong’s primary grain producing area, is a township in 
the north of Tongren County. In 1952, 85% of the population was recorded as Tibetan or Monguor (Ch. 
Tu).  HNZZZZZGK, 341. 
 
16 Duojie, “Jianlin Tongrenxian” 256, Stevenson 2-3. Zhao Long, “Yi Tongren Jiefang Jingguo” 261.  
Zhao Long, who as one of the few remaining Han Chinese officials of the former county government was 
made a member of the mission, gives the most complete list of delegates I have located.  For example, he 
notes that a Rongwo emmissary was named Ma Junde, probably marking him as a Hui Muslim.  Strangely, 
however, Zhao’s timeline contradicts other sources, including those he penned under other names.  In this 
account, the delegation set out “around September 10” rather than August 30.  It is possible that he was sent 
on a subsequent mission, perhaps to supply provisions to the PLA.  However, he also mentions “paying 




General Wang Zhen.17  Having dispensed with the formalities, the delegates were said to 
have implored the general to send troops south to Tongren to form a new county 
government.  The sources all agree that General Wang responded noncommittally.  
Instead he instructed the delegates to ask Repgong’s indigenous leaders to work with the 
twelve tribes to maintain social order and protect state property.18  The delegation 
returned to Rongwo having received little in the way of promises from Wang Zhen other 
than his implicit recognition of Repgong’s long-standing lines of authority.  In doing so, 
however, Wang Zhen was continuing a long legacy of imperial-local relations that for a 
millennium had formed a unique and dynamic, often contentious but mutually 
authenticating, syncretic nexus of authority that helped shape Amdo’s political and social 
worlds. 
 
Amdo, Empire and the Syncretic Nexus of Authority 
The dimensions of rulership over Tibetan regions of Amdo in pre-modern periods 
remain ambiguous and enigmatic.  As an ethnically mixed region distant from what is 
generally accepted as the Chinese and Tibetan cultural and political cores, Amdo has long 
been subject to numerous interwoven spheres of authority, including familial, political, 
confessional, economic and sectarian.  Speaking of the late-Qing period, Yang Hongwei 
describes tri-polar sources of authority and identity that he labels “tribal,” (buluo) 
“religious” (zongjiao) and “state” (guojia).  He suggests that when functioning in balance 
                                                
17 Wang Zhen is said to have refused the gifts but accepted the khata. Tongren Xianzhi, 29; Zeku Xianzhi, 
13. Doujie and Zhao write that the delegation brought khata, yak and other gifts (93-4).  Zhaxi Anjia and 
Duojie maintain that the gifts included eight horse-loads of grain, carpets and fox pelts. "Tongren Jiefang 
Qinliji," 56.  Zhao Long mentions seven beef cattle and ten cartloads of flour and horse feed (261).  
 




the three systems create a dynamic network of authorities that give meaning and structure 
to the social and political worlds of the Tibetan and Mongolian regions of northeastern 
Amdo, what Yang refers to as “society’s operational mechanism of authority” (shehui de 
quanli yunzuo jizhi).19  Yang argues that the charismatic religious authority inherent to 
the particularities of Tibetan Buddhism, with its focus on the figure of the reincarnate 
lama, is the lynchpin that holds the system together.  According to Yang, religious 
authority performs the necessary function of mediating between the tribes who are 
constantly at odds due to competition over limited resources.  Likewise, the state too 
depends on the charismatic authority of the religious establishment to exercise its rather 
limited demands for expressed allegiance, intermittent resource extraction and the 
maintenance of relative peace and order. 
If we understand Yang’s categories (tribal, state and religious) to be malleable 
and the moral authority and ability to enforce the will of each to be relationally and 
temporally fluid, this general framework seems to be useful going back at least as far as 
the thirteenth-century introduction of Mongol power into the Amdo political world.  
Referring specifically to the pre-Liberation political economy of the Repgong region, one 
Chinese-language study refers to the “religious monastery and Nangso-fu-qianbaihu 
system of politics and religion combined.”20  Perhaps this sums it up as well as any, 
encompassing monastic, indigenous secular (nangso), administrative/military (fu and 
arguably qianbaihu), tribal (qianbaihu, nangso), and imperial (potentially all of the 
                                                
19 Yang Hongwei, Xunhua Zangqu Quanli Yuanzuo Jizhi De Wenhua Kaocha: Yi Guangxu Chaowei 
Zhongxin (Ph.D. diss., Lanzhou University, 2009), 1-6. Yang’s study focuses on the region under the 
former administration of Xunhua Ting during the Guangxu Period of the late Qing Dynasty (1875-1908). 
 




aforementioned) as an integrated, syncretic and mutually authenticating web rather than 
clearly demarcated institutions in perpetual competition.   
Therefore, developing outward from Yang’s “operational mechanism,” I suggest 
that we refer to the intentionally flexible framework of a “syncretic nexus of authority” to 
express the permeable and reciprocal nature of authority in pre-national Amdo while 
dissuading us from overly positivistic tendencies or searching out uni-polar or even 
multi-polar sources of legitimacy and sovereignty.  I base the idea of a syncretic nexus of 
authority loosely on the “cultural nexus of power” paradigm that Prasenjit Duara 
inscribes onto Republican-era northeast China.  According to Duara, this nexus included 
religious, lineage, marketing, irrigation and other networks that provided shared symbolic 
values to legitimate rural order.21  The concept of the syncretic nexus of authority is 
likewise an attempt to capture the amalgam of often unconsciously expressed, morally 
relevant cultural traditions that govern political behavior.  It should be noted that this 
approach does not suppose to interpret cultural meanings expressed through the syncretic 
nexus.  Instead it hopes to help destabilize more positivistic assumptions and polemic 
interpretations to which Amdo history is often subject, particularly as expressed through 
competing Chinese and Tibetan nationalist histories.  In other words, it is an attempt to 
escape the teleological linearity of national narratives and instead return to pre-modern, 
imperial logics of authority.  
                                                
21 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State : Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), 15-17. It has been argued that the cultural nexus schema is too amorphous and 
elastic to prove analytically useful.  See Lloyd E. Eastman, "State Building and the Revolutionary 
Transformation of Rural Society in North China, Review of Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North 
China, 1900-1942 by Prasenjit Duara," Modern China 16, no. 2 (1990): 231-232.  My syncretic nexus 
formulation can surely be criticized along the same lines.  However, I use it more to disrupt mono-systemic 
formulations that would have Amdo being wholly integrated into the Chinese state system, as politically 
and culturally a subunit of Central Tibet, or wholly reliant on the system of religion and politics united, etc.  
Instead, syncretism seems a useful paradigm for identity and authority, perhaps at all times and places, but 





Although the political, religious, and economic landscape certainly evolved over 
the subsequent seven centuries, the syncretic nexus of authority that developed specific to 
Amdo dates back at least to the period of Mongol rule when armies under the offspring of 
Chinggis Khan first swept through the region.  Chinese-language studies chart three 
historical stages in the pre-Liberation indigenous political leadership of the Repgong 
area.  The earliest, dating back to the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (13th-14th C.) is referred to 
as the “government of the two nangso [Rongwo Nangso and Awar Nangso];” the second 
developing from the Yuan-Ming transition (late-14th century) as “the government of the 
Shartsang Lama of Rongwo Monastery and the Rongwo Nangso.”  Finally, during the 
Republican Period sources refer to the “Three-in-one Combined Political and Religious 
Leadership” under the Shartsang Lama consisting of the steward of Rongwo Monastery, 
the Rongwo Nangso and the Chieftain of the Gyelwo Tribe, zongqianhu of the Twelve 
Tribes of Tongren.22   
Yet, indigenous mechanisms of authority and legitimacy are not autarkic; they 
cannot be disassembled from the imperial administrative systems and ideologies that for 
much of the period emanated from Beijing.  While the actual power of the imperial center 
to intercede in local affairs waxed and waned from the thirteenth century through the 
twentieth, receiving the imprimatur of the imperial throne apparently never entirely lost 
its majesty.  While perhaps not well integrated from the perspective of the modern 
nation-state, from the perspective of empire the long-term relationship between imperial 
center and indigenous elites largely maintained the mutually imperative objectives of 
                                                




imbuing local actors with imperial authority while providing the crown with imperial 
grace and grandeur, the ritualistic bonds of loyalty between local elites and the imperial 
core that is central to imperial formations.  It is these imperial traditions that in the 
twentieth century Ma Bufang, the Guomindang and the CCP would each try to tap into in 
their attempts to integrate Amdo into their visions of the new nation.  
 
The Qianbaihu and Tusi “Systems” 
As it spans the administrative-state and tribal conceptual divide and because in its 
earliest incarnation it might be seen as the foundation of the syncretism still on display in 
twentieth-century Amdo, the qianbaihu zhidu, or the System of One Thousand and One 
Hundred Households, seems a good place to start disentangling (and re-entangling) the 
institutional mosaic of authority in eastern Amdo.  As an institution unique to the Tibetan 
regions of Amdo and northern Kham, the qianbaihu system has largely escaped the 
attention of scholars, even those that have studied China’s imperial frontiers.  Better 
known is what has been called the tusizhidu or the “native chieftain system.” John 
Herman refers to the latter as “a unique subbureaucratic institution created during the 
early Ming to extend nominal Chinese state control over the non-Han peoples located just 
beyond Beijing’s administrative reach.”23  Bureaucratically this was accomplished by 
recognizing the authority of an indigenous, hereditary headman (tusi/tuguan) over a 
                                                
23 John E. Herman, "Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System," 
Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 1 (1997): 50. On the tusizhidu see also Leo Kwok-yueh Shin, The Making 
of the Chinese State : Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Charles Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands : The Transformation of Qing 
China's Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Laura Hostetler, Qing 
Colonial Enterprise : Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001); Wang Jiguang, "Mingdai Biliwei Xinkao," Xibei Minzu Yanjiu, no. 1 (1993); Wu 
Yongzhang, Zhongguo Tusi Zhidu Yuanyuan Yu Fazhanshi, (Chengdu: Sichuan Minzu Chubashe, 1988); 




geographic area while classifying the chieftain and his domains within the administrative 
hierarchy of the state.24  In reality, the tusi often maintained wide autonomy. Although 
usually associated with the southwestern border regions, tusi also existed elsewhere, 
including Amdo’s eastern agricultural regions (Qinghai dongbu nonyequ).25  
While most sources note that the tusizhidu was first officially implemented under 
the reign of the founder of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang or the Hongwu Emperor 
(r. 1368-1398), there is some question as to whether or not the native chieftain system 
should be considered a “system” at all.  In fact, if considered over space and time perhaps 
it is better to think in terms of patterns, precedents and strategies of imperial rule rather 
than an integrated tusi system.  For example, there is general consensus that the tusizhidu 
evolved from the frontier policies of the Tang, Song and Yuan Dynasties (7th-14th 
centuries).26  However, the specific genealogy is debated.  Citing the research of Richard 
von Glahn, Herman refers to the “semiautonomous ‘haltered and bridled prefectures (jimi 
zhou)” of the Song’s south Sichuan frontier as the “institutional predecessors of the 
                                                
24 On the specific rights and duties of Ming-era tusi/tuguan, see Herman, “Empire in the Southwest,” 50-
52. 
 
25 According to Herman, 63% of tusi titles were bestowed on chieftains from the southwestern provinces of 
Guizhou, Yunnan and Sichuan. John E Herman, "The Cant of Conquest," in Empire at the Margins: 
Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Helen F. Siu Pamela Kyle Crossley, and 
Donals S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 137. The number of tusi enfeoffed in 
Qinghai varies between sources.  Wu Chengyi refers rather vaguely to “over twenty tusi, sixteen of which 
were in tuzu [Monguor] regions, two in Salar regions, and the rest in Tibetan regions.”  All except a single 
Han Chinese tusi were said to have been “descendents of Yuan Dynasty officials and local minority 
nationality headmen.” Wu Chengyi, "Lidai Wangchao Jinglue Qinghai Ge Minzu Zhengce Shiyao.," Xibei 
Xin, no. 2 (1991): 39.  Jing Fan’s 1935 study lists twenty-one tusi.  The single Tongren County tusi is 
identified as being ethnically Salar. Jing Fan, "Qinghai Zhi Zhengzhi Quyu," in Xibe Minzu Zongjiao 
Shiliao Wenzhai: Qinghai Fence, ed. Gansusheng Tushuguan Shumu Cankaobu (Lanzhou: Gansu Sheng 
Tushuguan, 1986) (hereafter cited as XBMZZJSLWZ QHFC), 182-4. See also Qinghai Shihua, 54-6; Gong 
Yin, 1319-1432; and Li Zonghua and Li Yankai, Anduo Zangzu Shilue (Xining: Qinghai Minzu Chubanshe, 
1992), 66-69. 
 
26 Wu Yongzhan, 39; Li and Li, 116; Qinghua Shihua, 55; and Cui Yonghong, Zhang Dezu, and Du 




Ming-Qing native chieftain system.”27  On the other hand, speaking specifically of 
Amdo, the authors of Anduo Zangzu Shilu (Overview of Amdo Tibetan History) claim that 
the foundations of the tusi system can in fact be traced back to the wanqianbaihu zhidu 
(System of Ten Thousand, One Thousand and One Hundred Households) of the Mongol 
Yuan, which in turn developed from the decimal system of military and social 
organization that had long existed on the northern steppe.28  For its part, the Qinghai 
Tongshi (Comprehensive History of Qinghai) makes a subtle distinction, referring to the 
Ming period’s introduction of the tuguan zhidu, tuguan being a more general term for a 
local official, while reserving tusi zhidu for Qing-era systemization of Ming policies.29  
Hou and Liu do the same, stating that in Qinghai the tusizhidu was officially 
                                                
27 Herman, “Empire in the Southwest,” 48. Elsewhere Herman traces the genealogy of the tusi zhidu back 
to the jimi prefectures of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and even the dependent kingdoms (shuguo) of the 
Han. He does acknowledge, however, that it was under the Yuan that the “negotiated relationship between 
the Chinese state and its frontier elite […] gradually conformed to a single institution of extrabureaucratic 
offices, which became known in the Ming and Qing dynasties as tusi offices.” In “Cant of Conquest,” 136.  
 
28 Li and Li, 102; Wei Xinchun, "Qinghai Zangqu Qianbauhu Zhidu Chansheng He Cunzai De Yuanyin 
Qianxi " Qinghai Minzu Yanjiu, no. 1 (1989): 503. According to Charles Hucker, the use of the Chinese 
term qianhu dates back to the Jurchen Jin state (1115-1234) that emerged as a powerful and innovative 
polity in what is now northern China before being eliminated by Mongol expansion under Chinggis Khan 
Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1985), 151.  David Sneath notes “decimal military-civil administrations” have been employed by Inner 
Asian polities going at least as far back as the Xiongnu (ca. 200 BCE).  While terminology changed and 
innovation and adaptation was common, “Since that time nominal decimal units of administration appear 
again and again in descriptions of steppe polities.” David Sneath, ed., Introduction to Imperial Statecraft : 
Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries, Studies on East 
Asia (Bellingham, WA: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 2006), 9.  
 
29 Cui, Zhang and Du, 265-7, 339-40. Herman notes that during the Ming tusi and tuguan coexisted as two 
different administrative classifications; tuguan for a “civilian native chieftain” who’s domains generally 
fell within a provincial boundary, and tusi for a “military native chieftain,” who exercised control on the 
administrative borders of the empire.  They were nominally under the supervision of the Ministry of 





implemented during the early Qing, and thus “developed later, disappeared later and was 
never as well developed or as authoritative as in the southwest.”30  
Gaitu guiliu, or the elimination of native chieftainships and the extension of direct 
bureaucratic administration, is a policy generally associated with the reign of the Qing’s 
Yongzheng Emperor (r. 1722-1735).  However, as Leo Shin, Herman and others have 
made clear, under the Ming the native chieftain system was unevenly implemented and 
administered along its southern borderlands.  In fact, on several occasions beginning as 
early as the sixteenth century the state moved to eliminate powerful or troublesome tusi 
with various degrees of success.  Under the more robust early Qing, the Yongzheng 
emperor’s grandfather and father undertook more systematic efforts to increase imperial 
control over the tusi with the eventual goal being their elimination.  The primary means 
was via exposure to neo-Confucian norms through state-sponsored schools.  This was 
meant to speed up the process by which aborigines would acculturate to Confucian ideals 
of behavior and hence become dynastic subjects endowed with the symbols of 
civilization that marked one as fully human (min).31  Herman writes, 
Eventually, Chinese ways would replace non-Han cultural practices as the 
indigenous frontier population ‘turned toward civilization” (xiang hua), thereby 
removing the cultural barriers separating China proper and peripheral non-Han 
societies.  At this point the Qing state would be in a position to abolish the native 
chieftainships altogether and extend direct bureaucratic control (gaitu guiliu) over 
the former autonomous frontier.32 
 
                                                
30 Hou Pixun and Liu Zaicong, eds., Xibei Bianjiang Lishi Dili Gailun (Lanzhou Shi: Gansu Renmin 
Chubanshe, 2008), 63. 
 
31 Huiyan Ma, 10. 
 





In an interesting parallel to the “Communist civilizing project” of the 1950s, the results of 
this “Confucian civilizing project,” as it has been called, were unsatisfactory.33  The 
gradual pace of cultural transformation offended the sensibilities of some of the Sino-
Manchu imperial elite just as the gradual pace of socialist transformation would be an 
affront to many dedicated Communists.  The critics included the Yongzheng Emperor, 
who replaced the gradualist policy of voluntary acculturation with a strategy of 
immediate incorporation.34   
Although the subject was broached at court, however, neither under the 
Yongzheng Emperor nor his successors was gaitu guiliu carried out in Amdo.  As noted 
in the Qinghai Tongshi, while “the Qing court implemented gaitu guiliu in the southwest, 
in the Qinghai region the tusizhidu was continuously carried out. [. . .] The tusizhidu 
existed in the Hehuang Region [Gansu-Qinghai border regions] for over three hundred 
years, straight until its abolition in the Republican Period.”35  To the contrary, it was 
during the Yongzheng reign in the aftermath of the devastating Lobsang Danjin Rebellion 
(1723) that Amdo’s tusi and in particular the qianbaihu were reorganized and systemized, 
taking the form that they would largely maintain into the twentieth century.  By this time 
it may have been that the two ‘systems’ were normatively identical in function, some 
authors suggesting that the qianbaihu zhidu be considered a subcategory of the tusi 
                                                
33 See Stevan Harell in his introduction to Cultural Encounters (op. cit.).  
 
34 As Herman points out, although associated most closesly with the Yongzheng reign, “The transition 
from indirect rule to direct rule in Guizhou occurred over a two-hundred-year period between 1500 and 
1700,” and even in 1700 full integration of Guizhou into the regular state bureaucracy was far from 
complete. In “Cant of Conquest,” 161. 
 





zhidu.36  According to the Qinghai Shihua, when in 1931 the Nanjing government 
ordered the elimination of the remaining Qinghai tusi, only eight of the nineteen native 
chieftains formerly recognized were still in existence.  It continues, “The tusi of the 
eastern agricultural regions were at that time completely gaitu guiliu.  Other than this, the 
Tibetan qianbaihu of the pastoral regions […] did not exit history’s stage until the 
Democratic Reforms [1958] after the founding of New China.”37   
Given the great spatial and temporal variations, more useful than speaking of a 
system of native chieftains might be viewing the qianbaihu and tusi zhidu within a 
historically enduring imperial strategy of governing, nominally or actually, frontier 
regions and peoples through native leaders and heuristically meaningful symbols and 
traditions.  While the details may differ from local context to local context, the pattern of 
distinct compacts with multiple local authorities can be clearly detected, thus fulfilling 
Tilly’s definition of empire.  This might be expressed in the banners of Qing Inner 
Mongolia; the jassaks in Outer Mongolia, Zungharia and among Amdo’s Mongol 
population;38 the begs and ahungs of Kashgaria;39 Tibetan Buddhist authorities;40 to a 
                                                
36 For example, the Cui, Zhang and Du state, “The qianbaihu zhidu is essentially inseparable from the 
tusizhidu, it is only that the type of ruling system of the qianbaihu zhidu is suitable for the tribal system of 
Tibetan nomads” (415).   Gong Yin seems to agree that the qianbaihu was a subset of the tusizhidu, 
although his otherwise exhaustive study of China’s tusi does not cover the Huangnan and Hainan regions.  
It does, however, include the Tibetan qianbaihu of the Qinghai Lake region, Yushu and Golok. See also 
Wei Xinchun, 53; Xu Likui, 1; and He Feng, "Cong ‘Fanli’ Kan Zangzu Qianbaihu Zhidu," Qinghai Minzu 
Xueyuan Bao, no. 2 (1998). 
 
37 Qinghai Shihua, 56.  Xu Likuai similarly writes, “In 1931, gaitu guiliu was implemented in the Qinghai 
region, but it was limited to the eastern agricultural areas, however the pastoral region’s qianbaihu zhidu 
was continuously maintained until Liberation” (4). Hou and Liu claim that only in 1934 was the tusi system 
finally eliminated in the Gansu-Qinghai region (70).  Similarly, Jing Fan’s 1935 study lists the tusi by 
administrative area with no indication that they either were or were in the process of being abolished.  See 
Jing Fan, XBMZZJSLWZ QHFC, 182-4.  
 
38 DiCosmo; Hou and Liu 77-80; "Henan Menguzu Zizhixian Gaikuan" Bian Xi Zu, ed., Henan Menguzu 
Zizhixian Gaikuan, Revised ed. (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Daxue Chubanshe, 2005) (Hereafter cited as 




lesser extent the gedimu leadership of the Chinese-speaking Muslim population now 
codified as the Hui nationality;41 the “native chieftains” of the southwest frontier; the tusi 
and qianbaihu of Amdo; and I would argue the Confucian-elite of the demographically 
dominant sinic population.42  While in certain locations during certain periods there may 
in fact have been a distinct “system” that we can call the tusizhidu, it might be more 
useful in understanding imperial-local relationships to acknowledge that a native 
chieftain strategy is among the more enduring legacies of “China-based” empires, one 
that would be creatively adopted by the Guomindang, the Ma Bufang regime, and until it 





                                                                                                                                            
 
39 Millward, Beyond the Pass; Forêt; DiCosmo; Hou and Liu, 70-6. 
 
40 Rawski, Last Emperors; Patricia Ann Berger, Empire of Emptiness : Buddhist Art and Political 
Authority in Qing China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003); Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing : 
The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 
2006) etc. 
 
41 Jonathan Neaman Lipman, Familiar Strangers : A History of Muslims in Northwest China, Studies on 
Ethnic Groups in China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 
 
42 By this I simply mean that if we take the imperial nature of the Qing state seriously, it might be useful to 
consider the Chinese literati elite and Confucian bureaucratic conventions as the agents and institutions of 
empire in Chinese regions, just as lamas, begs, and jassaks were agents of empire among other imperial 
constituencies.  This point is rarely overtly stated.  However, it is implied in works such as Michael G. 
Chang, A Court on Horseback : Imperial Touring & the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680-1785 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Crossley, Translucent Mirror; Rawski, Last 
Emperors; and taken in whole the volume by James A. Millward et al., eds., New Qing Imperial History : 
The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
 
43 That this strategy was employed in various contexts over different peoples is implicitly admitted when, 
for example, Hou and Liu write of the implementation of the “tusi zhidu, boke zhidu [beg system], and the 




Repgong and the Yuan-Ming Syncretic Nexus of Authority 
As if to emphasize the complexity of eastern Amdo’s Yuan-era political history, 
the Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhouzhi (Huangnan Tibetan Autonoumous Prefecture 
Gazetteer) states: 
[. . .] south of the Yellow River in [today’s] Hainan and Huangnan Prefectures the 
“Biliwanhufu” was set up under the Hezhou Circuit (lu), [and] a powerful local 
Tibetan leader was appointed head of the 10,000 Households (wanhuzhang), 
under the authority of the clan of the Yuan [Dynasty] Hezhou Commander-in-
Chief (duyuanshuai) Zhongba Pabalongshu. The Wanhuzhang at the time was the 
ancestor of today’s Tongren County Awar Tribe’s headman (formerly called the 
Awar Nangso).  At the beginning of the Yuan, Hezhou Commander-in-Chief 
Pabalongshu, on a bank of the Rongwo River in today’s Tongren County 
constructed a small Sakya monastery.  After this, Tibet’s (Xizang) Lharjé 
Draknawa received instructions from the Yuan Dynasty’s Imperial Preceptor 
Pakpa to come to Tongren and spread religion, [and] after this his royal 
descendants for many generations became the local officials (tuguan) of 
Rongwo.44 
 
Situated in a frontier region between many of the period’s great states, including the 
Chinese Song, Tangut Minyak (Xixia), Tibetan Tsongka (Qingtang), Khitan Liao and 
Jurchen Jin, during the centuries that preceded Mongol hegemony the region referred to 
in Chinese sources as Hehuang was a frequent victim of what Paul Jakov Smith calls the 
era’s “‘Great Game’ politics.”45  This came to an end in 1227 with the final destruction of 
the Tangut Minyak state, its domains incorporated into the rapidly expanding Mongol 
Empire. 
                                                
44 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 155. See Li and Li for more detail 100-101. 
 
45 Paul Jakov Smith, "Iredentism as Political Capital" The New Policies and the Annexation of Tibetan 
Domains in the Hehuang (the Qinghai-Gansu Highlands) under Shenzong and His Sons, 1068-1126," in 
Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China : The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics, ed. 
Patricia Buckley Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 78-
87.  Here Hehuang refers to the area of present-day eastern Qinghai and southern Gansu Provinces 
transected by the Yellow, Huang and Tao rivers. See also Luciano Petech, "Tibetan Relations with Sung 
China and with the Mongols," in China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th 





In 1235, Köten Khan, second son of the Great Khan Ögedai and after 1241 
younger brother of the Great Khan Güyük, had led an expeditionary force through the 
Sino-Tibetan border regions, reaching as far south as Sichuan.  After returning north, 
Köten was invested with a hereditary appanage at the old Minyak trading town of 
Liangzhou (near present day Wuwei, Gansu), giving the Mongols a permanent base on 
the edge of the Tibetan Plateau.46  In 1244, at the strong invitation of Köten, the Tibetan 
lama known as Sakya Pandita along with his nephew the future Pakpa Lama arrived at 
Liangzhou.47  Retrospectively, the stage was thus set for the eventual incorporation of 
Tibetan regions into the Mongol Empire.   
Until Güyük’s death in 1248, Köten would seem to have been the most powerful 
imperial representative in the region.  However, with the eclipse of the house of Ögedai 
in the internecine battles that habitually followed the death of a Great Khan, the 
ascendant Tolui line set up a parallel bureaucratic-cum-military administration over the 
region.  In particular, as early as 1253 but perhaps not until after Köten’s cousin Qubilai 
proclaimed himself Great Khan in 1260, the “Tufan and Other Regions Pacification 
Commission” (tufan dengchu xuanwei shici, hereafter Hezhou Pacification Commission) 
was established to oversee Amdo and neighboring districts.48  Located at Hezhou 
                                                
46 Herbert Franke, From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God : The Legitimation of the Yuan 
Dynasty (Munich: Verlag der Baerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978), 300; Petech, “Tibetan 
Relations,” 180-181. 
 
47 The Pakpa Lama’s full name was Blo dros rgal mtshan. 
 
48 The difangzhi all state that the Hezhou Pacification Commission was founded in 1253, with one 
explicitly asserting that it was established by Qubilai’s predecessor and elder brother, Möngke Khan. 
Tongren Xianzhi, 914-915; HNZZZZZGK, 80; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 155. Xu Likuai agrees, stating that it 
was founded in the 3rd year of the reign of Möngke (2), while Li and Li simply note, “One after another 
Qubilai established three pacification commissions under the zongzhiyuan” (101).  However, Chen 
Qingying maintains that, “The Mongols had not set up official administrative management organs of 




(present-day Linxia), in current administrative terms the pacification commission had 
authority over not only the “Tibetan regions of Gansu and Qinghai [not including 
present-day Yushu Prefecture] and a small part of the Tibetan regions of Sichuan,” but 
also “neighboring [areas] of China proper [neidi] and regions of mixed Tibetan and Han 
inhabitants.”49  
Under the Hezhou Pacification Commission, the Mongols established various 
types of military and civil administrative entities.  Xu Likuai anachronistically writes, 
“various minority nationality leaders were put in charge, gradually forming a type of 
native chieftain system (tuguan zhidu).”50  In today’s Repgong region, the Mongols 
invested the leader of what was apparently the area’s most powerful local Tibetan clan, 
the Awar Téu, with imperial recognition as the head of the Biliwanhufu.51  Meaning 
something akin to a “ten thousand-household brigade,” the Biliwanhu had at least 
                                                                                                                                            
Commission was formed along with the other pacification commissions established in China during the 
first decade of Qubilai’s reign.  In all, three pacification commissions would be set up in Tibetan regions, 
their jurisdictions roughly equivalent to the modern division of Kham, Amdo and Ü tsang.  Confusingly, 
both the commission established at Hezhou and the one to the south in Kham (Tufandenglu) contained 
Tufan in their titles. Chen hypothesizes that the Hezhou Pacification Commission was originally intended 
to oversea all of Eastern Tibet with Central Tibet under the administration of the Sakya ruling family.  He 
maintains that it was only due to several rebellions in Tibetan regions that the other two pacification 
commissions were established. Chen Qingying, "The Year of the Establishment and the Naming of the 
Domed (Mdo Smad) Pacification Commission of the Yuan Dynasty," China Tibetology, no. 1 (2003): 10, 
14.  On Yuan-era pacification commissions, see Hucker, 64. 
 
49 Wu Chengyi, 35. See also Li and Li, 101; Tongren Xianzhi, 914; Petech, “Tibetan Reations,” 192-193; 
Xu Likui, 2; Chen Qingying “The Year,” 9-14; HNZZZZZGK, 80; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 155.  
 
50 Xu Likui, 3. 
 
51 The Huangnan Zhouzhi states, “[Because] the Awar Téu Clan from south of the river was powerful and 
wealthy, the Yuan established the biliwanhufu, [with] authority over all the Tibetan clans south of the 
river” (1317). According to local oral tradition, the father of the first Awar Nangso was a Nyingma 
missionary who came to the region from Central Tibet.  There he would establish two monasteries 
including Gartsé Monastery.  As Awar Nangso, the head lama of Gartsé Monastery, and the Gartsé Baihu, 
his three sons would become the progenitors of the three tsowa that today form the Awar Téu Tribe.  See 
Chen Qingying, ed. Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, 2004), 242-
3; Zhiguanba Gongque Hudan Baraoji, Anduo Zhengjiao Shi (Mdo Smad Chos Byun), trans. Wu Jun, Mao 





nominal authority over the regions south of the Yellow River in current-day Huangnan 
and Hainan Prefectures.  Below the Awar Wanhu, local leaders were recognized as 
qianhu and baihu, or leaders of one thousand and one hundred households, marking the 
introduction of the decimal-based qianbaihu system into Amdo.52  
At the same time there is confusion in the secondary sources over the relationship 
between the Hezhou Pacification Commission and its commander Zhongba Pabalongshu, 
and the personal appanage of the ruling Chinggissid clan.53  Chinese sources note that 
despite his descendents’ perpetual claim to the region, after Köten’s death (ca. 1253) 
authority over neighboring Tibetan regions shifted to Qubilai’s line.54  In retrospect, 
perhaps most symbolic of this change was Qubilai’s assumption of patronage of the 
Sakya sect by physically dispossessing Köten of the young Pakpa Lama.  After 1261, the 
Pakpa Lama would become Qubilai’s chief agent of rule over Tibetan regions.55 
Meanwhile, several sources stress that the Hezhou Pacification Commission was 
controlled by Zhongba Pabalongshu and his family, suggesting that it was more of a 
hereditary fiefdom than a regular posting in the Chinese bureaucratic tradition.56  Hezhou 
was immediately responsible to the Shaanxi Branch Secretariat, although it is unclear 
                                                
52 Li and Li, 101; HNZZZZZGK, 80; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 155.  It should be noted that the division into 
10,000s, 1,000s and 100s should be considered an administrative ranking rather than a reflection of actual 
populations. 
 
53 On Mongol appanages see Thomas T. Allsen, "Sharing out the Empire: Apportioned Lands under the 
Mongols," in Nomads in the Sedentary World, ed. Anatoly M. Khazanov and André Wink (Richmond: 
Curzon, 2001); and Atwood, Encyclopedia of Mongolia, 18-19. 
 
54 Cui, Zhang, and Du, 255, Tongren Xianzhi, 915.  
 
55 On the Pakpa Lama and his relationship with Qubilai Khan, see Franke 305-311; and Luciano Petech, 
"'P'ags-Pa (1235-1280)," in In the Service of the Khan : Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Y¸an 
Period (1200-1300), ed. Igor de Rachewiltz (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993). 
 





how much bureaucratic authority these “proto-provincial administrative units” actually 
possessed.57  Hezhou was simultaneously under the direct supervision of the ambiguously 
named zongzhiyuan, or the “Office of General Regulations,” a central organ established 
in 1264 under the direction of the Pakpa Lama.58  In 1269, however, Qubilai appointed a 
son, Auruqchi, as the Prince of Xiping with all of the Tufan regions as his appanage.59  
Auruqchi in turn enfeoffed his son and his descendants as Prince of Zhenxi and Wujing 
based at Hezhou.60  Lastly, according to Christopher Atwood, Qubilai assigned another 
son, Manggala, to oversee the Tufan region from Shaanxi where he and his descendents 
were enfeoffed as the Prince of Anxi.61  In Herbert Franke’s summation, “a feudal 
superstructure had been laid over the local military and civilian offices just as in other 
parts of the Sino-Mongolian Empire.”62  More importantly it may reflect the inherent 
tensions between the centralizing bureaucratic state (Yuan) and its genesis from 
                                                
57 Xing Shangsheng Shu.  Hucker notes that branch secretriats lacked subordinate ministries and “were at 
best only rudimentary provincial administrations” (63).  
 
58 Petech, “Tibetan Relations,” 192; Wei Xinchun, 503; Tongren Xianzhi, 914; Atwood, “Encyclopedia of 
Mongolia,” 539.  On the zhongzhiyuan and its successor, the equally ambiguous xuanzhengyuan or “Office 
of Proclaiming Policy,” see Petech, “Tibetan Relations,” 190-192; and Franke 311-314. More reflective of 
what its actual duties were thought to have been, the office is sometimes translated as the “Office of 
Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs.”  
 
59 Ch. Aoluji. Petech, “Tibetan Relations,” 187-188, The Tongren Xianzhi claims that all of Tufan came 
under Auruqchi’s domination (915). According to Petech, in 1276 an expeditionary force under Auruqchi 
accompanied the Pakpa Lama back to Sakya, where they put down an uprising and consolidated his 
family’s leadership over both the Sakya and Central Tibet. In “P’ags’p’a,” 650. See also Atwood, 
“Encyclopedia of Mongolia,” 539. 
 
60 Tongren Xianzhi, 915.  See also Frank, 300.   
 
61 Atwood, “Encyclopedia of Mongolia,” 539; Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan : His Life and Times 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 225.  Manggala was born to Qubilai’s favorite wife, 
Chabi. 
 





charismatic, clan-based rule of an expanding steppe empire.  However, this overlaying of 
administrative, military, religious, imperial, princely, and indigenous interests, with all of 
its inherent contradictions, inconsistencies and ambiguities, also underscores the 
inadvisability of employing nation-based frameworks to understand what was a pre-
modern, imperial formation.63   
 
It was from within this convergence of imperial rule, sectarian concerns and local 
context that the institution of Rongwo Nangso first appeared.  Qin Shijin notes that the 
particulars regarding the origins, jurisdiction and authority associated with the nangso 
title remain unclear.64  Chinese-language sources most often gloss nangso as tuguan or 
native chieftain, with some commentators suggesting that the nangso differs from a 
traditional tuguan in that the position enjoyed the imprimatur of religious authorities.65  
The great twentieth-century Amdowa educator and Buddhist scholar Geshé Sherap 
Gyatso has argued that it originally meant internal minister or chamberlain (neicheng), 
                                                
63 Long ago Larry Moses noted that Mongols strength lay in their ability and willingness to integrate tribal, 
bureaucratic and imperial techniques into their institutions of rule. Larry William Moses, The Political Role 
of Mongol Buddhism, Indiana University Uralic Altaic Series V. 133 (Bloomington: 1977). 
 
64 Qin Shijin, Qinghai Longwusi Zhengjiao Heyi Tizhi Shi Lishi Yanjiu ([Xining?]: n.p., 1992), 93.   
 
65 Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 200-201.  Zhao Goubin argues that the position of nangso 
entailed more authority than that of tuguan, “because it is the product of politics and religion combined, 
[the nangso] had military power, and religious authority.” A similar suggestion is made by Li Yongchang 
who claims that the position was granted by Tibetan religious authority. It should be noted that both of 
these authors are describing nangso traditions other than the Rongwo Nangso.  Sonam Tsering 
differentiates the secular rule of the nangso family over “an important polity,” and the religious leadership 
of the Shartsang lineage.  Although several sources mention the nangso serving as a secular representative 
of the Shartsang Lama and Rongwo Monastery, when the last Rongwo Nangso described his selection he 
cites consultations with the leadership of Repgong’s Twelve Tribes and the Xining government but not the 
monastery. Zhao Guobin, "Hualong Shizu Tuguan Angsuo Jilüe," Hualong Wenshi Ziliao 8 (1988): 14; Li 






although it came to essentially mean local official (tuguan).66  Sherap Gyatso’s 
contemporary and sometimes nemesis, the polymath and iconoclast Gendün Chömpel 
described the nangso as a border official tasked with overseeing public order.67  Xu 
Likuai describes nangso as the “local official-in-general” (zongtuguan), which he equates 
with wanhu.68  Paul Nietupski refers to the Rongwo Nangso as Rongwo’s “governor,”69 
which seems to suggest a more regularized and bureaucratic function than is perhaps 
warranted, while Mark Stevens translates nangso in more utilitarian fashion as “pan-tribal 
leader.”70 
In any case, Qin notes that the title was “a completely distinctive development in 
the history of Tibetan regional administrative positions.”71  Like Sherap Gyatso but 
unlike most Chinese authors, Qin’s comments are noticeable for attributing the nangso’s 
origins to the Central Tibetan Yarlung Empire (7th-9th C.).  Qin hypothesizes that the title 
was brought to the Repgong area in the 13th Century from Central Tibet by the patriarch 
of the family that would come to dominate the region.  In 1264, with the civil war to 
                                                
66 In Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 202.  According to Tibetan sources the Rongwo Nangso’s 
manor was known as the yam on, apparently a transliteration of the Chinese term for a local government 
office, yamen.  See Sonam Gyatso. 
 
67 Gendün Chömpel contrasted nangso (literally “inner watcher”), with phyi so (“outer watcher”) assigned 
to guard the borders.  In Sonam Gyatso; Qin, 92. 
 
68 Xu Likui, 3.  Xu is specifically referring to the nangso at the time of the Yuan-Ming transition.  
Lamaocuo also glosses nangso as wanhu, perhaps referring to the original convergence of the biliwanhufu 
and the Awar Nangso. Lamacuo, "Qinghai Zangqu Buluo Zhidu De Xingcheng Yu Fazhan," Qinghai 
Shehui Kexue 6 (1995). 
 
69 Paul Kocot Nietupski, Labrang Monastery : A Tibetan Buddhist Community on the Inner Asian 
Borderlands, 1709-1958 (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), 69. 
 
70 Stevens, 18.  
 





succeed his older brother Möngke as Great Khan having been decided in Qubilai’s favor, 
a Sakya missionary named Lharjé Draknawa is said to have arrived in Amdo with his 
three sons and as many as thirty clansmen.  An “accomplished Buddhist master and 
medical practitioner,” Qubilai’s newly designated state preceptor (guoshi) the Pakpa 
Lama had dispatched his co-sectarian “to spread the Dharma and rule over Reb gong.”72 
Although the story quickly begins to take on a mythologized quality, it appears that by 
dint of his connections with the imperial throne and the ascendant Sakya tradition; by 
leveraging his family’s knowledge and patronage of religion and medicine; and by 
forging marital alliances with local leaders; under Lharjé Draknawa’s son Rongchen 
Dodé Bum and nine grandchildren the clan quickly began to consolidate authority over 
the Repgong region.73  Relying on Rong bo dgon chen gyi gdan rabs (The Lineage 
Holders of Rongwo Monastery), Sonam Tsering maintains that in the early 14th Century 
Dodé Bum was invited to the Yuan court where he was appointed the first Rongwo 
Nangso.  Later, Dodé Bum’s third son Lodrö Senggé would serve as religious advisor to 
the Mongol emperor and in 1333 was himself named State Preceptor.74  Lodrö Senggé is 
credited with establishing two subordinate nangso traditions, the Dowi Nangso in today’s 
                                                
72 Sonam Tsering.  See also Zhiguanba, 292-293; Qin, 17-19; HNZZZZZGK, 80; Zhaxi Anjia, 243; Chen 
Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 202. Atwood reports that the succession wars between Qubilai and his 
brother Ariq-Böke brought renewed turmoil to the region and that Amdo should not be considered pacified 
until 1264, perhaps not coincidentally the same year Lharjé Draknawa is said to have arrived in Repgong. 
In Encyclopedia of Mongolia, 539.  
 
73 Tib. Rong chen Mdo sde ‘bum; Ch. Longqin Duodaiben.   
 
74 Tib. Blo gros seng ge; Ch. Luozhi Sengge. Drakgonpa (Tib. Brag dgon zhabs drun Dkon mchog bstanpa 
rabrgyas; Ch. Zhiguanba Gongque Hudan Baraoji) claims that it was under the Ming that Lodrö Senggé 





Xunhua County and the Marnang Nangso or the Lower Repgong Nangso.75  In 1342, on 
land donated by the indigenous headman and father-in-law of Dodé Bum, Sakyil 
Tabéhu,76 Dodé Bum’s eldest son would found Rongwo Dechen Chökorling (hereafter 
Rongwo Monastery) at that time devoted to the Sakya tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.77  
Qin Shijin, however, challenges the idea found in several Tibetan sources that 
Dodé Bum was in fact recognized at the Yuan court as the Rongwo Nangso.  He reasons 
that the title nangso does not appear in the Yuan sources next to wanhu, qianhu, baihu 
and others, nor is it given a place in the administrative structure of Yuan-era Amdo.78  
Authors that rely on Chinese-language dynastic sources likewise refrain from suggesting 
that Dodé Bum was himself granted the title of nangso, instead generally referring to him 
as the tuguan or stating that he was the progenitor or ancestor of the Rongwo Nangso.79 
Clearly referring to Chinese dynastic sources, Danzhu Angben writes that the first record 
of the term nangso does not appear until the Wanli reign (1563-1620) of the Ming 
Dyansty.80  The most obvious way to reconcile these two viewpoints is that having 
brought the title with them from Central Tibet, by the time of Dodé Bum the title was 
                                                
75 Sonam Tsering.  In all, six nangso houses would be established in eastern Amdo, four south of the 
Yellow River and two north of the river in present-day Hualong County.  The Marnang Nangso was also 
referred to as the Karing Nangso (Tib. Ka ring, Ch. Gerang).  Danzhu Angben, ed., Zangzu Dacidian 
(Lanzhou Shi: Gansu Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), 554. 
 
76 Tabéhu is a transliteration of a Chinese-language title meaning “Great Baihu.” 
 
77 Tib. rong wo bde chen chos ‘khor ling. Sonam Tsering; Zhiguanba, 292; Qin, 20; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 
1378.  
 
78 Qin, 93-94. 
 
79 HNZZZZZGK, 80; Zeku Xianzhi, 9.  
 





being used locally and with other Tibetan centers of power.  On the other hand, in 
Chinese-language court documents tuguan remained in use.  After all, while the 
concentration here is on its relationship to the Yuan court, other sources of authority 
surely projected themselves into Rongwo’s political and social worlds.  In a vivid 
example of both the multiple imperial centers that could exert influence in Rongwo as 
well as the ability of the Mongol Yuan to simultaneously operate in multiple cultural 
milieus, according to Tibetan sources one of Dodé Bum’s nephews, Könchok Gyeltsen, 
was granted the positions of guoshi and beile nangso by the Mongol court.  The latter is a 
hybrid Tibetan-Mongol title, beile being an Inner Asian term meaning something akin to 
prince or nobleman.  Meanwhile, Central Tibetan authorities reportedly presented 
Könchok Gyeltsen with the title Nangso Guru.81 After Könchok Gyeltsen, the nangso and 
guoshi titles would remain in his branch of the family for at least the next several 
generations.82 
The exact circumstances that led to the rise of the house of the Rongwo Nangso as 
the dominant local institution and the recipient of imperial largess likewise remains 
murky.83  While most Chinese sources simply note the years that members of the 
Rongwo clan were recognized by the Ming court, implying that it was the state that 
essentially empowered the Rongwo clan, Qin opines, 
                                                
81 Sonam Tsering.  The author states that authorities in Lhasa granted Könchok Gyeltsen the Nangso Guru 
title.  However, it is unclear to which authorities this might refer.  Most plausible would be the Phagmodru 
Myriarchy, located in the Yarlung Valley to the southeast of Lhasa, which by the 1350s had replaced Sakya 
hegemony over Central Tibet.   Drakgonpa claims that Könchok Gyeltsen had an imperial audience in the 
Xuande Emperor’s 2nd year (1427) but does not mention any specific titles granted, only reporting that 
Könchok Gyeltsen received the imperial favor of an official seal and titles. Zhiguanba, 293. 
 
82 Sonam Tsering. 
 





[As] the power of the Rongwo Nangso developed unceasingly, in the 
Ming’s middle period, it informally replaced the original biliwei, and annexed the 
four Gartsé [Awar Téu] clans  (bu), [and] because of this it very quickly came to 
the attention of the Ming court, [and] from 1427 Lodrö Senggé of this family was 
enfeoffed by the Ming Court as the Magnificently Cultivated and Brilliantly 
Awakened State Preceptor (Hongxiumiaowu Goushi), [and from then on] without 
end [the family] had people enfeoffed as state preceptor and other local 
positions.84 
 
Importantly Qin is asserting local agency by not only noting the indigenous (or more 
specifically Central Tibetan) root of the nangso title but also by subtly suggesting that the 
rise of the house of the Rongwo Nangso occurred not because of imperial patronage but 
in the vacuum left by the diminished reach of the Ming state.  However, he does note that 
the two positions, nangso (local) and guoshi (imperial), were mutually reinforcing.  The 
Ming recognized the growing power of the nangso by granting its holder the title 
daguoshi (Great State Preceptor), which in turn elevated the local position of the nangso 
and his lineage above potential rivals.85 
Meanwhile, the authority of the biliwanhufu was simultaneously weakening.  In 
1370, with the Mongol Yuan now toppled from power, Hezhou had been occupied by 
Ming troops.  In that year the biliwanhufu was downgraded to a qianhusuo (One 
                                                
84 Qin, 93.  
 
85 While Qin bravely asserts himself in a debate with subtle but consequential political overtones, he does 
not weigh in on another divergence between the Chinese and Tibetan sources. Along with Qin, Chinese 
sources are unanimous in claiming that it was in 1427 that Lodrö Senggé was recognized as guoshi, the first 
in his line to receive this title. This, however, is at odds with Tibetan sources as well as the dictates of logic. 
There is a one hundred-fifty-year gap between his grandfather’s arrival in Repgong and the Xuande reign. 
If Lodrö Senggé was indeed Lharjé Draknawa’s grandson, it therefore seems unlikely that he traveled to the 
Ming Court in 1427.  Instead, Tibetan sources claim that Lodrö Senggé served as guoshi under Togghan-
Temür, the last emperor of the Yuan (the Shundi Emperor, r. 1333-1370).  In personal communications it 
has been suggested that Tibetan scholars in China are aware of this discrepancy but have been forced to 
follow the Chinese chronology.  Although the state’s reasoning is difficult to ascertain, one could speculate 
that there is an interest in tying the rise of Repgong’s leading family to the indigenous Ming state rather 





Thousand Household Battalion).86  Then, in 1403, the position was again elevated, this 
time to the biliwei (guard) with authority over “the pastoral regions of today’s Hainan and 
Huangnan Prefectures.”87  Wei Xinchun notes that on four occasions (1373, 1403, 1404, 
1406), the early Ming court conferred titles on successive leaders of the Awar clan, 
remarking that they were “enfeoffed as the Hezhou wei qianhu.”88  Although the details 
are less than clear as to when and how, at some point during the mid-Ming the inheritors 
of the Awar biliwanhu became known as the Awar Nangso.89 
Throughout, the descendents of Larjé Draknawa and Dodé Bum, who had done so 
much to spread the Sakya tradition in the Rongwo area, continued to receive honors 
under the Ming, in particular as guoshi.90  A grandson of Könchok Gyeltsen, for example, 
is said to have had four audiences with the Ming Emperor and raised a Tibetan army on 
                                                
86 This essentially refers to a change in the military-administrative classification of the region and the 
official rank of its leadership in the imperial bureaucracy.  When the Hezhou Pacification Commission was 
downgraded in 1371 to the Hezhou Guard (wei), all of the administrative units under it, including the 
biliwanhufu, were correspondingly downgraded one rank.  According to Danzhu Angben, the Yuan’s 
Assistant Pacification Commissioner, Hesuo Nanpu, became the commander of the Hezhou Wei.  Like 
Pabalongshu before him, Hesuo Nanpu’s descendents became the hereditary commanders of the Ming 
garrison at Hezhou.  Danzhu Angben, 310. 
 
87 Tongren Xianzhi, 155.   
 
88 Wei, “Qinghai Zangqu,” 54. See also Xu Likuai 3.  Wang Jiguang provides the Chinese names of the 
four recipients as well as their familial relationship.  In “Mingdai Biliwei Xinkao,”153-4.  The Tongren 
Xianzhi only notes that the Ming Court “four times in succession conferred a title upon the headman of the 
Awar Tribe” (155). Neither Xu, Wei nor the gazetteer specifically state that the title was nangso.  
Interestingly, Tibetan-language histories on the Repgong region are largely silent on the Awar Nangso and 
the biliwanhu, choosing to concentrate on the Rongwo Nangso and the Shartsang lineage as the political 
and religions authorities over an integrated Rongwo region.  See Sonam Tsering and Zhiguanba. 
 
89 Qin, 29-35. Like the Rongwo Nangso, the title Awar Nangso may have been used locally well before it 
appears in dynastic sources. According to a 1953 CCP ethnographic study, like the Rongwo Nangso, the 
Awar Nangso was first recognized as such in the second year of the Ming Dynasty’s Xuande Emperor 
(1427).  Although the report admits that it had no information as to the specific authority of the Awar 
Nangso, it does note that he served as the leader of the five Gartsé clans (Guashize zu). In Tongren Xianhi, 
1168. 
 





the Ming’s behalf.  In exchange he was granted not only the nangso and guoshi titles but 
made a sixth ranked general in the Ming army.91  In the process, over the course of the 
15th century, the house of the Rongwo Nangso eclipsed that of the Awar Nangso.  Qin 
Shijin surmises that this likely had multiple causes, the most important being the 
association of the Rongwo Nangso clan with the ascendant spiritual and economic power 
of Rongwo Monastery coupled with Ming attempts to control the lucrative and strategic 
Tea and Horse Trade, which may have eroded the Awar clan’s economic position.92  A 
1953 CCP investigation simply notes, “After many transfers of power, the rule of the 
nangso of the five [Gartsé] zu gradually weakened, [and] his position began to become 
lower than the nangso of the twelve [Repgong] zu.  Therefore the five zu of Gartsé came 
under the control of the twelve zu of Rongwo.”93  
The Chinese and Tibetan sources do agree, however, that from the time of Dodé 
Bum and his sons, a system of religious and secular rule united begins to develop in the 
Repgong region.  As suggested in Drakgonpa’s nineteenth-century history of Amdo (Tib. 
A mdo chos ‘byun; Ch. Anduo Zhengjiaoshi), it is perhaps from this time that we can 
begin to think of Repgong as a unified polity with its core located in today’s Tongren and 
                                                
91 Sonam Tsering, Zhiguanba, 293 and Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1379. 
 
92 Qin adds that the Ming’s saturation of Amdo with imperial titles may have watered down the importance 
of the biliqianhu.  Lastly, without specifically referencing examples, Qin mentions that natural disasters 
caused economic and social turmoil that led to political and social realignments (31-34).  See also 
Zhiguanba, 329-330. 
 
93 Tongren Xianzhi, 1168.  Qin Shijin maintains, “Gartsé Monastery and its subordinate Awa, [and Téu] 
tribes over a very long period of time, [have maintained] their independence of Rongwo Monastery and 
developed [independently] (15).  Danzhu Angben adds that it was not until the Qianlong Period of the Qing 
Dyansty (1736-1796) that the Awar Nangso’s authority had become limited to the five Gartsé Tribes 
(buluo). In fact, the Awar Nangso household’s leadership over the Awar Téu and Gartsé Monastery, which 
continued until 1958, likely made it the longest serving ruling house in Amdo.  The last Awar Nangso was 





Zeku Counties.94  As such, Repgong might best be thought of as the regions under the 
direct authority of the Rongwo Nangso and later Rongwo Monastery under the leadership 
of the Shartsang lineage.95 
 
Mongols, Manchus and Empire 
Despite the semblance of administrative control depicted in Chinese sources, 
there is little question that Beijing’s influence in Amdo waned considerably but did not 
vanish during the Ming (1368-1644).  Instead it maintained a presence in the region 
mainly via a series of garrisons (weisuo) that were almost certainly more interested in 
protecting the borders and maintenance of the vital tea and horse trade than occupying or 
administering territory.96  Hou and Liu admit that during this period Amdo was 
particularly difficult to rule and that the tusi system amounted to a strategy of “divide and 
                                                
94 In his history of Amdo, Drakgonpa notes that the geographic definition of Repgong includes multiple 
possibilities.  The expanded view is that it includes Xunhua and parts of Linxia, Guide, Tongde and Guinan 
etc.  The more narrow view is that it is limited to the areas drained by the Rongwo River and those 
inhabited by the nomads (youmu) of Repgong’s twelve tribes (zu).  This apparently refers to the pastoralists 
who in the 16th-18th centuries migrated from agricultural and mixed-use regions of present-day Tongren 
County to the high plateau now administered as Zeku County. Zhiguanba, 292 n.1, n.2.  Sonam Tsering 
describes twelve inner divisions most likely correlating to Dodé Bum’s twelve ministers, as well as 
eighteen outer divisions of Repgong, correlating to Samten Rinchen’s eighteen “temples of various sizes.”   
 
95 Attempts to map and categories the different types of polities that existed in pre-Liberation Tibet are just 
getting started, particularly under the guidance of David Germano at the Tibetan and Himalayan Library 
(www.thlib.org) hosted by Virginia University.  At present researchers have identified seven types of 
polities, ranging from empire to estate.  Currently Repgong is listed as an “agricultural estate,” a 
designation that seems too limited given the complex nature of both the nangso and Shartsang institutions 
in northeast Amdo.  
 
96 Elliot Sperling, "Did the Early Ming Emperors Attempt to Implement a 'Divide and Rule' Policy in 
Tibet?" in Contributions on Tibetan Language, History and Culture: Proceedings of the Csoma De Kõrös 
Symposium Held at Velm-Vienna, Austria, 13-19 September 1981, ed. Ernst Steinkellner (Vienna: 1983), 





rule” that met with only limited success.97  Wei Xinchun remarks that although the 
qianbaihu system was ostensibly a military administration under the command of the 
Biliwei, other than the granting of titles the Ming state had no administrative role in the 
pastoral regions of Qinghai.  Instead, Wei compares it to the “loose reign” (jimi) frontier 
strategy that China-based states had for centuries employed as one of their tools of border 
pacification.98  Wang Xuguan agrees, admitting that during the Ming period jimi wei 
[loose-reign guards] like the Biliwei were wei in name only, with the throne exercising 
only the most indirect control.99  Although several smaller garrisons (tun) were deployed 
further into Amdo (at Guide, Xunhua and Xining), the largest garrison and main post for 
the state-regulated tea and horse trade was located at Hezhou.  There, protected by the 
Yellow River and Jinshi Mountains, the border between Ming China and the realms 
beyond was effectively set.100  Wang notes that the Hezhouwei, under which the Biliwei 
                                                
97 Hou and Liu, 69-70.  Sperling has ably argued against the orthodox Chinese claim that Ming policy in 
Amdo amounted to a strategy of “divide and rule.” Instead he contends that Ming weakness limited its 
ambitions to policies aimed at the maintenance of order and the continuance of its commercial interests. He 
notes, “This attempt at maintaining influence with the commercial and economic powers in Tibet was a 
natural result of the position of impotence that Ming China held there.” In “Early Ming Emperors,” 351.   I 
include Hou and Liu’s assertion here to emphasize Ming weakness, not to support the “divide and conquer” 
argument.  
 
98 Wei Xinchun, 54.  The jimi strategy is often contrasted with the more interventionist huairou 
(cherishing) strategy of administration and assimilation.  In this case, Wei is distinguishing the Ming’s 
“loose reign” strategy to what he describes as the Qing’s effective incorporation of the region through the 
revamped qianbaihu and tusi systems.  However, Leibold reminds us that what at the center seems an 
incorporative strategy might be felt far more loosely on the periphery.  He writes, “Like other empires, the 
Qing tended to tread lightly on its frontier after conquest, adopting a jimi policy that allowed most regions 
to maintain their own political, legal, and institutional structures as long as they remained loyal to the 
Manchu court.” In Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 4. 
   
99 Wang Jiguang, "Mingdai Biliwei Xinkao,"151. 
 





nominally operated, was not much more than a forward sentry post for controlling 
Tibetan regions, an “‘internally Han (huaxia) externally barbarian (yidi) border.’”101  
Despite what appears to be a very limited ability to directly impose its will in 
much of Amdo and beyond, the Ming remained an important source of wealth and 
authority for many Tibetan institutions.102  Chinese sources, for example, emphasize that 
in 1393 the Hezhou Biliwei was divided into twenty-nine clans (bu), granting “tea and 
horse exchange market relations with twenty-one of them.”103  Moreover, as we have 
seen in the case of the nangso and guoshi, the Ming’s willingness to grant titles to local 
leaders, secular and religious, was not inconsequential.  In fact, in addition to recognizing 
headmen as tuguan or tusi, Yuan-period titles including qianhu and baihu continued to be 
sought after and conferred throughout the Ming.   
This is not to say, however, that the Ming was the only or even the primary source 
of authority available to local Tibetan leaders.  Various Tibetan governments and 
religious centers also maintained the ability to confer legitimacy on local actors.  The 
Ming Period, or if we use standard Central Tibetan political periodization, the Phagmodru 
                                                
101 Wang Jiguang, "Mingdai Biliwei Xinkao,"151. 
 
102 Among the more startling examples are the early Ming emperors’ patronage of the Black Hat Karmapa 
lineage, financial support for the construction of Lhasa’s Sera Monastery, and granting eight Tibetan 
religious leaders titles as either fawang (which Sperling translates as dharmaja or “king of the Dharma”) or 
wang (prince). Elliot Sperling, "Ming Ch’eng-Tsu and the Monk Officials of Gling-Tshang and Gon-Gyo," 
in Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory of Turrel V. Wylie, ed. Lawrence Epstein and Richard 
F. Sherburne (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1990), 75, 80.  See also Qin, 31-32; Elliot Sperling, "The 5th 
Karma-Pa and Some Aspects of the Relationship between Tibet and the Early Ming," in The History of 
Tibet: The Medieval Period, C. 850-1895 the Development of Buddhist Paramountcy, ed. Alex McKay 
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
 
103 Tongren Xianzhi, 916; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1317; Li and Li, 126-8. For a concise description of the 





Period (ca. 1354-1565), was a dynamic time of religious, political and cultural innovation 
in the Tibetan speaking world.  Due to both domestic and interstate pressures, by the 
sixteenth century the Ming’s already limited ability to assert its interests in Amdo was 
again severely weakened.  In response, Tibetan-language sources contend that the house 
of the Rongwo Nangso self-consciously hitched its fortunes to two newly emergent 
developments; Tsongkapa’s Gelukpa tradition, which was then in the process of being 
institutionalized and politicized, and Mongol military might.104 
In retrospect, the most important development of the Phagmodru Period may have 
been the founding and expansion of what would become known as the Gelukpa tradition 
of Tibetan Buddhism, the order that over time would become most closely associated 
with the institution of the Dalai Lama.  In fact, the movement’s founder, Tsongkhapa, 
was a native of northeast Amdo and his own master, Chöjé Döndrup Rinchen, also 
counted Dodé Bum’s eldest son, Rongwo Samten Rinchen, as a disciple.  Samten 
Rinchen would go on to found Rongwo’s “eighteen temples of various sizes,” including 
what would become Repgong’s main monastic institution, Rongwo Monastery, of which 
he became the first abbot.105   
Moreover, from the early sixteenth century Amdo became a refuge for successive 
waves of Mongol tribes and confederations forced from their homelands by the post-
Yuan, Inner-Asian steppe rivalries that were remaking the Mongol political world.106  
                                                
104 Sonam Tsering. 
 
105 Zhiguanba, 293; Sonam Tsering. 
 
106 See Elverskog (Chapter 2) for a very useful analysis of the period, as well as on pre-modern Mongol 
conceptions of statehood. See also Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West : The Qing Conquest of Central 




Repgong and surrounding regions would come under the control of a subunit of the 
Eastern Tumed Mongols.  According to an oft-cited Qing report, during this time “The 
Tibetans only recognized the Mongols, and did not recognize the ting, wei, ying, [and] wu 
[military-administrative] officials.”107  Cut off from Ming patronage, by the end of the 
sixteenth century the clan of the Rongwo Nangso had instead established a priest-patron 
relationship with the Tumed leadership.108   
This shift already underway, in 1601 a member of the Rongwo Nangso family 
accompanied the 4th Dalai Lama and his Mongol entourage on the Gelukpa prelate’s 
“return” to Lhasa.109  Recognizing the sway the Gelukpa had among much of the Mongol 
ruling elite, the story goes, upon returning to Repgong the traveler’s stepbrother was 
made to enter a Gelukpa monastery (to this point the Rongwo Nangso clan had 
patronized the Sakya tradition).  The stepbrother, Shar Kelden Gyatso, would eventually 
found Rongwo Monastery’s first Gelukpa college (1630) and become the monastery’s 
                                                                                                                                            
movement would have significant consequences for Amdo.  For example, sixteenth-century Mongol 
incursions into the vast regions surrounding Qinghai Lake (Mon. Kokonur; Tib. Tsongonpo) forced many 
of the local Tibetans on a southern migration.  Many would settle in present-day Huangnan Prefecture, 
remaking the demographic landscape of the regions lying within the bend of the Yellow River. Cui, Zhang, 
and Du, 367; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1317.  
 
107 Wei Xinchun 53. According to Wei, this situation persisted until the pacification of the Lobsang Danjin 
Rebellion and the reorganization of the tusi and qianbaihu systems. It was most likely during this period of 
Mongol rule that Amdo’s tribal system took something akin to its present form.  It was then formalized and 
preserved under Qing administration.  See Sangs rgyas rinchen and 'Brug thar, eds., Bod Sog Gi Rig Gnas 
'Brel Ba'i Zhiib 'Jug (Lanzhou: Kansu'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2003). 
 
108 Zhiguanba, 293; Sonam Tsering; Li and Li, 119. 
 
109 In 1578, under pressure from the rival Karma Kagyu school and its secular supporters, the Gelukpa 
lama Sonam Gyatso had been forced to flee Lhasa.  He traveled to Amdo and Mongolia where he and his 
entourage effectively missionized among the Eastern Mongols, including forming a priest-patron 
relationship with the Tumed chieftain Altan Khan.  It was Altan Khan who gave Sonam Gyatso the title of 
Dalai Lama, making him retroactively the third of his lineage.  Upon Sonam Gyatso’s death, a relative of 
Altan Khan, Yonten Gyatso, was recognized as the 4th Dalai Lama.  It would be under his successor, the 5th 
Dalai Lama, with the military support of the then Amdo-based Khoshud Mongols, that the Dalai Lamas 





first Gelukpa abbot.110  From this point, Gelukpa influence with Mongol support spread 
throughout the region, replacing the Sakya as the area’s dominant sectarian force.  When 
in the 1636 the Khoshud Mongols supplanted the Tumed’s position in Amdo, support for 
the Gelukpa and Rongwo Monastery under Shar Kelden only increased.111  Shar Kelden 
would posthumously become known as the 1st Shartsang Lama, his lineage quickly 
becoming the Repgong region’s dominant religious and political institution, a status it 
would maintain at least until the arrival of the PLA.112   
During the Qing period (1644-1912), however, the regional syncretic nexus of 
authority received a further major jolt.  The impetus for these changes was deeply 
intertwined with the Manchu Qing’s eighteenth-century expansion into a vast Eurasian 
empire, the impact of which is still felt in the enormous geographic size and ethno-
cultural diversity of the modern Chinese state.  In 1723, Khoshud Mongol forces under 
the leadership of Lobsang Danjin renounced all Qing titles and rebelled against Manchu 
overlordship.113  Illustrating the gulf between the centralizing Qing state’s imperial 
                                                
110 In 1618, his uncle brought the eleven year-old Shar Kelden Gyatso to study at Ganden Monastery, the 
monastery outside of Lhasa founded by Tsongkhapa. See Sonam Tsering. 
 
111 For a brief overview of the Khoshud in Amdo, see Uyunbilig Borjigidai, "The Hoshuud Polity in 
Khokhnuur (Kokonor)," Inner Asia 4, no. 2 (2002). 
 
112 Sonam Tsering.  The relationship between Rongwo Monastery and the Khoshud leadership appears to 
have been cemented from the 1660s under the patronage of the Khoshud chieftain, Erdeni Jinong Tsewang 
Tenzin.  After the 17th century, the Sakya all but disappeared as an institutional force from the Repgong 
region, their monasteries converted to the Gelukpa tradition.  See Pu Wencheng, ed., Gan Qing Zangchuan 
Fojiao Siyuan (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1990), 429-30. For a more hagiographical rendering 
of the founding of the Shartsang lineage and Rongwo’s transition to the Gelukpa tradition, see Zhiguanba, 
293-297. 
 
113 Tib. Blo bzang bstan ‘dzin; Ch. Luobuzang Danjin. Borjidai, 187.  On the rebellion and its 
consequences see, Naota Kâto, "Warrior Lamas: The Role of Lamas in Lobjang Danjin’s Uprising in 
Kokonor, 1723-1724," Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 62 (2004); Naota Kâto, 
"Lobjang Danjin's Rebellion of 1723," Acta Asiatica 64 (1993); Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the 
Early 18th Century : History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, 2nd , rev. ed., T`oung 




ideology and Mongol conceptions of sovereignty and expectations of rulership, in Johan 
Elverskog’s formulation Lobsang Danjin was asserting his right to rebel against a 
federated state (törö) that no longer served the interest of his own community (ulus).114  
The Qing retaliation for what it considered a serious breech of loyalty was as 
consequential as it was devastating, reshaping Amdo and with it much of the Tibetan and 
Mongol political worlds.  In the wake of the widespread destruction of much of the 
monastic institutions and political leadership of eastern Amdo, the Qing would foster a 
new generation of political and religious authorities while pumping vast amounts of 
resources into the region’s religious institutions.  The result was the vast expansion of 
state-sponsored Tibetan Buddhism, thus strengthening the imperial bond between the 
Qing center and many of Amdo’s political-religious elite.115 
                                                                                                                                            
Central Eurasia. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 243-248; Perdue, 
“Empire and Nation;” 288-296; Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 33-37. 
 
114 See for example the secret Qing memorial translated by Kato in which the Amdo leaders of the 
Khoshud Mongols express the view that the Qing had betrayed their service rendered in recapturing Central 
Tibet from forces of the Qing’s archrivals, the Zhungar Mongols.  In turn, the rebels made entreaties 
toward an alliance with the Zhungar.  This illustrates well what Elverskog refers as the ulus/törö system, 
the defining characteristic of which is the transient nature of the state (törö, which could be a nomadic 
federation just as it could be a sedentary empire) made up of several (normatively) fixed communities 
(ulus, often referred to as tribes) which might leave the törö to join or form new states.  For a study of the 
development of the term törö from a pre-Chingissid Turkic word denoting something akin to “tradition” to 
a post-Yuan term meaning “state,” see Carolyn Humphries and A. Hürelbaatar, "The Term Törö in 
Mongolian History," in Imperial Statecraft : Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, 
Sixth-Twentieth Centuries, ed. David Sneath, (Bellingham, WA: Center for East Asian Studies Western 
Washington University, 2006), 263-293.  
 
115 For example, the 3rd Shartsang Lama received Qing titles through the auspices of Chankya Rölpé Dorjé, 
under the Qianlong Emperor the most influential religious figure at the Qing court.  The 4th-7th incarnations 
of the Shartsang lineage would subsequently be discovered in Rölpé Dorjé’s family.  It should be noted that 
the 3rd Shartsang Rinpoche also traveled to Lhasa where he received titles from the 8th Dalai Lama. 
Authority clearly flowed in multiple directions.  See Sonam Tsering; Qin, 82-90.  On the Chankya Lama 
see Marina Illich, "Selections from the Life of a Tibetan Buddhist Polymath : Chankya Rolpai Dorje 
(Lcang Skya Rol Pa ‘i Rdo Rje), 1717-1886" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2006); Xiangyun Wang, 
"The Qing Court's Tibet Connection: Lcang Skya Rol Pa'i Rdo Rje and the Qianlong Emperor," Harvard 





At the same time the state’s mechanisms for incorporating the region’s more 
elusive pastoral tribal elements were reworked.  Faced with the evidence of the loose 
loyalties of Amdo’s pastoral population and even looser state control, a court official 
summed up the situation by noting, “There are twenty-nine Mongol banners. There are 
unknown hundreds of cooked, raw and wild Tibetan tribes.”116  The Yongzheng Emperor 
in 1726 thus created the position of Amban (banshi dachen), an imperial banner position 
outside the regular Chinese-style bureaucratic state, and dispatched him to Amdo.  The 
Amban was tasked with conducting a census of the Tibetan regions, dividing their 
territories, approving and appointing tusi, and reorganizing the qianbaihu.117  Among the 
two hundred and seven tribal groupings (buluo) identified in the census, the Amban 
recognized one zongqianhu, 22 qianhu, 114 baihu, 81 baizhang, and 46 ganbao or 
shizhang.118  These were then distributed among Qing-era administrative regions, with 
                                                
116 Li and Li, 152.  Cooked, semi-cooked and raw are traditional Chinese descriptions of degrees of 
acculturation and civilization.  The twenty-nine Mongol Banners were also a post-rebellion Qing 
administrative reform. 
 
117 Ibid.,153.  See also Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 35-38.  It should be noted that the 18th century 
term modern scholars are translating as “Tibetan” was fan.  At that point fan was not an ethnic 
categorization.  Instead, according to Ma Haiyun, in Amdo fan referred to those that the state considered 
“culturally ‘Tibetan’” and thus did not participate in the political and moral obligations of the Chinese state 
segment of the multicultural Qing Empire.  For example, at the time the Muslim Turkic-speaking Salars of 
Xunhua were categorized as fan. It was only after the 1780s, when the convergence of the Qing’s new 
bureaucratic administrations and intra-community Islamic sectarian rivalries brought the Salar community 
to the attention of the Qianlong Emperor and his court that the Salars were gradually reclassified as Huimin 
or Muslim subjects of the Chinese bureaucratic state and Confucian moral regime.  In Haiyun Ma, 3. 
 
118 Li and Li, 153; Chen Guangguo, ed., Qinghai Zangzushi (Xining Shi: Qinghai Minzu Chubanshe, 
1997), 350-1. As noted above, the position of zongqianhu was not hereditary.  Instead it appears to have 
been intermittently bestowed upon an indigenous leader at the behest of the state.  For example, in the mid 
19th century the Xining Amban dispatched a representative to present-day Guinan, just north of Zeku, 
where they gathered the three baihu and “renowned elders of the seventeen small buluo.”  “That year 
Lubenke [baihu of the Lutsang (Ch.) Tribe] was enfeoffed as ‘Qianhu of the Great Qing’ and given the title 
Qing Prince Zongqianhu of the seventeen Tibetan tribes.”  Lubenke (Ch.) was presented with a seal in the 
five languages of the Qing Empire (Manchu, Mongol, Chinese, Tibetan and Uighur) and given a level 
seven rank in the imperial bureaucracy. Guinan Xian zhi bian zuan wei yuan hui, Guinan Xianzhi (Xi'an: 
San Qin Chubanshe, 1996), 447.  Similarly, in the Republican period on two occasions Ma Bufang granted 




Repgong along with much of eastern Amdo in 1761 finally settling within the newly 
created Xunhua Ting (subprefect) under the supervision of the Xining Amban.119  Two 
centuries of Mongol dominance was significantly diminished, although far from 
eliminated, and Amdo was drawn closer to the imperial center.120  Khoshud Mongol loss 
was the gain of Rongwo Monastery and the Rongwo Nangso, who saw their power 
expand particularly as pastoral elements began to break off from their agricultural 
brethren and migrate south to form new tribal groupings in the formerly Mongol 
territories that are now called Zeku County.121  
Among the major impacts of the Yongzheng reorganization was limiting the 
mobility of Tibetan and Mongol pastoralists, restricting participation in the long-distance 
trade for tea and grain, and regularizing state extraction of “tribute and taxes.”  This 
                                                                                                                                            
 
119 Tongren Xianzhi, 78. Today’s Tongren and Zeku Counties would have been part of what was known as 
Xixiang (the western districts).  In 1823 Xunhua Ting came under the supervision of the Xining Fu 
(prefect).  The relationship between the extra-bureaucratic office of the Amban and the region’s more 
traditional bureaucratic organizations will become clearer with the completion of Max Oidtmann’s 
dissertation.  Normatively, in matters pertaining to Tibetan or Mongol affairs, the Xunhua magistrate was 
expected to report to the Amban.  In issues pertaining to regular civil administration, the magistrate would 
report to the prefect in Lanzhou, and after 1823 Xining.  Personal Communication. 
 
120 For example, Ma Haiyun notes that the Salars of the “Hehuang region quickly and peacefully 
transferred their political loyalty [from the Henan Mongols] to the rising Qing Empire” (9).  Chinese-
language sources almost universally refer to the “decline” (shuaibi) of the Mongols, while Borjigidai 
writes, “The Mongols in the Khökhnuur never recovered and from this time on declined politically and 
socially” (194 n. 6).  However, Nietupski makes it clear that although their autonomy was severely 
diminished, the Henan Mongols remained significant local powers, particularly as sponsors of Labrang 
Monastery, a relationship that was maintained through 1949.  Nietupski, Labrang Monastery, 129-132, 
172-173. See also Li and Li, 153; Cui, Zhang, and Du, 362-367; Qin, 79-81; Bulag, Mongols at China’s 
Edge, 38-40. 
 
121 Qin, 81; Zeku Xianzhi, 3-4; Qinghaisheng Bianjizu, ed., Qinghai Sheng Zangzu Mengguzu Shehui Lishi 
Diaocha, Revised ed. (Beijing Shi: Min zu chu ban she, 1985), 56.  The expansion of Rongwo’s influence 
was checked by the even greater expansion of the power of Labrang Monastery.  Nietupski argues, 
“allowing for historical shifts in allegiance,” the territories that owed tax obligations to Labrang extended 
into Repgong to the east bank of the Rongwo River and north as far as Nangra, including the Dowi area of 
Xunhua (Yartsi) (which he describes as “partial Labrang territory”). Nietupski, Labrang Monastery, map 2 






seems to have contributed to the steady impoverishment of pastoral Tibetans, particularly 
those whose pastures had been fixed in the relatively less fertile grasslands within the 
bend of the Yellow River.  From the mid 18th century, large numbers of Tibetans began 
to cross the river in order to seize pasture or animals from the Mongol territories 
surrounding Qinghai Lake.122  Bulag writes, “A massive migration took place, leading to 
protracted conflicts and war between Tibetans and Mongols.”123  By the Jiaqing period 
(1796-1820), several references to confrontations between pastoral elements and the state 
suggest that material conditions had become desperate.  For example, sources show that 
in 1799 a large number of Tibetans forded the frozen Yellow River to rustle cattle.  Over 
2,000 people were injured in the ensuing range wars.  Finally, in 1807 a large Qing force 
assembled under the Shaanxi governor general attacked the Tibetan sojourners.  After 
what is suggested was an orgy of violence and plunder, one after another the rebellious 
tribes, led by the Rongwo Nangso and various lamas, surrendered to the state.124  
However, conditions continued to worsen and in January 1822 desperate pastoralists 
                                                
122 Cui, Zhang, and Du, 367-369.  Chinese sources refer to as the northern migration (bei qianyi).  This is 
in contrast to the southern migration that had occurred two centuries earlier when Mongols had occupied 
the lake region sending Tibetans south of the Yellow River.  
 
123 Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 39. The Kokonur Mongols had been badly weakened by the post-
Lobsang Danjin Rebellion reforms. Bulag asserts that initially the Qing may have encouraged this 
migration as a way to further limit Mongol power. Again, when published Max Oidtmann’s research will 
shed considerable light on this understudied period. 
 
124 Cui, Zhang, and Du, 369; Zeku Xianzhi, 11; Tongren Xianzhi, 22.  According to the county annals, 
“[Afterwards] The people of each clan ate the bitterness from the lamas’ scriptures, [and] they never again 
engaged in thievery.” It should be noted that this was during a period of a more general breakdown of 
social order marked for example by the White Lotus Rebellion and staggering levels of official corruption. 
In fact, after the death of the Qianlong Emperor (1799), the ninth of twenty accusations leveled at his 
palace favorite, Heshen, was for concealing the case of one thousand “bandits” who had a rampaged 
through Xunhua and Guide Ting, rustling cattle and disrupting trade, including caravans of the Dalai Lama.  
In Pei-kai Cheng, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan D. Spence, eds., The Search for Modern China: A 
Documentary Collection, (New York: Norton, 1999), 88.  In fact, the Tongren Xianzhi notes that in 1798 





again crossed the Yellow River in search of pasture, setting up new confrontations with 
Tibetans and Mongols to the north.  This time the governor-general responded quickly, 
dispatching 8,000 men and delivering another defeat to the Hehuang Tibetans.125 
In the wake of this second “anti-Qing war,” a second reorganization of the 
qianbaihu was undertaken.  Chinese sources claim that the main intent of the 1822 
reforms was to reduce the power of individual tusi and qianhu.  Rather than the state 
taking on a larger administrative role, this seems to have been mainly accomplished by 
reducing the number of households under the supervision of each headman.  This of 
course necessitated increasing the number of indigenous leaders recognized by the state. 
The intention was to limit individual bases of power while tying increasing numbers of 
headmen directly to the Qing throne, what Chinese sources refer to as a “policy of 
division” (fenhua zhengce) and “winning people over” (longluo zhengce).126  Within 
Xunhua and Guide Ting, ten qianhu and forty baihu were recognized with seals, titles 
and a promise of an annual supply of barley.127  It was at this time, for example, that the 
Hor, Gönshül, and Gartsé Tribes of what would become Zeku County were recognized as 
                                                
125 Cui, Zhang, and Du, 369-372; Tongren Xianzhi, 23-24; Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 39-40. 
 
126 Chen Guangguo, 351. According to the new system, “Every three hundred Tibetan households is 
assigned one qianhu, under the qianhu are baihu, zonghu, and shizong etc.  Every baihu administers one 
hundred households, three baihu are under the supervision of one qianhu.  Every baizong administers fifty 
households, two baizong are under the supervision of a baihu; [. . .].” Wu Jun, "Qinghaisheng Huanhai Ji 
Henanbei Zhi Zangzu," in XBMZZJSLWZ QHFC, (Lanzhou: Gansusheng Tushuguan, 1986), 447-448. 
 
127 Zeku Xianzhi, 11; Tongren Xianzhi, 23.  Qianhu, baihu and baizong were promised twelve, eight, and 
four shi of barley respectively and many of the tribes (zu) along with the Rongwo Nangso were permitted 
trading privileges, perhaps an acknowledgment of the economic hardships that had precipitated the 1822 
confrontation. By 1951, Tongren County, including the region that would become Zeku, could count eight 





qianhu tribes.128  It was also in 1822 that the Qing state recognized the Sonak— which 
had recently broken away from the Hor— as an “independent tribe.”129  Chinese sources, 
with subtle if unmistakable ideological undertones, suggest that the long-term 
consequences of the new qianbaihu order was an increase in inter- and intra-ethnic 
rivalries and feuds that would continue to fester into the twentieth century.130  
The actual operation and effectiveness of the Qing-era qianbaihu system is little 
understood beyond the normative bureaucratic relationships between imperial agents and 
the pastoral tribal leaders as found in Chinese sources.  However, we should not assume 
that Beijing, Xining or Xunhua were always considered an external and unwelcome 
player in internal tribal affairs.  For centuries the qianbaihu had been recognized by 
outside authorities.  By expanding the number of leaders granted imperial recognition, 
along with promised yearly grants of barley, the 1822 reorganization of the qianbaihu 
may very well have garnered the crown its intended increase in political capital.  The 
intersection between imperial and local interests, with all its pre-national ambiguity, is 
illustrated well by a short bureaucratic report regarding the 1875 transmission of the 
Gönshül Tribe’s qianhu title (present-day Zeku County) from deceased father to his son 
Sönam Bum.  What makes the exchange particularly interesting is that for several years 
the court had not acted to fill the vacancy.  This was only remedied when the then-
                                                
128 Zeku Xianzhi, 491-493.  A few years later the Méshül was also recognized as a qianhu tribe. However, 
for unknown reasons during the Republican period the Méshül was again downgraded to a baihu buluo.  At 
the time of Liberation, the Hor, Gönshül and Gartsé accounted for Zeku’s three qianhu tribes.   
 
129 Ibid., 490.  These tribes will all be central to the story of twentieth-century Zeku. 
 
130 Chen Guangguo, 352.  Writing from a not-so subtle ideological viewpoint, the author contends that a 
further consequence was an increase in interethnic economic and cultural relationships between the “border 
regions” and China proper (neidi) which would eventually “alleviate the contradictions between the 




Rongwo Nangso submitted a memorial on behalf of the Gönshül.  According to the 
nangso’s appeal, since his father’s death Sönam Bum had been serving as acting qianhu 
of the Gönshül. Yet the authorities in Xunhua had failed to address the situation.  In his 
petition, the nangso argued that Sönam Bum had attended to all of his duties including 
effectively restraining the clans from engaging in feuds.  In response, Xunhua reported to 
its superiors in Shaanxi that Sönam Bum’s worthiness had been carefully investigated 
after which he was presented with permits and seals.131   
The appendix to the Zeku County Gazetteer contains a reproduction of the report 
discussing the nangso’s recommendation, where it is surely meant to demonstrate the 
region’s enduring submission to national sovereignty.  However, instead it illustrates the 
loose control and administrative flexibility that is inherent to these types of pre-national, 
imperial formations.  Bureaucratic structures interact with indigenous elements in a 
manner suggesting that while the Qing may have had the authority and perhaps even 
power to appoint qianhu, in reality these decisions were often made locally with only the 
formal acquiescence of the throne.  On the other hand, even when the state was too 
preoccupied or inefficient to exercise its imperial prerogatives, local leaders might seek 
official recognition to re-enforce their own claims of authority and legitimacy.  Rather 
than proving northeast Amdo to be an integral part of the Chinese nation-state— or from 
the opposite perspective, somehow illustrating its only nominal submission— it instead 
demonstrates the vast space often available to indigenous elites within imperial 
formations.  While in 1875 the Qing may or not have had the ability to aggressively insert 
                                                
131 Zeku Xianzhi, 540.  Although his name is not provided, if the chronology is correct this particular 
nangso, known as Nangso Khanak, was particularly influential.  Over a period of two decades he reportedly 
expanded the authority of the nangso house and traveled to both Beijing and Lhasa where he had audiences 




itself in the region’s local affairs, the important thing to note is that— at least in this 
case— it did not have to.  As Tilly and others have noted, empires tend to work not 
because of their ability to attend to all the details of rule over subordinate components but 
instead because of their “crude simplicity.”132  Above all, empire is a contract between 
the imperial center and peripheral elites.  This is not to suggest that on the whole Qing 
rule in Amdo was harmonious, nor, as suggested by the eighteenth and nineteenth-
century reforms to the administration of the qianbaihu, that the court was content to 
allow Mongol and Tibetan pastoralists free rein.  As is common in empires, Qing 
imperial rule in Amdo operated in tension between the enforcement of difference and a 
transformative agenda to civilize and control through the extension of administrative 
uniformity.133  However, contrary to initial logic it is when the imperial center is forced 
to assert itself aggressively in local affairs, such as in 1723 and 1822, that empire as a 
system of rule is in crisis and that its logics of sovereignty come into doubt.  
This can perhaps be most dramatically detected in the reaction to the New Polices 
(xinzheng) promulgated between 1901 and the end of the dynasty.  For example, in 
supporting the colonial ambitions of the banner general Zhao Erfang in Kham and 
simultaneously opening Inner and Outer Mongolia to Chinese agricultural settlement, the 
                                                
132 Tilly, 4. 
 
133 Just as following the Lobsang Danjin Rebellion Qing representative Nian Gengyao had submitted plans 
to integrate much of Amdo into the administrative structure of the Chinese segment of the Qing Empire 
(see above), Oidtmann argues that in the wake of the nineteenth-century disturbances the Qing’s imperial 
agent Nayanceng “arrived in Amdo with the objective of extending the population and civilization of 
‘China’ to the upper reaches of the Yellow River.”  This was part of a larger project of frontier 
administration championed by the ascendant practitioners of what has been called the “statecraft school” 
(jingshi).  Max Oidtmann, Adorning the Crown of the Emperor: Reincarnate Lamas, Manchu Officials and 
the Transformation of Tibetan Society under Qing Rule, 1792-1912. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, n.d., 
80.  On the statecraft movement, see William T. Rowe, Saving the World : Chen Hongmou and Elite 





Qing essentially reneged on the unwritten agreement it had made with Tibetan and 
Mongol elites several centuries earlier.134  The result was the severing of the relational 
compact that binds imperial elites to peripheral elites and forms the foundation of empire.  
Again, in 1875, at least in the case of Sönam Bum and the Rongwo Nangso, imperial 
logics continued to operate and the elastic bonds of empire had yet to be broken. 
The reorganization of the qianbaihu system might also be viewed within a larger 
Qing project to identify, map and categorize its subjects.  This inclination, along with a 
trend toward bureaucratic rationalization and centralization, has been part of what some 
scholars have identified as markers of “early modernity.”135  In fact, while there has been 
disagreement over the applicability of the word “tribe” to describe the social and political 
organization of Amdo’s Tibetan population, as noted in the introduction, among the ways 
in which the term buluo might be understood— the Chinese word generally translated as 
                                                
134 Elliot Sperling, "The Chinese Venture in K'am, 1904-1911, and the Role of Chao Erh-Feng," The Tibet 
Journal 1, no. 2 (1976); Dahpon David Ho, "The Men Who Would Not Be Amban and the One Who 
Would: Four Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 1905-1911," Modern China 34, no. 2 (2008); Mei-
hua Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," in Mongolia in the Twentieth Century : Landlocked 
Cosmopolitan, ed. Stephen  Kotkin and Bruce A. Ellman (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). See also the 
documents in McKay, vol. 3, 171-174, and the accompanying essay by Parshotam Mehra, "The Mongolian-
Tibetan Treaty of January 11, 1913," in The History of Tibet: The Modern Period, 1895-1859 the 
Encounter with Modernity, ed. Alex McKay (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), especially 
175-179.  This shift in ethnopolitics had in a sense been formalized when the Qing ruled in favor of the 
advocates of “provincehood” for former Qing “imperial holdings” of Xinjiang (1884) and Taiwan (1887).  
James Millward writes, “The implementation of provincehood in Xinjiang represented not an annexation of 
a former protectorate by ‘China,’ but rather a fundamental shift in the governing principles of the Qing 
Empire as a whole.  The late Qing took an administrative model employed in the agrarian core of its 
sprawling empire and applied it to the ecologically and culturally different regions of the periphery.  The 
debates over the pragmatics of provincehood thus hinted at deeper issues involving the nature of the empire 
and the status of the Manchus, Mongols and other Inner Asians in a realm dominated demographically by 
Han Chinese.” In Eurasian Crossroads : A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), 138.   
 
135 There has been considerable and debate on whether or not the Ming-Qing period might be thought of as 
being “late imperial,” “early modern” or other.  For a synopsis, see Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, "The Qing 
Formation and the Early Modern Period," and Jack A. Goldstone, "Neither Late Imperial nor Early 
Modern: Efflorescences and the Qing Formation in World History," in The Qing Formation in World-





“tribe” and the word most often used to describe Amdo’s larger Tibetan social-political 
groupings— is as a bureaucratic-administrative classification.  While more research 
needs to be done on the actual impact the reforms had on the political, economic and 
social organization of Amdo, the implementation of the Qing qianbaihu system does 
seem to have helped to fix and define the region’s general demographic composition. It 
certainly established the manner in which the state understood and interacted with 
pastoral Amdo into the modern period. 
Yet, despite the 1822 attempt to fix territorial and political (tribal) identities, 
throughout the 19th century eastern Amdo’s pastoral population remained in flux.  In fact, 
the Zeku County Gazetteer describes much of the century as a period in which, “The 
southern parts of Huangnan experienced continual large-scale tribal wanderings (yutu), 
divisions and new formations.”136  For example, in 1858, after yet another confrontation 
between the state and local Tibetan groups who had crossed the Yellow River, over 
18,000 members of the Kangsté and other tribes received permission to resettle in the 
vast grasslands north of Qinghai Lake, the culmination of a century-long struggle.137  
Still, from the 1822 reorganization (but perhaps more precisely from mid-century on) 
sources begin to speak of the “twelve tribes of Repgong,” the “twenty-five tribes of 
                                                
136 Zeku Xianzhi, 491. 
 
137 Ibid., 11. Bulag writes, “With a struggle lasting over one hundred years and at enormous human cost, 
the Tibetans had finally won the right to settle around the lake.  In 1858, the Qing court legalized the 
Tibetan’s position and demarcated their pastureland around Kökönuur Lake.” In Mongols at China’s Edge, 
40. Cairen Jia notes that twelve confrontations between the Kangtsé and Mongol banners were directly 
related to the Qing reforms. Cairen Jia, "Jiefang Qianhou De Huabaozang," in Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Jicui 





Yushu,” “the nine tribes of Golok,” and the “eight lake region (haihuan) tribes,” along 
with the twenty-nine Mongol banners.138   
Moreover, there seems little doubt that the qianbaihu system and titles were an 
inseparable part of the way, if potentially only one out of many, by which Tibetan 
headmen and their communities understood themselves and their relationship to the state.  
In the case of Mongolia, Elverskog has argued that, “the Qing project fundamentally 
entailed shattering these indigenous cultural, economic and political entities and 
subscribed them with the logic of empire” by not just recognizing rank but creating and 
maintaining “an imperial elite shorn of its pre-Qing logic.”139  He refers to the 
replacement of the ulus/törö ethos with a single axis in which authority flowed downward 
from the imperial center to the Mongol elite and loyalty the other way.  There is no 
indication that the Qing was able to effect a similar wholesale transformation of political 
identity in the transcultural frontier world of Amdo.  While Elverskog emphasizes Qing 
agency and even intentionality in Mongolia, in Amdo I would suggest that Qing 
imperium was a vital but not definitive factor in creating the distinct nexus of authority 
that developed over the course of at least seven centuries. Clearly other entities were as 
important, not the least of which was the Lhasa-based Gelukpa state (and component part 
of the Qing Empire) of the Dalai Lamas.  However, through imperial practices such as 
recognizing qianbaihu, tusi and nangso, as well as through the patronage of Tibetan 
Buddhist institutions, the imperial center maintained a prominent position within Amdo’s 
syncretic nexus of authority.  As will be demonstrated, these titles maintained their 
                                                
138 See for example Li and Li, 152-3, 183-5; and Cairen Jia, 79. 
 
139 Elverskog, 66.  Bulag seems to agree with Elverskog, suggesting that among Amdo’s Mongol 
population the “Manchu colonial regime” was akin to that which was imposed in Inner Mongolia.  Bulag, 




cultural relevance and moral authority well into the twentieth century and perhaps 
residually to the present day.  In this context, the ability of the imperial center to actually 
intercede within these quasi-administrative entities, which clearly waxed and waned over 
the centuries, is almost immaterial. 
When in the 1930s modern ethnographic studies of Amdo began in earnest, 
demographers, ethnographers and geographers employed and perhaps even reified the 
divisions created during the High Qing.140  Naturally, when the Chinese Communist Party 
entered the pastoral regions for good after 1949 they too relied on the qianbaihu 
template, speaking from the start, for example, of the Twelve Tribes of Tongren and the 
Ten Tribes of Zeku.141 
                                                
140 For example, see the collection of studies reprinted in the Qinghai volume of Xibei Minzu Zongjiao 
Shiliao Wenzhai (Digest of Northwest Nationality and Religious Historical Studies) (op.cit.) or various 
contemporary ethnographic journals such as Da Xibei (Great Northwest), Xin Yaxiya (New Asia), and Xin 
Qinghai (New Qinghai). 
 
141 In fact, some of the same people who served as ethnographers under the Guomindang continued to do 
so under CCP, the most prominent probably being Wu Jun.  See Xibei Minzu Zongjiao Shiliao Wenzhai and 





BETWEEN EMPIRE AND NATION:  
STATE-LOCAL AUTHORITY IN REPUBLICAN-ERA AMDO 
 
The Republican period in China was a time in which the relationship between 
state and society was being dramatically reformulated.  For several decades, scholars 
have commented extensively upon the military contests, political rivalries, and 
intellectual debates that dominated the era.  More recently studies have tended to focus 
on subtler epistemological changes that ushered in new ways of socializing, consuming, 
working, organizing space and time, and identifying individuals and their communities 
within the new hierarchies and shared spaces that have come to define global modernity.1  
With a few notable exceptions, however, most have focused on eastern urban centers.2  
                                                
1 For just a few examples of the historiographic turn, see Madeleine Yue Dong, Republican Beijing : The 
City and Its Histories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Karl Gerth, China Made : 
Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 
2003); Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen : Political Ceremonies and Symbols in 
China, 1911-1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Emily Honig, Sisters and Strangers : 
Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Rebecca E. 
Karl, Staging the World : Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002); Eugenia Lean, Public Passions : The Case of Shi Jianqiao, Mass Culture and 
Collective Sentiment in Republican China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Leo Ou-fan 
Lee, Shanghai Modern : The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999); Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike : The Politics of Chinese Labor 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity : Meanings of Health and 
Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); David Strand, Rickshaw 
Beijing : City People and Politics in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Michael 
Tsang-Woon Tsin, Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China : Canton, 1900-1927 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999); and Wang Ban, The Sublime Figure of History : Aesthetics and Politics in 
Twentieth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
 
2 Studies that push past the eastern metropolises include Bulag; Tuttle; Christopher Pratt Atwood, Young 
Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia's Interregnum Decades, 1911-1931, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 
2002); Kristin Eileen Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu : Chinese Urban Reform, 1895-1937 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2000); Wen-Hsin Yeh, Provincial Passages : Culture, Space, and the 
Origins of Chinese Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
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Often when the littoral edges are discussed, it is in the context of intellectual debates and 
policy developments occurring at the center.3  In fact, James Leibold has argued that 
although the contours of the new nation were being created and defined at the center, the 
frontier was crucial to “China’s new national imaginary.”  Leibold’s point is that the 
frontier became the site at which the state and its agents reified the primordial Chinese 
nation.  Borrowing from Benedict Anderson, he refers to the periphery as “the 
mythomoteur of the entire society,” the standard by which the nation affirms its 
antediluvian essence and establishes its internal narrative of nationhood.4  
However, less noticed were efforts at state and nation building actually occurring 
on the peripheries, efforts that have been largely left out of the nation-based histories that 
dominate the way we remember the past.  These national narratives enforce a linearity 
that demands only one regime represent the nation at a time.  Competing centers of 
power, in turn, are de-legitimized as warlords or militarists.5  
During much of the first half of the twentieth century, Amdo was dominated by 
the Xining-based government of the so-called “Ma Family Warlords,” represented in 
many Chinese sources by its third and final paramount leader, Ma Bufang.6  The Ma 
                                                                                                                                            
 
3 For example, see the work of Lin Hsiao-ting who examines the political competition over Eastern Tibet 
but largely in the context of the Guomindang’s own state building efforts.  Similarly, Liu Xiaoyuan 
analyzes the role of the “frontier” and “ethnopolitics” in the development of the Communist movement.  
Lin Hsiao-ting, “Tibet and Nationalist China’s Frontier;” Xiaoyuan Liu, Frontier Passages. 
 
4 Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 5.  
 
5 Prior to its victory in 1926-1928, many observers did not view the Guomindang of Sun Yatsen and then 
Chiang Kaishek as being substantially different than the other regional military regimes (dujun) that 
dominated the “Warlord Era.” Crossley asserts that in the wake of the failure of the first republican effort, 
“warlordism” actually enabled the fiction of a multicultural China to maintain itself for some years by 
permitting the maintenance of local interests and difference.  In “Nationality and Difference,” 149. 
6 Between 1912 and 1949, three figures would dominate Qinghai, Ma Qi, his brother Ma Lin, and finally 
Ma Qi’s son, Ma Bufang.  In many Chinese sources the younger Ma has come to represent the regime in 
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regime was certainly militarized and extractive.  However, this does not in itself make it 
distinct from Chiang Kaishek’s Nanjing government, nor any number of regimes 
worldwide, past or present, that are considered legitimate representatives of the nation-
state.  Taken from a certain perspective, the Xining government was a modernizing state 
that sought to do many of the things that modernizing states seek to do; building schools 
and roads, regulating commerce, engaging in demographic, ethnographic and geological 
surveys, attempting to enforce the state’s monopoly on violence, and rationalizing 
bureaucratic rule over a contiguous territory by eliminating the autonomous spaces that 
often exist within pre-modern polities.7  In fact, when recalling his travels in the 1940s, 
Japanese spy Hisao Kimura compared Ma’s territories favorably to those of eastern 
China, remarking, “[…] I could not help but notice as we passed through the fertile 
valleys of eastern Chinghai, how well-governed and peaceful the province seemed to 
be.”8  A second eyewitness, the American A. Doak Barnett, described Ma Bufang’s 
Xining regime as “authoritarian, militaristic and autonomous,” yet “one of the most 
efficient in China, and one of the most energetic.”9  Barnett took particular note of Ma’s 
ambitious sanitation, irrigation, education and beautification programs, alongside his 
                                                                                                                                            
aggregate. For the sake of simplicity I similarly allow Ma Bufang to stand in for the Xining regime.  On the 
genesis of the Ma regime during the late-Qing period and later its relationship with the Guomindang, see 
Jonathan Lipman’s Familiar Strangers.  
 
7 See Suzanne Cooke on Ma Bufang as the champion of Hui Muslim aspirations and Brent Hass on the 
more eclectic modernizing and nationalizing impulses of Ma’s government, particularly in the realm of 
education.  Hunsberger provides a more dismissive account of Ma’s modernization efforts. Susette Cooke, 
"Surviving State and Society in Northwest China: The Hui Experience in Qinghai Province under the 
PRC," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 3 (2008); Merrill Hunsberger, "Ma Pu-Fang in Chinghai 
Province, 1931-1949" (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1978). 
 
8 Hisao Kimura and Scott Berry, Japanese Agent in Tibet : My Ten Years of Travel in Disguise (London 
Serindia Publ., 1990), 56. However, Kimura would also refer to Qinghai as Ma Bufang’s “little empire.” 




personal propriety, martial orientation and intolerance for dissent, going so far as to 
venture, “General Ma seems to enjoy a considerable amount of popular support, […].”10  
Obviously, “well-governed and peaceful” is in the eye of the beholder and “popular 
support” would have been difficult to gauge.  However, the point is that the pejorative 
term “warlord” is also subjective.  The ultimate failure of Ma Bufang’s project should not 
in itself obscure the possibility that at one point Ma’s rule may have been a legitimate, or 
at least a no less legitimate, alternative to the Guomindang and CCP party-states.11 
In defeat, therefore, Ma Bufang lost more than territory, resources and position.  
He also lost the ability to define his own narrative, to assert his claims of legitimacy.  
Instead, PRC sources are brimming with testimonials to the brutality of the Ma clan and 
its agents, particularly at the expense of the region’s Tibetan population.  In sum, Ma has 
been memorialized as a rapacious tyrant and petty warlord whose religious persecution 
and ethnic pogroms severely damaged the historical unity of the nationalities.12  
                                                
10 Ibid., 188.  The American journalist John Roderick described Ma as “a somewhat enlightened warlord,” 
and “even something of a socialist,” at least in comparison to the other “Ma clique warlords” of northwest 
China. John Roderick, Covering China: The Story of an American Reporter from the Revolutionary Days to 
the Deng Era (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993), 104-105. 
 
11 Although often maintaining considerable autonomy, throughout the Republican period the Ma regime 
was allied with various political and military forces.  Most significantly, during the Great Plains War 
(1930) Ma Qi switched alliances from the Guominjun of Feng Yuxiang to the victorious Guomindang of 
Chiang Kaishek.  From this point on the Ma regime would officially be part of the Guomindang state. 
Bulag notes that at times Ma Bufang was forced to defend his nationalist credentials against accusations of 
feudalism and warlordism while at others Ma was able “play the Mongol and Tibetan card” to argue that 
through his domination over Qinghai he was in fact a patriot and a champion of national unity. In Mongols 
at China’s Edge, 49-51. 
 
12 As will be described in Part 2, in the early Liberation period the purported national exploitation of Ma 
Bufang and his agents would become the dominant rhetorical device used to contrast the evils of the old 
society with the CCP’s promises for the new.  For example, nine of the fifteen selections from the 1st 
edition of the Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji (1963) directly address the alleged brutality of the Ma regime.  
While the percentage of print devoted to this narrative drops over the years, a chapter dedicated to Ma 




This narrative certainly resonates strongly with many Amdo Tibetans, and not 
without reason.  Conflicts between Ma’s forces and indigenous Tibetan elements were 
often marked by terrible brutality and bitter recriminations.  Among the many sanguinary 
incidents often cited in PRC-published materials are multiple conflicts in Yushu and 
Golok, disputes with various tribes in the Repgong region, and sorties against the villages 
of the Nangra Tribe.13  However, as Bianca Horlemann has shown, discord between the 
Xining regime and local actors was far more likely to be grounded in the fiscal and 
logistical demands of expanding states than a pure reflection of ethnic or religious 
antagonisms.  For example, while ethnic undertones may have been present, at its core 
conflict between the Ma regime and Tibetan elements in Golok revolved around Xining’s 
need to establish a supply line to support its forces in Yushu where local actors and state 
representatives from Sichuan, Qinghai and Central Tibet were involved in a complex 
power struggle.14 
While the violent, extractive nature of Ma Bufang’s regime, one that certainly did 
contain an ethnic element, should not be mitigated or forgotten, neither is it the entire 
story.   More interesting, perhaps, is the space between outright hostilities and outright 
fraternization, the middle ground where most meetings between powerful institutions, 
such as indigenous authorities and Ma’s erstwhile state, probably operated.  As Kimura 
would later reflect upon with some astonishment when talking about Ma’s procurement 
                                                
13 Under the heading “The Struggle to Resist the Cruel Suppression of Each Nationality,” the Qinghai 
Tongshi lists four main internal conflicts between the Ma regime and indigenous communities: Yushu, 
Golok (Guoluo), Tongren and the Kazaks of northwestern Qinghai.  Cui, Zhang, and Du, 545-553. The 
confrontations between Ma’s forces and Tibetans in Yushu and Golok are particularly heavily 
memorialized in the Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao. While Yushu is traditionally considered to be culturally, 
linguistically and geographically part of Kham, during the Qing it was placed under the administrative 
jurisdiction of the Xining Amban and was subsequently designated part of Qinghai Province. 
 
14 Bianca Horlemann, “The Goloks and the Muslim Ma Warlords in Qinghai, 1908-1949” (paper presented 
at the 12th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Vancouver, B.C., August 2010). 
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of a Tibetan lama’s release from captivity in Lanzhou, “This in fact was a move typical 
of Ma, an extremely pragmatic Muslim with a large Buddhist population to govern.”15   
In fact, Ma Bufang, who clearly wished to exert direct control over the region, 
instead often found himself operating in imperial-style space not entirely unlike that 
previously occupied by the Xining Amban.  For instance, since the Qing’s suppression of 
the Lobsang Danjin Rebellion three centuries earlier, Mongols had presented offerings to 
the “god of Kökönuur” (Qinghai Lake) as part of a state-sponsored ritual meant to assure 
their loyalty to the imperial center.  In a striking example of subimperial practice, Ma 
Bufang and his predecessors continued to preside over the cult of Kokonor (Qinghai 
Lake).  Now, however, in what Bulag refers to as “ritualizing national unity,” the 
ceremony sought to ensure the perpetuation not of the dynastic house but of the 
multiethnic nation.16   
As was often the case, the above-mentioned Nangra hostilities largely revolved 
around a tax dispute.17  The Nangra are located in a wooded, hilly region on the south 
                                                
15 Kimura lays bare his own biases by noting that Ma was “A very different type of man from the fanatics 
who had stamped out Buddhism in India more than a thousand years before, he felt that infidels were better 
manipulated than put to the swords.” Kimura and Berry, 57, 218. 
 
16 Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 43-44, 50-54. The 1939 ceremony, sponsored by Ma Bufang, was 
particularly wrought with political significance.  With over 2,000 people in attendance— including Han 
Chinese, Hui Muslims, Kazakhs, and others— under the Guomindang flag and in front of portraits of the 
party’s founder Sun Yatsen, Tibetan and Mongolian dignitaries presented offerings to the god of the lake.  
Occurring during a period of particular weakness for the Xining regime, Bulag argues that Ma Bufang’s 
“political future” depended on his ability to prove to Chiang Kaishek’s representatives his loyalty to the 
regime, his willingness to resist Japan, and his ability to control Qinghai’s Tibetan and Mongol 
populations.  On the other hand, Ma was acting from a position of power vis-à-vis the Tibetan and Mongol 
participants.  For example, family members of Tibetan and Mongol dignitaries were often being held in 
Xining essentially as hostages.  Bulag concludes, “[Mongol and Tibetan elites’] forced loyalty ultimately 
saved Ma’s political career.” 
 
17 As detailed below, Ma Yuanhai’s “massacre” of Tongren County’s Detsang Tribe was also centered 
around the latter’s refusal or inability to provide tax revenue owed to Ma’s regime. The “bloody purge” of 
Guide’s Duojia (Ch.) Tribe for being in tax arrears is interesting in that the Xining regime reportedly 
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bank of the Yellow River in today’s Jianzha County (Tib. gcan tsha).18  Three times 
between 1931 and 1934 Ma’s soldiers laid siege to the Nangra and three times the Nangra 
Tibetans repulsed them with both sides absorbing significant casualties.  The dispute was 
finally settled through a reversion to what might also be considered subimperial practice.  
Ma and the Nangra headman, Qianhu Wangchen Döndrup, pledged an oath of 
brotherhood after which the Nangra chieftain joined Ma’s government as a “council” 
(canyi).19  Not unlike during the imperial period, Wangchen Döndrup’s appointment was 
a gesture that both acknowledged his local position and prestige and at least ostensibly 
co-opted him into the Xining state.  Instead of receiving imperial titles, however, 
Wangchen Döndrup gained a place, nominal or otherwise, in the evolving logic of the 
modern state system, one that was still a hybrid mosaic of imperial practices and national 
impulses.  
 
The Syncretic Nexus of Authority on the Republican-era South Qinghai Plateau 
                                                                                                                                            
employed Tibetan fighters of the Sheran Tribe Qianhu (Ch.) in support of its regular troops.  See Jianzha 
Xianzhi, (Lanzhou Shi: Gansu Renmin Chubanshe, 2003) (hereafter cited as Jianzha Xianzhi), 516. 
 
18 At the time the region was administered under Guide County (Tib. Khri ka).  With a population of over 
8,000, the Nangra were the largest tribe in the region.  According to Chen Qingying, the eight “villages” 
(zhuang) of the Nagra were actually eight small tribes (xiao buluo) divided into twelve hamlets (Tib. sde 
wa; Ch. tawa) and fifty-seven “natural villages” (ziran cun).  Each hamlet was under the supervision of a 
baihu. Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 266-267; Jianzha Xianzhi, 685. 
 
19 Depending on the source, it was between 1930 and 1933 that Wangchen Döndrup, then in his late 
twenties, inherited leadership from his father, becoming the 7th Nangra Qianhu. The specifics as to how the 
tax dispute was finally resolved is not mentioned, other than it was mediated with the help of an influential 
lama and a powerful leader of the Qinghai Lake region Tibetans, Kangtsé Welzang (See this chapter n. 29).  
Zhao Qingyang, “Ji Yiwei yu Dang,” 197; Jianzha Xianzhi, 685; Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 
267; Gray Tuttle and Tsehuajia, “Power and Politics in Chentsa before Communist Rule.” The Tibetan and 
Himalayan Library. http://places.thlib.org/features/15480/descriptions/88 (accessed March 15, 2012); 
Zhang Shaowu and Guo Suqiang, "Junshi Xiaomie Zhengzhi Zhengqu Xiangqian," in Jiefang Qinghai 
(Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987); ———, "Jiefang Qinghai Chuqi Pingxi Angla Diqu Panluan 
Yu Zhengqu Zangzu Touren Xiangqian De Jingguo," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuangji 15 (1987): 31. 
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 In 1924, more than seven hundred years after Lharjé Draknawa and his sons first 
settled in the Rongwo region, the last Rongwo Nangso was born into the hereditary 
nangso family.  Like many of his clansmen before him, at the age of eight Trashi 
Namgyel entered Rongwo Monastery.  Five years later his elder brother Jikmé Topgyé 
ascended to the position of Rongwo Nangso.  Trashi Namgyel would later recall that at 
the time his family’s influence went well beyond the Repgong region.20  The Chinese 
ethnologist and historian Chen Qingying agrees, noting that while Repgong’s twelve 
tribes were the “core of the nangso’s administrative region,” his authority spread 
throughout much of eastern Amdo north of Golok and south of the Yellow River.  With 
some exaggeration, a local saying held that the Rongwo Nangso ruled over “100,000 
earthen houses (tufang), 100,000 tents (zhangfang) and 10,000 Mongolian yurts 
(Menggubao).” 21  Although the duties and powers associated with the Rongwo Nangso 
title may have tended more toward being consultative and consensus seeking rather than 
peremptory or administrative, clearly the institution of the Rongwo Nangso maintained 
its regional prominence well into the twentieth century.   
Recognizing this, in 1945 Ma Bufang had Trashi Namgyel, then the younger 
brother of the Rongwo Nangso, sent to the provincial capital.  In Xining, the twenty-one 
year-old was appointed an officer in Ma’s army and made a Tibetan-language secretary 
and translator (suggesting that Trashi Namgyel could speak and perhaps read Chinese).  
                                                
20 Trashi Namgyel specifically notes his family’s influence among the Tibetans of what would become 
Huangnan and Gannan Prefectures. Zhaxi Anjia, 243.  
 
21 Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 202-3. According to Chen, the Rongwo Nangso had direct 
jurisdiction over two tribes with a combined 1000 households.  However, he asserts that the nangso’s 
authority spanned not only throughout the entirety of present-day Tongren and Zeku Counties, but also 
south into the Mongolian regions of Henan County, west into Guide, Guinan and Tongde Counties, north 
into Jianzha County and southeast across the Gansu border into Xiahe County. 
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Trashi Namgyel himself maintains, however, that the real purpose of his presence in the 
capital was as a hostage meant to assure Ma’s influence over “the twelve tribes of 
Tongren.”22  Ma’s reliance on what amounts to human collateral was itself a time tested 
strategy of diplomacy and statecraft that exposes some of the contradictions between the 
modernizing and bureaucratizing impulses of Ma’s government and earlier strategies for 
the exercise of sovereignty and authority.23   
The following year, Trashi Namgyel’s elder brother passed away.  He recalls, 
In accordance with the tradition of the nangso’s succession, the successor must 
have had previously entered a monastery as a lama.24  Because I had been a lama, 
and I was young and highly capable, members of my clan (jiazu) and the various 
qianhu unanimously recommended that I succeed to the position of nangso.  
Under these conditions, with a wide-ranging effort from my father and 
[Repgong’s] qianhu, after getting the approval (zuotong) of Ma Bufang, in the 
second lunar month of 1946 I officially inherited the position of nangso.  [I] 
became the final generation nangso of the Twelve Tribes of Tongren.25 
Trashi Namgyel asserts that his selection as Rongwo Nangso followed time-honored 
precedents.  He was chosen because of his talent and pedigree.26  Despite this, local elites 
                                                
22 Zhaxi Anjia, 244.   
 
23 See Sneath, Imperial Statecraft, 11; Allsen, 130.  In 1937, Ma had established a Mongolian-Tibetan 
Middle School.  Although Trashi Namgyel does not appear to have been among them, Mongol and Tibetan 
elites were often ordered to send their children to the school for training that included patriotic education.  
After graduating, they would often be given government posts.  However, they were essentially being kept 
as hostages. See Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 51. 
 
24 Here Trashi Namgyel is evidently using the familiar Chinese practice of referring to any Tibetan monk 
as a lama.  In Tibetan, an ordinary monk would be called a dra ba/wa while the term bla ma would be 
reserved for a high ranking religious figure and/or a particularly learned monk.   
25 Zhaxi Anjia, 243-44.  See also Stevenson, 8-9. 
 
26 By the early 18th Century, struggle between the various lines of the Rongwo Nangso family to succeed 
the nangso position had become so acute that a term limit of three years was set (later lengthened to five or 
seven years), after which the position would rotate among other members of the clan.  See Qin, 95 and 
Sonam Tsering.  However, Trashi Namgyel does not mention this, simply reporting that he was chosen 
after the death of his brother.  It may have been that the tradition of rotating the nangso ended in the late 
19th century when the powerful Nangso Khanak ruled for two decades.  On the other hand, one Chinese 
source claims that from 1942-1947 another of Trashi Namgyel’s relatives, Aorijia (Ch.), served a five-year 
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allegedly had to lobby Ma to get their selection approved.  Ultimately, in regards to the 
selection of the last Rongwo Nangso, the relative power of tribal authorities vis-à-vis the 
Xining regime is unclear.  However, Ma’s role, whether definitive or perfunctory, is 
representative of a larger pattern in which Xining retained the imperial prerogative to 
grant titles and offer recognition to Amdo’s secular and religious authorities— often the 
same figures and institutions that had acted as agents of Qing imperial rule— in exchange 
for various degrees of cooperation and compliance.  The Qing’s imperial relationships 
were being replaced by a new subimperial collaboration between Amdo’s indigenous 
leadership and the Xining regime.  
To take another example, according to several accounts it was Ma Bufang who in 
1932 elevated Gyelwo Dorjé, previously the baihu of the Kezhi villages, to overall 
leadership of the Gyelwo Tribe and zongqianhu of the entire Repgong region.  That same 
year, like the Nangra’s Wangchen Döndrup, Gyelwo Dorjé was appointed to the post of 
council to the provincial government and even reportedly joined the Guomindang.27  As 
zongqianhu, along with Nangso Trashi Namgyel and Rongwo Monastery steward Gélek 
Gyatso, Gyelwo Dorjé would come to be considered one of the three most powerful 
indigenous leaders of the Repgong region, the so-called “three-in-one feudal rule” of 
Tongren County.28  The exact circumstances under which Gyelwo Dorjé received the 
                                                                                                                                            
term as nangso.  After Liberation, Aorijia would serve in the Tongren County government until being 
accused of being one of the main instigators of the 1958 rebellion.  A year later, Aorijia died in prison (see 
Conclusion n. 11).  Tongren Xianzhi, 1086. 
27 Zhaxi Anjia, 245-246; Tongren Xianzhi, 1090; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1540.  
 
28 An early CCP investigation of Tongren’s pastoral regions (largely referring to present-day Zeku County) 
suggests that Gyelwo Dorjé had significant influence over the Shisa, Gartsé and a portion of the Gönshül 




zongqianhu title are uncertain.29   The position itself was a product of the Yongzheng-era 
systemization of the qianbaihu zhidu.  However, it had only been bestowed 
intermittently.  In granting the title, Ma Bufang clearly intended to affect the regional 
balance of power by forging an alliance of sorts with Dorjé and his Gyelwo tribe. Perhaps 
not unrelated, several sources claim that Ma Bufang intervened in a century-long 
grassland dispute between the Gyelwo and the Gengya Tribe located across the Gansu 
border in the vicinity of Labrang Monastery.30  Hardly the disinterested mediator, Ma 
reportedly provided the Gyelwo with one hundred guns and ten thousand rounds of 
ammunition.31  It is worth noting that the Ma clan had long been in competition with 
Labrang Trashikyil, the largest monastery in Amdo and a significant regional power in its 
own right.32  
                                                
29 Gyelwo Dorjé was the 4th generation chieftain of the Gyelwo Tribe and in 1932 he became the first 
Gyelwo headman to receive the title zongqianhu. No explanation is given in any of the sources as to why 
Gyelwo Dorjé would have been chosen as leader of the twelve tribes.  Zhao Qingyang simply states, “After 
1932, Ma Bufang made [Gyelwo Dorjé] qianhu of the Gyelwo Tribe and zongqianhu of Tongren County.” 
In “Tongren Qianhu,” 157.  Gyelwo Dorjé would be one of only two headmen recognized by Ma Bufang as 
zongqianhu.  In 1936 Kangtsé Welzang was recognized as zongqianhu of the Eight Confederated Lake 
Tribes.  Three years earlier, he had been named “Commander of the Qinghai Calvary Brigade,” although, 
as CCP sources suggest, the command structure may have been largely nominal.  On Gyelwo Dorjé see 
Zhao Qingyang, “Tongren Qianhu,” 157-159; Tongren Xianzhi, 1090-2; Duojie, “Jianlin Tongrenxian,” 
256-259; Tuttle and Tsehuajia; and Stevenson.  On Kangtsé Welzang see Cairen Jia; 78-91, and Shabo 
Bkrashis and Danzhu Angben 320. 
 
30 See Zhouta, Gansu Zangzu Buluo de Shehui yu Lishi Yanjiu (Lanzhou: Gansu Minzu Chubanshe, 1996), 
146-147. 
31 Huangnanzhou Zengxie, "Huangnan Tiaojie Minzu Jiufen Jishi," in QHWSZL JGHJ (Xining: 
Qinghaisheng Zhengxie Xuexi he Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui, 2001), 266-7; Zhaxi Anjia, 245-249. 
 
32 Nietupski notes that the greatest extent of “contiguous Labrang territories” was reached in the first half 
of the twentieth century, making Labrang a powerful regional rival to the Xining-based Ma regime. For an 
overview of the hostilities between Xining and Labrang, see Nietupski, Labrang Monastery, 68, 173-182. 
Any direct connection between the disputes between the Gyelwo and the Gengya and between Ma and 
Labrang is at this time conjecture.  However, similar dynamics occurred elsewhere.  For example, 
according to a local gazetteer, Ma allied with Tongde County’s Tsanggar Monastery (Ch. Shizang 
Monastery; Tib. 'btsang sgar don grub rab brtan gling) in its dispute with Labrang, supplying the former 
with weapons and ammunition.  When the prelates of the two Buddhist institutions later reconciled, Ma 
Bufang was reportedly furious.  His troops looted and burned Tsanggar Monastery before chasing the head 
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The complex relationships between Ma Bufang and indigenous headmen such as 
Trashi Namgyel, Gyelwo Dorjé and Wangchen Döndrup are indicative of a political 
environment in which a nascent bureaucratic structure thinly cloaked a political 
landscape more reflective of a pre-modern, imperial-style formation than that of a 
centralizing state.  Qinghai Province itself had been officially founded only in 1929 as 
part of the ascendant Guomindang regime’s administrative reorganization of north and 
northwest China.  That same year, Tongren County was carved out of the old Xunhua 
Ting.  Finally, in 1932 Tongren County was divided into sub-county districts (qu).  At the 
time what is anachronistically referred to as the “Zeku Region” (zekuqu), an ill-defined 
pastoral area up the Rongwo River and across the Méshül Mountains southwest of 
Repgong’s agricultural heartland, was designated the 4th District of Tongren County.  
Nonetheless, there is no indication that parallel bureaucratic governing structures were 
established on the grasslands at this time.  Instead, as far as can be told, the 4th District 
existed only on paper.33   
In 1935-1936, with the Communist Party’s Red Army threatening Amdo on its 
famous Long March, the Xining government moved to tighten its control over 
southeastern Qinghai by introducing sub-district townships (zhen) and rural xiang 
administrations, as well as the baojia community responsibility system.34  In the process, 
Ma’s government hoped to finally replace the tusi and qianbaihu political formations 
                                                                                                                                            
lama and his supporters across the border into Gansu, killing scores along the way.  The story ends with the 
lama returning to his monastery only to be poisoned.  Tongde Xianzhi, 377-378.  
33 Zeku Xianzhi, 55-56; Tongren Xianzhi, 78.  In 1913, Xunhua Ting had been rechristened Xunhua County 
(xian). 
 
34 Tongren County’s agricultural districts were divided into five xiang and two townships while Tongren 
along with Xunhua and Hualong Counties were designated the 3rd Baojia District. Tongren Xianzhi, 80. On 
the organization and implementation of the baojia system in Qinghai see Niu Huimin, "Ma Bufang De 




with bureaucratic institutions directly subordinate to the Xining regime. However, rather 
than centrally appointed officials, local headmen were often made leaders of these new 
administrative units.  In neighboring Guide County, for example, the baihu of the 
Dongshan (Ch.) Tribe, Lanzhou Jia (Ch.), was appointed head of three xiang and two bao 
where his official duties included tax collection, militia functions and the distribution of 
relief supplies.35  Despite bureaucratic dressings, the position clearly relied more on 
traditional prestige and relationships than fixed territorial-administrative designation.  
Moreover, the administrative reforms did not extend into pastoral areas.  Instead, “At the 
time the baojia system was being implemented in agricultural regions, the pastoral 
regions continued to follow the old system of qianhu and baihu rule.”36  When a decade 
later, xiang were finally introduced into pastoral regions, they largely mirrored existing 
tribal groupings, the qianhu or baihu being appointed xiang leader.  Thus, despite the 
trappings of modern administrative boundaries, indigenous elites continued to function as 
intermediaries between the state and local society without whom the state had little 
access.37  
Yet, just as it cannot be sensibly argued that Amdo’s pastoral regions were well 
integrated into the administrative mechanisms of the state, it should not be assumed that 
their leaders were somehow autonomous of the Xining regime.  In fact, like Trashi 
Namgyel, Gyelwo Dorjé and Wangchen Döndrup, nearly every major figure on the Zeku 
                                                
35 Dongshan Lanzhou, "Wode Guanren Shijia," Guide Wenshi Ziliao 1 (2000): 134. 
 
36 Tongren Xianzhi; 80; Zeku Xianzhi, 56.  The sixth and seventh baojia districts, including Tongde, 
Guoluo and Yushu, were considered “pure pastoral regions.”  As such the baojia system was not 
implemented in these areas.  Niu, 274. 
37 Zeku Xianzhi, 56.  In fact, in its standard description of the bureaucratic evolution of the region, the Zeku 
County Gazetteer does not even mention these sub-county administrations, strongly suggesting that they 




grasslands was associated with Ma Bufang.  In one episode, for example, Zongqianhu 
Gyelwo Dorjé is reported to have brought Lumbum of Zeku’s Gartsé Tribe for a 1936 
audience with Ma.38  A distinguished monk of uncertain background, in Xining Lumbum 
seems to have joined the Guomindang and served in Ma’s government (banshiyuan).  
Finally, according to Chen Qingying, in 1946 Ma appointing Lumbum leader of 
Guanshize (Gartsé) Xiang, while simultaneously recognizing him as disciplinary head 
(Tib. dge bskos, Ch. gegui) of Gartsé Monastery and qianhu of the Gartsé Tribe.39  In 
another example, CCP sources describe Serökyap of Zeku’s Gönshül Tribe as having 
been born into a wealthy “herdlord” (muzhu) family.  In 1940, he too reportedly joined 
the Guomindang and was appointed to the now familiar position of  “council to the 
provincial government.”  Two years later Serökyap was designated local militia 
commander and in 1945 the Qinghai government of Ma Bufang presented him with a 
wooden bell and seal recognizing him as qianhu of the Gönshül Tribe.  Finally in 1947, 
Serökyap was appointed leader of Guanxiu (Gönshül) Xiang.40   
Just as with Nangso Trashi Namgyel, it is difficult to determine the role Ma 
Bufang played in Serökyap and Lumbum’s selections as tribal leaders.  To what degree 
was Ma either confirming candidates already chosen by internal methods or dictating 
their selection?  Or perhaps this is the wrong question.  While it is natural to think that 
the Gönshül, for instance, would have chaffed at the interference of Ma’s regime into its 
                                                
38 As noted above, Gyelwo Dorjé seems to have held a position of influence over the Gartsé. 
 
39 Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 253.  A different chronology is provided in the Zeku County 
Gazetteer, which claims that Lumbum served as disciplinary head of Gartsé Monastery from 1933-1936.  
In 1936 he traveled to Xining with Gyelwo Dorjé where he was “appointed” qianhu.  He is then said to 
have joined the GMD in 1940.  Zeku Xianzhi, 528. 
40 Other entries in the same source note that Serökyap was appointed militia commander in 1935.  This 




internal affairs, Gönshül headmen may have viewed Serökyap’s association with Ma 
Bufang and the Guomindang in a more positive light.  Just as in 1875 when Rongwo 
Nangso Khanak requested that the Qing court recognize Serökyap’s distant predecessor 
Sönam Bum as qianhu of the Gonshül Tribe— and clearly the inclusion of both Sönam 
Bum and Serökyap’s appointments in Chinese sources is meant to emphasize this— 
accepted methods of succession may often have included receiving the imprimatur of 
state authorities, even if at times that approval may have been given fait accompli.41  
This ambiguity is underscored by an autobiographical account written by Lanzhou 
Jia, chieftain of Guide’s Dongshan Tribe.  The Dongshan were not particularly powerful 
or prosperous, nor did its headman enjoy great personal prestige or wealth.  Quite the 
opposite, Lanzhou Jia recalls, the Dongshan had long been harassed by the region’s other 
Tibetan tribes and only gained a semblance of independence by seeking the protection of 
the “Guide Prince,” Ma Yuanhai.42  Ma Yuanhai, a cousin and subordinate of Ma Bufang, 
controlled not only the region’s largest military force but was also the dominant 
economic power on the South Qinghai Plateau.43  When we consider that Ma Yuanhai, 
and most likely other powerful state actors, spoke Amdo Tibetan and a Tibetan headman 
                                                
41 Ibid., 540, 543.  On Sönam Bum see Chapter 1. 
42 Lanzhou Jia claims that there were several attempts to replace him as Dongshan baihu, some of which 
had the support of Ma Yuanhai. Underscoring his weakness, the Guide Xianzhi reports that Lanzhou Jia 
often personally participated in agricultural labor and he recalls being sent to lead a group of tribesmen to 
work on the Lanzhou-Xining road during the 1940s. Dongshan Lanzhou, 129, 132; Guide Xianzhi (Xi'an: 
Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1995) (Hereafter cited as Guide Xianzhi), 598. 
 
43 Ma Yuanhai was a nephew of Ma Bufang’s father and patriarch of Ma Family rule, Ma Qi.  He served as 
a military aid-de-camp and commander under the elder Ma, eventually becoming the most powerful figure 
on the South Qinghai Plateau.  A short CCP biography claims that Ma dominated not only Guide, but also 
“Tongren, Zeku, Jianzha, Guinan, Tongde and Golok.”  The sources accuse Ma of cruelly oppressing the 
Tibetan masses, massacring pastoralists, ruthlessly extracting resources, burning monasteries, “and causing 
great misery to the great majority of the pastoral region’s peoples.” Guide Xianzhi, 598-599.  See also 




such as Lanzhou Jia evidently spoke Chinese, Amdo’s position as a fluid multi-cultural 
zone begins to come into sharper focus.44 
In 1935, Ma Yuanhai ordered Lanzhou Jia to lead a tribal militia into the Zeku 
grasslands as part of a larger mobilization meant to counter the northward advance of the 
Red Army’s Long March.45  Initially, the Xining government divided Qinghai into fifteen 
regional defense districts.  Tongren and Xunhua Counties were designated the 4th 
Defense District, which was further subdivided into four regiments.  Again demonstrating 
Ma’s continued reliance on local elites, Tibetan headmen including Gyelwo Dorjé and 
Jikmé Topgyé (Trashi Namgyel’s elder brother and predecessor as Rongwo Nangso) 
were designated two of the regiment commanders, while the Nangra’s Wangchen 
Döndrup was appointed head of neighboring Guide’s 3rd Army (ying).46   Up the Rongwo 
River on the Zeku grasslands, Serökyap and another local Tibetan headman, the baihu 
Lhagyel, were appointed vice-commander and commander respectively of the Zeku 
region’s tribal militia.47  From the perspective of the nation-state, the appointments of 
indigenous headmen as militia commanders demonstrates Ma Bufang’s continued 
dependence on non-state (or quasi-state) actors even for basic functions that are often 
assumed to be the sole purview of the state.  The ambiguity goes both ways however, and 
                                                
44 Dongshan Lanzhou, 29.  Guide Xianzhi, 598.  Until the post-Liberation generation, many Muslim 
inhabitants spoke Amdo Tibetan as either a first or second language.  
 
45 Dongshan Lanzhou, 136.  Lanzhou Jia and his fighters spent a month positioned on the banks of Tséchu 
River before being allowed to return home, having never caught sight of their mysterious enemies. 
46 Jianzha Xianzhi, 685; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 980; Tongren Xianzhi, 683-4.  Wagya, qianhu of Zeku’s Hor 
Tribe (about whom much more will be written), was appointed the commander of the 4th District’s 4th 
Regiment.  However, it is unclear if the Zeku region was included within the 4th Regiment’s jurisdiction 
and Wagya was replaced as commander after an indeterminate amount of time.  
 
47 The tribal militias were almost certainly not integrated but organized and commanded separately under 
their own traditional leadership. See Dongshan Lanzhou, 136.   
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local elites such as Lhagyel and Serökyap were surely acting in a space between 
autonomy and dependence in which threats of or actual coercion, as well as the benefits 
of cooperation with and recognition by the Xining regime, were far from inconsequential.  
According to a polemic but not unlikely account, Ma used the pretext of the Red 
Army’s approach to further his efforts at establishing unified military control over the 
South Qinghai Plateau.  To the south of the Zeku grasslands, the Henan Mongol Banner 
Command was organized under the leadership of the Mongol Prince Künga Peljor and 
Ma-family partisan, Ma Yuanxiang.  After the immediate threat had passed, but with an 
all-out war with Japan seeming increasingly likely, the Mongol Banner Command was 
transformed into the 7th Defense District (now including Tongren and Tongde Counties) 
under the overall command of the Mongol prince and another leading Muslim military 
figure, Ma Liang.48  While it is difficult to determine how substantive or effective this 
force was, it seems significant that in the immediate post-Liberation period Ma Liang and 
Ma Yuanxiang would jointly lead an anti-Communist insurrection with its base in the 
Qinghai-Gansu-Sichuan border region.  As described below, that the uprising relied in 
significant part on the support and participation of indigenous Mongol and Tibetan 
leaders suggests that the interjection of forces like Ma Yuanhai, Ma Liang and Ma 
Yuanxiang into local networks of power was not always or necessarily wholly 
confrontational or coerced.   
While it would be a serious overstep to assume that the Ma’s acted in good faith 
and partnership with indigenous leaders, it does remind us to not assume clearly 
                                                
48 Ma Letian, "Ma Bufang Zai Qinghai Henan Mengqi Bushu Fangyu Hongjun De Jingguo," Qinghai 
Wenshi ziliao Xuangji 3 (1964): 63-65.  See also HNMGZZZXGK, 68; and Huangnan Zhouzhi, 980-81. It 




demarcated lines between indigenous authorities and state institutions or that cultural 
systems are autarkic or exclusive.  After all, authority in Amdo, like elsewhere, was not a 
zero sum equation.  Instead, actors operated within a complex, evolving yet historically 
rooted syncretic nexus of authority.  While Ma Bufang certainly wished to replace this 
unwieldy web with a uni-polar, hierarchical state system, in the end he often had to rely 
on subimperial methods to exert his authority in Amdo.  One further example 
demonstrates this point.  In 1909, the aforementioned Lhagyel had been born into the 
leading family of the Zeku area’s largest and most powerful Tibetan tribe, the Hor.  At 
five-years old, Lhagyel entered Hor Monastery and at the age of fifteen he was 
recognized as a Nyingma reincarnate lama.49  Subsequently, Lhagyel would become 
baihu of the Hor’s most important sub-grouping, the Wönkhor Tsowa.  In 1934 he 
traveled to the provincial capital with his elder brother, the Hor Qianhu Wagya.  In 
Xining, Ma Bufang greeted the Tibetan headmen as “brothers.”  Like Gyelwo Dorjé and 
Serökyap, Lhagyel was not only granted the position of “council to the provincial 
government,” but also reportedly joined the Guomindang.  The following year the 
Muslim warlord appointed the Tibetan Lama militia commander of the “Zeku region.”50 
 
Hor Qianhu Wagya, Collaboration and Empire 
The most powerful pre-Liberation figure in what would become known as Zeku 
County was not Serökyap, Lumbum or Lhagyel.  It was Lhagyel’s elder brother Wagya, 
                                                
49 The monastery’s full Tibetan name is Hor dgon theg mchog bkra shis gling. 
50 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1549; Zeku Xianzhi, 403, 529. There is nothing to indicate if Lhagyel ever took full 
vows or whether he later renounced them to assume his political/military career.  It should be noted that 
monasticism is generally assumed to be less important within the Nyingma tradition, particularly in 




qianhu of Zeku’s largest tribal grouping, the Hor.  Born in 1904 into the hereditary 
family of the Hor qianhu, Wagya ascended to tribal leadership in 1932.51  In addition to 
his younger brother being both a reincarnate lama and the baihu of the Hor’s Wönkhor 
Tsowa, according to various sources three of Wagya’s sons and at least two nephews had 
also been recognized as “living Buddhas.”  In addition, his sister and at least one of his 
daughters had married into other prominent Hor households, leading one commentator to 
hold the clan up as an example of the “feudal” nature of Amdo’s social and political 
structure that allowed the collection of secular and religious authority in one family.52   
While secondary sources claim that the Repgong leadership under Rongwo 
Monastery and the Rongwo Nangso had “unified control over both [pre-Liberation] 
Tongren and Zeku Counties,” not only was Wagya reportedly among the wealthiest 
individuals in the region, but his “prestige” (weiwang) was said to extend throughout the 
South Qinghai Plateau and across the provincial border into Tibetan regions of southern 
Gansu.53  Furthermore, Wagya and his brother Lhagyel were alleged to have been 
“acquainted with many of Qinghai’s key [Nationalist] Party and government leaders, the 
heads of each area’s royal houses (wanggong), and the [region’s] qianhu and baihu [. . 
                                                
51 Zeku Xianzhi, 491, 530; Qing Yang, "Yiwei Jiujing Kaoyan De Minzhu Renshi," Huangnan Wenshi 
Ziliao 2 (1994), 165.  According to present-day statistics Wagya had 6063 people under his direct authority.  
Rough censuses from the early 1950s generally estimated around 5600 members of the Hor Tribe out of an 
entire county population of over 17,000. ZCPG 1, 2-4. 
 
52 Wei Xinchun, 57. A reprint of an anonymous report from 1956 says of Wagya, “He simultaneously 
monopolized both political authority and spiritual authority.” In Qinghai Sheng Bianjizu, ed., Qinghai 
Sheng Zangzu Mengguzu Shehui Lishi Diaocha, Revised ed. (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1985), 56.  See 
also Wajia and Lajia, "Tongren Detsang Buluo Bei Jiaosha De Jingguo," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 10-
12 (1984): 132; Zhaxi Anjia, 249; Qing Yang 165; and Pu Wencheng, 488. 
 




.].”54  In fact, an official biography puts Wagya in the same league as many of Amdo’s 
top power brokers, noting,  
[. . .] at the time [Wagya] was deeply intertwined or [even] friendly with Ma 
Bufang, Ma Yuanhai, Ma Yuanxiang, Huang Wenyuan,55 [the 7th] Shartsang 
[Lama], [Zongqianhu Gyelwo] Dorjé, the Rongwo Nangso and other leading 
military, political and religious figures.56   
 
Yet, despite what appears to be a position of relative autonomy from the Xining 
regime, particularly in comparison to Lanzhou Jia or even the Rongwo Nangso, the Hor 
leader was deeply enmeshed in the intertribal politics of the south Qinghai Plateau, 
particularly as it intersected with state interests.  This reality is underlined by an anecdote 
Wagya and Lhagyel would pen decades later.  The incident in question revolved around 
Wagya’s attempts to mediate a tax dispute between the Xining regime and a subunit of 
the Hor, the Detsang Tsowa.57  According to their account, in 1937 two of Repgong’s 
tsowa had been allowed to pasture their animals on land of the Detsang in exchange for 
taking responsibility for various taxes, fees and corvée requirements imposed by the 
Xining government.  For whatever reason the outsiders did not fulfill their end of the 
agreement.  Yet, when the tax collector came (himself a Tibetan), payment from the 
Detsang was demanded in full.  In response to what is described as belligerent demands 
by the state’s agent, the Detsang’s chieftain reacted as mobile people have since time 
                                                
54 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1549. 
 
55 Huang Wenyuan was a scion of Labrang’s leading family and husband of the last qinwang, the “Mongol 
female price” Trashi Tséring.  See Chen Zhongyin and Zhouta, eds., Labulengsi yu Huangshi Jiazu 
(Lanzhou: Gansu Minzu Zhubanshe, 1995), 409.  See also this chapter n. 118. On Trashi Tséring see 
Dhondup and Diemberger.  
 
56 Qing Yang, 165. 
57 The Detsang are one of the five Hor tsowa.  The Zeku Xianzhi also contains an account of this incident.  




immemorial.  He replied indignantly,  “If [you] force us to pay the taxes, we will all 
move away…”58  Upon hearing this, Wagya claims to have hurried to the area.  The Hor 
qianhu understood that the world had changed.  By the late-1930s fleeing into the 
grasslands no longer offered mobile pastoralists respite from the encroaching state.  
Wagya thus counseled the Detsang leadership to stay put.  Employing a well-worn 
Chinese proverb, he reportedly replied, “Crows throughout the world are all black, no 
matter where you go it will be the same, I advise you that not leaving would be wise.”  
However, the Detsang headmen, including Wagya’s own son-in-law, did not heed the 
qianhu’s advice.  Instead they packed their tents and led their animals away.59 
Wagya’s words would prove prescient.  Twenty days later, two of Ma Yuanhai’s 
soldiers arrived in his camp.  They informed the Hor qianhu that Commander Ma and 
four hundred of his soldiers were in position to “pursue and kill the non-tax paying 
Detsang Tribe.”60  If Wagya wished to avert a massacre, he should immediately go to see 
the Muslim commander.  When he arrived, the “Guide Prince” presented Wagya with an 
ultimatum.  Either the qianhu would convince the Detsang to surrender or the Detsang 
would be “exterminated” (jiaosha).61  Whether out of bravado or poor calculation, the 
Detsang refused to listen to Wagya’s pleas.  True to his word, the next morning Ma 
                                                
58 Wajia and Lajia, 132. 
 
59 Ibid., 132-3. 
60 Ibid. 133.  The Detsang were reportedly trapped along the Gansu border by a force of four hundred 
cavalry troops.  Zeku Xianzhi, 411. 
 
61 Ma was encamped to the south among the Mongol Banners.  According to a second source, bearing 
horses and other gifts, Wagya’s delegation included six Hor chieftains among them his brother the 




unleashed his soldiers on the whole body of the Detsang.62  The battle, which Wagya 
reportedly was forced to witness, lasted the full day with both sides suffering heavy 
casualties.63  The Detsang’s spirited defense apparently enraged Ma Yuanhai.  The 
following day forty Detsang prisoners were executed.  Among the victims were men, 
women and children, including Wagya’s own son-in-law, whose severed head was 
presented to his parents for identification.64   
 This passage is certainly included among the wenshi ziliao to emphasize the 
depravity and greed of Ma Bufang and his lieutenants as well as the subordination of the 
region to their rule, all of which it accomplishes quite well.  Unintentionally perhaps, it 
also illustrates the erosion of imperial space, even in the vast grasslands of southeastern 
Amdo, in which a semi-autonomous existence substantially free of the extractive powers 
of an increasingly emboldened state to varying degrees could be carved out.  Conversely, 
however, the narrative ends with a passage that manages to highlight the incomplete 
status of Ma’s state-building project and instead reveals the broad contours of an ongoing 
subimperial relationship between Amdo’s indigenous leadership and Ma Bufang.   
                                                
62 Wagya and Lhagyel report an interesting inter-cultural exchange as the two discussed possible outcomes.  
Ma allegedly exclaimed, “I am a Muslim [Huimin], I do not lie, you are a qianhu, I would never deceive 
you.”  Wagya continues, “However, the Detsang Buluo’s Tibetan people, absolutely did not believe Ma 
Yuanhai’s words, [they] said no matter what [they] would not surrender.” Wajia and Lajia, 134. 
 
63 Zeku Xianzhi, 411; Wajia and Lajia, 134.  Ma Yuanhai’s forces lost twenty-one soldiers including an 
officer.  The county gazetteer reports that over forty women, children, elderly and infirmed Detsang 
tribesman were killed, more than thirty were taken prisoner, and an astounding twenty thousand head of 
livestock were confiscated. 
 
64 Wajia and Lajia, 134-135. In the end, Ma did not exterminate the tribe.  Initially, Wagya successfully 
pleaded with Ma to have mercy on his eight year-old grandson.  Over the following days, with the 
exception of one headman, the rest of the prisoners were released, although only after four teenage girls 
were allegedly raped.  Although the Detsang Baihu Jiaoba (Ch.) was among those who led his people’s 
flight, he would maintain his position throughout the Republican period and into the post-Liberation era.  




A month after the confrontation, Lhagyel led leaders of the Hor tribe to Xining for 
an audience with Ma Bufang.65  There, through a reversion to tactics more familiar to 
imperial borderlands than modern nation-states, a conclusion to the Detsang incident was 
reached. The Tibetan delegates admitted the guilt (renzui) of the Detsang Tsowa and 
presented Ma with horses and the highest quality Tibetan carpets.  Then, in exchange for 
allowing the downtrodden Detsang to return to their pastures, on behalf of the Hor’s four 
remaining tsowa Lhagyel offered to help pay the Detsang’s tax arrears and fines.  This act 
of contrition apparently appeased Ma, who presented each headman with a rifle and 
arranged the release of the sole remaining imprisoned Detsang leader.  According to 
Wagya and Lhagyel’s account, Ma finished by using the incident as a warning to the 
gathered headmen.  They would be held responsible should their followers fail to follow 
his orders, hinder or attack his soldiers, or rustle his herds.66   
While Wagya and Lhagyel use the Detsang incident to retroactively assert, “the 
increasingly cruel rule of Ma Bufang and Ma Yuanhai [over] us headmen and the 
masses,” other sources would note Wagya’s close involvement with the Ma Bufang 
regime that continued up until the eve of Liberation.67  In late August 1949, as the PLA 
crossed the mountains between Linxia and Xunhua and prepared to ford the Yellow 
River, Wagya did not send representatives to Xunhua along with the Rongwo delegation.  
Instead, he personally traveled to Labrang, the Tibetan Buddhist monastic center, trading 
                                                
65 The Zeku Xianzhi reports that upon the request of Wagya, a member of the Lutsang Tribe (Ch.) from 
present-day Guinan County joined the Xining delegation (411). 
66 Wajia and Lajia, 134-135. 
 




depot and cultural crossroads located across the Gansu border.68  At Labrang, in an act of 
submission that was being played out time and again across Amdo and elsewhere, Wagya 
bestowed gifts on victorious units of the PLA.69  Upon returning home, it is said that he 
proceeded to “actively propagandize the [Communist] Party’s policies to the masses and 
expressed support for the Party’s leadership.”70   
Like many of the region’s indigenous leaders, Wagya has been canonized in post-
Mao narratives of the early period of Liberation.  In these treatments, Wagya’s 
cooperation with the CCP has been lionized as a victory of the Party’s nationality policy, 
while his earlier cooperation with Ma Bufang and the GMD is excused as the result of the 
poisonous influence of Ma’s reactionary rule.  However, despite later professions of 
enmity toward Ma and his military commanders, even CCP sources note that Wagya had 
been hesitant to throw his lot in with the Communists.  As late as 1952, with the political 
situation complicated by the outbreak of several insurrections, “fearing arrest” Wagya 
thought better of traveling to Xining for a CCP-sponsored conference.  Instead, after 
reaching Xunhua he returned home on what seems to have been a manufactured pretext.71  
While there may have been a degree of truth to the claim that Wagya actively and 
                                                
68 Negotiations over the surrender of Xiahe were begun in the latter part of August and finalized on 
September 7, 1949.  In late August, the Mongol qinwang Trashi Tséring sent her husband, Huang 
Wenyuan, to accompany a Gannan legation to Lanzhou.  After Xiahe County was Liberated, she personally 
led the “Mongol Banner Jassaks, [and] tribal leaders forth [to Labrang] to welcome the PLA, present the 
PLA representatives with khata, [and] invite the PLA to quickly Liberate the Mongol banners.”  Due to the 
Ma Liang-led insurrection, in 1952 Xiahe would have to be pacified once again (see below). HNZZZZZGK, 
86. 
 
69 In a short biographical blurb, the Zeku County Gazetteer asserts, “[Gönshül Qianhu] Serökyap along 
with Tongren and Zeku’s other qianhu and baihu jointly traveled to Lanzhou to offer congratulations.” 
Zeku Xianzhi, 526. 
70 Qing Yang, 165.  See also Zeku Xianzhi, 530-1. 
 
71 Ibid., 165-166.  
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enthusiastically expressed support for the CCP, it ignores the political acumen of people 
like Wagya who had long experience dealing with multiple interests and powers across 
the region.  Moreover, as will be detailed in Part 2, it obfuscates the contentious and very 
delicate relationship between the Party and indigenous leaders that would exist 
throughout the 1950s.  Nonetheless, for the next decade Wagya would work closely with 
the CCP, acting as the primary conduit between the Party and the Zeku grasslands.   
Since at least the Second World War, when various European governments or 
puppet regimes came to terms with Nazi Germany, “collaboration,” the act of betraying 
one’s nation to another, has become something of an ultimate sin.  However, it only 
becomes necessary to think in binary divisions between collaboration and resistance 
when uneven temporalities and multiple sovereignties are replaced by unitary notions of 
the nation-state.  As Rana Mitter has pointed out when speaking of the vast gray space in 
which imperial power intersected with lived experience in Japanese-occupied northeast 
China, collaboration occurred within a context in which many Chinese elites were still 
operating in broadly imperial terms.  Instead of anomalies that belie and betray more 
common society-wide patterns of resistance— as national remembering would often have 
it— Mitter argues that collaboration is in fact the “‘bargain’ between two sides at the 
empire’s periphery.”72  To put it another way, according to Tilly’s formulation in which 
empire’s rule through distinct compacts with each segments, without collaboration there 
cannot be empire.   
                                                
72 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth : Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 17. 
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As conceived of in the immediate post-Liberation period and again in the post-
Mao era, the narrative of Liberation in Amdo explicitly allows for this collaborative 
relationship between indigenous authorities and the Ma Bufang and Guomindang 
regimes.  In fact, given the necessity of procuring their cooperation the CCP could not 
hope but strike similar imperial-style “bargains” on its peripheries.  This collaboration, 
which from the Party’s perspective transgressed not national loyalties but class loyalties, 
would be codified and justified under the rubric of the United Front.  In retrospect, more 
problematic is the collaboration of non-Chinese indigenous leaders with the Chinese 
Communist state.  Just as the awkward reality of the quotidian collusion between 
Japanese imperialism and individual Chinese experience has only recently begun to be 
addressed in scholarly fashion, the relationship between Tibetans and the Chinese 
Communist Party has remained a sensitive and under-theorized element of the absorption 
of Tibetan regions into the modern Chinese state.73  Perhaps to understand the 
                                                
73 In the case of China and Japan, the “puppet” government of Wang Jingwei has stood in for the much 
more widespread, subtle and everyday Chinese cooperation, collusion, and interaction with the Japanese 
occupation.  Recent studies have begun to investigate the considerable gray space between collaboration 
and resistance in which most individuals and institutions operated during the Japanese occupation. See 
Mitter; Timothy Brook, Collaboration : Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Marjorie Dryburgh, "Rewriting Collaboration: China, Japan, and the 
Self in the Diaries of Bai Jianwu," The Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 03 (2009), Poshek Fu, Passivity, 
Resistance, and Collaboration : Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993).  Uradyn Bulag is responsible for the most sophisticated work on what we might 
call minzu collaboration, arguing that Mongol nationalist aspiration was dependent on finding “friends” 
beyond the putative nation, what he terms “collaborative nationalism.” Focusing on a Yi community, 
Steven Harrell has written of the paradoxical position minority cadres occupy between their local 
communities and the Han state.  In his analysis, the majority of these cadres do not consider themselves 
collaborators but instead act as honest brokers on behalf of their co-ethnic constituents “whom they view as 
equal and respectable (though not always respected) citizens of China.”  While it remains to be seen how 
representative this account is (and Harrell allows that it might not be applicable in Xinjiang and Tibet), he 
is at least attempting to come to a more subtle understanding of how non-Han state actors may understand 
their actions within a state that is “a creation of people not only ethnically, linguistically, and culturally 
different from themselves but also often their oppressors.” Stevan Harrell, "L'état C'est Nous, or We Have 
Met the Oppressor and He Is Us:  The Predicament of Minority Cadres in the PRC," in The Chinese State 
at the Borders, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouve: UBC Press, 2007): 223.  In Tibetan studies, Robert Barnett has 
been at the forefront of attempts to come to a more nuanced coceptualization of the relationship between 
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participation of many indigenous Tibetan leaders in the post-Liberation regime, their 
actions must too be understood within the logic of empire in which collaboration, shorn 
of its unequivocally pejorative associations, was a strategy of survival that was fully 
integrated into the operable mechanisms of authority that existed in Amdo and elsewhere. 
In this sense, Wagya— and other “collaborators” like him— might be considered as 
“rational actors in the dynamics of empire.”74  It is only when the logic of empire is 
trumped by the logic of the nation that collaboration with the Ma Bufang regime, or for 
that matter the CCP, necessarily becomes a crime. 
 
Toward a United Front: The Nangra Rebellion and Post-Liberation Imperial Space 
In 1949, however, the transition from empire to nation was far from complete. In 
fact, although the Liberation of Qinghai Province had been proclaimed on September 5, 
pockets of intense fighting continued through the end of the year.75  Then in December, 
“Ma Bufang remnants” launched what PRC sources refer to as a widespread, coordinated 
“armed rebellion.”76  The post-1949 continuation of the Chinese Civil War is a story that 
                                                                                                                                            
Tibetan cadres and the Chinese state. See Robert Barnett, "Beyond the Collaborator-Martyr Model: 
Strategies of Compliance, Opportunism, and Opposition within Tibet," in Contemporary Tibet: Politics, 
Development, and Society in a Disputed Region, ed. Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2006); ———, "Language and Ethnicity: Cadre-Speak in Contemporary Tibet," Inner Asia 
10, no. 1 (2008). 
 
74 Mitter, 19. 
75 DDZGQH, vol. 1, 46-48.  Part Three of JFQHSLXB, 206-375, contains documents pertaining to military 
operations and political resolution of a number of these insurrections. Taken in total, the reader gets a sense 
of the fragile nature of the PLA’s September victory. 
 
76 Ibid., 48.  In January 1950, “anti-bandit” efforts were divided between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Regiments of 
the 1st Army.  Each was assigned an “anti-bandit region” that together made up most of northeastern 
Qinghai, including Guide (which then included Jianzha) and Xunhua but not Tongren or other areas within 
the bend of the Yellow River.  See “Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Qinghai Junqu Mingling” in 




has largely escaped scholarly attention.77  Yet, between 1949-1953, at least five 
significant military challenges to the Communist regime erupted across Qinghai Province 
alone.78  Given the PLA’s sweeping victories in Northwest China, it is unclear how large 
a threat the insurgencies actually posed.  However, Lin Hsiao-ting reports that throughout 
“China’s Central Asian border regions,” Guomindang agents had under their nominal 
command as many as 80,000 “irregulars” led by prominent indigenous figures such as 
Labrang’s paramount leader Apa Alo (Huang Zhengqing), Tibetan chieftains in Golok 
(Amdo) and Nagchu (Kham), and several of Ma Bufang’s Hui Muslim generals.  
According to Lin, “Chiang [Kaishek’s] military advisors were convinced that these new 
military resources, although scattered and still ill-trained would be of considerable value 
to their effort to recapture the Chinese mainland.”79   
The CCP took the threat seriously as well.  Both contemporary and secondary 
sources paint the insurrections as a coordinated rebellion conducted under the supervision 
of Chiang Kaishek and Ma Bufang with support from Taiwanese airdrops and American 
                                                
77 Recent studies by Jeremy Brown and Lin Hsiao-ting are among the few exceptions.  Brown finds that for 
several years the CCP’s control over Guizhou Province was extremely tenuous.  In particular, the 
provincial Party apparatus had been infiltrated by GMD agents while an 8,000-strong guerilla force 
operated in the mountainous Guizhou-Yunnan-Sichuan border regions. Jeremy Brown, "From Resisting 
Communists to Resisting America:  Civil War and Korean War in Southwest China, 1950-51," in 
Dilemmas of Victory : The Early Years of the People's Republic of China, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul 
Pickowicz (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 105-129; Lin Hsiao-ting, Modern China's 
Ethnic Frontiers : A Journey to the West (New York: Routledge, 2011).   
 
78 The five insurrections are generally described as follows: 1) the Eastern agricultural regions around 
Xining of Datong, Huangyuan, Huangzhong, and Menyuan under Ma Ying and other Ma Bufang remnants; 
2) Xunhua County under Ma Laowu, 3) the Chadaimu (Tib. Tsaidam) Basin in the grasslands northwest of 
Qinghai Lake under the Xinjiang rebel Osman (Usiman) and his Kazak allies; 4) the Nangra guerilla base 
of Wangchen Döndrup; 5) the insurrection of Ma Yuanxiang and Ma Liang on the Qinghai, Sichuan and 
Gansu border regions of the Southern Qinghai Plateau.  On Osman and the rebellion among Qinghai’s 
Kazakh population, see Jian Zhixiang, “Tribal Politics in the Borderlands: Oral History among the Kazakh 
in Xinjiang,” Paper presented at the Wheatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, 
March 27, 20012.  http://itunes.apple.com/us/itunes-u/weatherhead-east-asian-institute/id534934901 
(accessed September 14, 2012). 




imperialist power.80  Of considerable concern to the CCP was the participation of Tibetan 
and Mongol elites, reflecting a deep anxiety over its relationship with Amdo’s tribal and 
religious authorities.  Allegedly, after the Communist victory GMD agents had formed 
sleeper cells within Tibetan communities.  Li Xibo, the first Party Secretary of Guide 
County, would later write,  
[…] some bore into monasteries, wrapped themselves in monk’s robes (jiasha; 
Sanskrit Kasaya), [and] disguised [themselves] as lamas; others hid in the felt 
tents of the pastoral areas, adopted Tibetan names, [and] waited for the 
opportunity to wreak destruction.81 
 
Yet given what has been argued regarding the operating nexus of authority in 
Republican-era Amdo, various levels of cooperation between agents of the former regime 
and local leaders should not be surprising.  They almost invariably had far closer 
connections to local communities than did the CCP.  Prior to Liberation the Communists 
had no more than a handful of Tibetan cadres and very little opportunity or success 
operating in Amdo.82  By contrast Ma’s Xining regime was fully integrated into Amdo’s 
syncretic nexus of authority. 
This is not to imply the steadfast loyalty of many indigenous actors to either Ma 
Bufang or the GMD.  Instead, complex regional dynamics were in play as local elites 
sought to maintain autonomous space or secure their positions of authority within an 
environment defined by rapidly changing power dynamics. As the PLA approached 
                                                
80 That the CCP considered the several insurrections to be interconnected components in a single rebellion 
is made clear in the chronology (dashiji) produced at the back of Jiefang Qinghai (489-507) and the foldout 
map that appears between pages 440-441. See also DDZGQH, vol. 1, 46-50. 
 
81 Li Xibo, "Lu'ershi Zai Guide Jiaofei," Guidexian Wenshi Ziliao, no. 1 (2000): 14. 
82 The only senior ethnically Tibetan Communist Party member in Qinghai at the time of Liberation was 
Trashi Wangdu (Ch. Zhaxi Wangtu), vice-Chairman of the provincial Party Committee and vice-governor.  




Amdo, Ma’s agents actively spread “rumors” of the Communists’ purported radical 
agenda, in particular their hostility to religion.83  The CCP countered with its own 
propaganda, declaring that the new state would be built not upon the national exploitation 
of the past but instead upon the principles of nationality equality and unity.  Party leaders 
pointedly promised to protect mosques and monasteries, respect the customs of each 
nationality, uphold freedom of religious belief, and form a united front with all classes of 
each nationality.84  On balance, many local leaders may simply have chosen to throw 
their lot in with the regime that they were more familiar with (GMD) rather than gamble 
on the unknown (CCP).  Yet, as was the case with the Repgong leadership and Wagya of 
the Hor, many elites leaned toward the CCP while continuing to hedge their bets.  
Overall, the political jockeying should best be thought of as conditional alignments 
within a fluid political landscape. 
It was in this deeply contested environment that old acquaintances from the pre-
Liberation nexus of authority once more found themselves seeking to maintain the 
subimperial space they had to varying degrees carved out under Ma Bufang.  For 
example, after Guide County was Liberated on September 18, 1949, the Dongshan Baihu 
Lanzhou Jia was immediately reappointed to his pre-Liberation post of xiangzhang.  
However, by 1951 he was becoming increasingly concerned about his prospects under 
the new government.  In autumn, amidst a “rent reduction, anti-local despot, and suppress 
                                                
83 Zhao Long, 260.   
 
84 For example, see Liang Hansheng’s opening speech at the first Provincial All-Nationality People’s Unity 
and Friendship Conference, held in January 1950.  Liang Hansheng was concurrently vice secretary of the 
Qinghai Party Committee, Vice-chairman of Qinghai Province and political commissar of the Qinghai 
Military Region. See also speeches by 1st Field Army Commander Peng Dehuai (125-127) and Qinghai 




counterrevolutionaries” campaign, a regional qianhu and his son were executed by firing 
squad.  Lanzhou Jia would later recall,  
In the past I was not only a local official (guanren), but I was the xiang leader, 
[my] relationship with Ma Yuanhai was also very good, [and] it was also true that 
[I] had blockaded the Red Army [on the Long March], [. . .]  [I] began to think 
that the CCP’s knife might already be close to my head.85   
 
Finally, guns and ammunition in hand, in early 1952 Lanzhou Jia fled into the mountains 
with a small group of fighters, eventually seeking the protection of a much larger 
insurrection occurring just to the east in the Nangra territories of Wangchen Döndrup.86   
 
Prior to Liberation, Wangchen Döndrup had organized a well-armed “self-defense 
army” that has been described as “the southern Qinghai region’s mightiest tribal armed-
force.”87  However, as the PLA swept toward Xining in early September 1949, Wangchen 
Döndrup refused Ma Bufang’s orders to lead his fighters against the Communists.  
Instead, like many Tibetan leaders including Wagya, Serökyap and the Repgong 
triumvirate of Trashi Namgyel, Gélek Gyatso and Gyelwo Dorjé, the Nangra chieftain 
sent representatives to greet the victors and offer them his support.  After Guide County 
was officially Liberated, Wangchen Döndrup was reconfirmed as qianhu and 
concurrently made administrative head of the Nangra region, now referred to as Guide’s 
6th District.88  Yet, even as he participated in the ceremonial functions of the new state, 
                                                
85 Dongshan Lanzhou, 139.  
 
86 Ibid., 140. 
 
87 Jianzha Xianzhi, 511.   
 
88 Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 416; Zhang and Guo, “Jiefang Chuqi Pingxi” 31; Jianzha Xianzhi 
685; Zhao Qingyang, “Yiwei Jingli,” 197-198.  In June 1952, the 6th District would be renamed Jianzha 
District and in February 1953 become Jianzha County.   
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such as attending the 1950 Xining funeral of provincial Vice-chairman Ma Pu, Wangchen 
Döndrup was continuously reevaluating his relationship with the Communist regime. 
Party leaders were well aware of the provisional nature of the Nangra qianhu’s 
loyalty.  As PLA troops overwhelmed rebel bases elsewhere in northeast Amdo, over the 
first half of 1950 Wangchen Döndrup’s forested mountain stronghold was quickly 
becoming a haven for retreating Ma Bufang stalwarts and antagonistic tribal elements.89  
During his August stay in Xining, Zhou Renshan, Qinghai’s leading nationality affairs 
cadre, urged Wangchen Döndrup not to be deceived by reactionary elements.90  In 
response, Wangchen Döndrup reportedly declared,  
After Liberation, I did not understand the government’s policies, […].  In 
particular [I] listened to the rumors of the evildoers, and made mistakes in regards 
to the government.  Today [I] have come to the government, [I] have been warmly 
received by senior cadres, [they have] sincerely explained the policy of national 
equality and unity and the policy of the freedom of religious belief, [this has] 
caused me to recognize the value that the Party and the government place on us 
minority nationalities, [we] are genuinely regarded as brotherly nationalities. 
From now on I will definitely remain close to the government.91  
 
However, almost immediately upon leaving Xining, sources contend, Wangchen 
Döndrup “broke his word.”  Joining together with former officers of the Ma Bufang 
regime and calling their Nangra base “Little Taiwan,” soon after Wangchen Döndrup 
                                                                                                                                            
 
89 Zhang and Guo, “Jiefang Chuqi Pingxi,” 416, 419. See also Zhao Qingyang, “Yiwei Jingli,” 198; Yang 
Jiuce, "Weijiao Angla Gufei De Huiyi," in Jiefang Qinghai, (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 
431-432. Eventually more than three thousand “Ma Bufang reactionary officers, fleeing landlords, local 
tyrants, and other bandits” reportedly gathered in the Nangra region.  
 
90 On Zhou Renshan, see Chapter 4. 
 
91 Zhang and Guo, “Jiefang Chuqi Pingxi,” 33.  For a slightly different rendering see Zhang and Guo, 




launched what would be referred to as “Qinghai’s longest and most influential rebellion 
of the early Liberation period.”92  
Despite the growing threat, the PLA did not immediately mobilize a full military 
response.  Several months earlier, with the security situation already deteriorating, the 
Qinghai Provincial Party Committee had announced,  
In the historically and ethnically complex Qinghai region where nationality 
struggle is extremely acute, the bandit question and our efforts regarding the 
nationality question are inseparably related. … On the question of bandit 
suppression, [we] must militarily subdue and politically break down [their] 
alliances.93 
 
In the Nangra region, this meant splitting Wangchen Döndrup from his largely non-
Tibetan allies.  To this end, between late 1950 and early 1952 the Party made seventeen 
separate diplomatic efforts to lure Wangchen Döndrup back into the fold.  In particular, 
influential Tibetan religious and secular figures— among them representatives of the 10th 
Panchen Lama, Kumbum Monastery (Ch. Ta’ersi), and the Buddhist scholar and educator 
Geshé Sherap Gyatso— were enlisted to try to convince the Nangra headman that his 
future lay not with the Ma Bufang partisans but in new China.94   
                                                
92 Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 415, 417-419. According to the authors, between November 1949 
and March 1950 “rebel activity in Nangra was continuous.”  However, it was after Wangchen Döndrup’s 
return in August of that year that it began to reach the level of a full-scale rebellion.  In November, the 
insurgents formed the “China Guomindang Northwest Revolutionary Committee,” Wangchen Döndrup 
becoming commander of the rebels’ “Oppose the Communist Save the Nation” 2nd Army.  The 2nd Army 
had two regiments raised from among the Nangra and a third from elsewhere in Guide.  Altogether, 
Wangchen Döndrup is said to have had over 2,100 “tribal militiamen” under his command.  See Jianzha 
Xianzhi, 511. 
 
93 Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 420.  
 
94 Descriptions of all seventeen diplomatic missions are found in both Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 
420-423 and Zhang and Guo, “Jiefang Chuqi Pingxi,” 37-40.  An appendix to the latter contains a 1951 
letter addressed to Wangchen Döndrup by the chairman and vice-chairman of Qinghai provincial 
government (53-55) (also found in JFQHSLXB, 269-272) and the September 8, 1952 Qinghai Daily 




The seventeen missions having proved unsuccessful, in late April 1952 the 
Provincial Party Committee announced its intention to “use force to suppress the Jianzha 
District counterrevolutionary rebellion.”   Finally on May 1 1952, the PLA launched a 
massive military assault on the Nangra region.  Although, Wangchen Döndrup managed 
to escape the encirclement, his home village and members of his family were quickly 
captured.  By the following afternoon, Qinghai’s “Little Taiwan” had been destroyed.95 
That same day an announcement appeared in the Qinghai Daily promising that if 
Wangchen Döndrup were to “step back from the precipice and end [his] relationship with 
the bandits, [he would] be treated leniently by the People’s Government, [and his] life, 
property and qianhu position would be protected.”96  Soldiers were ordered to protect 
monasteries and strictly abide by the Party’s nationality policies.  Tibetan religious and 
tribal leaders were told that if they surrendered they would not face punishment and their 
property and positions would also be preserved.  The Nangra region itself was promised a 
two-year tax holiday, and the delivery of emergency grain relief and medical provisions 
and expertise so that “production can be restored.”97  On July 11, Wangchen Döndrup 
finally came down from the mountains and surrendered his weapons.  In Party parlance, 
                                                
95 Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 423-424. Ten thousand soldiers reportedly took part in the attack.   
For detailed descriptions of the military campaign, see JFQHSLXB, 276-295.  See also Yang Jiuce, 431-
434; Li Xibo 17-19; and QHSZJSJ, 505-507.  A Tibetan guerilla has also given a short description of the 
fighting. See Information & Publicity Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ed., Tibet under Chinese 
Communist Rule : A Compilation of Refugee Statements, 1958-1975 (Dharamsala: Information & Publicity 
Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1976), 13-21.  See also this chapter n. 107. 
 
96 The announcement is reproduced in JFQHSLXB, 273-274.   
 
97 Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 423-424; Zhang and Guo, “Jiefang Chuqi Pingxi,”  41. Albeit hardly 
impartial, sources claim that not only were captives quickly released (including tribal leaders but not 
“outside counterrevolutionaries”), but over 3000 people received medical attention and three hundred 
ninety-five households received a portion of an initial shipment of 37,000 jin of emergency grain. See 




he “received a new life [and] returned to the people.”  In turn, Wangchen Döndrup was 
fêted by senior leaders in Xining, Lanzhou and Beijing and had his position as qianhu 
reconfirmed.  Soon after, the Nangra chieftain would be named head of the newly created 
Jianzha Tibetan Autonomous County and vice-chairman of Huangnan Prefecture.98  
Even acknowledging Wangchen Döndrup’s position as head of the largest tribe in 
a strategic location, the efforts by the CCP to draw the Nangra headman back into the 
fold seem remarkable.99   Mark Stevens suggests that special attention was paid to the 
Nangra situation not only because of its relative proximity to the provincial capital and 
the region’s agricultural heartland, but also in the hopes that “a success in peacefully 
wining over dBang chen [Wangchen Döndrup] could be held up as a model for other 
tribal groups in the rugged Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan border region.”100  In fact, a 
People’s Daily announcement celebrating the resolution of the Nangra revolt makes this 
explicit, framing the agreement as a “Model of the People’s Government’s 
implementation of the policy to win over and unify with minority nationalities.”101  While 
the military operations were almost certainly more decisive than the diplomatic overtures, 
the agreeable conclusion of the Nangra insurrection was heralded as a stunning success 
for the CCP’s nationality policy.  Specifically citing the Nangra incident, Party leaders 
declared that armed rebellion in minority regions was not simply a case of the ruling class 
                                                
98 Ibid., 428-430; Ibid., 49-52; Zhao Qingyang, “Yiwei Jingli,” 199-130; JFQHSLXB, 301; Jianzha Xianzhi 
686. Wangchen Döndrup had been hiding out in a forested area of neighboring Tongren County.  He 
purportedly returned to find his property intact and that his mother had received needed medical care. 
 
99 For example, sources note that Wangchen Döndrup’s men had ambushed and killed Party cadres and 
PLA soldiers. See JFQHSLXB, 270, 273, 300. Zhang and Guo, “Junshi Xiaomie,” 418, 429. 
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trying to preserve its feudal privileges (class struggle), but a function of historical 
antagonism between nationalities (nationality struggle).  “Because of this in pacifying 
rebellion [we] must actively separate the nationality and religion problem from the 
counterrevolutionary problem, [and] separate the outside counterrevolutionaries from the 
indigenous nationality upper strata elements.”102  While, the former were to be eliminated 
militarily, the latter should be brought into a United Front.  Perhaps sensitive to charges 
that class struggle was being ignored, the Party’s Northwest Bureau explained,  
From our perspective these upper strata elements are the masses’ oppressors and 
exploiters and the leaders of the rebellions, however from the perspective of the 
minority nationality people, especially among Tibetans and Kazaks for whom the 
pastoral economy is central, they are seen as heroes, the reason is simple, it is 
because in the past under the rule of Han chauvinism, [indigenous elites] played 
the leading role in opposing nationality exploitation. […]. Today [we] strive to 
unite with these minority nationality upper strata elements, in reality this is 
winning over the minority nationality masses.103   
 
Party leaders boasted that they had “[…] applied experiences resolving the Nangra 
problem, [and] one after another smoothly resolved armed rebellions in Gansu in the 
Muslim (Huimin) inhabited regions around Xiji and the Tibetan inhabited regions of the 
Amuquhu (Ch.) Tribe.”104   
                                                
102 Xibeiju Tongzhanbu and Xibei Minwei Dangzu, JFQHSLXB, 305. That many of the “outsiders” were 
also minorities is largely glossed over.  While Hui Muslims en mass were considered to be victims of 
national exploitation and therefore not responsible for participating in rebellion, leaders of these rebellions 
were not granted the same leniency as the headmen of other nationalities.  Marshal Peng Dehuai would 
only partially explain this discrepancy by noting that like Chiang Kaishek, the “Ma Bandits are the enemies 
of the Han, and are also the common enemies of the Hui and the people of other nationalities.”  In 
JFQHSLXB, 126.  
 
103 Ibid., 307.  
 
104 Ibid., JFQHSLXB 300, 306. Satisfactory headway was also seen being made elsewhere, such as an 
ongoing effort to pacify an insurrection among Kazakhs far to the northwest in Qinghai’s Chadaimu Basin.  
The Amaquhu are one of the Gannan tribes under the direct supervision of Labrang Monastery.  After 
Liberation, Labrang’s representative had been made district leader.  For two years there were reportedly no 
troubles.  The rebellion only began in response to the Party’s own “shortcomings and mistakes, like 
forcibly establishing the district government, demanding grain taxes, soldiers clearing land etc.” According 
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At the end of 1952, Wangchen Döndrup addressed a conference attended by many 
of Qinghai’s leading indigenous elites.  During his speech, he urged the attendees— 
 especially “the [Mongol] princes and [Tibetan] qianbaihu”— to heed his own 
experiences, concluding, “The bandits and spies are like birds in the sky, if there are no 
rocks on which to stand they cannot land, therefore if none of us act as a rock, there will 
be nowhere for the spies and bandits to land.”105  In a few short months Wangchen 
Döndrup had been transformed from a rebel leader into a model United Front personage. 
Of course, this is a story told entirely from the perspective of the Chinese state.  
We will likely never know how Wangchen Döndrup himself viewed his “return to the 
people.”  While the Party tells the tale of Wangchen Döndrup essentially as a story of 
nation building, it is possible to see it instead as an exercise in the maintenance of 
imperial space.  Speaking of the Nangra Rebellion, Stevenson indirectly identifies the 
contradiction between empire and nation as the core issue in the Nangra drama, writing, 
The [Nangra] region had never been under effective (Tibetan or Chinese) state 
control, and the political situation prior to the Communist victory had certainly 
been one of scattered, loose confederations or small kingdoms. The Tibetan 
renegades were doing what they had it seems always done, resisting outside 
control and acting on the principle of local loyalty.106 
 
Yet, while Stevenson suggests that Tibetan polities such as Wangchen Döndrup’s had 
consistently been outside of “effective state control,” like Doyle he fails to note that the 
                                                                                                                                            
to the report, the issue was peacefully resolved after local dignitaries, in particular Labrang’s Apa Alo, 
were enlisted as mediators (However, subsequently the former district leader joined Ma Liang’s Gansu 
rebellion).  The Xiji Rebellion was similarly resolved through the recruitment of important pre-Liberation 
elites.  See JFQHSLXB 302-303, 307, on the Amaquhu see also Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 
419-420.  
 
105 Cited in Zhang and Guo, “Jiefang Chuqi Pingxi,” 52.  The conference was for the chairmen and vice-
chairmen of Qinghai’s new national autonomous administrative units.  See Chapter 4. 




definition of “effective” might not be static or self-evident.  In an imperial relationship, it 
might refer to nominal loyalty, the granting of titles, and little more.   
 To put it another way, the confrontation between the Nangra and the Chinese 
Communist Party-state was essentially an extension of earlier efforts to define center-
peripheral relations.  In the months after Wangchen Döndrup “returned to the people,” he 
reportedly traveled to Beijing where he met with senior leaders including Mao Zedong.  
A Nangra partisan would later report that Mao received the Nangra Qianhu by 
exclaiming, “I am glad to meet you. You are the first man in the history (sic) who fought 
bravely with a great power for three years and whose village rightly deserves the name 
‘Second Taiwan.’”107  In the 1930s when faced with an increasingly extractive Xining 
government, Wangchen Döndrup had been able to negotiate a mutually beneficial 
settlement that maintained the broad outline of an imperial relationship between he and 
the Ma regime.  Two decades later, even from a position of considerable weakness, 
Wangchen Döndrup was again able to leverage his geographic position and personal 
prestige, this time with the new Communist authorities, to obtain what he must have 
viewed as concessions, guarantees, and titles from the new state power.  After all, while 
empire is a compromise between central and peripheral elites, this does not mean that 
these negotiations are predicated on equal power relations.  For its part, both immediate 
security concerns and the long-term strategic and ideological underpinnings of the Party’s 
                                                
107 Information & Propaganda Office, 19.  The source is a Nangra Tibetan named Dorji Tsering (alias 
Rinzin) who fought in the insurrection.  After the fall of Nangra, Rinzin fled with about eighty fighters.  
With little to eat other than the raw meat from their horses, the small band spent a month in the frigid 
mountains before two lamas sent by the Chinese state convinced them to surrender in exchange for 
amnesty.  Rinzin reports that the Chinese kept their word for one year.  However, he alleges that starting in 
1953 mass arrests and even executions of those who had participated in the rebellion became 
commonplace.  Rinzin escaped to Lhasa in 1954 and then into exile in 1958.  His “refugee statement” was 
made in Dharamsala that same year.  Rinzen’s story cannot be independently confirmed.  For example, he 
reports that Wangchen Döndrup and another indigenous leader of the Nangra Rebellion were arrested in 
1954, an allegation not found in the Chinese sources.   
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nation-building project made it amenable to such an arrangement.  In doing so, the 
resolution of the Nangra insurrection is a prime example of the negotiated space that can 
be preserved during the transition between empire and nation.  Like the Dongshan’s 
Lanzhou Jia, who after a short stay in the Nangra region also returned home to reclaim 
his post as xiangzhang, Wangchen Dondrup’s insurrection was an attempt to maintain 
some semblance of an imperial relationship.  At least temporarily, the United Front 




Liberation’s Last Act: The Ma Yuanxiang Rebellion and the Opening of Amdo’s 
Southeastern Grasslands 
When in December 1952 Wangchen Döndrup exhorted his fellow qianhu and 
baihu to resist the entreaties of outside agitators, he was specifically referring to a 
rebellion that had been brewing in the Gansu-Qinghai-Sichuan border region.  However, 
just as Wangchen Döndrup had much longer relationships with the Ma Bufang stalwarts 
that flocked to his mountain stronghold than with the Communist Party, the leaders of 
this insurrection were hardly newcomers to the southeastern grasslands.  In the mid-
1930s, Ma Liang and Ma Yuanxiang had commanded Ma Bufang’s southern defenses 
against the Red Army, working closely with indigenous headmen such as the Mongol 
Prince Künga Peljor.  By contrast, in the summer of 1952 Qinghai UFWD director Zhou 
Renshan noted that the region was the very last part of Qinghai to which the Party had 
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dispatched its cadres.108  In fact, among the reasons cited for the need to come to a quick 
resolution of the Nangra situation was so that Party work teams could be sent into Golok 
to begin the process of building administrative capacities among its famously recalcitrant 
inhabitants.109  Similarly, although Tongren County had been Liberated in September 
1949, for the following several years there was no permanent state presence in its 
southern pastoral districts, the area that would become Zeku County.110  It was not until 
mid-summer 1952 that the Northwest Military region dispatched South Qinghai Pastoral 
Region Inspection Teams (fangwentuan) into the region.111  From July through 
September 1952, the PLA’s Pastoral Inspection Teams “convened meetings, [and] spread 
the Party’s nationality policy while medical teams (yiliaodui) gave free medical treatment 
to the masses.”112  Simultaneously, Tongren County sent pastoral work teams into the 
                                                
108 Zhou Renshan, "Jixu Kaizhan Minzu Quyu Zizhi Yundong," in Minzu Zongjiao Gongzuo Wenjian 
Huiji, ed. [Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Tongzhanbu] (n.p., [1959]) (Hereafter cited as MZZJGZWJHJ), 
644.  Zhou specifically cited the contiguous territories of present-day Zeku, Henan and Guoluo Counties.  
See Chapter Four. 
 
109 Golok was not even officially liberated until November 1950, a full year after the rest of the province, 
and the first Party Work team was ony dispatched to Golok in July 1952.  Qinghai Sheng Difangzhi 
Bianzuan Weiyuanhui and "Qinghai sheng zhi, Junshizhi" Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, eds., Qinghai Sheng Zhi, 
vol. 56 Junshizhi (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2001) (Hereafter cited as QHSZJSZ), 490. On the 
Golokwa’s notorious independent streak, see for example Emily Yeh, 508; John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans 
of the Cold War : America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 
128-129. 
 
110 Zeku Xianzhi, 382, 403-4, 408.   
 
111 Qinghai Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., Qinghai Sheng Zhi, vol. 2 Dashiji (Xining: 
Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2001) (Hereafter cited as QHSZDSJ), 206. Over a four-month period, two 
teams reportedly visited dozens of tribes in Jianzha, Tongren (Zeku), Henan and Tongde Counties, 
spreading the Party’s nationality policy to over 15,000 pastoralists.  Geshé Sherap Gyatso was leader of the 
first “regiment” and the Shartsang Lama the second.  However, it seems doubtful that these senior Buddhist 
leaders traveled with the inspection teams throughout their four-month deployment. Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Qinghaisheng Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou Zuzhishi Ziliao : 1953-1987.  ([Xining]: 
Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei Zuzhibu, Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei Dangshi Yanjiushi, Huangnan 
Zangzu Zizhizhou Dang'anju, 1993) (Hereafter ZGGCD HNZZZZZLSDSJ), 10. 
 
112 Zeku Xianzhi, 15. 
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grasslands to spread propaganda and gather demographic and economic data.  That year 
three “tent schools” were established and precursory tax collection and social welfare 
efforts were initiated, although, as sources would later admit, none of these initiatives 
were particularly successful.  In other words, three years after Liberation the Chinese 
Communist Party still only had a minimal presence in much of the vast pastoral regions 
of southeastern Amdo.   
By comparison, Ma Liang and Ma Yuanxiang, the men who led the insurrection 
in Gansu and Qinghai respectively, were intimately familiar with the region and its 
leadership.  In fact, the story of the self-proclaimed “Qinghai Commander” Ma 
Yuanxiang is itself a lesson in the syncretic nature of pre-1949 Amdo.113  Several sources 
claim that Ma was a Hui Muslim from Linxia or perhaps a Salar from Xunhua County.  
Lin Hsiao-ting describes him as “a Tungan Muslim general with blood ties to the 
renowned Ma Muslim family of Chinese Central Asia.”114  However, perhaps befitting 
the transcultural world that exists on the northeastern edge of Amdo, the commander of 
the PLA’s “bandit suppression” forces asserts that Ma Yuanxiang was actually a Tibetan 
born Lamu Zang.115  In this narrative, among the Chinese speaking population of his 
                                                                                                                                            
 
113 JFQHSLXB, 316; Li Shurao and Zhang Zhixin, "Ma Yuanxiang Gufei De Fumie," in Jiefang Qinghai 
(Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 436. 
 
114 Lin Hsiao-ting, Modern China’s Ethnic Frontiers, xxi. 
 
115 Li and Zhang, 435-436.  The Huangnan Zhouzhi (1026) and its abbreviated version, the Huangnan 
Zangzu Zhizhizhou Gaikuang (90) agree with Li and Zhang, claiming that Ma was originally a Tibetan 
named Labuzang.  However, another participant in the counterinsurgency states that Ma was a Hui Muslim 
from Linxia. Meng Zhiren, "Qingnan Chaofei Qinliji " in Jiefang Qinghai, ed. Zhonggong Qinghai 
Shengwei Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin Jiefangjun Qinghaisheng Junqu 
Zhengzhibu (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 51. The website 
http://blog.stnn.cc/lemanhb/Efp_Bl_1002505796.aspx claims that Ma was a Hui from Xunhua while the 
website “Huizu zai Xian” (“Hui Online”) agrees that Ma originally came from Xunhua but suggests that he 
might have been ethnically Salar. http://www.huizucn.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=23535. 
146 
 
southern Gansu birthplace (Gannan), he went by the “Hui name” Liao Muzan.  As a 
young man Lamu Zang served as a herdsman and farmhand in the Linxia area for Ma 
Bufang’s uncle and predecessor, Ma Lin.  In an expression of gratitude and loyalty, Lamu 
Zang would change his surname to Ma.  Later, “Because [Ma Yuanxiang] was fluent in 
Tibetan language and intimately familiar with the conditions of the pastoral regions, [he] 
became Ma Bufang’s close and trusted follower [. . .].”116 
In any case, the man now known as Ma Yuanxiang would rise to become one of 
the most powerful figures on the South Qinghai Plateau.  In the mid-1930s he was 
appointed chief of the Henan Mongol Banner Command.  More than a decade later, 
having served in the Anti-Japanese War, Ma Yuanxiang was a general in Ma Bufang’s 
82nd Army.  On October 28, 1949, well after the capture of Xining, Ma Yuanxiang 
surrendered to the Communist forces and was sent to a PLA officer retraining school.  
Eight months later, Ma Yuanxiang returned home to find that his son, brother and 
nephew had been captured and killed.  Fearing his own arrest, Ma Yuanxiang donned a 
disguise and made his way south into the territory of the Four Mongol Banners.117  
Although Künga Peljor had since passed away, on the Mongol grasslands he and his old 
colleague Ma Liang exploited long-standing connections to leading indigenous figures 
including the late-Mongol prince’s son-in-law Huang Wenyuan, to spread anti-Party 
sentiment, organize a counterrevolutionary militia, and establish a “guerilla base area” on 
                                                                                                                                            
 
116 HNZZZZZGK, 90. 
 
117 Xibeiju Tongzhanbu and Xibei Minwei Dangzu, JFQHSLXB 309-310.  The more common narrative, as 
found in Li and Zhang (436), is that in the officer training school Ma Yuanxiang continued to spread anti-
Party ideas before (without explanation) being allowed to flee. See also HNZZZZZGK, 90.  The admission 
that Ma was essentially forced to take up arms was made in December 1952 by the Northwest UFWD and 




the Southeastern Qinghai Plateau.118  Calling itself the Anti-Communist Save the Nation 
102nd Route Army, by the end of 1952 Ma Yuanxiang’s force had grown from a small 
band of twenty-five compatriots to a force of nearly two thousand fighters supported by 
GMD airdrops.119   
From his sanctuary situated in the vast grasslands between the Henan Mongol 
territories and Labrang, Ma Yuanxiang and his allies allegedly sent agents throughout 
southeastern Amdo who reportedly “deceived and won over reactionary elements from 
among the qianhu, baihu, princes, reincarnate lamas and old military officers.”  He also 
allegedly attempted to establish a second guerilla base in the Hor territories of Wagya and 
Lhagyel.120  Responding to Ma’s provocations, the Hor headmen organized a five 
hundred-man self-defense force.  Lhagyel, who in the mid-1930s had been named by Ma 
Bufang as the commander of the region’s anti-Communist militia, was now assigned the 
                                                
118 The degree to which Huang Wenyuan was complicit in Ma Yuanxiang’s insurrection is unclear.  Since 
the early days after Xining’s Liberation, Huang had been a conspicuous participant in the new state.  He 
had led a delegation to 1950’s Unity and Friendship Conference, being named one of its vice-chairmen.  In 
summer 1952, Huang Wenyuan was made a vice-chairman of the South Qinghai Pastoral Region 
Inspection Corps.  In March 1953, he was named vice-commander of Li Shurao’s South Qinghai Bandit 
Extermination Command.  A history of the county suggests that rather that colluding with Ma Yuanxiang, 
Huang Wenyuan “did all he could to get the Bandit Ma Yuanxiang to surrender.”  When this proved 
impossible, Huang ended his relationship with the former general.  Li Shurao and Ma Fangfu, “Qingnan 
Jiaofei zhong Qunzhong Gongzuo Zongjie," in JFQHSLXB, 329-332; HNMGZZZXGK; 74; QHSDSJ, 206; 
Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1027.  
 
119 Li and Zhang, 436; Tongde Xianzhi, 378; Xibeiju Tongzhanbu and Xibei Minwei Dangzu, 310, 311.  Li 
and Zhang maintain that Ma received five airdrops, the contents including machine guns, rifles, 
ammunition, radios and six GMD agents to help lead the insurrection.  Ma is also said to have been 
provided gold, silver, jade, pearls, weapons, and counterfeit currency with which to bribe local headmen.  
However, according to an undated but apparently contemporary document, there were in total eight 
airdrops.  The first seven went to Ma Liang’s 103rd Route Army and only the eighth was sent directly to Ma 
Yuanxiang.  The document identifies twenty-two Guomindang spies dropped into the region and 
inventories accompanying war matériel.  JFQHSLXB, 360-366.   
 
120 JFQHSLXB, 311-12, 316; HNZZZZZGK, 91.  According to December 1952 instructions issued by the 
Qinghai Party Committee, Ma Yuanxiang’s agents were active in Tongren (including Zeku), Tongde, 
Jianzha, Guide, Hualong and Xunhua Counties.  By the following February Golok and Xinghai had been 




same position in the CCP’s anti-Ma Yuanxiang efforts.121  In January, a Hor “sentry” 
captured a messenger sent by Ma Yuanxiang to instigate rebellion among the tribe’s 
leadership.  Instead, Wagya turned the spy over to the Party.  In an atmosphere in which 
many indigenous leaders had yet to fully commit to the new state, Wagya’s actions are 
heralded as one of his great contributions to the revolution.122  According to Zhao 
Qingyang,  
Someone said: In such a way you earnestly arrested a bad person, are you not 
afraid that afterwards you will suffer retribution?  [Wagya] said: The Chinese 
Communist Party is the ocean in the water, the endless river, bandits and spies are 
puddles of water, after a few days under the sun they will be dry.123 
 
However, in emphasizing Wagya’s decision to turn over the provocateur the possibility is 
raised that Wagya’s assistance may not have been a foregone conclusion.  Zhao 
Qingyang admits that as late as 1952, “the reactionaries’ rumors had bewitched [Wagya], 
causing him to have all kinds of apprehensions, he could not rest, [but] was very worried 
about his future.”124  In this context, the capture of the spy suggests a moment of crisis in 
which after several years of lukewarm support— and with many of his counterparts 
already complicit in Ma Yuanxiang’s rebellion— the Hor Qianhu was forced to make full 
his commitment to the CCP.  At least in retrospect, there was no turning back. 
Meanwhile, in December the Northwest Military Region established the Gansu-
Qinghai Bandit Suppression Command and issued instructions to “resolutely politically 
                                                
121 Zeku Xianzhi, 529; Qing Yang, 167. 
 
122 For example, sources claim that Ma Yuanxiang had formed a “blood-brother relationship” with the 
baihu of one of the ten tribes of Zeku, Lhakba of the Shawonar Tribe.  Zeku Xianzhi, 527. 
 
123 Qing Yang, 167-8. 
 




win over, divide, and simultaneously militarily exterminate the small group of bandits.”125  
Provincial authorities noted that indigenous elites had complex reasons for joining the 
rebellion and “there were many internal contradictions.”  Hoping to exploit these 
differences, the Qinghai Party Committee warned, “counterrevolution [must be] strictly 
separated from the nationality and religion question, [we] absolutely must not confuse 
them as we have in the past.”126  As with Wangchen Döndrup’s rebellion, they were told 
to make a firm distinction between pastoral tribal and religious elements involved in the 
insurrection and “outside counterrevolutionaries.” “The former are generally targets to 
unite with and win over.  The latter are targets to be resolutely and completely 
eliminated. […].127  Special attention was to be paid to tribal and religious leaders.  Under 
the principle of “Repeatedly [Attempt to] Win Over, [and] Treat with Particular 
Leniency,”128 Party leaders instructed, “no matter how large their crimes, [they should be 
dealt with under] the principle of firmly educating and winning over, [we] cannot waver 
in the slightest.”129 
                                                
125 Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei, "Guanyu Xiaomie Ma Liang, Ma Yuanxiang Gufei de Zhishi."  In 
JFQHSL, Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin 




127 Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei, “Guanyu Tuanjie Gezu Renmin Jianjue Qingjiao Ma Lian, Ma 
Yuanxiang deng Gufeide Zhishi.” In JFQHSLXB, Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji 
Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin Jiefangjun Qinghaisheng Junqu Zhengzhibu eds. (Xining: Qinghai 
Xinhua Chubanshe, 1990), 318. Instructions sent by the Qinghai Party Committee note that the uprisings in 
Nangra and on the South Qinghai Plateau were in many ways dissimilar.  In particular, the Ma 
Yuanxiang/Ma Liang insurrection was led primarily by GMD/Ma Bufang generals with material support 
from Taiwan and was geographically isolated compared to the Nangra rebels. Ibid,  316-317. 
 
128 Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei, "Guanyu Xiaomie Ma Liang, Ma Yuanxiang Gufei de Zhishi," 313. 
 
129 Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei, “Guanyu Tuanjie Gezu Renmin Jianjue Qingjiao Ma Lian, Ma 
Yuanxiang deng Gufeide Zhishi,” 318; Qinghai Junqu Zhengzhibu. "Jinjiao Ma Liang, Ma Yuanhai deng 
Gufei zai Zhixing Zhengce shang de Jixiang Guiding," in JFQHXB, Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei 
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In March 1953, troops under the command of Qinghai Military Region Vice-
Commander Li Shurao spilled into the region.130  In mid-April, scouts located Ma 
Yuanxiang’s main force on the Henan-Golok border.  His forces badly mauled by the 
subsequent PLA assault, Ma was driven west into Tongde County.  Trapped on the banks 
of the Yellow River, in May 1953 Ma Yuanxiang was killed and his insurrection 
crushed.131  If the Liberation of Xunhua on August 26, 1949 is commemorated as the first 
salvo in the Liberation of Qinghai, the May 7, 1953 death of Ma Yuanxiang and the 
eradication of his band of loyalists is officially remembered as the drama’s final act. 
“After this, our province’s last remaining political bandits were extinguished.”132 After 
nearly four years, ninety-eight “bandit extermination engagements,” and fourteen 
hundred PLA casualties, the Party could proclaim, “a great victory in the whole 
province’s bandit extermination struggle.”133  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Zhonggong Renmin Jiefangjun Qinghaisheng Junqu Zhengzhibu 
eds. (Xining: Qinghai Xinhua Chubanshe, 1990), 322-323.  
 
130 Li and Zhang, 437-438; QHSZJSZ, 509-510.  As commander of the South Qinghai Bandit Suppression 
Command and secretary of the South Qinghai Work Committee, Li Shurao was put in charge of both 
military and political operations. Their headquarters was established on the grasslands between Henan and 
the Gartsé Tribe’s territories in what would become Zeku County.   
 
131 On the military operations see Li and Zhang, 437-440; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1027-1029; QHSZJSZ, 509-
510; and the related documents in JFQHSLXB, 329-355 and photo plates 213-231. The Rongwo Nangso 
Trashi Namgyel recalls that Tongren’s indigenous leadership helped the military efforts by aiding in 
logistics, such as providing guides and translators, and collecting grain and supplies.  Zhaxi Anjia, 244. 
 
132 Jiefang Qinghai, 507.  The Qinghai Military Region Command and Political Department takes it a step 
further, proclaiming Ma’s defeat to be the “elimination of the last political bandit remnants on the 
Mainland.” Qinghaisheng Junqu Silingbu, 9.  According to one account, the Maji Shan region of Golok 
was the last part of Qinghai to be Liberated.  It reads, into early 1954 five small tribes (xiao buluo) 
“isolated from the world,” “resisted and did not accept the leadership of the local people’s government.” 
Huang Taixin, "Qinghai Jiefang Zuiwan De Diqu: Majixueshan," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuangji 17 
(1988): 51.  Nonetheless, the official history of Qinghai’s Liberation makes it clear that the defeat of Ma 
Yuanxiang was the last major military operation of the Liberation period. 
 
133 Introduction to “Part 3” in Jiefang Qinghai Huace. 
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By 1953, two significant challenges, one to the north of the Zeku region, another 
to the south and west— and briefly in the region itself— had been extinguished.  While 
the CCP remained vigilant toward the presence of Guomindang spies and internal 
enemies, Liberation as an event had come to its successful completion.  However, nearly 
four years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the lack of more than a 
nominal Party or military presence, the fear of Guomindang renegades, and the uncertain 
loyalties of indigenous elements made the region a great concern for the new regime. 
Nearly two decades earlier, Ma Bufang had attempted to use the Red Army’s approach to 
tighten his administrative and military grip on the south Qinghai Plateau.  Now, Ma 
Yuanxiang’s insurrection had given the CCP both the impetus and the access to initiate 
the first stages of the political integration of the region.134    
It therefore seems no coincidence that one month after the death of Ma Yuanxiang 
and the pacification of southeastern Amdo the Party announced its intention to split the 
pastoral districts from Tongren County’s agricultural heartland, forming a new county-
level administration on the South Qinghai Plateau.  When in July 1953, the first 
permanent Party contingents began to arrive in what was to become Zeku County, they 
did not naively expect to effortlessly transform the plateau into an integrated component 
of the new socialist nation.  Instead, Party operatives were well aware that they were 
operating in a newly opened and potentially volatile space.  While flush with many 
successes, the Party had also turned back several challenges led not only by remnants of 
the Ma Bufang/Guomindang regime, but by local headmen and religious leaders as well.  
Conversely then, these experiences also strengthened the Party’s resolve to move slowly, 
                                                
134 See for example Guo Shuhua, "Huiyi Jiefang Chuqi Wo zai Henan Mengqi Gongzuo De Yiduan 
Jingli," Qinghai Wenshi ziliao Xuangji 14 (1985): 101-103.  Guo was the secretary of the Henan Mongol 
Banner Work Committee. 
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to employ the United Front strategy of allying with indigenous elites as the primary 
means of state building and national integration.  How to merge these two impulses— 
representing national and imperial logics— would ultimately be the key to the success of 
the CCP’s state and nation building project in Zeku and across the Tibetan Plateau.  The 
lion’s share of the military operations had ended.  For the pastoralists of Zeku’s high 




PART 1 CONCLUSION 
THE SYNCRETIC NEXUS OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN  
EMPIRE AND NATION 
 
Yang Hongwei has described authority and identity in northeast Amdo (Xunhua 
Ting) as tripartite and interactive, consisting of tribal, religious (Tibetan Buddhist) and 
state (Qing government) elements.  Yang suggests that, when functioning in balance, the 
three components can be mutually supportive, creating a dynamic network of authorities 
that give meaning and structure to the social and political world of the Tibetan and 
Mongolian regions of eastern Amdo, what Yang refers to as “society’s operational 
mechanism of authority.”  Although Yang prefers to use the more nebulous monikers 
“state” (guojia) or “government” (zhengfu), he is essentially talking about a particular 
formulation of imperial rule that developed uniquely in Amdo over the past millennium. 
While Yang’s model is primarily structural, I prefer one that recognizes moral 
authority and political power as emerging from an amalgam of sources that are largely 
inseparable and unquantifiable.  The syncretic nexus of authority is therefore an attempt 
to capture this convergence of often unconsciously expressed traditions that govern 
political behavior while leaving space to recognize variations (rather than irregularities as 
they might seem in a more structural framework).  By paying close attention to local 
primary sources we will certainly learn more about the case-by-case operation of 
authority and its variations in Amdo.  In the end, rather than language, ethnicity, or 
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religion, it may be that it is the specific syncretism that existed in Amdo that will be the 
region’s defining characteristic. 
 
None of this is to say that the Amdo frontier was a symbiotic zone of cultural and 
political cooperation.  Confrontation, both across and within cultural milieus was instead 
quite common.  Whether grassland disputes, sectarian rivalries, tax revolts, or forced 
conscription, arguing that the particular nexus of authority that developed in Amdo was 
mutually reinforcing and authenticating does not imply that it was always amiable or 
exhibited an equipoise of moral authority and enforceable power.  Quite the contrary, the 
nexus was always in flux.  While I suggest that Amdo be considered to have had an 
imperial relationship with the “Chinese” state over much of the last millennium, and that 
the flexibility that imperial practices entail ensured a limited role for the imperial state in 
local affairs, this does not mean that the relationship between the imperial center and 
Amdo’s various polities was always or even primarily mutually satisfactory.  A 
particularly stark example is the Jinchuan Wars that erupted in the mid-18th century to 
Amdo’s south in Kham.  Alexander Woodside maintains that more Qing soldiers were 
mobilized and more treasure spent fighting thirty thousand Khampas than in any of the 
ten great campaigns that the Qianlong Emperor self-consciously rested his legacy upon.1  
Nor am I arguing that the syncretic nexus of authority as I have described it was 
visible to most of the individuals that existed within it.  Although a soteriological text, the 
                                                
1 Woodside refers to the Khampas as “the Chechens of eighteenth-century Asia with regard to their skill in 
humbling a bigger opponent.” Alexander Woodside, "The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political 
Thought," in The Chinese State at the Borders, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 15.  On the 
manner in which the Qianlong Emperor and his advisors constructed narratives and occluded others about 
the ten campaigns, and how this has influenced nationalist history making, see Peter C. Perdue, "Embracing 
Victory, Effacing Defeat: Rewriting the Qing Frontier Campaigns," in The Chinese State at the Borders, 
ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Commemorating War in 
Eighteenth-Century China," Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (1996). 
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autobiography of the great Amdowa Buddhist master Shabkar contains a vast wellspring 
of information about social, economic and political conditions in Amdo at the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  Unsurprisingly, it seems clear that rather than abstract ideas of 
empire and syncretism, local spiritual authorities and the entity or entities with the rights 
of taxation were probably those which most directly and transparently impacted 
individual and community existence.  
It is difficult to know how far past the local monastery, village, tribal leader, 
agricultural estate or principality the gaze of the average resident of Amdo typically 
focused, although the vast network of pilgrimage and trade routes, some of which are on 
display in Shabkar’s account, suggest the possibility of more trans-regional 
consciousness and experience than perhaps existed in some other pre-industrial societies.  
Yet the Manchu Qing Empire, as well as the Lhasa-based Ganden Podrang government 
of the Dalai Lamas, does appear in Shabkar’s text.  For example, at one point he recites a 
song of his own spontaneous creation that includes the lines, 
For this life, if you wish there to be peace in all regions, 
It is fine to respect the laws of the Manchu ruler. 
 
For the next life, if you aspire to happiness and well-being, 
It is excellent to respect the laws of cause and effect expounded by Lord Buddha.2 
 
Shabkar thus seems to confirm that the temporal authority of the Qing state was 
recognized in Amdo and that its sovereignty had real consequences for the lived 
experiences of individuals, even if in the Buddhist sense this was largely transitory.   
Shabkar’s account also brings into view Amdo’s position as a frontier zone of 
interaction between various cultural-religious blocks.  For example, Shabkar is invited to 
                                                
2 Zabs-dkar Tshogs-drug-ran-grol and Matthieu Ricard, The Life of Shabkar : The Autobiography of a 
Tibetan Yogin, trans. Matthieu Ricard (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 507. 
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Dowi (here Dobey) to settle an almost two decade-old feud that had caused the deaths of 
eighty “men and horses.”  Shabkar reports, “Neither envoys from China nor lamas and 
officials from Tibet had succeeded in settling the dispute.” After doing what neither 
Beijing nor Lhasa could in resolving the conflict, Shabkar publicly consecrates a relic, “I 
taught the Dharma.  Everyone, even the Chinese, Mongols and Salars, listened with 
faith.”3  Implied in Shabkar’s account is an awareness of identities, such as Manchu, 
Tibetan, Chinese, Mongol, and Salar, that appear to approach modern ethnic categories. 
However, as with the uncertain ethnic background of Ma Yuanxiang or the bilingual 
relationship between Lanzhou Jia and Ma Yuanhai, when the great lama speaks of an 
“old Chinese Muslim,” or talks about a multicultural and multi-devotional gathering such 
as the one he officiated over, it evokes a level of hybridity and syncretism that must also 
be considered.4  
 Thus, as I conceive of it, the syncretic nexus of authority is that space where all of 
this developed over time— in concert and in competition.  While I have concentrated on 
culturally Tibetan regions, Amdo’s syncretic nexus of authority might be extended to 
include non-Tibetans, such as Sinic and Turkic Muslim populations, many of whom until 
recently spoke Amdo Tibetan as a first or second language.  Taken as a whole, therefore, 
the multiple examples presented in Part 1 suggest a dynamic in which local tribal 
leadership was not an autarchic institution but operated in imperial space and intersected 
with larger bureaucratic interests and charismatic authorities, even if all of the 
dimensions of these relationships are often not readily identifiable.  The syncretic nexus 
                                                
3 Ibid., 501. 
 
4 Zabs-dkar, 519.  Ma Haiyun, for example, notes not only the blurred categories of identification that 
existed in Amdo well into the Qing period, but also “the political intimacy of local Salar leadership and the 
powerful Tibetan leadership of the region” (16).  
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of authority as it developed up the Rongwo River and over the Méshül mountains is in 
the end what the representatives of the Communist Party would have to contend with 
when attempting to transition the grasslands of Zeku from a piece in quasi-imperial 
formation to an integrated component of the nation-state.  
 
One further story illustrates the role of Ma Bufang and his regime within the 
syncretic nexus of power that developed in Amdo.  This example comes from an unlikely 
source, the autobiography of the mother of the 14th Dalai Lama, Diki Tsering.  Her 
memoir is the product of a collaborative effort between herself and two of her 
grandchildren.  Published in English, like so many exile accounts it is written for a 
western audience within a broadly prescribed Tibetan nationalist narrative.5  Nonetheless, 
as is often the case, fissures in that narrative come in subtle and sometimes surprising 
anecdotes.  As it pertains to Ma Bufang and the nexus of authority that previously existed 
in Amdo, the rupture comes in her retelling of the story of her son’s discovery as the 
fourteenth incarnation in the lineage of the Dalai Lamas. 
Among those who follow recent Tibetan history, Ma Bufang is perhaps best 
known as the arrogant warlord who extorted from the Lhasa government a great deal of 
treasure in exchange for allowing the newly selected 14th Dalai Lama and his family 
passage to Central Tibet.  This was not the first time the Ma clan had sought to 
manipulate the tradition of the recognition of reincarnate lamas to extend its authority and 
increase its coffers.  For example, in 1919, Ma Bufang’s father, Ma Qi, had detained the 
then young 7th Shartsang Lama who was subsequently ransomed “back” to the Twelve 
                                                
5 Beginning in 1979, Diki Tsering’s granddaughter, Yangzom Doma, recorded and translated into English 
stories of Diki Tsering’s childhood.  After Yangzom Doma’s untimely death in 1982, her brother compiled 
and edited his sister’s notes, which were finally publishing in 2000. 
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Tribes of Repgong.6  Cynically or not, however, Ma was following in a long imperial 
tradition of state interference in the selection of reincarnate lamas that dates back at least 
to the mid-Qing, a right that the Chinese Communist Party has likewise insisted upon, 
particularly since the early 1990s and the well-publicized debate over the succession to 
the 10th Panchen Lama.7   
The point here, however, is that even with several decades of perspective and in 
the context of the powerful conforming pressures of national narratives and collective 
memory, Diki Tsering’s account does not suggest that Ma Bufang should not or did not 
have a role in confirming the selection of her son.  Instead, the Muslim warlord and the 
young lama are said to have instantly recognized one another.  She writes, 
Ma Pu-fang said that if there is a Dalai Lama, then it was this boy, the 
brother of Takster Rinpoche.8  He said this boy was different, with his big eyes 
and his intelligent conversation and actions, that he was dignified far beyond his 
years.  He dismissed the other families and told my husband and me that we were 
to remain in Tsongkha for a few days.9  
The family stayed in Ma’s “care” for several weeks before being allowed to travel on to 
Lhasa.  Diki Tsering claims that she only later learned of the ransom demands.  However, 
it seems clear from her account— at least for a Tibetan from northeast Amdo— that Ma 
Bufang’s role in the selection process was not necessarily unseemly or abnormal.  An 
almost off-hand remark with which she concludes the story makes this all the more 
                                                
6 Stevenson, 11.  
 
7 Isabel Hilton, The Search for the Panchen Lama (London: Viking, 1999). 
 
8 Takster Rinpoche was the elder brother of the Dalai Lama.  In his youth he had been recognized as a 
regionally important incarnate lama. 
 
9 Diki  Tsering, Dalai Lama, My Son : A Mother's Story, ed. Thondup Khedroob (New York: Compass 




apparent.  This self-proclaimed daughter of Tibetan peasants admits, “I had known Ma 
Pu-fang since childhood because he was acquainted with my father’s two brothers.”10  
Clearly the 14th Dalai Lama’s family was not from an ordinary peasant household.  
However, neither was their wealth or prestige particularly exceptional, and certainly not 
in the league of regional dignitaries such as Wagya, Gyelwo Dorjé, Nangra Wangchen 
Döndrup or Nangso Trashi Namgyel.  All of which makes the family’s association with 
Ma Bufang the more noteworthy.  That Diki Tsering— “the simple girl with her simple 
life and the ordinary ambition of being a good housewife and mother”— apparently 
spoke Chinese, again brings the multicultural fabric of this part of Amdo into sharper 
focus.11   
All told, it seems clear that the Xining regime of Ma Bufang and his predecessors 
was an active element in the syncretic nexus of authority that continued into the post-
Qing period.  After all, it should not be forgotten that the Ma clan, and Sinic-Muslim 
people as a whole, were also native to the Amdo frontier.  Jonathan Lipman notes, “‘The 
Ma family warlords’ represent a new development in the Muslim worlds of northwest 
China, the modern nation-state’s incorporative power expressed locally through cooption 
of existing elites.”12  In this formulation, it is not the Ma regime that is a new.  Instead 
what is new is the ideology and expectations of the nation.  Yet in coopting existing elites 
such as Ma Bufang, the Guomindang was engaged in its own subimperial practice.  Ma 
                                                
10 Ibid., 96. 
 
11 Ibid. 16, 92. 
 




Bufang becomes the indigenous headman in the relationship between center and 
periphery that structurally defines empire.   
It goes beyond the scope of this study to fully investigate the Ma Bufang state or 
systematically review his efforts at regional integration.  For example, did Ma Bufang, as 
some sources claim, really have the power to recognize Lumbum’s position in his local 
monastery?13  The question is important to those wishing to make definitive statements 
about exclusivist concepts of sovereignty.  However, it is less important if much of 
twentieth-century Amdo is considered a period when authority continued to operate on 
multiple temporal planes and within multiple epistemological logics, the intersection of 
which was not necessarily cause for crisis but could often be dealt with in the space 
between empire and nation.  Again, this is not to imply that relationships between Ma’s 
state and indigenous elements were not antagonistic.  Clearly they often were.  However, 
amity and equilibrium are not what define imperial space, nor does their absence 
necessarily preclude the acceptance of an imperial relationship.  Instead, as Charles Tilly 
has pointed out, it is simply the difference between a well-functioning empire and one in 
transition or turmoil.14 
Finally, this is not to suggest that Ma Bufang’s regime was somehow an empire, 
but only to say that it often operated within a dwindling but still operable logic of empire. 
It is tempting to think of Ma’s state as alien to the “traditional” Mongol-Tibetan world of 
Amdo.  I argue instead that the Xining government was implicitly accepted as part of the 
syncretic nexus of authority that had developed over many centuries.  Ma Bufang, for all 
                                                
13 Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 253. 
 
14 Tilly, 4. 
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his vilification, was among other things an aspiring nation builder.  Whether out of 
necessity or strategy, however, time and again he found himself creatively employing 
imperial strategies in the service of building his fledgling state, what Bulag has referred 
to as “going imperial” or “subimperial practice.”  This does not mea that all accepted Ma 
Bufang’s authority.  Many elements within Amdo were clearly in opposition to Ma and 
his agents, especially as Xining’s actions became increasingly extractive and centralizing.  
However, Ma Bufang and his government did not operate outside the logic of Amdo’s 
nexus of authority.  All of which is to say, pre-Liberation Amdo was a complex syncretic 
nexus of authority that should not be disentangled too such a degree that it loses its logics 










ZEKU COUNTY: STATE BUILDING, NATIONAL INTEGRATION  






LIBERATION AND RE-IMPERIALIZATION: THE LIBERATION  
OF TONGREN COUNTY 
 
The military operation that resulted in the death of Ma Yuanxiang is heralded as 
Qinghai— or even China’s— last major domestic military challenge of the Liberation 
period.  However, it also laid bare the reality that nearly four years after PLA troops first 
poured into Qinghai Province “ending the Ma Bufang family’s long forty years of bloody 
rule in Qinghai,” the southern grasslands remained a dangerous zone of ambiguous 
boundaries and uncertain loyalties.  Although Tongren County had been officially 
Liberated in September 1949, initially the Party had all but ignored its southern 
grasslands choosing instead to consolidate its position in the agricultural heartland of 
Repgong proper.  According to the county gazetteer, provincial leaders issued 
instructions that in pastoral regions “[…] the old qianbaihu system cannot be rashly 
changed all at once.”  Therefore, “the county committee appointed the former qianhu 
[and] baihu to their former positions but [now] under the leadership of the People’s 
Government.”1  Many of these figures had traveled to various points on the Amdo 
Plateau to signal their willing submission to the new regime and in January 1950 several 
of them would be invited to Xining to attend the province’s 1st Unity and Friendship 
Conference.  After the establishment of the Tongren County government, many would be 
chosen to sit on the government and advisory bodies that were organized in Rongwo 
                                                




Township.2  When in 1952, Tongren County was reorganized into seven districts (qu), the 
three qianhu Wagya, Serökyap, and Lumbum were appointed leaders of the 5th-7th 
districts.  However, just as with Ma Bufang’s post-war efforts to establish xiang 
administrative districts in Qinghai’s pastoral regions, these pastoral districts were almost 
certainly districts in name only.3  There simply was no physical infrastructure and no 
human resources through which to govern.  In fact, other than the few fixed-place 
monasteries and the small hamlets that grew around them (Tib. sde wa, Ch. tawa), there 
were no permanent structures on Zeku’s grasslands.4  Rather than going to the grasslands 
the Party had tried to bring the grasslands to them. 
However, even in Repgong proper the Party proceeded with a caution that belies 
its reputation as an engine of radical social revolution.  Today, Tongren County seems 
one of Amdo’s more accessible major centers of Tibetan population and culture.  
However, in the 1950s the Party faced formidable challenges to establishing an 
administrative and even military presence in the region.  For example, there was no direct 
                                                
2 The initial appointments of these pastoral figures to official positions appears to have occurred in 
December 1950 at the first Tongren County All Nationalities All Walks of Life People’s Representative 
Conference.  See Zeku Xianzhi, 526-531. 
 
3 Ibid., 15, 56; Tongren Xianzhi, 80.  Rather than a physical location, the administrative seats of the 5th-7th 
districts are listed as the Hor Tribe, Gartsé Tribe and Méshül Tribe respectively.  The 4th District, located in 
the southern reaches of Repgong proper bordering on the Zeku grasslands was also established at this time 
with its administrative seat in Dowa Village.   
 
4 Monasteries in Zeku tended to be small and several were actually mobile tent monasteries. According to 
Pu Wencheng, at the time of Liberation the two largest monastic communities in the region both had less 
than two hundred resident monks.  The total population of Hor Monastery was estimated to be three 
hundred forty, its one hundred twenty monks augmented by a small lay community. Many of the other 
monasteries were mobile tent structures and the majority of the region’s monks were considered by 
investigators to be part-time practitioners who continued to participate in the pastoral economy.  Around 
the larger earthen monasteries, small villages had developed but the impression one gets is that these were a 
ramshackle collection of buildings serving the monasteries immediate commercial needs and inhabited by 
what the Communist Party considered to be the materially unproductive segments of society— the 
desperately poor, elderly, widowed and infirm.  Pu Wencheng, 481-489; Nian Zhihai and Bai Gengdeng, 
Qinghai Zangchuan Fojiao Siyuan Mingjian (Lanzhou: Gansu Minzu Chubanshe, 1993), 169-173, 299-




route to Xining, the trip taking anywhere from several days to a week or more.5  
Moreover, prior to Liberation there had been no CCP underground activity in the 
Repgong region, nor were there any pre-1949 indigenous Communist Party members 
who could be quickly inserted atop a new county government.6  Thus, in addition to 
considerable linguistic and cultural obstacles, Party leaders would have to overcome 
transport, communications, housing, supply, security and staffing difficulties.  Zhao 
Qingyang, who served the previous county administration before joining the post-
Liberation regime, would later write, 
Tongren County is [an ethnic] border region, communication [or transportation] 
was extremely inconvenient, a curtain was drawn over the news (xiaoxi bimu) [of 
the outside world], there were no telephones, there were not even any radios.  Just 
before Liberation, there were many reactionary rumors, they said things like ‘the 
Communist Party kills people and sets fires,” “Communism means communal 
wives,” “[they] kill all the collaborators [from the old regime]” and so on.”7  
 
Yet, as will be recalled, the region was not so isolated from outside events as to be 
unaware of the momentous happenings that were approaching its borders.  The Shartsang 
Lama, for example, was receiving regular updates on the advance of Communist troops 
and the speed with which many local dignitaries rushed to greet the PLA suggests both a 
regional interconnectedness and the political acumen of its varied leadership.   
                                                
5 HNZZZZZGK, 226.  See also Duojie, 256; Zhaxi Anjia, 252. 
 
6 ZGGCD QHSHNZZZZZZZSZL, 19.  See also Tongren Xianzhi, 493. 
 
7 Zhao Long, 260.  Writing under the names Zhao Qingyang, Qing Yang, Zhao Zhaxi, and, as here, Zhao 
Long, Zhao is responsible for much of the content of volume 2 of the Huangnan Wenshiziliao.  Prior to 
liberation Zhao had been a Han official in Tongren’s Civil Administration Department.  Because his family 
lived in the area, Zhao stayed behind when most of the officials of the former government fled.  As one of 
the few Chinese bureaucrats left in the region, he was included in the Xunhua delegation.  Over the 
following years he would become an important link between the new state and Tongren’s indigenous 




The first direct communication between the CCP and Repgong’s indigenous elites 
had occurred on August 30, 1949, when the “private” delegation sent by Gélek Gyatso, 
Trashi Namgyel and Gyelwo Dorjé traveled to Xunhua County to greet PLA commander 
Wang Zhen.  At the time, General Wang responded noncommittally to the delegates’ 
purported plea for troops to be immediately sent to “Liberate Tongren County.”8  Instead, 
Wang Zhen asked that Repgong’s leadership take responsibility for maintaining public 
order and safeguarding state property.  Clearly, committing resources to the Repgong 
area was not a priority for General Wang, whose forces were then sweeping toward a 
final victory in China’s northwest.  To the contrary, a day or two after the delegation 
returned to Rongwo, soldiers arrived with a request for hides and flour.  Led by Trashi 
Namgyel— apparently acting within his customary role as nangso— religious, tribal and 
economic leaders immediately mobilized to provide the sought after aid.  In short time, 
one hundred twenty cattle loads of flour had been sent north.  The flour and meat was 
used to feed the troops while the hides were reportedly turned into the cattle-skin rafts 
needed to traverse the Yellow River on their way to Xining.9  Although far from the 
fighting, in these small but significant ways, through the collusion of the indigenous 
leadership Tongren County has staked a claim as an active participant in the Liberation of 
Qinghai.10   
                                                
8 Zhao Qingyang, “Tongen Qianhu,” 151. 
 
9 Zhaxi Anjia and Duojie, "Tongren Jiefang Qinliji," in Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Jicui: Jianguohoujuan 
(Xining: Qinghaisheng Zhengxie Xuexi he Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui, 2001): 57; HNZZZZZGK, 25; 
Tongren Xianzhi, 29, 710.  
 
10 For example, decades later, the nangso would claim, “in particular [I contributed to the] beneficial 
situation by procuring flour, beef and mutton etc, [and in this way] gained the confidence of the Party and 




Before fleeing the area, the former county head Tséring Gyel had entrusted 
temporary leadership to the men whose traditional authority and prestige transcended 
both Repgong’s many tribal divisions and statist structures: Nangso Trashi Namgyel, 
Zongqianhu Gyelwo Dorjé, and Rongwo Monastery steward Gélek Gyatso.  Now, as 
General Wang Zhen had instructed, the three indigenous elites quickly assembled a local 
self-defense corps, instructing the twelve tribes to provide five to ten young men each in 
support of the effort.  Under the command of another of the Shartsang Lama’s brothers 
named Gaguo (Ch.), this irregular force patrolled the granary, wool factory, Dexinghai 
trade company, school, government offices and elsewhere.  Even still, lawlessness 
quickly descended upon the township.  Zhao Qingyang recalls,  
[. . .] at night everywhere was the sound of gunshots, during the day lawless 
people scurried all around, threatening the property of Rongwo’s inhabitants at 
gunpoint [and] setting fire to Rongwo’s buildings, the residents stayed behind 
closed gates not daring to go out.11   
 
In another passage, Zhao and his co-author the Shartsang Lama’s nephew Dorjé write, 
At the time Ma Bufang’s Dexinghai [trade company] had left behind about 1.5 
million jin of wool and a large amount of grain, some economic [i.e. common] 
bandits under the instigation of remnants of Ma Bufang’s defeated army, spared 
no effort to sabotage and plunder.  At night they lit fire to the former 
government’s horse pastures, [setting] a towering blaze, gunshots rang out during 
the day, wailing came from all directions […].12 
                                                
11 Zhao Long, 262; Tongren Xianhi, 709. In the end, they reportedly raised seventy-eighty militiamen.   
 
12 Duojie and Zhao, 94.  Dexinghai is described in PRC sources as one of several official trading concerns 
set up in 1926 by the Xining regime to levy taxes and monopolize the market for animal and agricultural 
products.  In pastoral regions, animal products would be exchanged for tea and grain at what are described 
as artificially low prices and then exported to coastal markets at significant profit. According to a 
contemporary news report, Ma forced Tibetan and Mongol herdsmen to remit taxes in wool and otherwise 
manipulated the market to accumulate large stores of wool. Ma was further able to reduce costs by 
transporting wares in military vehicles (within his domains) and then avoiding export taxes.  “‘Because of 
these reasons, when his wool arrived in Tientsin, no matter how low the market price, [even if] the common 
merchant [in Tientsin] was unable to make a profit, he [Ma] was able to earn a profit.’” Quoted in 
Hunsberger, 177.  See also Zhang Fengxu, Lei Daheng, and Tian Zhengxiong, Qinghai Xumu (Xining: 
Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 27-28; Qinghai Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., Qinghai 






Adding to the uncertainty, ethnic tensions quickly rose to the surface.  According to the 
sources, groups of Tibetans began gathering in the streets declaring that they were going 
to drive Rongwo’s Han Chinese and Hui Muslim shopkeepers and merchants out of town.  
In response, the merchants raised their own self-defense organizations.13   With the 
security situation on the verge of collapse, the Shartsang Lama is said to have personally 
led his monks down from the monastery to the Xingdehai offices.   Declaring that “the 
Hui and Han merchants are under my monastery’s care,” he allegedly allowed people of 
all nationalities to store their grain and wool in the monastery for safekeeping.14  “Monk 
patrols” (sengren xunluodui) then joined what seems to have been a separate fifty-plus 
man self-defense force organized by Zongqianhu Gyelwo Dorjé from his Langtsang 
Tsowa (Ch.).15  However, despite the combined efforts of Repgong’s indigenous 
leadership, the atmosphere on streets of Rongwo remained volatile.16     
While the sources all suggest that it was the desire of the Shartsang Lama, the 
religious and tribal upper classes and the masses of the Tibetan people that a “People’s 
Government” be formed, it seems fairly clear that the main concern of Repgong’s leading 
actors was the breakdown of social order that had accompanied the collapse of the old 
regime.  It was in this context that the Shartsang Lama dispatched his nephew Dorjé (no 
relation to Gyelwo Dorjé) to Xining to “pay respects (zhijin) to the provincial and Party 
                                                
13 Duojie and Zhao, 94.  94-95. Predictably, the authors blame the tensions on the mistaken belief that the 
shopkeepers and not Ma Bufang were to blame for past exploitation. 
 
14 Ibid., 94. 
 
15 Zhao Qingyang, 158; Duojie and Zhao, 94-95.  Gyelwo Dorjé’s son commanded this force. 
 




leadership.”17  The lama’s emissary was the type of trans-cultural agent often found in 
frontier regions.  A young, bilingual Tibetan, Dorjé was a recent graduate of the 
Provincial Normal School in Xining.  Now back in Rongwo, he was studying Tibetan 
with his uncle the Shartsang Lama in anticipation of taking entrance exams for Lanzhou 
University’s Minority Languages Department.  While his relationship to the Shartsang 
Lama was certainly critical, as Dorjé himself would admit, it was his ability to operate in 
both the Sinic and Tibetan worlds that specifically recommended him for this duty.18 
Dorjé notes that at the time both the northern (through Xunhua) and western 
(through Guide) routes to Xining were littered with bandits and other dangers.  He was 
therefore provided an “experienced, astute and capable” Tibetan self-defenseman to 
escort him on the eight to nine-day journey to Xining.19  Arriving in the capital on 
September 12, Dorjé was greeted by the most senior figures in the regional PLA and 
CCP, including Army Chief Liang Hansheng,20 Party Secretary Zhang Zhongliang, Vice-
Secretary (and future 1st Party Secretary) Zhang Guosheng, and Qinghai’s ranking ethnic 
                                                
17 Huangnan Gaikuang, 87; Tongren Xianzhi, 29.  According to Duojie and Zhao, with the Shartsang 
Lama’s encouragement, several Tongren delegations made their way to Xining to “ask the Party and 
government leaders to quickly dispatch people to Tongren to establish the new government” (94).  
However, no information is given on any of these efforts other than Dorjé’s. 
 




20 In this initial period of military rule, Liang was head of Qinghai’s military control committee.  He was 
also political commissar of the 1st Army and would soon be appointed to the same position in the Qinghai 
Military District.  In 1950 Liang would become the Vice-Secretary of that Qinghai Party Committee. 
"Zhongguo Gongchandang Qinghaisheng Zuzhishi Ziliao" Zhengbian Zhidaozu, ed., Zhongguo Gong Chan 
Dang Qinghai Sheng Zuzhishi Ziliao, 1949.9-1987.10 ([Xining]: Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Zuzhibu, 
Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Dangshi Yanjiushi, Qinghaisheng Dang'anju, 1995) (Hereafter cited as 




Tibetan Party official, Trashi Wangdu.21  On behalf of the Shartsang Rinpoche, Dorjé 
presented the provincial leaders with a khata, rugs and other gifts.  Then, “[I] in detail 
reported the yearnings of the Shartsang  [Lama] and the masses of each nationality and 
walks of life for the early Liberation of Tongren.”22  In response, the gathered leaders 
reportedly promised, “[We will] definitely fulfill your needs.  After we dispatch people 
[to Tongren] you must arrange for their food and lodging, [and if] we are staying with a 
family or an inn, carefully arrange our food, lodging and feed for our horses.”23  These 
somewhat strange conditions seem to hint at the logistical and material difficulties facing 
the CCP even in a relatively accessible agrarian district such as Repgong, making the 
Party’s delayed entrance into pastoral areas all the more understandable. 
After the meeting, Dorjé was sent with escorts to view performances and movies, 
not a common experience for most young Tibetans in 1949, even those from privileged 
backgrounds.  He remembers the attention that these high leaders paid him, “A recently 
graduated student, I had never experienced such spectacle, enjoyed such a reception, [I] 
                                                
21 Born in the Gartsé area of Kham, Trashi Wangdu joined the PLA during the Long March, following it 
north through Amdo and on to the CCP wartime base of Yan’an.  There, in 1938, Trashi Wangdu studied at 
the newly established Minorities Institute and was among the first group of Tibetans to join the Chinese 
Communist Party.  In addition to being appointed to several senior provincial government positions, he was 
the only Tibetan member of the 1st-3rd Qinghai Provincial Party Committees (1949-1962).  He eventually 
became a Standing Committee member, and from 1956 until 1958 served as one of a half dozen secretaries 
of the Party Committee Secretariat. When the post-rebellion Party Committee was chosen in 1960, Trashi 
Wangdu lost his position on the Standing Committee but maintained his membership on the committee.  By 
this time, most of the men (and they were all men) who had founded the Qinghai Party and government had 
been replaced by a new generation of leadership. ZGGCD QHSZZSZL 4-15.  A collection of hagiographic 
essays commemorating his life and work can be found in Ma Wanli et al., eds., Zhaxi Wangtu Jinian Wenji 
(Xining: Qinghai Minzu Chubanshe, 2007).  See also Qinghai Sheng Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., 
Qinghai Sheng Zhi, vol. 80, Renwuzhi (Hefei Shi: Huangshan Shushe, 2001) (Hereafter cited as 
QHSZRWZ), 291; June Dreyer, "China's Minority Nationalities: Traditional and Party Elites," Pacific 
Affairs 43, no. 4 (1970): 509 (referred to as Cha-hsi-wang-hsü); and T.N. Takla, "Notes on Some Early 
Tibetan Communists," Tibetan Review 2, no. 17 (1969): 7-8 (Tashi Wangchuk). 
 
22 Duojie, “Jianlin Tonrenxian,” 257. 
 




was extremely flattered, [my] whole life [I] will never forget it.”24  Although he is 
certainly writing within a prescribed narrative, the importance that these positive 
impressions made upon Dorjé and others like him should not be underestimated.  Dorjé 
would quickly become a key link between Repgong’s Tibetan community and the 
Chinese Communist Party, his career path in a sense representing the normative model 
for the cultivation and development of minority nationality cadres.25  
Meanwhile, a day after Xining had been officially pacified, Tongren County’s 
number one symbol of local collusion with the old regime resurfaced.  On September 7, 
Tséring Gyel surrendered in Xining.  Ten days later the PLA Provincial Military Control 
Committee reappointed him head of Tongren County.26  As Dorjé would later matter-of-
factly admit, with security its primary concern and no indigenous base upon which to 
build, “there was no one more appropriate who could be immediately dispatched [to 
Repgong].”27   In fact, simultaneous with Tséring Gyel’s reappointment, the three men to 
whom he had entrusted the county, Gélek Gyatso, Gyelwo Dorjé and Trashi Namgyel, 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Dorjé would serve as translator for his uncle during the 1950-1951 mission to Lhasa (see below).  Upon 
his return, he was appointed the head of the prefectural finance bureau.  His byline in a co-authored wenshi 
ziliao submission states “Before 1958 [Dorjé] served as the head of the prefectural finance bureau, after the 
3rd Plenum [of the 9th Central Committee in 1978], he was assigned to the Huangnan Prefecture 
Consultative Conference.”  Without stating so directly, the editor is indicating that Dorjé was removed 
from power and almost certainly persecuted during the intervening decades.  It was presumably between 
his rehabilitation and his passing in 1987 that Dorjé authored or co-authored several wenshi ziliao 
submissions.  See Duojie and Zhao, note on 103.  
 
26 Duojie, “Jianlin Tonrenxian,” 257; Tongren Xianzhi, 29, 573, 608-609, 710-711; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 25; 
HNZZZZZGK, 29, 87; ZGGCDHNZZZZZLSDSJ, 1. Tséring Gyel had only been appointed head of Tongren 
County in May 1949.  Not including the four months Tséring Gyel served in the position, between 1930 
and 1949 nineteen Tongren County chiefs served an average of just over nine months each.  The lack of 
continuity may be an indication of the precarious administrative position of the GMD during this period. 
 




were officially recognized as canyi, or advisors to the new government.28  This is of 
course the same term previously employed by Ma Bufang’s regime to afford people like 
Lhagyel, Lumbum, Serökyap and Wangchen Döndrup positions within the state 
administration.   
On September 19, Dorjé returned to Repgong.29  Perhaps to the surprise of many, 
with him was Tséring Gyel, Tséring Gyel’s personal secretary, and the radio equipment 
and operator with whom he had fled several weeks earlier.30  Three days later, on 
September 22, 1949, “with significant help from the Shartsang Lama,” the Tongren 
County government, or “People’s Committee,” was established with the former county 
head as its new leading official.  Soon after, Xining dispatched three Party representatives 
to Rongwo Township under the leadership of a cadre named Wu Wenxiang.  In addition 
to building the new administration, the three Han cadres were tasked with “aiding” 
Tséring Gyel in sorting out the property and accounts of Ma Bufang’s “bureaucratic 
capitalist” Xingdehai trade association and four other offices.”31  If Tséring Gyel’s 
appointment is a reflection of the pre-Liberation absence of a Communist Party 
organizational presence in the region, these three Chinese cadres represent the first 
                                                
28 Tongren Xianzhi 29. According to Huangnan Prefecture’s Party history, the 7th Shartsang Lama was also 
made canyi.  However, this is not mentioned elsewhere. ZGGCD QHSHNZZZZZZZSZL, 175. 
 
29 Given the travel times between Xining and Rongwo, Dorjé’s chronology is difficult to reconcile.   
 
30 Zhou Long, 262.  The Shartsang Lama decided to house the radio transmission office and its operator in 
his own residence.  Tséring Gyel and the other newcomers were quartered in the Dexinghai building. 
 
31 ZGGCDHNZZZZZLSDSJ, 175; Zhao Long, 262; Duojie, “Jianlin Tonrenxian,” 257-258; Huangnan 
Zhouzhi, 25; Tongren Xianzhi, 29-30, 1094; Yang Yaozu and Deng Jingsheng, "Tongren Diqu Jiefang 
Chuqi De Jianzheng Qingkuang," Qinghai Wenshi ziliao Xuangji 10-12 (1984): 175-176.  Wu Wenxiang 
headed the new secretariat, Liu Deping the Finance Office and Mao Qianji the General Affairs Office.  
Dorjé seems to suggest that the three cadres traveled with him and Tséring Gyel to Xining.  However, the 
Huangnan Prefecture Gazetteer claims that they assumed their positions on October 16, while the official 




attempt to remedy the situation.  Rather than Tséring Gyel, Wu Wenxiang and his 
colleagues should almost certainly be considered the leading state representatives in the 
Repgong area. 
However, despite shows of support from the Shartsang Lama and the three canyi, 
the Party’s plans for the establishment of the new county government were almost 
immediately hijacked by local intrigue.  Soon after the inauguration of the Tongren 
County People’s Committee, villagers from nearby Sokru Village abducted Tséring Gyel 
and two of his aides.32  The captives were carried across the river to a small temple where 
they were suspended from a beam and beaten.33  According to multiple accounts, Tséring 
Gyel’s life was only saved by the timely intervention of Gélek Gyatso, the steward of 
Rongwo Monastery and brother and advisor to the Shartsang Lama.34   
The sources attribute the kidnapping to the simmering hatred of the masses for the 
old regime, some suggesting that Sokru villagers interpreted Tséring Gyel’s reappearance 
as signaling the return of Ma Bufang.35  Lecturing the Sokru villagers, Gélek Gyatso 
allegedly declared,  
                                                
32 It is not clear whether or not the two aids were the same men Tséring Gyel brought back with him from 
Xining. 
 
33 Duojie says that Tséring Gyel was kidnapped along with two “workers” (gongzuo renyuan).  Duojie and 
Zhao refer to them as “attendants” or “entourage” (suicongrenyuan/suixingrenyuan), while Zhao Qingyang 
mentions “some workers” (jige gongzuo renyuan). Duojie, “Jianlin Tonrenxian,” 258; Duojie and Zhao, 95; 
Zhao Qingyang, "Ji Yiwei Yu Dang Zhenxie Hezuo De Haopengyou," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 
152.   
 
34 See Duoji, “JIanlin Tongrenxian,” 258, Duoji and Zhao, 95; Zhao Qingyang, “Yi Jiwei yu Dang,” 152; 
Zhaxi Anjia and Duojie, "Tongren Jiefang Qianhou," Qinghai Wenshi ziliao Xuangji 10-12 (1984): 174. In 
some of the retellings Trashi Namgyel and Gyelwo Dorjé also come to Tséring Gyel’s aid.  Zhao and Dojie 
give credit to the Shartsang Rinpoche who upon hearing the news dispatched his other brother Gaguo, 
commander of the region’s self-defense force.   
 




You resent Ma Bufang having in the past used weapons to cruelly oppress us 
Tibetan people, this is completely understandable.  But today it is incorrect to use 
these types of methods for retribution against [Tséring Gyel].  Because he has 
already surrendered and pledged allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party and 
People’s Government, […] he has already become the head of the county’s 
People’s Government.  Today you have treated him wrongly.  We longed for the 
Chinese Communist Party, so we must employ the person sent by the Chinese 
Communist Party as county head [and] actively aid him in quickly establishing 
the Tongren County government.  Whoever wishes to stir up a commotion, [they] 
will be strictly punished.36 
 
In this and other descriptions, the Sokru incident becomes an anecdote both for the 
national exploitation of the former regime and the ideal intercession of a patriotic United 
Front personage.  Yet, Gélek Gyatso’s success in rescuing the Party’s appointed 
administrator might also be seen as a metaphor reflecting the tensions between statist 
impulses and subimperial practices embedded in its early state and nation-building 
efforts.  Almost entirely lacking in manpower, resources, and local prestige and 
knowledge, the Party had turned to a functionary of the Ma Bufang state.  Yet, replacing 
the national oppression of that regime with the Communist Party’s policies of national 
equality and national unity was its primary rhetorical rational for its rule in Amdo.  At 
least partially in recognition of the violence Tséring Gyel’s presence committed to this 
narrative— as demonstrated by the actual act of violence committed by the Sokru 
villagers— Tséring Gyel was quickly transferred out of the region.  With few other 
resources at its disposal, the three canyi had their consultative positions exchanged for 
permanent posts, with Gélek Gyatso taking over as the county’s top official, while Trashi 
                                                
36 Duojie, “Jianlin Tongrenxian,” 258-259.  According to other accounts, Trashi Namgyel and Gyelwo 
Dorjé also went to Tsering Jia’s aid.  For a similar appeal not directly attributed to Gélek Gyatso but on 





Namgyel and Gyelwo Dorjé were made his first deputies.37  Thus, the very same 
triumvirate described in PRC sources as the “‘three-in-one feudal rule” of Tongren 
County” were elevated to county leadership within the new revolutionary government.  
While the selection of Tséring Gyel had been a concession to the administrative structure 
of the Ma Bufang state, the appointment of the monastery steward, nangso and 
zongqianhu was in some ways a more fundamental compromise with pre-national forms 
of authority.   
Although we will most likely never know the immediate reasons for the assault on 
Tséring Gyel, it seems likely that his abduction was in retaliation for specific grievances 
rather than a more general attack on the old regime.  After all, while Tséring Gyel’s 
collusion was perhaps more direct, few indigenous leaders in this part of Amdo were 
without connections to Ma Bufang and his government, including Rongwo Nangso 
Trashi Namgyel, Zongqianhu Gyelwo Dorjé, and Rongwo Steward Gélek Gyatso 
himself.  Unlike these figures, however, what Tséring Gyel seems to have lacked was a 
parallel indigenous source of authority that might make legitimate his position as 
intermediary between the Xining authorities and local society.  In effect, Tséring Gyel 
represents the limits of the United Front.  On the other hand, the title canyi might be 
thought of as containing real significance in recognizing and leveraging the axial position 
of certain individuals within an unstable but resilient nexus of authority.  If so, a different 
quotation attributed to Gélek Gyatso during his confrontation with the Sokru villagers 
                                                
37 The ouster of Tséring Gyel and promotion of the three indigenous leaders did not officially occur until a 
December meeting of the Provincial Military and Government Committee.  It is not clear when Tséring 
Gyel actually left his post.  However, he was transferred to the Provincial Agriculture and Forestry 
Department, demonstrating his continued usefulness despite his service to Ma Bufang and his unsuccessful 
post-Liberation posting in Tongren.  Zhaxi Anjia and Duoji, “Tongren Jiefag Qinliji,” 58; Yang and Deng 




seems more convincing than the one reproduced above.  The monastery steward is said to 
have simply exclaimed, “If you kill the county head sent by the Chinese Communist 
Party, how will I explain it to the Chinese Communist Party!”38   
 
Toward the end of 1949, Wu Wenxiang, then the senior Party representative in 
the region, personally invited Gélek Gyatso, Gyelwo Dorjé and Trashi Namgyel to lead a 
delegation of “the headmen of the twelve tribes” to Xining for the All-Province All-
Nationalities People’s Representative Unity and Friendship Conference (quansheng gezu 
renmin daibiao lianyihui).39  In early January, after five days on horseback, the thirty-
member Repgong delegation arrived in Xining.  In the capital they were welcomed by 
government leaders and housed in Xining’s most luxurious hotel.  The next day Wu 
Wenxiang escorted the Tibetan headmen to the garden meeting rooms located behind the 
provincial government headquarters.  There they exchanged khata with Qinghai’s senior 
leadership, including Party Secretary and Governor Zhang Zhongliang, Liang Hansheng, 
Zhou Renshan, and Trashi Wangdu.40  Other delegations received similar treatment.  
Organized under the auspices of Zhou Renshan’s United Front Work Department, the 
sources freely admit that the conference’s main purpose was to “eliminate the [minority 
nationality] representatives’ fears and apprehensions.”  Government representatives were 
                                                
38 Duojie and Zhao, 95. 
 
39 Zhaxi Anjia, “Yiwo Jiefang Qianhou,” 252; Tongren Xianzhi 30, ZGGCDHNZZZZZ LSDSJ 2.  The 
Huangnan Prefecture Party history describes the delegates as member of the “nationality and religious 
upper strata.”  Trashi Namgyel simple writes that they were “representatives of the twelve tribes.”  
According to the guidelines set by the provincial Party committee, each delegate was supposed to represent 
five thousand people. Zhang Bo and Yao Xiuxhuan, "Qinghai Gezu Renmin Lianyihui Shengkuang 
Zhuishu," in QHWSZLJC JGH (Xining: Qinghaisheng Zhengxie Xuexi he Wenshi Weiyuanhui, 2001), 
243. 
 




told to “humbly listen” to the representatives’ concerns and emphasize the Party’s 
nationality policies.41  When the conference was convened on January 10, the five-
hundred-plus attendees were told that it represented an “unprecedented demonstration of 
the great unity of the people of each nationality, [and] possessed great political and 
historical meaning.”42   
An agenda circulated prior to the meeting described the conference’s four main 
tasks as uniting the various nationalities into one large family; eliminating remnant 
bandits and restoring social order; promoting the nomadic economy by guaranteeing free 
markets and fair prices;43 and establishing nationality autonomous administrations.44 
However, with the conference already having been delayed by the rebellions that were 
then spreading across northeast Qinghai, the conference’s clear focus was national unity 
and security.45  In his keynote speech Party Secretary Zhang Zhongliang declared, 
The Three Big Mountains [i.e. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic 
capitalism] which under Ma Bufang had pressed down upon the heads of 
Qinghai’s various nationalities have been toppled, the old era of ruling through 
                                                
41 Zhang and Yao, 243. See also ZGGCD QHSHNZZZZZZZSZL, 147.  According to Zhang and Yao, in 
addition to the provincial chairman and vice-chairmen, the delegations met with representatives of the 
provincial public security bureau, civil affairs bureau, culture and education bureau and military region 
command. 
 
42 Ibid. After Han Chinese, Tibetans made up the conference’s largest contingent, followed by Mongols, 
Hui, Monguors (Tu) and Salars. Although there were reportedly worker, peasant, merchant, student, Party, 
government and army delegates, it seems clear that that the majority of non-Han attendees were members 
of the upper classes of their respective communities.  Among the attendees was Hor Qianhu Wagya. 
 
43 The Party considered the relationship between pastoral society and merchants, both those affiliated with 
Ma Bufang’s trade concerns and otherwise, to be defined by predatory trade practices and systematic 
exploitation.  Therefore, contrary to expectations the Communist Party promised to guarantee “free 
markets” and fair prices.  For example, see Zhang, Lei and Tian, 27-28; Zhang and Yao 244; Zeku Xianzhi 
212-213; and Geyong, "Zai Muqu Congshi Yiliao Weisheng Gongzuo De Huiyi," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 
2 (1994), 277-278. 
 
44 Ibid., 243-245.  
 
45 The conference was originally slated to begin in December.  However, it was delayed because of 




bullying and cruelty is gone and will not return, the people of Qinghai’s various 
nationalities are constructing a home in which they are their own masters.46 
 
Liang Hansheng followed by assuring Amdo’s secular and religious elites, “In all work 
fully implementing nationality equality and nationality unity is the Qinghai Provincial 
People’s Government’s basic policy.”47  After Liang, speaker after speaker promised to 
overcome great Han chauvinism, “to come together to eradicate the bandits and spies, 
and construct a happy, new Qinghai.” Along with two qianhu, a representative of the 10th 
Panchen Lama, and Geshé Sherap Gyatso, Rongwo’s Gélek Gyatso was chosen as one of 
“six Tibetan representatives” in the conference’s thirty-two member chairmanship.48  The 
following day, Zhou Renshan proposed a “Unity Pledge” (tuanjie gongyue), the attendees 
promising to conduct themselves in the spirit of nationality equality and unity, mutual 
respect, and mutual aid and cooperation; to resolve disputes through mutual consultation 
and dialog; to eliminate enemies and restore social order; and to follow the leadership of 
the government and act as “good citizens.”  On January 15, Liang Hansheng declared in 
his closing speech that the conference showed that “Qinghai’s seven nationalities are not 
divided by language, [they] are not divided by region, [they] are not divided by belief, 
                                                
46 Cited in Zhaxi Anjia, 252-253. 
 
47 Zhang and Yao, 245. Liang declared that the three most urgent obstacles to achieving national equality 
and unity were: 1) eliminating the historical legacy of national enmity; 2) quickly restoring social order so 
that all nationalities can “live in peace and harmony; and 3) establishing markets in pastoral regions so that, 
free of the exploitative trade practices of the old society, a mutually beneficial trade relationship could be 
developed between the grasslands and sedentary areas. 
 
48 Ibid., 244-245.  The chairmanship was made up of fifteen “Party/government/army representatives,” six 
Tibetans, three Mongols, three Hui, one Salar, one Monguor and three Han Chinese.  Twelve of the fifteen 
state representatives appear to have been Han Chinese.  The others were Trashi Wangdu, Hui Party 
member Ma Letian, and a third identified as Xialongrao, suggesting he was most likely Tibetan or Mongol.  




[and they] are not divided by customs, [but] are united together under the flag of Mao 
Zedong, they are like brothers in an intimate and harmonious family.”49 
 
Trashi Namgyel would later recall that his most lasting impressions of his time in 
Xining were of the warmth and respect with which he was treated by the Communist 
Party.  Particularly in contrast to his experiences with the old regime, “it really was like 
two different societies, two different worlds.”  Soon after, he traveled to Lanzhou to 
attend an enlarged meeting of the Northwest Military and Political Affairs Committee.  
The meeting’s agenda stressed the vital tasks facing the new nation: restoring the national 
economy, regulating prices, exterminating bandits and spies, expanding the patriotic 
United Front, and strengthening national unity.  On July 1, the anniversary of the birth of 
the Chinese Communist Party, Trashi Namgyel was invited to a “song and dance party” 
which was personally attended by senior leaders including Northwest PLA Commander 
and Politburo Standing Committee member Peng Dehuai.  Trashi Namgyel recalls, 
“through the ‘Two Conferences’ I immediately realized the differences between the CCP 
and Guomindang, at a GMD conference, every time it was just [they] want money and 
resources, moreover [we had to] bring generous gifts, the burden on the masses was very 
heavy.”50  Like Dorjé, although he is telling his story within a prescribed narrative it is 
not hard to imagine that Trashi Namgyel, who during a previous trip to Xining had been 
held as human collateral by Ma Bufang, would have been impressed, honored and 
relieved by the reception he and his colleagues received and the assurances made.  More 
importantly, regardless of whether or not it reflects Trashi Namgyel’s attitude at the time, 
                                                
49 Ibid., 247, 249.  The authors are paraphrasing rather than quoting Liang’s speech. 
 




the story reflects the Party’s strategy for the recruitment and nurturing of a senior United 
Front figure. 
 
Rongwo Nangso Trashi Namgyel as the Paradigmatic United Front Personage  
In February 1950, Gélek Gyatso was chosen to serve as secretary on a mission of 
utmost importance to the Party.  The Northwest Bureau had been ordered to organize a 
delegation of “prestigious religious patriotic figures” to travel to Lhasa to try to convince 
the Dalai Lama’s government to agree to the “peaceful liberation of Tibet and the 
unification of the motherland.”51  According to his nephew Dorjé, because the Shartsang 
Lama had received his geshé degree and served in senior positions at Lhasa’s Ganden 
Monastery, and because of the service he had provided the Party since Liberation, the 
Rongwo prelate was chosen as one of three senior lamas to lead the delegation.  Setting 
out in mid-May, the Shartsang Lama, his brothers Gélek Gyatso and Gaguo, nephew 
Dorjé and an entourage of over twenty, did not return to Repgong until November 1951.52   
                                                
51 The Southwest Military Region was simultaneously organizing its own mission to Lhasa led by the 
Gétak (dge stag) Rinpoche of Kham’s Beri Monastery. See Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of 
Snows : A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 40-41. 
 
52 Duojie, "Jiefang Chuqi Xiaricang Huofo Shouming Puzang Cunjin He Tan Jingguo," Qinghai Wenshi 
Ziliao Xuangji 15 (1987): 126-130; ———, "Huiyi Jiujiu Xiaricang Huofo," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 
(1994): 107-111; Wang Rongde and Zhao Qingyang, "Xiaricang Huofo Wei Xizang De Heping Jiefang 
Xiexiale Guanghui de Yi Ye," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 112-118; Han Haiyan, "Yuan Tongren 
Xianwei Shuji Du Hua'an Tongzhi Yishi," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 173; Xizang Zizhiqu 
Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Weiyuanhui and Xiazang Junqu Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji Lingdao Xiaozu, eds., 
Heping Jiefang Xizang ([Lhasa]: Xizang Renmin Chubanshe, 1995), 72; Duojie and Zhao, 96-100; Tongren 
Xiangzhi, 1094-1095.  The leader of the Amdo delegation was the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, the Taktse 
Rinpoche (Ch. Dangcai Huofo) Thubten Norbu. The Shartsang Lama and the lineage holder of Datong 
County’s Tsanpo Monastery (Tib. btsan po dgon dga’ ldan dam chos gling; Ch. Guanghuisi) were 
appointed vice-chairmen.  According to the Northwest Bureau’s May 1st announcement, because he “shows 
the most enthusiasm [and his] relationship with various aspects of Tibet are comparatively many,” the 
Shartsang Lama was initially chosen to chair the mission.”  The three Buddhist prelates and their 
entourages traveled separately before meeting up in early May near the Qinghai-Ütsang border.  Wang 
Rongde, one of the four Han Chinese members of the Tongren delegation, tells a fascinating story in which 




In Gélek Gyatso’s absence, Trashi Namgyel was chosen acting county head, a 
position soon made permanent.53  While Trashi Namgyel had in theory become the 
county’s chief executive, all indications suggest that his political role remained more akin 
to that of nangso.  Certainly the line between the two was permeable and perhaps people 
did not think in such bifurcated terms.  Nonetheless, according to Trashi Namgyel’s own 
published recollections, his responsibilities to the Communist Party were not unlike what 
they had been to Ma Bufang.  He and his colleagues were expected to serve as the 
intermediary between the expanding state and local society by raising militias and 
maintaining social order, providing the military with logistical support and supplies, 
collecting taxes and mediating disputes.  While the Party would place great attention on 
the cultivation of minority cadres, in these early years what the state needed more than 
bureaucrats was the charismatic authority associated with indigenous tribal and religious 
positions.  Thus, despite doling out government positions to indigenous leaders, 
essentially the Party expected and needed post-Liberation indigenous elites to continue to 
act as pre-Liberation elites, albeit somewhat repackaged and certainly re-messaged.  In 
the person of Trashi Namgyel, all indications suggest that the Party had located just such 
an interlocutor. 
                                                                                                                                            
body and for several months kept as virtual prisoners, prevented from traveling on to Lhasa and unable to 
communicate with their superiors. Despite limited evidence to suggest it was his influence rather than the 
PLA’s fall 1951 invasion, the Shartsang Lama is given credit for helping convince the Dalai Lama to agree 
to the “peaceful Liberation.” After reaching central Tibet, the Takste Rinpoche would flee into exile where 
he became one the key early figures trying to elicit foreign support to first head off and then resist Chinese 
control. See also HNZZZZZLSDSJ, 2-3; Zhao Qingyang, 152.  Shakya, Dragon in the Land of the Snows, 
41-42 (on the mission) and 74-86, 149-157, 171-175 (on the Thubten Norbu’s efforts in exile). 
 
53 In March 1952 Tongren County would be re-designated the Tongren Tibetan Autonomous County with 
Gélek Gyatso as its first chairman.  In July of the following year, the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous 




This is not to suggest that those with indigenous positions of authority and 
prestige had carte blanche vis-à-vis their co-ethnic constituencies that the Party could 
readily tap into.  There were limits to this authority and as with Gélek Gyatso’s appeal to 
the Sokru villagers— and before that Wagya’s mediation of the Detsang tax dispute—
pre-Liberation elites could easily be caught between the state and local interests. Trashi 
Namgyel recalls one such episode.  Metaphorically linked as it was to foreign 
imperialism’s enslavement of the Chinese nation, early on the CCP made the eradication 
of opium production, trade and consumption a central component of its moral 
legitimacy.54  In fact, in the lead up to the PLA’s assault against his Nangra base, one of 
the accusations leveled against Wangchen Döndrup was that he allowed or even 
supported opium production.55  Yet, according to Trashi Namgyel many of Repgong’s 
tribes had a long history of heavy indebtedness that they could not hope to repay except 
by growing opium poppies.  As is often the case, the state’s desire to stamp out illegal 
narcotics quickly led it into conflict with local communities that depended upon their 
cultivation for their livelihoods.  Trashi Namgyel claims he became the recipient of 
threats and abuse for his promotion of the government’s anti-opium policies. Eventually, 
he recalls, “Through patient work, [I was able] to make the majority of the masses realize 
their mistakes, and make the distinction clear that their heavy debts were the creation of 
the old society [and] Ma Bufang’s regime, [I] peacefully resolved the contradiction 
                                                
54 Chen Yung-fa has shown that despite the anti-opium rhetoric, the cultivation and sale of opium 
subsidized much of the CCP’s Yanan operations. Chen Yung-fa, "The Blooming Poppy under the Red Sun" 
The Yan'an Way and the Opium Trade," in New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution, ed. 
Tony Saich and Hans J. Van de Ven (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
 
55 See the “open letter” sent to Wangchen Döndrup by the Qinghai Party Committee in JFQHSLXB 270. 




between the government and the masses.”56  While the stilted language so common in 
PRC sources obscures the specific measures Trashi Namgyel used to negotiate a 
settlement, what is interesting is how the state sought to appropriate the charismatic 
authority of the nangso and redirect it toward their state and nation building project—  
 and the tensions that this produced. 
Perhaps nowhere was the traditional prestige of pre-liberation secular and 
religious elites relied upon as heavily as in the Party’s attempts to resolve intra- and inter-
tribal conflict, commonly referred to as “grassland disputes” (caoyuan jiufen).  So 
prevalent were these often generations-long feuds over Amdo’s scarce resources that they 
would often form a regular section in Party and government work plans and reports and 
merit their own heading in relevant chapters of gazetteers.57  Considering them 
particularly harmful to the Party’s primary goals of restoring social order, developing 
national unity and increasing production, the Party would expend extraordinary energies 
trying to mediate these incessant disputes.   In doing so, it relied heavily on the 
intervention of indigenous religious and secular leaders.  For example, Zhao Qingyang 
notes that in Gélek Gyatso would often invoke his authority as representative of the 
                                                
56 Zhaxi Anjia, 244-245.  These events occurred in May 1950. 
 
57 “Grassland Disputes and Border Management” falls under the Civil Affairs (minzheng) heading in 
gazetteers’ chapters on Government (zhengquan).  Based largely on fieldwork in Golok, Emily Yeh has 
suggested that grassland disputes were not common in the pre-Liberation period but have “proliferated 
since incorporation of these areas into the PRC […],” the result of the imposition of “state territoriality” 
and in particular the recent privatization of pastureland.  However, it seems clear from both secondary 
sources and the accounts of observers such as Robert Eckvell that pre-Liberation feuds were both common 
and destructive.  Responding to Yeh, Fernanda Pirie has written, “the nomads regard the new fences as 
providing new sources of conflict, but not as radically altering the nature or frequency of the resulting feuds 
[…].”  Yeh acknowledges that “romanticized memory” may partially explain her findings, correctly noting 




Shartsang Lama.58  This was of course a level of prestige that the state could not hope to 
muster, a reality that for the time being the Party seemed to accept.59  
Trashi Namgyel’s short autobiographical account offers perhaps the most detailed 
and extensive examples of such work.  For instance, in December 1949 six Tongren 
County residents raised money to engage in unspecified trans-county trade.  While 
staying at an inn in neighboring Xunhua County, the caravan’s money and valuables were 
burgled and evidently thrown into the Yellow River.  According to Trashi Namgyel, 
“Tongren’s tribes” were infuriated and immediately threatened revenge.  He writes, “the 
situation was extremely serious.”  Although not a traditional grassland dispute, the 
conflict gave Trashi Namgyel a chance to demonstrate his usefulness to the new regime.  
He reports that he immediately enlisted the aid of “prestigious lamas and chieftains,” 
while dispatching people to investigate the incident and simultaneously enlisting the aid 
of the Xunhua government.60  In this sense, Trashi Namgyel was acting in two 
overlapping capacities, as the Rongwo Nangso and the leader of Tongren County, 
underscoring the permeable space between empire and nation that continued to exist in 
this part of the new Chinese state. 
Trashi Namgyel goes on to cite several other instances in which his attention was 
instrumental in disarming otherwise violent disputes.  Among them was the major 
                                                
58 Zhao Qingyang, “Ji Yiwei Yu Dang,” 153. 
 
59 As both Yeh and Pirie have noted, even today disputes tend to be mediated by religious authorities and 
secular community leaders, in some cases the state actively ceding its legal and administrative 
responsibilities to these non-state actors. Emily Yeh 514-520, Pirie, 90-94. 
 
60 Zhaxi Anjia, 245; Han Haiyan, 173; Huangnanzhou Zengxie, "Huangnan Tiaojie Minzu Jiufen Jishi," in 
Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Jicui: Jianguohoujuan, ed. Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi, 
Qinghaisheng Weiyuanhui, and Xuexi he Wenshi Weiyuanhui (Xining: Qinghaisheng Zhengxie Xuexi he 




conflict between Zongqianhu Dorjé’s Gyelwo Tribe and the Gengya Tribe of neighboring 
Xiahe County mentioned previously.  The dispute had begun in 1915 when the Gengya 
reportedly occupied a fifteen-kilometer stretch of valley grassland that had belonged to 
the Gyelwo.  Trashi Namgyel insists that decades later Ma Bufang had purposefully sown 
intra-ethnic discord by supplying Gyelwo Dorjé with weapons and ammunition while 
simultaneously recognizing the Gengya Tribe’s ownership over the disputed valley.  By 
the early 1950s, the hostilities that would break out anew each summer had left eighty-six 
people dead and cost the lives of thousands of animals.61  
If the Party was going to govern Amdo, increase its productive capacities and 
eventually implement socialist reforms, it needed to resolve ruinous intertribal feuds such 
as this.  In fact, one way to value the importance the Party placed in resolving grassland 
disputes is by the resources it marshaled against them.  In this instance, Fan Ming (head 
of the Northwest Military and Political Affairs Liaison Department),62 Chen Chengyi 
                                                
61 Zhaxi Anjia, 245-246; Huangnanzhou Zhengxie; 266-267; GNZZZZHGK 87-88. Although it claims that 
by 1953 over 2700 feuds had been settled throughout the region (qu), this is the only dispute to which the 
Gannan Zangzu Zizhiahou Gaikuan (Overview of the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture) specifically 
refers, illustrating the severity of the conflict and the effort the Party exerted in reaching a resolution. 
 
62 As head of the Northwest Tibet Work Team and as commander of the 11th Independent Division of the 
1st Field Army, Fan Ming would in short order become one of the chief architects of the “Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet.” He would remain a leading voice in the administration of Central Tibet until being 
purged in 1958 over a long-simmering dispute with rivals from the 18th Army of the Southwest Military 
Region.  The dispute between the two military regions and its consequences is a subject of much 
speculation, particularly as it concerns the Lhasa Rebellion of 1959 and subsequent flight of the 14th Dalai 
Lama into exile, as well as its impact on Cultural Revolution-era factionalism.  The 18th Army, with former 
commanders Yin Fatang and Chen Mingyi as its leading spokesmen, has been fairly successful in 
establishing a narrative of the Liberation of Tibet that puts the 18th Army and its leadership in the central 
role while essentially excising the contributions of Fan Ming’s 11th Independent Division. See Xiao Hao, 
Xizang, 1951 Nian : Ren Min Jie Fang Jun Jin Zang Shi Lu (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1999); Zhao 
Shenying, Zhang Guohua Jiang Jun Zai Xizang ([Beijing]: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, 2001); Miao 
Piyi, Miao Piyi Huiyilu (Lhasa: Xizang Renmin Chubanshe, 2005).  Before his recent passing, Fan Ming 
himself penned a volume that in large part reads as an attempt to rehabilitate his legacy and that of his 11th 
Division comrades. The author and his editor (Fan’s daughter) creatively weave their historical argument 
within the current state discourse of anti-Dalai Lama, anti-splittist rhetoric, arguing that it was the 18th 
Army’s “gradualist strategy” (in Goldstein’s terms) and support for the Dalai Lama that led to the current 




(head of Gansu Province’s secretariat), and Wang Feng (at the time chairman of the 
Northwest Bureau’s Nationalities Committee), were dispatched to mediate the dispute.  
Locally, Trashi Namgyel’s counterpart was Apa Alo, the longtime leader of the Labrang 
Tibetans referred to by Lin Hsiao-ting as “one of the most pivotal figures in Chinese 
Inner Asia and a frequent foil of Ma Bufang.”63  Just as Trashi Namgyel acted as a super-
tribal indigenous authority in the Repgong region, Apa Alo served a similar function, 
albeit without the institutional prestige of the office of the Rongwo Nangso.  Instead, Apa 
Alo’s authority was based on his familial connections to the 5th and 6th incarnations of the 
founder of Labrang Monastery, the Jamyang Shepa lineage, which he parlayed into 
becoming the region’s paramount military and political leader.  After a brief post-
Liberation flirtation with GMD/Ma Bufang-led insurgencies, Apa Alo would join the new 
state, serving in several senior provincial positions and in 1955 receiving the unusual 
honor of being awarded the rank of major general (shaojiang).64   
                                                                                                                                            
On Fan Ming and the riff between the 18th Army and 11th Division, see also Melvyn C. Goldstein, "On 
Modern Tibetan History: Moving Beyond Stereotypes," in Tibet and Her Neighbours : A History, ed. Alex 
McKay (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 217-226; ———, A History of Modern Tibet. Volume 2, the 
Calm before the Storm, 1951-1955 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 37-38, 422-423; 
Tsering Shakya, "Historical Introduction," in Leaders in Tibet: A Directory, ed. Victoria Conner and Robert 
Barnett (London: Tibetan Information Network, 1997), 4-5; Benno R. Weiner, "When 'the Sky Fell to the 
Earth:' the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 1966-71 " (Master's 
thesis, Columbia University, 2002).  
 
63 Lin Hsiao-ting, Modern China’s Ethnic Frontiers, 61.  Apa Alo, who’s given name was Lobsang 
Tsewang and is known in Chinese as Huang Zhengqing, was the elder brother of the 5th Jamyang Shepa and 
patriarch of the regionally dominant Huang clan.  Prior to Liberation he also held a variety of Guomindang 
posts and titles.  Lin cites Apa Alo as one of the main actors around which Chiang Kaishek hoped to build 
his anti-Communist front.  Lin suggests that Apa Alo was initially receptive to the idea but does not explain 
how or when the relationship soured. Lin also reports that during the Sino-Japanese War Apa Alo 
maintained a personal garrison of over 10,000 soldiers.  See also Paul Kocot Nietupski, Labrang Monastery 
: A Tibetan Buddhist Community on the Inner Asian Borderlands, 1709-1958, Studies in Modern Tibetan 
Culture (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), 81-93; Chen and Zhuota, 307-409.   
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Trashi Namgyel explains the process by which indigenous authorities sought to 
mediate the dispute,  
I and other nationality elites from the two counties totaling thirty-five people from 
start to finish attended to the work of resolving [the dispute].  During this 
mediation I primarily did the Tongren aspects of the work.  [I] implored [to the 
Gyelwo] that the roots of the dispute were created by the instigation of the 
reactionaries of the old society.  We acted as the representatives of the masses, 
and hence spoke on behalf of the masses, and adopted a correct viewpoint, [which 
is] defer to the big picture, [on the basis of] mutual understanding and mutual 
compromise, earnestly and sincerely facilitate a new neighborly [and] friendly 
relationship.65 
 
Thus, with indigenous elites acting both on behalf of the state (as leaders of Tongren and 
Xiahe) and representing their specific constituencies (as pan-tribal headmen in the 
Repgong and Labrang regions with intimate links to the main monastic institutions), 
“Through more than forty days of hard work, the two sides reached an agreement, and on 
the July 1st [1950] commemoration of the Party’s founding, the work of dividing 
boundaries was finished.”66  A unity meeting was convened at which the principals swore 
a pledged of “unity and patriotism” and the new boundaries were entered into a registry.  
Trashi Namgyel continues, “From then on, the mutual hatred was ended, the historical 
feud had traveled down the glorious road of national unity and friendship.”67  
In another incident, Trashi Namgyel describes the resolution of a dispute between 
members of Zeku’s Méshül Tribe and Xiahe’s Sangkhok Tribe.68  Even more so than the 
                                                
65 Zhaxi Anjia, 245.  
 
66 Ibid., 245; Huangnanzhou Zhengxie, 266-268.  The negotiations were held in Lanzhou.  In fact, the 
agreement between the Gyelwo and Gengya was signed the same day that Trashi Namgyel reports he 
attended the party with Peng Dehuai and other senior leaders.   
 
67 Zhaxi Anjia, 246.   
 




Gyelwo-Gengya feud, this conflict illustrates both continuity with Ma Bufang’s regime 
(the role traditional authorities were expected to play as mediators between the state and 
society) and rupture (the Party’s intention to juxtapose Ma Bufang’s cynical exploitation 
of grassland rivalries with its own efforts at national reconciliation) embedded in its state 
and nation-building project.  The dispute broke out some years before Liberation when 
members of the neighboring Méshül allegedly plundered a Sangkhok caravan that was 
delivering “tribute” (gongwu) to Xiahe.  On the orders of Apa Alo, a leading lieutenant 
named Jamyang Norbu is said to have marshaled a war party of over 30,000 soldiers 
against the Méshül, “killing people, setting fires, butchering animals and so forth in acts 
of retribution.  After this reciprocal robberies and murders continued for several years 
without end.”69  In 1947, a year after becoming nangso, Trashi Namgyel received Ma 
Bufang’s approval to assume responsibility for resolving the conflict.  Later that year, he 
met with Jamyang Norbu at Repgong’s Gartsé Monastery.  However, concerned that a 
successful resolution to the crisis would reduce the Ma clan’s influence, just as an 
agreement was being reached, Ma Bufang reportedly telegraphed orders that the peace 
process be scuttled.70   
As Trashi Namgyel retells it, Ma Bufang’s interference meant that the dispute 
between the Méshül and the Labrang Tibetans continued to fester.  Finally, in 1952 
                                                
69 Zhaxi Anjia, 247.  Jamyang Norbu is known in Chinese as Huang Xiang.  Although having previously 
taken monk’s vows, during Labrang’s 1925 dispute with the Xining regime he was placed in command of 
the Gengya and Sangkhok.  Returning to the laity, for the next three decades he remained a leading regional 
figures.  After Liberation Jamyang Norbu would serve as Xiahe’s county leader from 1949 until his death 
in 1957.  Considering that the entire Méshül Tribe had under 1500 members, the assertion that Jamyang 
Norbu had 30,000 soldiers under his command perhaps should be taken with a grain of salt.  Danzhu 
Angban, 328; Xiahe Xianzhi, 670-676; Gannan Zangzu Zizhizhou Difang Shizhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, 
Gannan Zangzu Zizhizhou Zhi, 2 vols. (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1999), 1854-1855. 
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another attempt was made at mediation.  Because Trashi Namgyel was then in the Zeku 
region collecting “patriotic pastoral taxes,” Tongren County initially assigned Gyelwo 
Dorjé to be its chief mediator.  However, as five years earlier it had been the Rongwo 
Nangso who had led the negotiations, several of the Méshül representatives insisted on 
Trashi Namgyel’s renewed participation.  In August, the Rongwo Nangso “gathered over 
thirty monks (lama), chieftains (hongbao) and representatives of the masses from several 
tribes” at a site on the Tongren-Xiahe border.  His opposite was once again Jamyang 
Norbu, now the official leader of Xiahe County.  Starting up where the negotiations had 
abruptly left off five years earlier, “with the support and aid of the two regions’ relevant 
Party and government department leaders, [we] reached the principles of a fair and 
reasonable mutual understanding.”71  Remarkable if true, Trashi Namgyel notes that 
never before had a nangso traveled to Xiahe (Labrang).  However, evidently overcoming 
grave misgivings on both sides, Trashi Namgyel was persuaded to lead a delegation 
across the border.  There at a Unity Conference, the agreement was formalized.  In Xiahe, 
Trashi Namgyel and his companions met with Labrang’s leading religious and secular 
authorities as well as local government and Party leaders.  The implication is that the 
Party, through the mediation efforts of Trashi Namgyel and other indigenous actors, had 
not only overcome discord sewn by Ma Bufang but had struck a historic victory for 
national unity.   
Trashi Namgyel provides several other examples of his mediation efforts, 
including intervening in separate disputes between Zeku’s Gartsé and Hor Tribes and the 
Henan Mongols.  In the latter case, a nephew of Hor Qianhu Wagya and his brother 
                                                




Lhagyel was killed, inciting demands for revenge from the Hor leadership.  Realizing that 
an explosive situation was developing, the provincial government immediately 
dispatched a representative to try to diffuse the situation while the prefecture assigned 
Trashi Namgyel to head a work group to aid these efforts.  After multiple overtures, 
Wagya and Lhagyel were eventually prevailed upon to intercede with the victim’s father 
and relatives.  Trashi Namgyel maintains, “the two sides dispersed those that had 
gathered to prepare for the armed feud (xiedou), a serious sanguinary incident was 
avoided.”72  In still another instance, Trashi Namgyel was sent by the county to head a 
work group meant to settle a long-standing dispute between one of the Repgong Tribes 
and members of Wangchen Döndrup’s Nangra.  In the end, the conflict was resolved 
through mediation conducted under the personal auspices of United Front Work 
Department leader Zhou Renshan.  According to Trashi Namgyel, the positive resolution 
of this dispute helped dispel any lingering doubts the Nangra qianhu had toward the 
CCP.73 
The inclusion of these passages in PRC-published sources is clearly meant to 
contrast the policies of the old regime to those of the Communist Party.  In the process, 
however, Trashi Namgyel demonstrates the limits of state power and the vital role 
traditional elites continued to play in the maintenance of order among and between the 
peoples of eastern Amdo.  In essence, the Party did not have direct access to the Tibetan 
masses, a considerable deficit that it hoped to redress through the careful construction of 
government and Party organs, the training of minority cadres, and a campaign of focused 
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propaganda work.  In the meantime, relying on subimperial practices it sought to 
appropriate the charismatic authority of traditional elites for its state and nation building 
project.  For his part, whether out of conviction (as he would later claim), self-
preservation, or a sense of responsibility in his position as nangso, Trashi Namgyel seems 
to have played the role quite dutifully.  After all, although never before faced with such a 
interventionist or reformist state, Trashi Namgyel and countless other of Amdo’s 
indigenous authorities were continuing to fulfill their accustomed liminal roles at the 
confluence of state power and local society.  
 
A year after attending the meetings in Xining and Lanzhou, Trashi Namgyel was 
recommended for a Central Nationalities Institute Minority Cadres Training course.  The 
nangso reports that by then he had personally become a dedicated believer in the CCP.  
However, he admits, “Because [people] were ill-informed, there were many rumors, [my] 
family recommended I should not go to such a far off Han [Chinese] area to study.”  
Despite these misgivings, Trashi Namgyel traveled to Beijing.  In the capital a 
celebration marking the start of the cadre-training course was attended by some of the 
highest ranking officials in the country, including President Liu Shaoqi, PLA Chairman 
Zhu De, head of the Party Secretariat Deng Xiaoping, and national UFWD director Li 
Weihan. While in Beijing, Trashi Namgyel was made part of gatherings organized to 
greet such Tibetan luminaries as the 10th Panchen Lama and the delegation sent from 
Lhasa that would eventually sign the “Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet.”  Trashi Namgyel recalls that he even met with the delegation’s 




Qinghai’s experiences since Liberation.  After the Seventeen-Point Agreement was 
signed, the nangso and two other Tibetan students went to Beijing’s Central People’s 
Broadcasting Station.  There, in the three principal dialects of the Tibetan Plateau, they 
announced the news of “The Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”74  As recounted many years 
later, by 1951 Trashi Namgyel had become a full-fledged United Front representative. 
 
Toward the Grasslands: Du Hua’an and the Construction of Tongren County  
Despite September 1949’s establishment of the Tongren County People’s 
Committee— first under the stewardship of Tséring Gyel and subsequently the 
triumvirate of Gélek Gyatso, Trashi Namgyel and Gyelwo Dorjé— through the fall and 
winter of 1949-1950 the Party maintained only a skeletal administrative presence in the 
Repgong region.  Wu Wenxiang had been appointed head of the county’s secretariat.  
However, by all indications he had only a handful of cadres with which to staff it and few 
other resources at his disposal.  In fact, Deng Jinsheng, a functionary of the old county 
government who like Zhao Qingyang transferred his loyalty to the new regime, would 
later admit, “during this period, the main [tasks] were maintaining the area’s law and 
order [and] protecting the government treasury [and] property.  Establishing a true 
people’s political power […] was something that could only happen after a large corps of 
cadres arrived in Tongren.”75   
It was not until spring 1950 that Qinghai’s leadership took its first steps toward 
breaking its near-total reliance on Repgong’s indigenous elites.  In April, Provincial Party 
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Secretary Zhang Zhongliang personally assigned three of his cadres, Li Deyuan, Yang 
Yaozu and Chen Jiexiang, to organize and lead a Tongren County Party Work 
Committee.76  Armed with instructions to “broadly liaise with the masses, and vigorously 
launch work,” soon after the three Party representatives led a contingent of two dozen 
cadres from Xining to Rongwo Township.77  However, upon their arrival the newcomers 
discovered a security situation that had not noticeably improved from the previous 
autumn.  An eyewitness recalls, “Spies spread rumors to mislead the masses, bandits 
blocked roads and robbed at gun point, social order was in chaos, at night there was the 
sound of gunshots in the vicinity of Rongwo Township.  Some areas grew opium […], 
[people] had a wait and see attitude [toward the Communist Party].”78  Yang Yaozu and 
Deng Jinsheng concur, admitting, “small groups of bandits and spies appeared one place 
then another, the work committee could not cope, [we had to] telegraph to ask for help.”79   
That help would soon arrive in the person of United Front operative Du Hua’an. 
A native of Sichuan Province, Du was a Long March veteran and seems to have been 
considered an expert on nationality work.80   In late June, Xining appointed Du the first 
                                                
76 Li Deyuan was chosen the committee secretary.  Under him, Yang Yaozu was named chief of the 
organization department and tasked with propaganda work while Chen Jiexiang was made head of the 
county’s public security bureau with responsibility for security and judicial work. 
 
77 Ibid., 176; Tongren Xianzhi 493. Tongren’s first Communist Party branch was established on May 20.  
All six of its inaugural members were from the newly arrived work committee. 
 
78 Han Haiyan, 171.   
 
79 Yang and Deng, 176. 
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Party Secretary of Tongren County.  He was instructed to organize a county Party 
Committee, exterminate bandits and spies, restore social order, spread the Party’s 
nationality policies (“especially the nationality religion policy and the United Front 
policy”), establish county-level government organs, recruit and cultivate nationality 
cadres (minzu ganbu),81 and restore agricultural and pastoral production.  With a 
detachment of more than one hundred twenty cadres and security personnel, Du set out 
from Xining almost immediately.82  Already in Rongwo Township on July 1, Secretary 
Du convened the first “Tibetan, Hui and Han nationality mass meeting” at which the 
Party’s positions on national equality, national unity and religious freedom were 
explained and the establishment of Tongren County’s Chinese Communist Party 
Committee was announced.83  
According to the sources, almost immediately upon his arrival Du began the work 
of linking up with the masses.  Yang and Deng write, 
With the crops already ripened, [Du] immediately mobilized and organized the 
county [Party] committee, county People’s Government cadres and garrison 
                                                                                                                                            
Huangnan, Du Hua’an would rise to become vice-head of the provincial United Front Work Department 
and eventually a member of the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee (1963-1966). 
 
81  Although technically a neutral term meaning nationality, in this context the word “minzu” should be 
understood to refer almost exclusively to non-Han Chinese.  In other words, a Han cadre is just a ganbu 
while a non-Han cadre is a minzu ganbu.  As such, non-Han are ethnicized and othered in a way that the 
normative majority are not.  This is in part what Dru Gladney has referred to as “Oriental Orientalism.”  
Gladney, “Representing Nationality.” 
 
82 Along with the county gazetteer, Han Haiyan refers to the armed contingent as wuzhuang renyuan, Yang 
and Deng call them wuzhuang zhanshi, and the official prefecture Party chronology names them as gong’an 
ganjing. See Han Haiyan, 171; Yang and Deng, 176; HNZZZZZ LSDSJ, 3; Tongren Xianzhi, 30. 
 
83 Du Hua’an was the Party Secretary and Li Deyuan stayed on as his vice-secretary.  At the time there 
were forty-four Party members in the County divided into three branches.  All were men and except for one 
Hui Muslim all were Han.  In addition there were sixty-eight non-Party cadres, of which three were 





command troops to enter the villages, [so as to] on the one hand help the masses 
quickly harvest the yellow fields, on the other actively propagandize policies.84   
 
Four agricultural work teams were quickly assembled and assigned to four designated 
agricultural areas.85  In addition to assessing and developing agricultural production, the 
work teams’ primary tasks were to spread the Party’s nationality policies, overcome 
rumors, eradicate opium cultivation, and restore social order.  So as to not burden the 
peasantry, they were reportedly expected to bring their own food and supplies. Secretary 
Du is said to have personally led the entire mass of cadres into two groups of villages to 
help with the harvest and demonstrate that the CCP and its representatives were 
“completely different from Ma Bufang’s fat-cat officials” (guanlaofu).  Through these 
efforts, a cadre named Han Haiyan would later claim, a few enemies were captured, 
social order gradually improved and a few local elites began to trust the Party.86    
Administratively, Du and his cadres set about “reforming and strengthening” 
government offices by retiring many of those who had worked in the old government 
while retaining a select few.87   Newly arrived Han cadres were put in charge of the 
finance, organization, public security and general affairs departments, while several of 
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85 According to Han, the work teams were announced at Du Hua’an’s July 1 meeting.  Yang and Deng 
state that they were instead formed in 1951.  However, in December 1950 Du himself reportedly mentioned 
that “four work teams [already] have been organized and dispatched into the villages to implement work.”  
Cited in Tongren Xianzhi, 575. 
 
86 Han Haiyan, 172.  In August, Trashi Namgyel, Gyelwo Dorjé and the head of the public security Chang 
Zhizhou, declared a curfew over Rongwo Township and the vicinity.  See the appendix to Tongren Xianzhi, 
1113. 
 
87 Yang and Deng, 176.  The source specifically mentions Zhao Qingyang (here Zhao Long), Deng 
Jinsheng and Qin Xiu.  Elsewhere Zhao notes that the three were present at the establishment of Tséring 
Gyel’s People’s Committee.  See Zhao Long, 262.  As mentioned, Zhao is responsible for much of the 
contents of volume 2 of the Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao, largely dedicated to the early Liberation period.  




Repgong’s qianhu and baihu were recruited to organize and serve as leaders of offices 
and bureaus dealing with affairs considered better suited for figures with local standing 
such as the culture and education office, civil administration office and tax bureau.88  In 
September and October, Tongren’s 1st-3rd district governments were established in 
Repgong’s agricultural heartland.  Each of these sub-county administrations was headed 
by a member of that area’s indigenous elite.  However, if the subsequent experiences in 
Zeku are any indication, the work of building district administrations was almost 
certainly led by Party work teams, which with the founding of each district were 
transformed into district Party committees.89  
Building on these considerable if incremental gains, from December 6-12 1950, 
the first Tongren County All Nationalities All Walks of Life Representative Conference 
was convened.  According to the sources, among the one hundred thirty-eight attendees 
were all of the qianhu and baihu of the greater Repgong region (including what would 
become Zeku County) as well as thirty-seven monastic representatives.90  With Trashi 
Namgyel as secretary and Du Hua’an and Gyelwo Dorjé as vice-secretaries, a twenty-
one-member Tongren County Government Committee was chosen.  Among the selected 
committee members were the three qianhu of the southern pastoral regions, Wagya of the 
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the November 1951 return of the Shartsang Lama and Gélek Gyatso.  Du was said to have traveled several 
dozens of miles out of town to welcome them back.  Han’s implication is that the Shartsang Lama’s 
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89 Yang and Deng, 177; Han Haiyan, 174; Tongren Xianzhi, 80; ZGGCDHNZZZZZLSDSJ, 4.  The 1st 
District, which included Rongwo Township and its environs, was headed by a member of the Rongwo 
Nangso clan referred to in Chinese as Aorijia, while the Party Committee was apparently chaired by a Han 
cadre.  On Aorijia see Chapter Two n. 27 and Conclusion n. 21. 
 
90 Tongren Xianzhi, 575; Han Haiyan, 172.  In total there were seven qianhu and thirty-six baihu.  As 





Hor, Serökyap of the Gönshül, and Lumbum of the Gartsé.91  Acting concurrently as 
secretary of Tongren County’s Party Committee and vice secretary of the county 
government, Du Hua’an gave the conference’s main report.  Speaking to the newly-
assembled Han cadre force and security personnel, but with its impact on the indigenous 
attendees clearly in mind, delegates were urged to “serve the people of the nationality 
areas with all your heart and all your mind,” and reminded, “do not beat people, do not 
scold people, do not oppress people, do not exploit people, so that the people of each 
nationality can achieve happiness.”92  
The following spring, Du moved to further consolidate Party control.  As part of a 
campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, soldiers and officials of the “old army” and 
“old government” were required to register and assemble for retraining, investigation, 
political study and “thought reform” (gaizao sixiang).  In serious cases, the perpetrators 
were reportedly arrested.  However, according to Han Haiyan, after reeducation the 
majority of these compromised individuals were allowed (perhaps euphemistically) to 
“return to their villages to [contribute] to production through manual labor.”93  In May, a 
county-level Nationality United Front Work Meeting was convened to implement the 
Party Center’s “Common Program” (gongtong gangling), including its provision that 
autonomous governments be established in minority regions.  This was followed in 
October by the establishment of the Tongren Tibetan Autonomous Region Preparatory 
Committee.  Gélek Gyatso, not yet returned from Lhasa, was made chairman, Du Hua’an, 
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92 Tongren Xianzhi, 575.  The conference’s seventeen-point agenda is replicated in the appendix pp. 1111-
1112.   
 




Trashi Namgyel, Gyelwo Dorjé and the Hor Qianhu Wagya were chosen as vice-
secretaries.94   
Meanwhile, in summer 1951 the first steps were taken toward integrating the 
pastoral districts into the county’s regular administration.  In June, a single “poor 
pastoralist” from the Gartsé Tribe became the “Zeku region’s” first cadre.95  Then in 
August, two pastoral work teams were deployed into the Zeku grasslands to explain the 
Party’s policy of national equality and plans for development of the pastoral economy.  In 
addition to spreading propaganda, the work groups were instructed to provide free health 
care to the sick and vaccinations to those at risk.  They also had an economic purpose, 
albeit one with a clear corresponding political objective.  The work teams were ordered to 
bring commercial and agricultural goods with them to the grasslands so that the 
pastoralists could acquire these necessities more conveniently and less exploitatively.  
They were also instructed to purchase side products produced by both agriculturalists and 
pastoralists, provide rural and pastoral Tibetans material resources needed to raise their 
productive capacities, and extend emergency relief to especially poor households.  Lastly, 
as forward operatives the work teams also had a reconnaissance function.  They were 
instructed to “investigate [and] research pastoral life [and] conditions of production.”96   
Han Haiyan confesses that the work teams were only able to visit the camps of four baihu 
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Zeku’s Wagya would be chosen one of the vice-secretaries along with Du Hua’an, Trashi Namgyel and 
Gyelwo Dorjé. 
 
95 Zeku Xianzhi, 14. 
 
96 Yang and Deng, 176-177; Han Haiyan, 172-173; Tongren Xianzhi 31. The Tongren Xianzhi adds that the 





and reports in the Zeku archives admit that they encountered significant difficulties 
implementing their assignments.97  Nonetheless, with perhaps considerable 
embellishment, Yang and Deng recall that when the work teams approached, “The broad 
masses of peasants and herders could not resist calling out, ‘on the grasslands there has 
arisen a sun that will never set.’”98   
 
“Barren Wilderness Since Time Immemorial:” Geyong and the Opening of the 
Zeku Grasslands 
Although written forty years after the fact and evoking a feeling of nostalgia and 
political orthodoxy that must be taken into account, the recollections of a local Repgong 
Tibetan provide a colorful and unique first-hand account of the establishment of Zeku 
County.99  Geyong’s (Ch.) story begins in 1951 when at an age of just fifteen years old he 
joined the new Tongren County government.  At the time, he recalls there being only 
around seventy government workers in the entire county, “most were demobilized 
soldiers, some still wearing their army uniforms and boots, dragging their bandaged legs 
to work.”100  The monthly salary for these veteran fighters was six yuan.  Those who had 
just joined the revolution, like the story’s protagonist, received half of that.  Other than 
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98 Yang and Deng, 177.   
 
99 Geyong’s nationality is not provided.  However, he was apparently an Amdo Tibetan speaker, which 
admittedly does not prove that he was Tibetan (at least as defined by the state).  However, his transliterated 
name and description of his experiences suggest that if not Tibetan he was likely a Monguor (tuzu), the 
distinction not being particularly pertinent to the anecdote. 
 
100 Geyong, 269. According to an official source, by the end of 1951 there was actually one hundred sixty-
four cadres, sixty-two were either CCP or Communist Youth League members, and one hundred two were 
not affiliated with the Party.  All but twenty-two were Han and all but six—including all the Party 




the Party secretary and vice-secretaries, each of whom had their own rooms, the cadres 
slept in shared dormitories.  While higher officials would eat together in a small mess 
hall, the rank-in-file ate communally in a larger canteen.  To emphasize to his audience 
the austere conditions in which these earliest cadres lived and worked, Geyong reports 
that even the Party secretary could not get more than a single fifty-pack of Starlight or 
Liberation cigarettes.101  
Initially Geyong appears to have been attached to one of Du Hua’an’s agricultural 
work teams.  As he describes it, even in Repgong’s agricultural districts life in the field 
was full of hardships.  Generally each work team had only one or two horses between 
them to carry their supplies while the cadres all walked.  Geyong recalls that it was not 
uncommon to see a cadre with no horse at all struggling through the countryside with his 
luggage and rifle strapped to his back.  As a communications worker (tongxunyuan), in 
addition to his other duties each evening Geyong listened to nightly news broadcasts.  
After getting back on the road the next day, he would write out the previous evening’s 
news reports on a blackboard for the benefit of his comrades.  However, despite the 
hardships he was fed and clothed and he received his three yuan per month salary.  
Relatively speaking, Geyong appears to have considered himself quite fortunate.102   
Geyong admits that at the time his political consciousness was not particularly 
high.  However, this began to change when he was ordered to accompany an ill cadre out 
of the countryside to visit a doctor in the county seat.  There, for the first time Geyong 
came face to face with the wonders of modern medicine.  He claims to have quickly 
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decided to devote his life to healing the masses and soon received permission from 
Organization Department Director Yang Yaozu to transfer to the health clinic.  There 
Geyong began training with a small group of medical workers, in particular the chief of 
the center, Dr. Wang Jianren.   
Over the following year, Geyong accompanied Dr. Wang on least two lengthy 
trips through the countryside.103   He describes these journeys through the impoverished 
and often hazardous countryside in some detail, traveling on foot across mountain passes 
and from village to village with just a donkey to carry the small team’s supplies.  In each 
location they would dispense vaccinations and treat the infirmed.  In Geyong’s retelling, 
not only were Dr. Wang and his group healing the sick, they were literally “battling” 
(douzhen) for the souls of the masses, fighting to overcome the ignorance and superstition 
that plagued Tibetan society and in its place delivering the Party’s gift of rational, 
scientific modernity.  However, this was easier said then done.  Geyong vividly describes 
a scene in which the family of a cadre had sought care for their critically ill child by 
inviting monks “to chant sutras, seeking the Buddha’s blessing and protection, but [they] 
did not know enough to see a doctor.”104  While the monks chanted upstairs, Geyong’s 
medical team diagnosed the boy with pneumonia.  In front of his worried grandparents, 
Dr. Wang administered an unspecified injection.  The child’s fever quickly broke and 
after several days he had fully recovered.  However, despite this show of the superiority 
                                                
103 Ibid., 270-274.  On the first excursion, the group of Dr. Wang and three medical students traveled 
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1954 each year medical teams were organized to provide free healthcare in the countryside.  The account 
mentions that the medical teams accompanied merchant-trade work groups.  However, these economic 
functionaries do not appear in Geyong’s account.  Instead he makes it clear that the small team of medical 
workers were completely on their own. Tongren Xianzhi, 862. 
 
104 Geyong, 272.  The cadre’s name is given as Tian Wenbo.  His nationality is not provided but it is clear 




of “science” over “superstition,” the grateful parents thanked both the medical workers 
and the monks.  As if it were a disease itself, Geyong writes, 
[I] wished to correctly treat the superstitious activities of the masses, [but] there 
was no way to change several thousand years of feudal superstitious thought at 
once, [however] later on they slowly came to believe in science.105 
 
The narrative recalls the almost missionary zeal with which Geyong applied 
himself to these early assignments into the countryside.  Conversely, however, the 
overriding impression one gets is the limited nature of the effort relative to the size of the 
sparsely inhabited region and breadth of the health emergency.  Still, the author describes 
the grateful responses of the people they treated and there is no reason to think this was 
not the case.  These medical workers should not be confused with the “barefoot doctors” 
that became legend in both China and the west after their emergence in the mid 1960s.  
Unlike these peasant “paramedical practitioners,” Dr. Wang was a trained physician and 
Geyong his full-time aid.  Yet, each did stem from a similar motivation to somehow 
extend China’s limited medical resources to the vast and vastly underserved rural 
populations, the Party thus reaping the benefits of both a grateful population and a 
strengthened national body.106 
In the spring of 1953, the decision was made to split pastoral Zeku (although this 
name had not yet been official decided upon) from the predominantly agricultural 
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106 Paul Pickowicz refers to barefoot doctors as one manifestation of the Chinese Communist project to 
train “paramedical personnel” meant to fill in the enormous gap between China’s rural health needs and the 
capacity of its nascent medical system.  Rather than medical professionals, barefoot doctors referred to 
local peasant “paramedical” providers who took the lead in supplying healthcare and health education to 
their neighbors.  They were meant to split time between providing medical care and working in the fields. 
Paul G. Pickowicz, "Barefoot Doctors N China: People, Politics and Paramedicine," Eastern Horizons 11, 




heartland of Tongren County.107  The purpose was ostensibly to promote the pastoral 
economy of the grasslands.  However, in immediate terms it entailed constructing a 
county seat where no permanent population center had stood before.  As part of this 
effort, a medical center would need to be established.  Therefore, three medical cadres 
from Tongren’s Health Office were picked to found and run the new county’s health 
center.  He Chenxi (presumably a physician) was chosen as its head, Wu Deqi as the 
nurse, and the author Geyong as the pharmacist, accountant and in all likelihood 
translator.108  The three medical personnel were given three days to prepare.  Then, to the 
sound of fireworks and with the warm farewell and thanks of the Tongren County 
leadership, the mass of its cadres and many of the Rongwo’s residents, at the end of June 
the first wave of Zeku County’s cadre force set off.  The column marched southward 
away from the agricultural lowlands of Repgong and toward the Méshül Mountains 
across which lay the grasslands of the high plateau.109   
According to Geyong, this group of pioneers consisted of no more than forty to 
fifty men.  Yet, evoking a palatable sense of purpose and importance, he reports that 
along with their pack animals carrying tents, luggage, supplies, and medicine, “[we] 
formed an enormous [troop] column, vast and mighty.”  That first night they camped just 
                                                
107 On the decision to establish Zeku County, see Chapter 4. 
 
108 At one point in the story, Dr. Wang tries to communicate with locals in Tibetan.  Geyong notes that 
even he could not understand the doctor.  The anecdote was meant to humorously illustrate Dr. Wang’s 
commitment to serving the Tibetan people.  However, it also demonstrates the very difficult cultural-
linguistic challenges faced by outside Han cadres.  Geyong 273. 
 
109 Geyong, 274-5.  Geyong says that these events occurred on September 1.  However, he is almost 
certainly describing the sixty-one-member contingent that left Rongwo on June 29.  There is no record of a 
similar force departing on September 1 and arriving September 3.  Nor does he mention joining an already 
established settlement.  As detailed in Chapter 4, the Zeku County Work Committee would arrive on 
September 11, but the context suggests that this is not the group Geyong accompanied either.  My best 




on the Tongren side of the pass.  Then on the morning of the second day, “[we] crossed 
the great Wöngya Mountain and into the Topden grasslands within the borders of Zeku 
County.”110  That this was the first time the young man had seen the pastoral grasslands 
only two days distant from Rongwo Township is evidenced by the wonder with which he 
describes their vastness, the freshness of the air, and the clarity of the river streams.  For 
example, Geyong writes, “Sitting by a brook, making amends to the natural scenery, 
made me forget the day’s hardships and hunger.”  He recalls he and his compatriots 
walking across the high plateau, some singing mountain songs, others playing games.  At 
times “March of the Liberation Army” would break out, while officers on horseback 
would compete in races through the grasslands.  “Looking at the cadres’ clothing, some 
red, some green, some blue, some white, some black, it truly looked like the grasslands 
were in bloom, giving the grasslands a vitality never seen before.”111   
Despite the romanticism, however, Geyong’s tale makes clear the very real 
difference in lifestyle and life experience that separated the sedentary regions of Repgong 
and the high plateau, and before long the newcomers’ spirits were dampened by the 
enormity of the project that lay before them.  When on the third day word came down 
that they had nearly reached their destination, this vanguard contingent of cadres 
expected to find at least a small village where members of the masses might welcome 
them with firecrackers. “Everyone rushed their animals to get there first. [. . .].  [But] who 
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could know that when we had arrived at the county seat, it would turn out that it was 
complete wilderness.”112  Zhao Qingyang describes the site even more bluntly,   
The county seat was a piece of barren wilderness since time immemorial (gujin 
huangtan).  For several dozens of li in every direction there was no sign of human 
habitation. One— there was no timber, two— there were no bricks or tiles, 
three— there were no skilled workers.  [Building of the county seat] would have 
to completely depend on receiving aid from outside.113 
 
Rather than fixate on the difficulties, however, Geyong emphasizes the resolve 
with which the cadres set about their work.  He reports that after the initial shock had 
worn off, they cheerfully went about pitching their tents on the previously empty 
grasslands, and soon “a charming tent city appeared in front of us.”  However, it would 
turn out that the barren wilderness was not so uninhabited.  Before long, local Tibetan 
pastoralists approached what must have been an unusual commotion.  In classic fashion 
that recalls so many other encounters between the forces of civilization and modernity 
with indigenous peoples, the Tibetan cadre recalls that the Tibetan nomads wandered 
about the encampment, “looking here, looking there, and especially at our female 
comrades, they looked at them with the utmost care.”  That evening they threw together 
what food they could.  Despite the primitive conditions and the uncertainty of what the 
next day might bring, Geyong finishes his description of that first night with a sense of 
triumphalism and confidence that may or may not have reflected his and his companions' 
thoughts at the time.  “After night fell, each tent lit a candle, if seen from outside, it really 
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resembled festival lanterns, celebrating the birth of this area’s first People’s 
Government.”114   
In truth, the People’s Government would not be founded for several months.  
Before then a tremendous amount of work had to be done; political work among the 
pastoral leadership and masses, but also the strenuous physical work of constructing 
living quarters and offices, securing the site, establishing communications and logistics, 
and eking out an existence on the harsh, high plateau.  The encampment lay on the 
Shadar Grasslands near the convergence of the Tséchu and Shadar rivers in the territories 
of the Sonak Tribe.  At 3,660 meters above sea level (12,000 ft.), even in summer the 
temperature at night could dip below freezing.115  Geyong remembers, 
By mid-autumn, the beautiful yellow scenery of the grasslands had 
changed colors, there were a few rainy [days], [but] many very windy days, 
sometimes it enveloped us in blackness, making the sky dim and the earth black, 
so that people could not open their eyes.  In the early morning the ice on the grass 
was like a layer of white snow.116   
 
The settlement remained a ramshackle collection of tents while plans were slowly made 
to establish a township, the first large collection of permanent structures to be constructed 
on this part of the Tibetan plateau.  In the meantime, the county seat consisted of about 
twenty tents, each serving dual functions as primitive living quarters and office space.  
Geyong recalls, “There were no office desks or chairs, [instead we] sat on mats on the 
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115 According to the county difangzhi, the average September temperature in the county seat is still 4.2°C 
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freezing point again until April. Zeku Xianzhi, 60, 76.   
 





ground.”117  That first month, to protect against the cold and provide a measure of 
security against more sentient threats, a 2.5-meter high, 1.5-meter thick earthen wall was 
built around the encampment.  Although Geyong does not mention it, security had to 
have been a concern in a region that had recently seen a major insurrection, where rumors 
of spies, bandits and saboteurs were rife, and in which the loyalty of the pastoral 
population was still highly suspect.  After work on the outer wall was complete, one 
meter and higher walls were constructed around each tent, dividing the encampment into 
work units (public security, legal, trade, grain, health etc).  However, as winter set in the 
already frigid nights became almost unbearable, so much so that they are etched in 
Geyong’s memory.  He recalls, for instance, that at night it was difficult to open your 
eyes, and in the morning your shoes would be stuck to the ground where they had been 
left the previous evening, now encased in a blanket of ice.118   
Yet according to Geyong, the cadres’ morale remained high.  He describes the 
quality of these earliest officials to be quite poor, at least in terms of their abilities to 
build a county government.  However, he says, they were full of spirit and perseverance.  
Party leaders would organize work teams to go into the field to “understand the people’s 
feelings and resolve the masses’ sufferings.”  As a medical worker, Geyong often 
accompanied them into the grasslands, providing free treatment for all types of illnesses 
and injuries.  Soon, he claims, locals began traveling to the encampment on their own to 
seek medical help, which the medical team dispensed freely in their seven square meter 
tent that served as dormitory, pharmacy, kitchen, and waiting room.  Geyong recalls, 
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“although the conditions were poor, everyone worked passionately, [and] earned the 
admiration and respect of the masses.”119 
In the spring, the encampment was fortified by the arrival of a larger coterie of 
cadres.  In the interim, the county government and Party Committee had been established 
with Guo Min as Party Secretary and the region’s qianhu and baihu, people such as 
Wagya, his brother Lhagyel, Lumbum and Serökyap, filling the top government 
positions. Soon after Geyong was invited to study at the provincial health school, and so 
ends our first-hand account of the initial period of Zeku County’s existence.120  In 
abbreviated, annalistic form, the story is continued in the county difangzhi.  Like many of 
the stories referenced in this chapter, Geyong’s narrative is drawn from the Huangnan 
Wenshi Ziliao.  As discussed in the conclusion, by the early 1960s the United Front and 
its strategy of emphasizing national struggle over class struggle will have been disavowed 
as capitulationist.  In the process the transitional period of subimperial collaboration with 
non-proletarian elements was negated.  After 1978, the state’s need to reestablish the 
terms under which minority regions were integrated into the nation-state necessitated 
rewriting the early-Liberation period back into the history of the PRC.  Although not 
without setbacks, the post-Mao narrative of the Liberation of Huangnan Prefecture is one 
of steady progress that essentially ends with the 1953 defeat of Ma Yuanxiang and 
establishment of Zeku County.  However, the official correspondences of the new Zeku 
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County Party and government tells a story that sometimes subtly, sometimes overtly, 
shows the Liberation of Zeku County to have been a far more deliberative, contentious, 






BECOMING MASTERS OF THEIR OWN HOMES:  
NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE INVENTION OF ZEKU COUNTY 
 
On September 11, 1953, a dozen Chinese cadres arrived on the north bank of the 
Tséchu River.  Led by a veteran Party official named Guo Min, they had been dispatched 
from Rongwo Township with orders to establish a new county-level administration in 
what had been Tongren’s pastoral districts.1  On the Shadar Grasslands they joined the 
primitive encampment that Geyong and sixty comrades had pitched two months earlier.  
According to contemporary sources, work began the following day.  Far more than 
Geyong’s advance force— which hardly merits mention in Party histories— the arrival of 
the County Establishment Preparatory Work Group (jianxiang choubei gongzuozu, 
hereafter County Work Group) marks a watershed moment in the history of the region.  It 
was from this point that the southern grasslands were first considered to be 
administratively operating separately from Tongren County. It also almost certainly 
represents the first time in its history that the Zeku region had been governed as a whole 
and distinct political entity.  September 12, therefore, is considered the beginning of the 
“preparatory stage” for establishing what was not yet officially known as the Zeku 
Tibetan Autonomous County.2 
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The main political events of the three-month preparatory period revolved around a 
series of four meetings held between Guo’s work group and the region’s indigenous 
leadership.  According to the County Committee’s “Preliminary Work Report on the 
Building of Zeku County,” “At each meeting, unity was reinforced and the government 
was built according to the needs of the pastoral masses (muzhong).”3  In fact, much of the 
legwork occurred in the periods between the meetings when “political work” or 
“preparatory work” was conducted within the tribes.  Through the intercession of tribal 
leaders, work teams were sent to investigate the region’s social, economic and political 
conditions and explain the Party’s programs and policies to its future beneficiaries.  Both 
the preparatory work and the meetings themselves, therefore, were deeply informed by 
the United Front principles and mass line methodologies of “consultation” and 
“persuasion.”   
Yet despite proclaiming overall progress, by mid-autumn Guo Min would report 
that they had also encountered several setbacks.  Although on the surface not the most 
substantive of the several impasses the work group faced, a disagreement that emerged in 
late October between tribal leaders and the Party is particularly instructive.  It revolved 
around a fundamental yet seemingly trivial question: what to name the new county. At 
the 2nd County Preparatory Meeting, Du Hua’an, the leading United Front representative 
in the region and soon to be the Party Secretary of Huangnan Prefecture, suggested that it 
be called Zeku County.4  However, tribal representatives strenuously objected.  
According to the report, several reasoned that because the region had formerly been 
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under Tongren County’s administrative jurisdiction, the county’s new appellation should 
include the character “Tong.”  Yet the Party secretary held firm, explaining, “‘Ze’ is the 
‘Ze’ from ‘Mao Zedong.’ ‘Ku’ is the ‘Ku’ from ‘treasure house’ [baoku]. So the name 
‘Zeku’ is a great one.”5  Allegedly, the gathered headmen were swayed by Du’s argument 
and the issue of the county name was successfully resolved. 
 This otherwise inconsequential anecdote is striking for at least two reasons.  
Firstly, that there was apparently no obvious choice by which the new county should be 
known helps illustrate the degree to which Zeku was a construct of the new state.  
According to the county gazetteer, Zeku is a translation and transliteration of the Tibetan 
place name Tsékhok, which the gazetteer imprecisely translates as “the basin between the 
mountains” (Ch. Shanjian pendi).6  By extension, this suggests that a cohesive region 
called Tsékhok existed prior to the arrival of the Chinese Communist Party.  In fact, there 
is no evidence that before 1953 there existed a place Tibetans referred to as Tsékhok that 
encompassed all or nearly all of what would become Zeku County.  In fact, in his Great 
History of Amdo (mdo smad lo rgyu chen mo), Hortsang Jigme explicitly states that the 
Tibetan toponym Tsékhok was an invention of the Chinese Communist authorities 
without specific historical precedent.  Instead, he refers to a region known previously as 
Tsézhung that was larger but included present-day Zeku County.7  Tsézhung appears at 
                                                
5 ZCPC 2, 15. The documents only refer to the Chinese toponym “Zeku.”  It is not clear whether the tribal 
leaders were objecting to just the Chinese name or the proposed Tibetan county name as well. 
 
6 Zeku Xianzhi, 1. 
7 Hor-gtsang Jigs-med, Mdo-Smad Lo Rgyus Chen Mo ([Dharamsala]: Bod kyi dpe mdzod khan, 2009).  
According to the author, Tibetan scholars did suggest that the region be called Tsézhung. However, for 
unknown reasons Chinese authorities refused. Neither the toponyms Tsékhok nor Zeku are found in 
Drakgonpa’s influential nineteenth-century Amdo history, The Development of Religion in Amdo (mdo 
smad chos byung), nor in its Chinese-language translation, The History of Politics and Religion in Amdo 




least originally to have referred to the lands belonging to the Mongol royal house that 
dominated the region into the nineteenth century, after which power gradually shifted 
back to Rongwo Monastery and the Repgong region.8   
More important than the name itself, however, is the suggested lack of regional 
cohesion.  While PRC sources refer to the “Ten Tribes of Zeku,” there is little to indicate 
that there was a shared affinity that united them or set them apart from other peoples 
across the newly imagined county borders.  Although during the Republican Period the 
region had been administratively organized as a district of Tongren County, traditional 
elites continued to function as representatives of their tribal communities more than as 
state administrators.  The subimperial relationships between Xining and indigenous 
leaders did little to replace tribal loyalties or encourage broader regional identities.  In 
fact, as described below, the Chinese Communist Party considered the tribal structure of 
pastoral society to be the antithesis of a unified national consciousness and a major 
impediment to their nation-building efforts.  
 Secondly, the manner by which Du Hua’an settled the issue of the county name is 
instructive for what it reveals about the process of state and nation building.  Given 
several other of Du’s pronouncements— and those of his superiors— regarding the 
importance of consultation and the centrality of promoting national unity, it seems Du 
would have been better served to concede to the objections of the tribal leaders rather 
than spend political capital over what seems to have been an issue of little practical 
consequence.  If Secretary Du wanted to convince tribal headmen that the Party truly 
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intended to make them “masters of their own homes,” as was loudly and repeatedly 
proclaimed, this would seem to have been a symbolically powerful opportunity to make 
good on that promise.  Yet, against what appears to have been considerable resistance Du 
insisted on naming the new administrative region Zeku County.  In retrospect, the reason 
was simple.  The decision had been made well before the process of consultation had 
begun.   
 
Becoming Masters of their own Homes (Under the Leadership of the Party): Zhou 
Renshan’s 1952 Speech on National Autonomy9 
In fact, more than a year before Du Hua’an’s appearance at the 2nd Preparatory 
Conference, the term “Zeku County” was already being used in official communications.  
For example, in a speech delivered in summer 1952 to a provincial pastoral work 
conference, United Front Work Department Director Zhou Renshan referred to Zeku 
County alongside other extant county administrations.  Although the speech was clearly 
intended for internal consumption only, the mention of Zeku County without any 
additional explanation suggests that the decision to establish the new county was 
relatively well known, at least among segments of the Party’s cadre force.10  
As the head of the Provincial United Front Work Department from 1949-1954, 
after which he served as vice-secretary of the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee until 
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his 1956 transfer to Central Tibet, Zhou Renshan was not only one of a handful of senior 
provincial-level Party officials but was also perhaps Qinghai’s leading post-Liberation 
voice on nationality affairs.11  His 1952 speech, entitled “Continue the Movement to 
Launch National Autonomous Regions,” was pedagogic in nature, bluntly summarizing 
past work experiences and explaining to the gathered cadres the Party’s policies, 
rationales, and methodologies for implementing minority work in pastoral areas.  In 
particular, Zhou argued that the establishment of nationality autonomous regions was the 
key interfacial mechanism by which non-Han people would be both administratively and 
psychologically integrated into the new nation-state. 
In both internal documents and open sources, the argument for breaking the 
southern pastoral districts from Tongren proper is made primarily in economic terms.  
For example, a November 1953 Zeku County work report notes that work teams had 
previously been sent to the region out of “ great concern” for the area’s extreme 
backwardness and poverty, a condition blamed on the “the cruel rule” of Ma Bufang.  
However, because the region was “purely pastoral [and] the people lived entirely in 
tents,” Du Hua’an’s pastoral work teams had encountered significant but unspecified 
difficulties fulfilling their assignment.  Party leaders reasoned that by severing the 
pastoral districts from Tongren’s agricultural heartland, where people lived in “earthen 
houses” (tufang), “it will be easy for government leaders to create plans to promote 
                                                
11 Zhou was also vice-secretary (listed second and third respectively in the Party hierarchy) at the 1st and 
2nd Qinghai Provincial Party Congresses (1954,1956). After his transfer, Zhou would serve in the upper 
echelons of what would become the Tibetan Autonomous Region until the Cultural Revolution when, for 
still unclear reasons, he became the champion of the “rebel” faction of the feuding mass organizations.  
Ultimately Beijing would identify Zhou as one of the TAR’s two main culprits of the Cultural Revolution 
and punished accordingly.  After his 1978 rehabilitation, Zhou reemerged in Xinjiang where his long 
experience working in difficult minority areas was likely valued.  In 1983, Zhou would assume his highest 
if largely symbolic position, as aStanding Committee member of the National People’s Congress, before 




production and improve people’s livelihoods.”12  Therefore, according to the report, local 
headmen in consultation with the Tongren County government made the decision to 
found the new county.   
There is little question that economic factors were of central importance.  Yet the 
pastoral economy was not something that existed in isolation.  The Party correctly 
understood that pastoralism was part of a particular political economy that in many ways 
was inimical to their modernist state and nation-building project.  In fact, provincial Party 
planners divided Qinghai into three strategic zones: those in which the primary economic 
activity was agriculture, those that had a mixed economy, and those that were purely 
pastoral.  It was this latter category in which Party agents were instructed to proceed most 
cautiously and deliberately.  As noted earlier, in 1950 Xining issued instructions that the 
old qianhu and baihu retain their traditional positions, albeit now under the leadership of 
the Party.13  Even more consequently, in a 1951 speech to the Provincial Party Committee 
Zhou Renshan explicitly declared that pastoral districts would be exempt not only from 
land reform but even more moderate reforms such as rent reduction.14  In particular, he 
announced that Party would follow a policy of “no division of property, no class struggle 
and no class delineation.”  “The Three No’s,” as the policy would become known, was 
                                                
12 ZCPC 2, 1. Secondary sources also declare that Zeku County was created in order to “promote the 
development of the pastoral economy.”  See Zeku Xianzhi, 332. 
 
13 Tongren Xianzhi, 551. 
 
14 "Zhou Renshan Tongzhi Di'erzi Dangdaihui Shang Guangyu Minzu Yu Tongzhan Gongzuo De Fayan 
Tigang: August 24, 1951," in MZZJGZHJ, ed. [Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Tongzhanbu] ([Xining]: 
n.p., [1959]), 629-30.  Pastoral regions were also exempted from nation-wide political campaigns such as 
the Five-Anti and 3-Anti Campaigns.  However, they were to take part in the Resist America Support 
Korea Campaign, which in pastoral and mixed economy districts was limited to patriotic and anti-
imperialist education. Zhang, Lei, and Tian, 121.  On the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign in Zeku, see 





declared to be the guiding principle upon which all work in pastoral regions would be 
implemented.15   
By guaranteeing that their positions would remain inviolable and their wealth 
untouched, the “Three No’s” were explicitly designed to attract the cooperation and 
support of the indigenous pastoral elite.  Particularly in pastoral regions, rather than 
radical socialist transformation, the Party appropriated certain subimperial practices in its 
early state and nation-building efforts.  In fact, Zhou’s 1952 speech contained only the 
barest mention of the promise of socialist transformation.  Instead, it was almost entirely 
concerned with issues of state and nation building.  While this included developing the 
pastoral economy, economic concerns were wrapped up in a host of political, security 
and philosophical considerations crucial to the strengthening of Party rule in Qinghai.  A 
1952 Qinghai Party Committee report made this clear, stating, “Developing the economy, 
[and] doing good work building the economy is the material foundation of the 
consolidation of strong mass relations, the consolidation of national autonomous regions, 
                                                
15 The Three No’s and its corollary the Two Benefits first became an official policy at a 1948 meeting of 
CCP leaders of Inner Mongolia.  Bulag argues that it was an “explicit statement that the [land reform] law 
was not applicable among pastoral Mongols.” In Collaborative Nationalism, 120.  However, the rational 
was fundamentally different in Inner Mongolia than in Qinghai.  According to Bulag, the Mongolian 
Communist Ulanhu (Ch. Wulanfu) argued that pastoral class relations were fundamentally different than 
agricultural ones, i.e. they were not marked by exploitation but a symbiotic relationship.  However, in 
Qinghai it was not suggested that pastoral class relations were unique nor that class exploitation did not 
exist.  Instead, it was pastoral society’s historical backwardness and victimization that made the Three No’s 
a matter a practical necessity.  Ideologically, the Three No’s were understood as a means to overcome the 
primary contradiction in pastoral society: the legacy of national exploitation.  According to the provincial 
gazetteer, the Three No’s and Two Benefits policy was not officially implemented in Qinghai until the 1st 
Qinghai Representative Congress finally met in 1954.  However, it is clear that the Three No’s had been in 
effect since at least 1951.  For example, the provincial gazetteer notes that in September of that year, in 
response to concerns from “pastoral tribal headmen,” it was publicly announced that there would be no 
division of animals or grassland.  A month earlier at the 2nd Party Congress, Zhou Renshan was already 
specifically referring to the Three No’s. See Zhang, Lei, and Tian, 66. On Ulanhu see Bulag, Mongols at 




[and] the consolidation of Party leadership.”16  Ultimately economic development was 
therefore vital not only for its obvious benefits to individual livelihoods and the regional 
and national economies but also for the predicted political benefits that would come in 
return.   
With socialist reforms delayed indefinitely, in pastoral regions the implementation 
of regional nationality autonomy was instead declared to be the Party’s main task.17  
Since the early 1930s, the core of the CCP’s minority policy had evolved from one 
guaranteeing self-determination for non-Han peoples to the far less flexible formula of 
regional autonomy within a multi-national Chinese state.  Strongly influenced by Soviet-
trained Chinese cadres and Comintern agents, the CCP’s 1931 “outline constitution” had 
offered non-Chinese peoples “unconditional and absolute” support for the right of self-
determination, including secession.18  By the mid-1930s, however, and the forced-
“borderization” and “northernization” of the CCP, Xiaoyuan Liu argues that the Party’s 
fundamental policy had shifted from one of benign indifference to one of “winning over” 
non-Chinese inhabitants through mass-line strategies.  However, the Anti-Japanese War 
                                                
16 "Zhonggong Qinghai Sheng Weiyuanhui Guanyu Muyequ Gongzuo Huiyi Taolun Yu Jiejue De Wenti 
Shang Zhongyang He Xibeiju De Baogao: August 22, 1952," in MZZJGZWJFJ, ed. [Zhonggong Qinghai 
Shengwei Tongzhanbu] ([Xining]: n.p., 1959), 618. 
 
17 "Zhou Renshan Tongzhi,” 630-631. Neither the documents found in MZZJGZWJHJ nor in the Zeku 
archives go into much detail about how autonomous regions should operate beyond noting that local 
conditions should be taken into account and that members of the host nationality should become “masters 
of their own homes.”  In this chapter nationality autonomy should similarly be thought of as a somewhat 
nebulous concept rather than in strict administrative and regulatory terms. 
 
18 Xiaoyuan Liu, 70-72.  According to Liu, three options were originally made available to non-Han 
peoples: 1) secession, 2) federation, 3) autonomy “within the Chinese Soviet Republic.” Leibold finds the 
Party’s position to be more ambiguous, arguing that the peculiarities of written Chinese allowed “the 
Chinese Communists to explicitly include Lenin’s principle of national self-determination […] while also 
wording the promise of secession in such a way as to limit its application to the Chinese minority 





spurred an internal reorientation that opposed “ethnonationalism” and instead promoted 
an inclusive supra-ethnic nationalism.  Conceptually speaking, the non-Chinese peoples 
of the old Qing Empire became ethnic minorities in a Han-dominated nation-state or, as 
Liu puts it, a “China of Nations.’”19   
However, it was not until the founding of the People’s Republic of China that the 
promises of self-determination and succession were explicitly rescinded and replaced by 
regional national autonomy.  Liu remarks,  
The official literature in the PRC has defined this development as the ‘historic 
self-determination by the Chinese nation.’ […].  In other words, the CCP fully 
exercised its newly achieved leading role in China’s nation building and made a 
‘determination’ for all of the nationalities of the land.20 
 
  As such, contrasting Chinese nationality policy with that of the Soviets, who maintained 
the trappings if not the actual possibility of national self-determination, Liu argues that 
the CCP entertained neither the “fact” nor “fiction” of self-determination.  Instead, the 
Party’s policies toward minority regions simply amounted to a “nationalizing mission.”21 
Like the prospects for genuine self-determination, it can be argued that neither the 
“fact” nor the “fiction” of national autonomy should be taken seriously either.  Certainly, 
history has shown that little genuine autonomy has been made available to non-Han 
peoples within their autonomous regions.  Moreover, several scholars have noted that the 
delineation of nationality autonomous areas served not only to bound territory but also to 
fix identities— in particular the dichotomy between the majority Han and national 
                                                
19 Xiaoyuan Liu 159. See also Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 101. 
 
20 Ibid.,165.  See also Warren Smith, 56. 
 
21 Ibid.  Here Liu challenges Steven Harrell’s assertion that the CCP’s efforts amounted to a “Communist 




minorities— and to de-legitimize separatist aspirations.22  Yet, within the Party’s own 
understanding of its historic mission, it does not simply follow that calls for the 
establishment of nationality autonomous regions were empty rhetoric.  As far back as 
May 1951, Director Zhou had begun another speech to another pastoral work conference 
by asking, “Why do we want to energetically establish national autonomous regions?”  
To his own question Zhou authoritatively replied, “[Because] nationality autonomous 
regions and national democratic coalition governments are the political form that best 
embodies national equality and are [therefore] the best method to consolidate national 
unity.”23  A year later, he proclaimed that experience had shown,  
Without the People’s democratic weapon of nationality political power, the 
people who inhabit nationality regions will not have great faith in the proletariat 
[…].  Only after the benefits of nationality equality provided by the Party of the 
working class are realized will they trust in the working class from the bottom of 
their hearts.24 
 
According to Zhou, nationality autonomy was a “powerful weapon,” for enlisting the 
active participation of minority peoples in the Party’s nation-building project. 
Yet Zhou made no secret of the difficulties the Party was experiencing directly 
organizing the “pastoral masses.”25  Recognizing that both national and class 
consciousness— two elements which might otherwise be mobilized to draw the masses 
                                                
22 Gladney refers to “minoritization.”  Cited in Crossley, “Nationality and Difference,” 151.  Back in the 
1960s, George Moseley argued, “‘Regional autonomy’ is the opposite of what its name implies: ‘regional 
detention’ would be more descriptive.” George Mosely, introduction to The Party and the national 
question in China Translated by George Moseley. Edited by George Moseley. (Cambridge, M.A.: M.I.T 
Press, 1966), 17. 
 
23 "Guanyu Jiji Tuixing Minzu Quyu Zizhi De Yijian: Zhou Renshan Tongzhi Yu Yijiuwuyi Nian Wu Yue 
Shiwu Ri Zai Muyequ Gongzuo Huiyi Shang De Fayan Tigang," in Minzu Zongjiao Gongzuo Wenjian 
Huiji, ed. [Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Tongzhanbu] n.p., [1959]), 623. 
 
24 Zhou Renshan, 637.  It would have been understood that the Party was the representative of the working 
class.   





into a broad alliance with the CCP— were almost non-existent in Amdo’s grasslands, it 
was instead necessary to rely on the indigenous elite.  Another senior provincial Party 
official, Chen Sigong, ordered cadres to, “Launch work through upper strata 
representatives, in complete consultation, from top to bottom,” adding, “[these] are the 
correct measures for the work of establishing national autonomous regions.”26  Similarly, 
in Zhou’s 1952 speech, he reminded his audience, “the implementation of nationality 
autonomous regions begins with uniting with the tribal leaders, [and] other work is also 
done by persuading the tribal leaders.”27  Chen Sigong elaborated further, 
Previously because of the control of the upper strata, the pastoral masses had 
apprehensions [toward the CCP], [and] we had a lot of difficulty directly 
connecting with the pastoral masses.  Since the establishment of national 
autonomous region governments, this situation has begun to change.  On the one 
hand, through taking part in national autonomous region rule, upper strata 
personages and mid-level pastoral representatives go and spread the Party’s 
policies, [and] implement [nationality] work.  On the other hand, through national 
autonomous area preparatory committees [we] can organize work teams, dispatch 
them to localities, penetrate the broad pastoral masses, [and] meet the pastoral 
masses directly.28 
 
The Party was therefore engaged in a long-term battle for the hearts and minds of 
pastoral Tibetans.  Yet it was also concerned with immediate security conditions.  A 
report issued by the Party’s Northwest Bureau contended that the combination of the 
antipathy minority peoples historically had for the Han Chinese and deficiencies in the 
Party’s own nationality work “is often used by bandits, spies and other 
                                                
26 Chen Sigong, "Qinghai Sheng Tuixing Minzu Quyu Zizhi De Jingyan Ji Jinhou Yijian," in 
MZZJGZWJHJ, ed. [Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Tongzhanbu] (n.p., [1959]), 659. Chen would remain a 
senior member of the Qinghai leadership into the 1960s, serving as a standing committee member of the 
Provincial Party Committee for much of the time and leading several Party departments including the 
powerful Organization Department, the Disciplinary Inspection Committee, the Provincial Party School, 
and even the Women’s Work Committee. ZGGCDQHSZZSZL, 17-21; QHSZRWZ, 299. 
 
27 Zhou Renshan, 649. 
 




counterrevolutionaries for the purpose of sowing discord and destroying national 
unity.”29  By the same token, the proper implementation of minority policy could drain 
the swamps in which anti-Party elements survived.  For example, in his 1952 speech 
Zhou claimed that by propagating United Front principles such as the guarantee of 
religious freedom and respect for local customs and practices, the Party had generally 
been able to effectively counter rumors about its nationality and religious policies.  He 
continued, 
Therefore in this year’s bandit extermination [campaigns], not only have [we] not 
met tribal opposition, but [tribal leaders] have aided many facets of [our] soldiers’ 
bandit extermination activities. […] this is the result of the proper implementation 
of our policies.30   
The implication was clear.  The restoration of social order and the development of 
national unity were dependent on the successful implementation of the Party’s minority 
policies, the core of which was the establishment and exercise of national autonomy.31   
Yet, despite Zhou’s somewhat rosy assessment, in the summer of 1952 Amdo was 
far from pacified.  While Wangchen Döndrup’s Nangra Rebellion was in its last throes, 
with the aid of Tibetan and Mongol tribal elements, Ma Liang and Ma Yuanxiang were in 
the process of carving out counterrevolutionary bases in the Gansu-Qinghai-Sichuan 
border regions.  With this in mind, Zhou directly correlated progress in establishing 
national autonomous governments with declining indigenous support for the Party’s 
enemies.  First, he noted, were areas such as Tongren in which cadres had been 
                                                
29 "Xibei Diqu Minzu Zhengce Shixing Qingkuang Jiancha Zongjie Baogao," in MZZJGZWJHJ, ed. 
[Zhonggong Qinghai Shengwei Tongzhanbu] (n.p., [1959]), 481.  See also Zhou Renshan, 631. 
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dispatched early and the organs of national autonomy had already been established.  Next 
were places to which cadres had been sent later and were thus still in the process of 
establishing autonomous governments.  Lastly were regions to which cadres had only just 
recently been deployed and preparations for establishing national autonomy had yet to 
begin.  In these areas, according to Zhou, 
[…] the relationship between some of the important headmen and 
counterrevolutionaries has not yet been completely severed, [and] the line 
between enemies and friends has not yet been completely demarcated, therefore 
the center of work in these areas is still to vigorously strive to unify the headmen, 
distinguish a clear line between enemies and friends, [and] consider how to 
prepare to establish a [national autonomy] administration.32 
Strikingly, alone in this third category were the contiguous territories of the South 
Qinghai Plateau— identified as Golok, Henan and Zeku— that served as the base of Ma 
Yuanxiang’s insurrection.  In fact, a full year before its establishment, Zhou singled out 
Zeku as the very last “county” to which cadres had been dispatched.33 
 
Thus, within broader United Front work, regional autonomy was considered to be 
the specific mechanism for winning the support and commitment of national minorities. 
It was assumed to have the power to overcome the historical “legacy” of Han 
chauvinism, according to the Party the root cause of disunity and inter-national 
alienation.  Cadres were instructed to contrast the Party’s policies of national equality and 
national autonomy with those of Ma Bufang and Chiang Kaishek.  In his 1951 speech, 
                                                
32 Zhou Renshan, 644. 
 
33 Both the Golok and Henan Party Work Committees were dispatched in July 1952 along with the South 




Director Zhou asserted that the democratic institution of national autonomy was 
“diametrically opposite from [past] reactionary rule.”34  A year later, he would add,  
Without this weapon, [we] cannot comprehensively eliminate nationality 
estrangement (minzu ge’he), [and] unite each nationality.  Because [establishing] 
nationality autonomous regions is the best path toward all-around unity, whatever 
historical antagonisms minority nationality people have toward the Han 
nationality, after the correct implementation of nationality autonomous regions, 
[they] can be properly dealt with [and] eliminated.35 
Only through a  “sincere” commitment to aiding national minorities in establishing 
national autonomy, where they would be “masters of their own homes,” could the Party 
gain the “trust” of non-Chinese peoples.  
Of course, in order to achieve this unity “parochial attitudes” (xia’ai guandian) 
commonly displayed by members of minority nationalities— also known as “local 
nationalism”— also had to be eliminated.  However, Han chauvinism was said to be a far 
greater concern.  Zhou explained,  
Because local nationalism is the product of past national exploitation, after 
nationality autonomy is implemented, [and national minorities] become masters 
of their own homes in managing the internal affairs of their nationality, the 
political conditions for this attitude will be completely eliminated.36 
The onus to alleviate inter-nationality disunity was therefore put on the Party and its 
representatives.  This was, however, easier said than done.  At every level, from Zeku 
County, to Huangnan Prefecture, to Qinghai Province, to the Party’s Northwest Bureau 
and Beijing, Party leaders were forced to issue frequent orders alternately reprimanding 
and pleading with local cadres who often failed to live up to the Party’s own 
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pronouncements.37   Instead, cadres were routinely accused of lacking trust, displaying 
arrogance and showing disrespect toward the non-Chinese people among and with whom 
they now worked.  A stinging joint report by the Northwest Bureau’s United Front Work 
Department and Nationality Affairs Committee expressed these concerns in the strongest 
possible language, stating, 
[…] this reflects “the expression of the reactionary thought and Guomindang 
thought of the landlord and capitalist class.” It impedes the proper implementation 
of Party policy, damages the intimate unity of the nationalities, causes the various 
nationalities to have a huge loss of faith in the Party, [and] is a barrier to our 
implementation of national equality and the main focus of the present work.38  
For example, the report noted that Han cadres often criticized the “backwardness” of 
Tibetan women's dress, their elaborate headpieces considered to be particularly wasteful.  
The same allegation was leveled at Tibetan Buddhist practices, such as lighting oil lamps 
and burning cypress branches.  These attitudes, the report contended, “make the masses 
unsatisfied,” and “do not benefit unity.”39 
However, it was not only backwards cultural practices that many Han cadres 
found distasteful.  In Qinghai, there existed considerable ambivalence and even hostility 
toward policies that appeared to abandon all pretenses of class struggle in favor of 
conciliation with the feudal elite of minority nationalities.40  The reversion to imperial-
                                                
37 Throughout much of the 1950s, no less powerful figures than Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi 
repeatedly raised the specter of Han chauvinism.  In 1953, Mao himself proclaimed, “[. . .] Han chauvinism 
exists almost everywhere.  It will be very dangerous if we fail now to give timely education and resolutely 
overcome Han chauvinism in the Party and among the people.” Cited in Leung 53-54.  See the special issue 
of Chinese Law and Government, 14.4 (1982), for numerous examples of such warnings from both the 
1950s and again during the years immediately following the fall of the “Gang of Four.” 
 
38 “Xibei Diqu,” 485. 
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style strategies often creates a backlash among the champions of the modernizing nation-
state.  As noted by Bulag, because it “violates the very sensibility of nationalist ideology, 
[…] subimperialism is often mired in tension with nationalism.”41  In the case of the 
agents of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party’s reversion to subimperial practice 
seemed to betray the homogenizing and transformative tenants of both nationalism and 
socialism.  
The standard response of Party leaders to such criticisms was to emphasize that 
these attitudes were themselves a remnant of Han chauvinism, an expression of poor 
political consciousness, and betrayed a lack of understanding of the specific conditions of 
minority regions.  Importantly, it was stressed that rather than abdicating the promises of 
the revolution, as it seemed to some, the United Front was itself a path to both national 
and socialist transformation.  Thus, in his 1951 speech, Zhou Renshan explicitly denied 
that the exercise of national autonomy amounted to the protection of feudal structures and 
class enemies.  Instead, he asserted that national autonomy was a method by which 
socialist democracy, already enjoyed by the Han majority, would be extended to non-Han 
peoples.  Zhou argued, 
What is called the national democratic alliance and nationality autonomous region 
political power, is the form of local political power [applicable] to the special 
characteristics of [minority] nationalities, and in comparison with the nation-wide 
democratic political power, it is a political power that is the same in essence [but] 
different in form.42 
                                                
41 Bulag, Collaborative Nationalism, 67. 
42 “Zhou Renshan Tongzhi,” 634.  Zhou would explain that from a class viewpoint (essence), national 
autonomous regions still take the alliance of the proletariat classes (workers, peasants and in this case 
herdsmen) as the foundation in a united front with all of the democratic classes.  However, because of 





He continued by explaining that the “question of the relationship of the old system to 
nationality autonomous regions” was one of “temporarily preserving” and “gradually 
changing.”  As traditional elites were co-opted into the new system, now as leading 
members of local government committees, the “national form” would be maintained 
while its “essence” would begin to change.  In other words, “the single person rule of the 
baihu system would move toward the rule of the many.” 43  
In this way the Party’s subimperial practice of allying with traditional elites was 
re-imagined as a transformative process of nation building.  In his 1951 speech Zhou had 
proclaimed, “[if we] do not pay attention to the special nationality characteristics [of 
Qinghai], [we] cannot achieve success, […].”  Yet he qualified this statement by noting, 
“of course the purpose of attending to special characteristics is to make it easier to 
produce a revolutionary force [and] gradually implement all types of socialist reforms.”44  
The following year at the 1952 pastoral work conference, Zhou hammered the point 
home, asking an apparently skeptical audience, “‘Why no division [of property,] no 
[class] struggle, no [class] delineation, [why] preserve feudalism […]?”45  Zhou’s answer, 
simply put, was that nationality autonomy was not just a means to win over and energize 
local people, but was itself a “social reform that fit the special characteristics [that exist] 
among the [minority] nationalities.”46 
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Nowhere was the transformative potential of national autonomy more apparent 
than in its presumed ability to undermine tribal loyalties and replace them with the logic 
of the nation-state.  In fact, behind closed doors it was openly acknowledged that the 
tribal structure of Amdo’s pastoral society was an obstacle to both economic 
development and national unity.  For example, in his 1952 speech Zhou declared, 
“Because by their nature tribes are backwards [luohou], they are in opposition to 
democratic unity.  Among the peoples of the pastoral regions the influence of the tribes is 
very deep.”  Zhou promised, however, “the process of [establishing] substantive and 
strong national autonomous regions is the process of moving from tribal division to 
democratic unity.”47 
Of particular concern to the Party was the high incidence of inter-community 
conflict— usually referred to as grassland disputes— that came to almost metonymically 
represent the seeming inherent disunity that plagued pastoral society.  Grassland disputes 
were declared to be a bi-product of the “contradictions in the old system’s grassland 
management and pastoral production.”48  As such, replacing the competition for 
resources and national exploitation that marked the old society with democratic unity and 
rational grassland management found under national autonomy would eliminate these 
injurious conditions. At the pastoral work conference, Zhou advised,  
In resolving [grassland] disputes, have preliminary discussions and consultations, 
always emphasize the methods of the autonomy of nationality regions, [and] in 
this way the people in charge will easily accept [the tasks], and the problems will 
also be satisfactorily resolved.49  
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A summary report from a September 1953 Pastoral Work Conference further emphasized 
the role of national autonomy, proclaiming, 
Experience shows: the best method for resolving these particular contradictions 
[grassland disputes] is by completely fulfilling the promise of nationality 
autonomous regions, earnestly helping each nationality, each tribe, within the 
county-level government, to gradually unite under the leadership of the 
autonomous area’s People’s Government, to carry out and abide by the laws of 
the autonomous area People’s Government’s policies, and propel pastoral society 
on the road to democratic unity.50 
Elsewhere, Chen Sigong would claim that in areas in which national autonomous regions 
had been established, the incidence of inter-tribal disputes had diminished and cases of 
“retaliatory banditry and armed feuds had basically stopped.”51   
National autonomy therefore had the power to not only extinguish inter-ethnic 
animosity, but also end the intra-ethnic conflicts that threatened unity and disrupted 
social order.  As the benefits of national autonomy became clear, Zhou predicted, “tribal 
attitudes will gradually be reduced and move toward disappearing on their own accord.”52   
However, none of this would happen overnight.  Party leaders had to convince their own 
rank-and-file that because the structure of pastoral society was the product of historical 
economic, social and political conditions, the elimination of the old system could not be 
realized through dramatic Party-imposed mass campaigns.  Change necessarily could 
only come through a process of “organic transformation” (youji de tuibian) in which “the 
old gradually weakens [and] the new gradually takes root.”  Therefore, Zhou instructed 
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cadres to let the old system die out on its own, remarking, “do not rescue the dead, but do 
not cast off the living” (side bujiu, huode budiu).53  Only when the masses ceased to 
recognize the authority of the qianhu, baihu, and other pastoral nobility (wanggongzhe), 
Zhou contended, could they effectively be eliminated as an economic and political class.  
In this manner, the 1952 Party Committee report declared, “backwards nationalities” 
would gradually be transformed into “vanguard nationalities” marching down a shared 
path to socialism. 
Emphasizing the pragmatism that formed the basis of United Front work, Zhou 
made it clear that during this preliminary period, in all tasks— from production and trade, 
to bandit suppression and uncovering spies— “getting results is most important.”54  Yet 
the line between pragmatism and deception is a thin one.  Zhou reminded his cadres, “in 
work methods we only emphasize the intention of developing national autonomous 
regions, [and] do not raise the issue of the backwardness of the tribes and their future 
[disappearance].”55  Implied is that this was a covert effort, the consequences of which 
were to be withheld from all but the most dedicated activists.  In the same vein, Zhou 
informed his audience that despite the support and sanctuary religious elements had 
allegedly provided to counterrevolutionaries, security officials were not to conduct 
operations in monasteries.  Nor were political committees to be set up within their 
walls.56  Instead monasteries should liaise with parallel external governing committees 
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(i.e. district level, county level etc.), meaning the internal governance of monasteries was 
to continue as before.57  These considerable concessions were explicitly made in 
recognition of the religious sensitivities of the indigenous populations.  Zhou noted, albeit 
patronizingly, that guarantees of freedom of religion and the respect for local customs 
were what the average minority nationality person “cared most about,” and were 
therefore the prime methods for gaining their trust.58  Ultimately, he explained soberly, 
“This will benefit unity.”59   
Elsewhere Zhou insisted that among Qinghai’s nationalities, “religious belief is 
very deep, now [they] would rather sacrifice their lives than sacrifice religion.”60  This 
would have to change before the religious leadership could be openly challenged.  
Therefore, rather than doing direct political work within the monasteries, Zhou instructed 
cadres to concentrate on “making friends and collecting information.”  He continued, 
“only after the majority of religious personages within the monastery wholeheartedly 
trust us, can we alter this passive approach to religious work.”  While the CCP was sure 
that the monasteries remained hubs of counterrevolutionary activity, it wished to avoid a 
scenario in which the Party might “win the battle but lose the war” (yinxiao shida). 
Instead, counterrevolutionaries should be exposed through careful United Front work.  
Zhou explained, “toward those religious and tribal representatives who have relationships 
to counterrevolutionaries, [we] will continue to win [them] over through the principle of 
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unity education, [this will] cause them to voluntarily separate themselves from 
counterrevolution, and lean toward us, [and we] do not adopt the method of attack.”61  
Thus the Party’s approach to religious institutions and activities was both pragmatic and, 
in a sense, hostile.  Yet, in its internal logic this did not make it cynical or incompatible 
with its focus on voluntarism and reliance on consultation and persuasion.  In fact, Zhou 
would remind cadres, “Methods are not goals, [yet] the relationship between the two is 
extremely close, [if] the methods are not good, then [we] certainly will not be able to 
reach the goal which is how to serve the people.”62    
This collision between volunteerism and compulsion— expressed in the oft-used 
slogan “masters of their own homes, under the leadership of the Party”— in a sense 
embodies the United Front approach of consultation and persuasion.  Arguably, the 
outwardly incompatible principle of nationality autonomy under CCP leadership was 
internally compatible when the Party’s self-appointed position as the vanguard of the 
proletariat and the vanguard of the multinational nation is kept in mind.  Of course there 
was little true autonomy possible in this arrangement, particularly given the intersection 
of nationalism and socialism that have combined to assume most of China’s minority 
peoples to be both backwards and in need of being actively transformed by the more 
politically, culturally and economically advanced Han nationality.  Bulag argues,  
Although all proletarianized nationalities were proclaimed to be equal politically, 
minority cultural customs, religious practice, and modes of production were 
deemed not just different and hence incompatible with Chinese versions of a 
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socialist society, but inferior, hence requiring active Chinese ‘elderly brotherly’ 
help.63 
 Zhou Renshan illustrates this dynamic well, declaring,  
Our policy is to attend to [nationality] special characteristics, respect special 
characteristics, [and] through [respect for] special characteristics do a good job of 
eliminating antagonisms, increase mutual trust, raise consciousness [and] develop 
the cause of each nationality, [however, it is] absolutely not to cultivate special 
characteristics and develop special characteristics (such as backwards customs 
and religious belief, and so on) that would result in unconsciously traveling down 
the road to protecting backwardness and strengthening antagonisms.64 
Thus, despite chastising cadres for expressions of Han chauvinism, little inherent value 
was to be found in the “special characteristics” of minority nationalities.  Instead, 
showing respect for local customs and practices was itself a pragmatic means of nation 
building.  Chauvinism (Han or otherwise) was therefore embedded deeply within the 
CCP’s nationalization and socialization projects. 
However, it is also clear that within the limited parameters that mass line politics 
allowed, Party leaders did intend national autonomy to be an instrument of democracy 
and national equality that should be genuinely implemented and realized.  Zhou remarks, 
for example, that one of the major defects in the exercise of minority policy had been a 
tendency for the “guests to usurp the role of the host” (xuanbin duozhu) and for Han 
cadres to “not respect the authority of Tibetan office holders.”65   In fact, clearly 
concerned that the Party’s position toward the indigenous elite had been too ambivalent 
or not properly internalized, in a follow-up to the 1952 Pastoral Work Conference, a 
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Provincial Party Committee report declared that too often cooperative upper strata 
elements had not been properly consulted nor given appropriate positions and real 
authority.  The report continues, “There is a general confusion in understanding that the 
upper strata of the pastoral regions are targets for our long-term cooperation and not 
targets of attack, [they are not] ‘for temporary use ’ (zanshi liyong) and [this is not] ‘a 
changing of the guard’ (huaban sixiang).”66  A year later, the Northwest Bureau roundly 
criticized Chinese cadres for displaying a pattern of chauvinistic attitudes towards the 
indigenous leaders who now served as chairmen and vice-chairmen of national 
autonomous regions.  Its report declared that this had caused minority representatives “to 
feel that they have position but no authority;” instead of becoming masters of their own 
homes, the report contended, local people feel that they “built a home in which they have 
no say.”67  
So while genuine self-rule was clearly not possible within the Party’s United 
Front formula, neither was national autonomy conceived of as a ruse or a shell.  Instead, 
to paraphrase Zhou Renshan, if properly executed it had the power to build trust, 
overcome chauvinism, strengthen national unity, eliminate tribal divisions, develop 
productive capacities, isolate counterrevolutionaries, win over both the indigenous elite 
and pastoral masses, arouse national and patriotic consciousness, and lead to socialist 
transformation— all under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.  National 
autonomous areas were transformative institutions that would serve as the bridge between 
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empire and nation.  As a Qinghai Party Committee report succinctly summarizes, 
“through national autonomous regions [we will] head down the great path to national 
unity.”68 
It comes as little surprise, therefore, that in the spring of 1953 the Party began to 
make preparations to establish Party rule in what would become known as Zeku County. 
As would be expected, the decision was said to have been made in consultation and even 
at the behest of tribal leaders.  An internal report from late 1953 contends, “Since Zeku is 
a wholly pastoral county, different from Tongren County, which is semi-agricultural and 
semi-nomadic, after the tribal leaders consulted with the Tongren government they 
decided to establish a separate county.”69  What is interesting is not so much that the 
Party claimed it had procured the agreement of tribal leaders, but that this language is 
maintained in its internal communications, emphasizing once again the manner in which 
consultation and persuasion was internalized within the operating philosophy of the Party 
administration.  In fact, when in the spring of 1953 discussion officially began over the 
fate of Tongren’s southern grasslands, tribal authorities were certainly consulted.  
However, as demonstrated by Zhou Renshan’s 1952 speech, the decision to form a new 
autonomous county had been made long before.  And although the expected benefits to 
the pastoral economy were almost certainly real, increasing the productive capacities of 
the pastoral highlands and raising the living standards of its inhabitants was irreducibly 
intertwined with a host of other practical and philosophical concerns, all of which were 
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central to the Party’s efforts to gradually and voluntarily transform a pre-national 
imperial borderland into a integrated component of the new nation.  
 
 
Building Mao’s Treasure House: National Unity, National Representation and 
National Autonomy 
 
While we know that plans to establish Zeku County had been in the works since 
at least the summer of 1952, secondary sources note that the subject of the administrative 
future of Tongren’s southern pastoral districts was only officially broached at a March 
1953 joint meeting of the Tongren Tibetan Autonomous Region Government and 
Consultative Committees.  Convened during the height of anti-Ma Yuanxiang military 
operations, the “Joint Committee” (liangwei) meeting was attended by sixty-seven 
committee members and thirty-one non-voting observers from among the “nationality 
headmen” (minzu touren).70  Although no comprehensive list of participants is provided, 
it seems certain that several of the Zeku region’s secular and religious elites would have 
been expected to attend.  For example, having been recognized as one the most prominent 
figures in the greater Repgong region and the most powerful indigenous headman south 
of the Méshül Mountains, for the past year Wagya had served as one of four vice-
chairmen of Tongren’s government committee.71  Similarly, the Gartsé qianhu Lumbum 
had been selected a vice-chairman of the County Consultative Committee.  Several other 
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tribal leaders, including Lhagyel, Serökyap, and Lhakba were also members either of the 
two bodies.72 
 The 4th “Joint Committee” meeting had been convened primarily to deal with 
issues of pastoral production and administration.  Delegates discussed the implementation 
of the Provincial Committee’s “guiding principles” for pastoral regions, in Party 
parlance, making “pastoralism number one, side production number two, agriculture 
number three.”73  The meeting set the 1953 production and construction plan mandating 
increased output in the pastoral sector, including improvements in livestock breeds and 
grazing management, the launching of a campaign to control livestock disease, and 
efforts to raise pastoral incomes.  Also discussed was the establishment of regional 
autonomous governments, including the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Region and 
what was to become Zeku County.74   
When the “Joint Committee” again met at the end of July, the question of Zeku 
County was once more on the agenda.  However, by that time only the details were left 
open for discussion.  With the Ma Yuanxiang Rebellion having been recently 
extinguished, Geyong’s vanguard detachment had already marched over the mountains 
and into the Shadar grasslands.  Outstanding issues, such as where to set the county’s 
boundaries, where to place the county seat, and how to allocate the cadre force necessary 
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to will the new county into existence were all that remained for the committee to 
deliberate.75  
 However, it would not be until the September 11th arrival of Guo Min and the 
County Work Group that work on establishing the new county officially began.  The 
immediate goal was to hold a people’s representative congress that could vote the new 
autonomous county into being.76  Before then, however, propaganda would need to be 
disseminated and delegates carefully selected.  Yet, with minimal access to the masses 
and little region-wide cohesion, the process would have to be mediated by the pre-
Liberation indigenous elite.  The first step of the preparatory period, therefore, was to 
convene a “Headman Unity and Friendship Conference” (touren lianyi huiyi), modeled 
on the both the 1950 provincial and Tongren county unity conferences.  From September 
21-23, twenty-seven representatives of the tribes and monasteries met with the twelve-
man County Work Group, according to a later source, for “communal consultation on 
restoring social order, building the new administration, developing the economy, 
improving peoples’ livelihoods and handling all types of disputes between the people.”77   
Demonstrating the sensitivity with which the Party seems to have considered 
these initial meetings— although curiously not mentioned in secondary sources— 
Secretary Du Hua’an traveled to the Shadar grasslands to personally lead the 
proceedings.  As suggested by Du’s keynote address, “How to Raise Unity,” at first 
glance the conference appears to have been an attempt to forge an alliance between the 
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Party and tribal leaders.78  While in the Party’s assessment unity between the nationalities 
had been severely damaged by the alleged national oppression of the Chiang Kaishek and 
Ma Bufang regimes, this was only in part the disunity to which Secretary Du referred. 
Upon closer inspection it becomes clear that the meetings were more akin to an inter-
tribal summit brokered under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party.  Du later 
summarized, 
All the work we do is centered on unity and we pay close attention to it.  
Therefore, at the first Unity and Friendship Meeting for the tribal leaders we did a 
clear analysis of the root of past disunity.  They [the tribal leaders] all agreed that 
disunity in the past was due to the national oppression of the Chiang-Ma bandit 
gang and the internal conflicts that this created.79 
 
In fact, in his 1951 speech on “Nationality and United Front Work,” Zhou Renshan had 
emphasized that in pastoral regions the primary contradiction needing repair was not 
between the Han and the indigenous population, but between Tibetans and Mongols and 
“the internal relations within the tribes.”80  Thus, at least in the Amdo grasslands, the 
familiar phrase minzu tuanjie, or national unity, had dual connotations.  The first, more 
intuitive meaning and the one it retains to this day was unity between nationalities.  Yet 
contrary to initial expectation, in post-Liberation Zeku minzu tuanjie more often than not 
referred to unity within the Tibetan nationality.81   
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In fact, a County Work Committee report from the fall of 1953 notes deep 
divisions both between and within Zeku’s tribal groupings.  It was these internal tribal 
divisions and the conflicts they purportedly created that were considered to be the 
primary impediment to establishing a national autonomous government.  Blame is 
predictably allocated to Ma Bufang, the incidence of grassland disputes being 
“inseparable from the crimes of his bandit gang.”  It continues,   
The reactionary ruling class of the past created internal conflicts and damaged the 
relations between the people, […].  Particularly for the past twenty plus years, the 
Chiang-Ma bandit gang implemented a destructive rule over the broad pastoral 
masses to benefit their own interests.82 
 
 More tangibly, Yangdan (Ch.), an important sub-tribal leader of the Hor, would later 
allegedly argue, “In the past the bandit Ma Bufang gave us guns, bullets and horses to rob 
people.  And we got rewarded for sharing with him.  With this kind of instigation he 
[destroyed] our unity.”  Cited during a December speech delivered on the last day of the 
1st Zeku County Representative Congress, the speaker would continue,  
Let’s ponder why he would do that. It is obvious that he could protect and 
consolidate his power and rule by keeping the people disunited and in conflict.  
We must remember our hatred for our enemies and try to eliminate them.  To do 
that we must bring all the people in Zeku together to construct a new Zeku.83   
 
 
The Party was, therefore, well aware that it needed to not only build county 
boundaries and administrative organs, it also needed to create a county-level constituency 
from the disparate interests and loyalties of Zeku’s tribal population.  For example, 
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according to the Party’s investigations the Hor currently had ongoing disputes with the 
Gönshül, Gartsé, and Sonak Tribes, while the Gartsé was also involved in disputes with 
both the Sonak and Shisa.  Inter-county disputes included hostilities between the Méshül 
and tribes in Tongde County, the Wöngya and Guinan County, the Hor and rivals in both 
Guinan and Xiahe Counties (Labrang), the Shawonar with Xiahe and Guinan, and just 
about everyone with the Four Mongol Banners (simengqi) of Henan County.84   
Disputes within tribal groupings were even more common and as debilitating as 
inter-tribal feuds.  For example, the Méshül recognized dual secular and religious 
leadership.  Investigators noted, “Although the Méshül is one tribe, in reality it is not 
united.  This manifests itself in the relationship between [the monk official] Tsintar and 
Chieftain (Hongbu) Lama Bum.  Therefore some of the Méshül masses follow Tsintar 
and others Chieftain Lama Bum.”85  Elsewhere, the report notes tensions within the Hor 
ruling family, an admission not found in the secondary sources.  In particular, a triangular 
rivalry allegedly existed between Lhagyel and another Hor leader whose name is given as 
Caibudan (Ch.).  The report contends that Lhagyel had been moving to assert 
independence from his elder brother, sowing a measure of distrust between Wagya and 
himself.  Therefore, “Although in some affairs Wagya relies on Lhagyel, in others he 
does not have confidence in him.  However, although Caibudan is close to Wagya, 
despite appearances his relationship with Lhagyel is not good.”  Internal divisions within 
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the Wöngya, Gönshül, and Gartsé are also singled out, although none are elaborated upon 
beyond the names of the rival headmen.86  
The circular issued on the final day of the Unity and Friendship Conference, 
“Decision on Strengthening National Unity and Protecting Social Stability” (hereafter 
“The September Decision”), gives a clear indication of the Party’s priorities at this early 
date.  In fact, of its nine articles, only the first is overly dogmatic and national in scope.  
It states,  
Strengthening patriotism, spreading internationalist education and policy [and] 
raising class awareness, will cause [the people] to understand that the basic spirit 
of nationality policy is “national equality within the borders of the People’s 
Republic of China, the implementation of unity and mutual aid,” and “making the 
People’s Republic of China become a big family of fraternal cooperation between 
each of the nationalities.”87  
 
With this one exception, the other articles specifically address issues of immediate local 
concern, namely alleviating inter-community conflict and the restoration of social order.  
For example, under the heading “Grassland Management,” point two refers to “mutual 
respect” for the “historic boundaries” of each tribe’s grazing lands.  However, rather than 
a guarantee that the Party would not infringe upon traditional pastoral arrangements, as it 
could also be interpreted, the passage is clearly aimed at resolving internal conflict over 
grassland use, stating, “Each tribe should implement unity and mutual aid, [they] must 
not harm unity, hinder production, [or] wantonly take cattle and sheep, […].”88   
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More than anything, the “September Decision” sought to replace the cycle of 
retributive violence, which the Party identified as the fuel for grassland disputes, with a 
system of regular punishments and compensations.89  For example, along with the return 
or replacement of stolen animals, the directive stated that the theft of a single sheep 
would be punishable by one month of forced labor (laoyi).  The sentence was raised to 
two and four months for the theft of a cow and horse respectively, while “Harming unity 
resulting in the injuring or death of another” was punishable by three or five years 
imprisonment depending on the level of culpability.90  Those that instigated disputes, 
failed to report them to the government, sent others into battle, or otherwise stirred up 
trouble were to be punished accordingly, although by making a self-criticism the penalty 
could be mitigated.  However, those that took part in revenge killings would be 
“delivered to the People’s Government and punished according to the law.”  An article 
even dictates that the owner of a dog that had bit and injured another was responsible not 
only for medical costs but also for payments associated with inviting monks to chant 
sutra (nianjingfei).  From the perspective of the state, behavior rooted in the backwards 
socio-economic conditions of the grasslands was being turned into criminal behavior 
governed by a set of rational laws, delineated jurisdictions and regular punishments.91 
Yet, the “September Decision” recognized that tribal signatories, not security officials, 
remained the key guarantors of stability and unity.  It therefore stipulated that if the 
leaders themselves stirred up trouble, instigated disputes, or otherwise neglected their 
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responsibility to implement and enforce the “September Decision” they were to be 
suitably punished.92   
Other than the issuance of the “September Decision,” the main task of the Unity 
and Friendship Conference was the selection of a Zeku County Preparatory Committee.  
While a full name list is not provided, “in consultation with tribal leaders,” a twenty-nine-
member committee, consisting of seventeen indigenous elites and the twelve members of 
Guo Min’s work team, was chosen.  Party guidelines dictated that a “nationality 
representative” (i.e. indigenous leader) be put in charge of autonomous region 
governments while an “outside cadre” (i.e. Party representative) served as second-in-
command.93  In fact, at the 1952 Pastoral Work Conference Zhou Renshan had explained 
that due to their ability to sway other indigenous elites, the one or two most influential 
qianhu or baihu should be enlisted as an autonomous region’s overall leader 
(zongzeren).94  Now, as the most powerful of Zeku’s three qianhu, Wagya was “elected” 
committee secretary with Party representative Guo Min as his first vice-secretary.  
Wagya’s younger brother, the Hor baihu and reincarnate lama Lhagyel, Gönshül qianhu 
Serökyap, and Lhakba, baihu of the Shawonar Tribe were selected the second through 
fourth vice-secretaries respectively.95  At the same time a county Political Consultative 
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Committee was inaugurated.  Its co-chairmen were Lumbum, qianhu of the Gartsé Tribe, 
and the Méshül “monk official” Tsintar, baihu of his tribe’s E’haba (Ch.) Tsowa.96  It 
should be noted that with the exception of Tsintar all of these Tibetan office holders had 
been closely associated with the Ma Bufang regime; Lhagyel, Serökyap, and Lumbum 
having formally joined the Guomindang and Lhakba being identified as a “sworn 
brother” to the recently defeated Ma Yuanxiang, a relationship that is alleged to have 
continued into the post-Liberation period.97  Again, the Party was reestablishing the broad 
parameters of the subimperial relationships of past regimes, albeit in a radically re-
imagined and an immensely more penetrative manner.  
With a set of legal codes promulgated and the new leadership chosen, the Unity 
and Friendship Meeting concluded on September 23.  A summary report lauded, “The 
meetings with the tribal leaders were productive and laid the foundation for building the 
county.”98  The very next day the 1st Zeku County Preparatory Conference was convened, 
marking the start of “official deliberations over the question of establishing Zeku 
County.”99  Overall, the meeting seems to have been more celebratory than substantive.  
The sources only note that the new positions were confirmed, work tasks assigned, and 
the development of the pastoral economy discussed.  Party leaders made clear their hope 
that the tribal leaders would enthusiastically spread the United Front policies of regional 
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autonomy and national equality, announce plans to establish Zeku County, and get 
reactions from the tribal masses.100   
However, any conceit Du Hua’an, Guo Min and the County Work Group may 
have assumed from the apparent success of these initial meetings was certainly dampened 
when on October 20 only seven of the seventeen tribal representatives showed up for the 
county’s 2nd Preparatory Conference.101  Among the many no-shows was Committee 
Secretary Wagya, his brother Lhagyel reportedly attending in his place.  With attendance 
unacceptably low, the conference’s work plan was essentially scrapped.  A summary 
report notes that the only issue of substance successfully dealt with at the second 
preparatory meeting was the question of the county name, which as described at the 
opening of this chapter was pushed through by Du Hua’an himself.  Thus, when reports 
claim that Secretary Du convinced tribal leaders that Zeku was indeed a suitable name, 
apparently it referred to only seven of the preparatory committee’s seventeen indigenous 
representatives.  
While Du was able to get his way when it came to the relatively trivial question of 
the county name, he was unable to resolve a second, more consequential dispute. With no 
existing settled communities of any size, an administrative center would have to be 
literally built from the ground up.  Yet, with inter-tribal relations already tense, the 
location of the future county seat was a question of considerable importance.  Party 
leaders favored its present position on the north bank of the Tséchu River in the 
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territories of the Sonak Tribe.102  Being near the center of the proposed county, the 
location was said to be ideal.  However, according to a work report prepared for the 
Prefectural Party Committee,  
Hor tribal leaders Wagya and Lhagyel and some of the monastic leadership 
opposed this location for the county seat [and instead suggested] it should be built 
in Hor, the reason was that Hor’s climate was better than Sonak’s, [and] 
vegetables and trees could be grown.”103  
 
In another report the climate is again cited, Lhagyel reasoning that it would “be helpful to 
the Han cadres who are sent here for work.”104  Leaders of other tribes, however, 
strenuously objected.  Concerned that the already powerful Hor were attempting to 
dominate the new county, some reportedly threatened to relocate to Tongren or Guinan 
Counties if the county seat was in fact built in Hor.  Party leaders were also well aware 
that Wagya and Lhagyel had motives that went beyond concern for the newcomers’ 
comfort.  Commenting on the Wagya’s proposal, a report remarks, “Obviously this would 
be beneficial for his tribe and himself.”105  Given both the contentious nature of the 
disagreement and the meeting’s low attendance, Party leaders postponed a final decision 
for a later date. 
Noticeably frustrated by the poor attendance and sensing hesitancy if not outright 
obstruction on the part of the indigenous leadership, Secretary Guo turned his attention to 
efforts to expand the Party’s reach beyond the tribal elite.  In a handwritten report penned 
under his own name, Guo set a goal of increasing representation from the forty-five 
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delegates currently slated to attend an eventual inaugural county representative congress 
to one hundred and seventeen.106  Of the additional seventy-two delegates, Guo dictated 
that fifty-one were to be selected from among the masses and twenty-one from 
government work units.  Guo noted that although women made up more than half of 
Zeku’s population, none had been among the original forty-five representatives.  He 
therefore stipulated that twenty-five female tribal delegates be selected.107  
Demonstrating an accelerated pace of state building that belies more general instructions 
to avoid proceeding too “rashly” or neglecting “democratic process,” Guo announced that 
the 117 delegates were to meet in less than three weeks time for the opening of the 1st 
Zeku County Representative Conference.108  While socialist transformation had been 
postponed for a later date, the Party was already clearly exhibiting revolutionary 
impatience in its state-building project.109   
Time already running short, Guo urged the indigenous members of the 
preparatory committee to explain to the masses the meaning of representation and to 
research the demographic and political conditions within their tribes so suitable people 
could be chosen as delegates. While democratic methods were stressed, Guo added that 
the candidate list must be carefully prepared.  According to Guo, “the committee 
                                                
106 I have been unable to identify the original forty-five delegates.  As noted above, there were twenty-
seven tribal leaders at the Unity and Friendship Conference, which was weeded down to seventeen for the 
Preparatory Committee.  A chart provided in two separate reports confirms that the forty-five were all 
“tribal representatives.” 
 
107 ZCPG 4, 94.  In the end, only twenty female tribal representatives would be selected.  However, five 
female state delegates were chosen, bringing the total number of female representatives to twenty-five. 
ZCPG 4, 121. 
 
108 For example, see Zhou Renshan, 639-640.   
 




members of each tribe [i.e. tribal leaders] should consult with the masses and investigate” 
so as to identify people considered to be trustworthy, willing to work for the benefit of 
the people, able to contribute to the development of pastoral production, capable of 
elevating national unity, competent to perform all types of tasks, and therefore qualified 
to represent the people.110  Yet Party leaders doubted that successful elections could be 
held without Party guidance, a suspicion that was surely heightened by the 2nd 
Preparatory Committee’s dismal turnout.  It was therefore resolved that work teams 
would be sent down to the tribes to instruct the populace on voting methods, discuss the 
idea of nationality autonomy, and explain the meaning of representation.111   
On October 26, the first of four work teams was deployed on a ten-day 
assignment to Wagya’s Hor.  A week later, the three remaining teams were sent into the 
grasslands, each assigned to multiple tribes.  The work teams were instructed to first 
“consult” with tribal leaders to explain their purpose and enlist the aid of the local 
leadership.  According to the plan, headmen would then introduce the work teams at 
“mass meetings,” after which the work team leader would address the gathering.  In Hor, 
for example, eight hundred people reportedly met for two days of mass meetings at which 
Wagya spoke about the importance of establishing autonomous regions and relayed the 
“spirit” of the 2nd Preparatory Conference.  Afterwards, according to a preset quota, 
twenty-seven Hor delegates were selected, including five women and two representatives 
of Hor Monastery.112  The process of selecting delegates is further elaborated upon in a 
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short report on work conducted among the Khéri Chunga Tribe, the smallest of Zeku’s 
ten tribal groupings.113   It notes that after prepping tribal leaders and then holding a mass 
meeting, the work team again met with the leadership that same evening to discuss 
possible candidates.  The following day a second mass meeting was held at which the 
local leader (hongbu) spoke of the advantages of establishing the Huangnan Special 
Region (prefecture) and Zeku County, both as Tibetan autonomous regions.114  He then 
explained the need to choose candidates from among them to represent the masses in the 
new government.  A list of nominees was produced, the names previously decided upon 
in consultations between the work team and tribal leaders.  After local leaders again 
addressed the masses, delegates were chosen by a unanimous showing of hands.115    
A similar procedure was reportedly implemented among the Wöngya Tribe. 
Located in the far northwest corner of the new county, the Wöngya leadership apparently 
had been quite anxious about the new political order.   For example, the Wöngya 
complained that the Tongren tax collectors had employed the same brutal tactics as was 
associated with the old regime.  Therefore, one of its headmen, known in Chinese as 
Luociri had “thought of us as being no different than Ma Bufang.”116  Apparently this had 
                                                
113 A 1953 census estimated the Khéri Chunga population at just 348 members divided into eighty-seven 
households.  The more accurate 1958 census claimed ninety-six households although with just 315 people.  
According to Chinese sources, it was only during the Republican period that the Khéri Chunga broke away 
from the Méshül to form its own tribe, Chen Qingying claiming that it occurred during the rule of Ma 
Bufang. ZCPG 1, 59; Chen Qingying, Zhonguo Zangzu Buluo, 260; Zeku Xianzhi, 494. 
 
114 ZCPG 1, 58. The report does not give the leader’s name. In Chinese sources, the last baihu of the Khéri 
Chunga is alternately referred to as Caiduo or Caijun.  See Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 261. 
 
115 ZCPC 1, 8-9. 
 
116 Ibid., 9. Elsewhere in the same passage his name is transliterated as Luotiri, perhaps a mistake.  The 
Wöngya baihu was named Shawo.  However, throughout the decade Luociri (perhaps a transliteration of 
Losar) would play a more prominent role in county governance. Without providing details, a separate 




led the Wöngya to not send a representative to the previous preparatory meeting and to be 
disinclined to choose delegates for a future representative conference.  However, after 
meeting with the work team, hearing about the benefits of national autonomy, and being 
assured that the tax situation would be investigated, Luociri reportedly exclaimed, 
In the old society, Chiang Kaishek and Ma Bufang suppressed us so much that 
our anger knew no bounds, the amount he cheated us was also incalculable.  After 
Liberation, Chairman Mao and the Communist Party saved us Tibetans from the 
fire.  Our position has been raised.  Establishing the Huangnan Special Region 
and here establishing Zeku County, these are our People’s Governments, [they] 
are the governments given to us to handle [our own] affairs.  So we must select 
our representatives well, [and] when the conference convenes we must send our 
representatives.117 
 
The benefits of national autonomy now clear— here stated as developing pastoral 
production and raising living standards— a member of the Wöngya’s masses allegedly 
proclaimed that herdsmen must protect the grasslands and its cattle and sheep, eliminate 
bandits and spies, correct mistaken behavior, and seek the government’s redress for those 
that did not mend their ways.118  Three thieves were even said to have voluntarily turned 
themselves in.119  It is obviously impossible to verify the accuracy, and perhaps more 
importantly, the sincerity of direct quotes or more general sentiments attributed to local 
people and communities.  However, it is important to note that they appear in classified 
                                                                                                                                            




117 ZCKK 1, 9. The report notes that the materials regarding the case had been sent to the Prefecture (di) 
Committee.  It is obviously impossible to verify the accuracy, and maybe more importantly, the sincerity of 
direct quotes or more general sentiments attributed to local people and communities.  However, it is 
important to note that they appear in classified documents circulated through the Party and state’s 
bureaucratic channels.  Therefore, they were part of the way conditions were represented by the Party-state 








documents circulated through the Party and state’s bureaucratic channels and and were 
therefore part of the way conditions were represented by the Party-state to the Party-state. 
Despite this purported progress, a second report was decidedly less laudatory.  It 
noted that because the tribes were scattered throughout the grasslands the work teams 
were only able to successfully reach and begin work within four of Zeku’s ten tribes, the 
aforementioned Hor, Khéri Chunga, and Wöngya along with the Shawonar (referred to 
here as the Rongwo Tribe (Longwu Buluo)).120  Among the four, as described above, 
delegates were purportedly chosen through democratic process, a vote of hands from a 
prepared list of candidates.  Elsewhere, however, tribal leaders necessarily chose 
delegates without input from the Party.  Therefore, rather than relying on “democratic” 
methods to pick qualified representatives as Secretary Guo had instructed, delegates were 
instead randomly chosen by lottery.  Surprisingly, it turns out that this (arguably more 
purely democratic) method had been employed not only in tribes the work teams had 
been unable to visit, such the Méshül and Köde Karing, but even among the Khéri 
Chunga where successful elections had elsewhere been reported.  Moreover, the report 
admits that among the masses it was often difficult to find people willing to volunteer to 
serve as delegates, particularly among women.  Predictably, the Party viewed this in 
historical terms. A report claims,  
                                                
120 ZCPC 2, 5.  Specifically, the document states that the work team made it to the Lageri (Ch.), one of the 
three Tsowa that make up the Shawonar.  Located in southern Zeku bordering the Henan Mongol 
territories, in the early nineteenth century the region’s two tsowa were gifted (fengxian) by the Mongol 
prince (qinwang) to the Shartsang Rinpoche after the lama had cured the Mongol leader’s son of an illness.  
Afterwards, the Shartsang Lama’s estate sent members of the Rongwo Nangso’s clan to administer the 
region on its behalf.  Their descendents would become known as the Myikya, now the third tsowa of the 
Shawonar.  Because of its direct subordination to Rongwo Monastery, the Shawonar are often referred to in 
Chinese sources as the Three Rongwo Villages (zhuang) or clans (zu).  As late as 1942, Lhakba, the last 
baihu of the Shawonar, is said to have had his position personally confirmed by the Shartsang Rinpoche.  A 
1954 table depicting the religious leadership of Zeku County lists the Shartsang Lama as the abbot (sizhu) 





In the old society, national oppression was felt most deeply by the oppressed 
pastoral masses, [they] did not have any rights, especially the women. After 
Liberation, although nationality policy protects the equality of all nationalities, 
awareness is still not high. Because of this, they are extremely confused about the 
meaning of convening People’s Representative Congresses. They believe that 
being a representative is similar to being a servant.121   
 
Overall, a third report summarized, “this shows that people do not have a clear 
understanding of their political right to choose representatives, [therefore] there is a 
danger that the representatives are only being chosen by lottery.  This is unsuitable for the 
spirit of elections.  It is a deficiency in our work.” 122 
With the selection process mired in uncertainty and outstanding issues from the 
Second Preparatory Conference still unsettled, the representative conference planned for 
November 9 had to be again postponed.  Instead, on that date the Party convened a Third 
Preparatory Congress.  According to the Party’s own assessments, the previous meeting’s 
failures were due to poor preparation.  Therefore, the November conference was preceded 
by what the documents describe as intensive political work, efforts that seemed to be 
rewarded when all but three tribal representatives reportedly traveled to Shadar to attend 
the meetings.123   
The immediate impasse remained the dispute over the county seat.  Through 
“informal discussions” and investigations, the Party had advanced knowledge of each of 
the tribal leaders’ positions.  Wagya and the Hor’s resolve to establish the county seat in 
their lands hand not changed.  The Wöngya, whose territories bordered the Hor in 
western Zeku, were noncommittal.  The other tribes, however, were firmly insistent that 
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the county seat should remain at its present location.  Determined to avoid the mistakes 
that had helped scuttle the October conference, rather than immediately convening the 
full meeting Party leaders divided the delegates into several “small groups.”  The Hor 
representatives were sequestered together in a single group while the remaining headmen 
were dispersed among several others.  Working within each small group, Party 
representatives quickly brought the Wöngya over to the majority opinion.  Undeterred, 
Wagya again reasoned, “Even though the Hor Tribe is located relatively far way from the 
other tribes, the climate is good, there are good prospects for the future, it will be 
beneficial for the livelihood of the Han cadres.”  If the report is to be believed, Wagya 
had even absorbed some of the terminological tricks of the new regime, concluding, 
“These are the opinions I have brought with me from the masses.”124 
Yet, Wagya was not the only tribal leader already becoming adept in the new 
expressions and rationales.  In the other work groups tribal leaders are said to have 
expressed the need for Wagya to consider the interests of the entire county and to act in 
the spirit of “serving the people.”125  Party intermediaries then returned to Wagya, 
relaying the message that the other headmen were unanimously opposed to erecting the 
county seat within his lands.  That evening, after again being urged to keep the benefit of 
the entire county in mind, Wagya finally acceded to the demands of the other tribes— all 
along the Party ostensibly acting as honest broker.   
However, Party leaders remained unconvinced of Wagya’s sincerity.  One report 
contended, Wagya “only accepted it verbally but his thinking had not changed.” 
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Therefore, the next morning the small groups were reconvened.  Wagya’s change of heart 
was announced and the entire preparatory committee was urged to “learn from Wagya’s 
spirit of selflessness, unity and mutual aid.”126  To this, the Méshül monk official and 
vice-secretary of the consultative committee Tsintar reportedly replied with guarded 
optimism,  
County Secretary Wagya has accepted our suggestions, [he has] considered the 
interests and demands of the People of the ten tribes of the entire county. I like it 
very much.  From now on I will strive to do good work. If [in the future] County 
Secretary Wagya shows no concern for the interests of the masses, then how can I 
not respond.127 
 
Having provided Wagya an honorable exit, and all but guaranteeing a favorable 
resolution to the question of the county seat, the full conference finally opened.  There, 
Wagya accepted the “people’s suggestion” that the administrative seat be erected along 
the banks of the Tséchu River.  Secretary Guo formally introduced the proposal, after 
which the committee unanimously voted to “build the county seat in the middle of the 
county.”128  The report summarizes, “In this way, the issue was resolved…. The 
agreement on the county seat is the beginning of developing unity among the ten tribes in 
Zeku.”129 Admitting the leading role of the Party, Vice-secretary Serökyap of the 
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opposition of the other tribes, Wagya is said to have “immediately” accented to their demands and 
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Gönshül reportedly concluded, “Afterwards we all, including the county leaders and 
chairmen, must work hard under the leadership of Secretary Guo.”130 
The resolution of the question of the county seat was thus a lesson in the proper 
implementation of the mass line practice of consultation and persuasion.  Unlike the 
October conference, the work group’s report noted, “a) prior to the meeting preparatory 
work was done well, ideas were made clear to the cadres, and the conditions [in the 
county] were thoroughly researched and appraised [i.e. consultation];” and secondly, the 
leadership, 
 “b) adhered to the principle of cautious implementation, won over the center [i.e. 
the Wöngya]; isolated mistaken [ideas] [i.e. the Hor], […] after County Secretary 
Wagya accepted the suggestion [of the majority] and expressed his attitude, the 
encouragement of each of the committee members strengthened his sentiments 
[i.e. persuasion].”131   
 
As a result, it was announced that national unity had been strengthened and the 
conference was deemed a success.132 
Yet, despite these intensive efforts at consultation and persuasion the decision to 
establish the county seat in Shadar had almost certainly been made long before Wagya’s 
political epiphany.  As described in Geyong’s short memoir, almost from the moment of 
their arrival at Shadar, cadres had begun to build a rudimentary government seat with 
work units separated by earthen walls and the entire encampment enclosed behind a 
sturdy rampart.  Now, just three days after the conclusion of the conference and several 
weeks before the 1st People’s Representative Congress would formally endorse the 
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decision, Guo Min personally sent a report to the Provincial Finance Office.  In it, he 
divulged that the County Work Group had already asked an engineer to survey the area 
and design the new township.  He went on to discuss the difficulty of procuring building 
materials on the desolate grasslands and attached a blueprint and proposed budget for 
consideration.  Instructively, the report was signed not by the County Preparatory 
Committee, which was ostensibly led by Wagya and the indigenous county leadership, 
but by Guo Min as secretary of the CCP’s Zeku Work Committee.133  
In addition to resolving the dispute over the county seat, the delegates to the Third 
Preparatory Committee discussed several other outstanding issues.  Of particular 
importance was the continuing difficulties cadres were encountering recruiting candidates 
for the representative congress, now rescheduled for the end of the month.  It was 
resolved that in order to “raise the awareness of the people,” renewed emphasis would be 
placed on conducting propaganda work within the tribes.  Additionally, tribal 
representatives complained that they were having trouble procuring grain and sought the 
“government’s help” in changing national policies to guarantee supply.  Although details 
are unavailable, the problem of the Tongren tax collectors, brought to the work team’s 
attention by the Wöngya, was also considered.134 
Lastly, the Third Work Committee discussed the strengthening of national unity.  
At the previous preparatory meeting (October 20-22), it had been decided that each tribe 
would organize “mediation committees” (tiaojie weiyuanhui).  At the time, delegates had 
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134 Here the tax collectors are described as the Tongren Pastoral Wool Tax Work Group.  The report states 





been urged to resolve as many disputes as possible within the next month.135  By mid-
November mediation committees had reportedly been formed in all but the Shisa and 
Khéri Chunga Tribes, and a remarkable one hundred and thirty internal disputes had 
allegedly been settled.136  A year later the number had reportedly risen to three hundred 
and fifteen.137  Over the next several years a tremendous amount of energy would be 
expended resolving grassland disputes.  Unfortunately, the methods used to settle these 
intercommunity conflicts are described in only the vaguest of terms.  Employing Party-
line rhetoric, it was declared that disputes should be settled “according to the principles 
of fairness, unity and mutual aid,”138 based on the principles of “mutual understanding” 
(huxiang liangjie) and “mutual concessions” (huxiang rangbu),139 and “taking the present 
situation as the starting point, showing consideration for history, showing consideration 
for the overall situation, [and] benefiting production and unity.”140  As described in 
Chapter 3, attempts to resolve disputes were almost certainly mediated by tribal leaders 
and in important cases with the aid of Party/state representatives.  We know that a major 
conflict between the Méshül and Labrang’s Sangkhok Tribe was resolved with the aid of 
Trashi Namgyel, Jamyang Norbu and several senior officials of the Northwest Bureau.  A 
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hint of what a successful resolution might have looked like is provided in a separate 
report that notes a dispute between the Shisa and the Gartsé had been resolved “on the 
basis of mutual aid and mutual understanding” when the Gartsé’s Serökyap agreed to 
loan its Lajia (Ch.) Grasslands to the Shisa on a temporary basis.141  In another case, two 
Hor sub-tribal leaders, Yangdan and Jiuba (Ch.) helped resolve a dispute by ceding 
winter pastures to a neighboring tribe from Guide County.142 
As per the “September Decision,” legal statutes stipulated punishments for animal 
rustling and other provocative actions.  However, it seems clear that the Party’s chief 
weapon in combating intercommunity violence was not law enforcement but “patriotic 
education and political propaganda.”143  Tribal leaders were urged to teach common 
herdsmen to respect territorial boundaries.  They were reminded that the roots of disunity 
had been extinguished and unity was now necessary to increase production and improve 
the people’s livelihoods.  Wagya allegedly exclaimed,  
[…] in the old society we had homes but were not masters, that is to say the 
bandit Ma Bufang was the master of our homes.  Now, [we are] Liberated. 
Chairman Mao has given us homes and made us masters of them.  In the future 
we need to take good care of our homes and manage well our own affairs.144  
 
Widely reported upon cases such as the resolution of the century-long dispute between 
tribal elements in Tongren and Jianzha, which Trashi Namgyel had also help mediate, 
were said to be the result of the correct implementation of nationality policies.  Lhakba’s 
personal example was also often cited.  In September, he had successfully organized sixty 
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Shawonar tribesmen on a two-day pursuit of bandits who had looted Tongde’s Ragya 
(Ch. Lajia) Monastery. Returning the property without reward, the former “sworn 
brother” of Ma Yuanxiang had now become a revolutionary exemplar.  It was announced 
that, “people should learn from the spirit of Lhakba [who] took initiative in solving 
problems in order to further consolidate national unity.”145  In the same tenor, apparently 
in recognition of the resolution of the Gartsé-Shisa dispute, Serökyap was praised for 
offering to share the Gönshül’s grasslands with the smaller, less fortunate tribes and to 
help them develop animal husbandry.146  A report would later claim, “within each tribe 
very many disputes of all sizes have been resolved.  This success cannot be separated 
from the hard work of the indigenous headmen and committee members.”147  
Yet, subsequent investigations would show that grassland disputes continued to 
persist in alarming numbers.  For example, despite the celebration of unity that would 
surround the 1st Zeku Representative Congress when it was finally convened at the end of 
November, disputes between County Chairman Wagya’s Hor and both the Sonak (on 
whose land the conference was being held) and the Gartsé continued to fester.  And 
notwithstanding Serökyap’s altruistic example, a 1954 investigation of pastoral 
conditions would criticize him for repeatedly breaking grassland regulations to advance 
his own interests.148   
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146 A 1955 investigation found that the Gönshül, Méshül, Wöngya and Hor Tribes had the best grasslands, 
while the other tribes often lacked sufficient grass and water.  ZKCG 6, 77-78. 
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In fact, “mediation of disputes” (tiaojie jiufen) would become an official work 
category, the number of successful resolutions— often in the hundreds— dutifully 
detailed in yearly work reports and related documents.  However, the seeming 
inexhaustible number of settlements and the admission, sometimes explicitly and 
sometimes implicitly, that new ones continued to crop up and old ones resurface, suggest 
that efforts to strengthen national unity were less successful than often claimed.149  For 
example, the county government’s 1955 work report would celebrate the “equitable and 
satisfactory settlement” of another one hundred sixty-five cases, including “historical 
disputes” between the Henan Mongols and both Zeku’s Hor and Gartsé Tribes, as well as 
between the Gartsé and Shisa.  Despite this, that same year an urgent directive sent by the 
County Party Committee to all work groups declared the outbreak of ten large inter-tribal 
disputes to be a reflection of poor work style and poor understanding of local 
conditions.150  According to the notice, both the Party leadership and rank-in-file cadres 
were at fault. The report continued, “Whatever behavior does not benefit unity is 
behavior that harms production and harms the socialist industrialization of the state.  
Only [if] we set an example and educate the masses can [current] disputes be ended [and 
future disputes] prevented.”151 
                                                
149 For example, the above report notes that in a certain region nine of the thirty-eight previously resolved 
disputes had resurfaced. ZCPC 6, 78. 
 
150 ZCPC 8, 7-8.  Among the ten was an “armed” conflict between the Hor and the Mongol Banners that 
had resulted in nine deaths.  A separate report describes disputes (jiufen) between the Gartsé and the 
Mongol Banners and the Gönshül and Xiahe’s Sangkhok to be particularly serious.  ZCPC 9, 10. 
 
151 ZCPC 2, 28 (132).  To this day grassland disputes continue to be a semi-regular occurrence in Amdo.  
For example, the Zeku Xianzhi reports that a dispute thought to have been resolved in the 1950s between 
the Sonak and one of the Mongol “tribes” violently resurfaced in the 1980s and 1990s.  Likewise, a dispute 
between “Zeku” and “Tongren” erupted five times between 1953 and 1986.  Additionally, in 1963 a 
grassland dispute caused the county lines to be redrawn so that seven of the Wöngya’s tsowa came under 





For all of its considerable accomplishments, over the next several years 
communications between Zeku County and its superiors would be more notable for their 
admissions of setbacks, deficiencies and mistakes than successes.  Most of these were 
blamed on a combination of difficult work conditions and poor work style (i.e. political 
mistakes) among the admittedly overtaxed cadre force.  As 1953 summary report by the 
Party Committee’s Secretariat— the organ in charge of work assignments and resource 
allocation— would understatedly admit, “We began to build Zeku County in July.  On 
December 5 the county was formally established.  Since there was no material base, it 
was difficult work.”152  The Secretariat’s report notes that the overall quality of the cadre 
force was low, individuals having been thrown together from different work units with 
little relevant experience or knowledge of the region.  As a result, over the previous half 
year an enormous amount of manpower and resources had been wasted.  According to 
“incomplete statistics,” in that short time span, ten million yuan had been misused.  And 
not all of the wastage was inadvertent.  Two Chinese cadres, Jie Tianxiang and Ren 
Shiyin, were accused of embezzling (tanwu) 2.12 million and over 300,000 yuan 
                                                                                                                                            
three of Guinan’s tsowa became part of what was then called the Wöngya People’s Commune. Chen 
Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 264; Zeku Xianzhi, 364, 495.  Emily Yeh and Fernanda Pirie have both 
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that state has “come to recognize that the nomad’s feuds cannot be resolved by the imposition of criminal 
punishments […].”  Therefore, both the state and tribal society have come to rely on the mediation of the 
same types of authorities as they had in the past.  Emily Yeh, 515-520; Pirie, 97. 
 





respectively.153  Moreover, cadre malfeasance was not limited to outright theft.  Noting 
the difficult work conditions, the Hor Work Group had reported that although they lacked 
experience working in minority regions, most cadres were willing to “bear hardships and 
endure physical labor” (chiku nailao).   Yet, some feared making leftist or rightist 
political mistakes and therefore did not actively engage in propaganda work.  Others, 
however, did not think the work important and therefore did not take it seriously.  As an 
example, a public security cadre named You Langtai is alleged to have left the worksite 
to visit relatives in neighboring Guide County.  He returned two days later with a broken 
saddle and continued to refuse to attend to his assignments, saying, “feedback can be 
collected when the work team returns to the county seat.”154 
Less nefarious, but still worrying, was the case of a cadre surnamed Du.  Du had 
been in charge of procuring and managing the cadres’ food supplies.  The Secretariat’s 
report claimed that he worked hard but lacked training and methodology.  As a result, the 
accounts were in disarray and Du himself was under considerable stress.  During a 
political study session he reportedly exclaimed, “I am willing to work as a soldier taking 
care of the horses for no pay, as long as I do not have to be the food manager.”  Using Du 
as an example, the Secretariat concluded that due to both physical hardship and a lack of 
political education and practical training, morale was low.  It noted insufficient guidance, 
regulations, and planning from upper levels and a lack of political consciousness among 
the grassroots cadres.  In addition, unfamiliarity with pastoral regions had resulted in the 
persistence of both Han chauvinism and local nationalism, leading to poor cooperation 
                                                
153 These figures are in the “old currency” (jiubi).  For perspective, during the same period of time150 
million yuan was reportedly distributed as relief aid (shehui jiuji) (see chapter 5).  Zeku Xianzhi, 352.  
 




between cadres and tribal leaders.  Noting its inability to effectively translate directives, 
the office requested the deployment of an additional Tibetan-language secretary.  The 
report predicted that work could only be successfully implemented with better 
communication and more accurate information.155  
Undeterred, on November 29, 1953, the 1st Zeku County All Nationalities All 
Walks of Life Representative Conference finally met to formally announce the 
establishment of Zeku County.  With twenty-seven representatives, by far the largest 
contingent was from the Hor.  Next was the Shawonar and Gönshül with ten and nine 
delegates respectively, followed by the Méshül, Gartsé, Sonak and Wöngya, each with 
seven representatives.  Based on the Party’s admittedly imprecise figures, this amounted 
to roughly one delegate for every two hundred people.  Adhering to Party guidelines, 
smaller tribes were allotted a slightly higher representation.  Still the Khéri Chunga 
received only three representatives and the Shisa and Göde Karing both five.156  In 
addition, nine spots were allotted to the monasteries.  Delegates were therefore allocated 
fairly evenly by population, if not between the tribes, with one notable exception.  As 
Guo had instructed, twenty-one members of the Representative Congress were identified 
as state delegates (sixteen men and five women), giving the Party/state a massive 
presence at the congress, one that badly outweighed its still miniscule physical presence 
on the grasslands.157 
                                                
155 ZCPC 2, 19-20.  
 
156 The populations of the three tribes were estimated at 348, 696 and 724 respectively, meaning 115-150 
people per delegate. Population figures were calculated by assuming four people per household.  ZCPG 3, 
2.  On the allotment policy, see Guo Min’s pronouncement in ZCPC 2, 4.  See also Zeku Xianzhi, 324. 
 
157 ZCPG 3, 2, 10. A table dated February 11, 1954 (two months later) states that there were 120 state 




However, not everything proceeded quite according to plan.  As per Guo Min’s 
October instructions, exactly 117 delegates had been selected, ninety-two men and 
twenty-five women.  Yet when the conference convened only ninety-five were present.  
Assuming that all of the state representatives did attend, sixty-two male and just twelve 
female indigenous representatives would have participated in the meeting.  Moreover, 
less than half of the tribal representatives registered as instructed.  Therefore, during the 
conference it was discovered that several of the delegates were not who they claimed to 
be.  This was said to have affected the “purity” (chunjiexing) of the conference.158   
Keeping in mind the demographic and topographic conditions of the high plateau, these 
missteps suggest the incredible newness of the political order the Party was trying to 
create after just three months of dedicated preparations.159 
Over seven days of meetings, speeches were given, the location of the county seat 
again approved, and a new county leadership elected.  Predictably, the themes of the 
conference were unity, production and security.  Echoing the speech Du Hua’an had 
given three months earlier to kick off the preparatory period, Guo Min declared, “Unity is 
the foundation of all the work we do.”160  Leaving nothing to chance, on the day before 
the conference officially opened a preparatory meeting was held to study selection 
procedures and discuss the candidate list.  Unsurprising, when elections were held on the 
conference’s second day, the new leadership looked a lot like the previous one.  Wagya 
was selected to lead a twenty-one-member county committee, with Guo Min, Lhagyel, 
                                                
158 Ibid. 2,10, 13. ZCPG 3, 10. One of the imposters was allegedly from Guinan County.   
 
159 It should be remembered, for example, that the meetings were almost certainly held outdoors in 
December temperatures that average around -14°C (6.8°F). Zeku Xianzhi, 76. 
 




Serökyap, and Lhakba as vice leaders.  A Consultative Committee was also chosen, also 
with twenty-one members.  Guo Min was selected chairman and the Gartsé qianhu 
Lumbum and the Méshül baihu and monk official Tsintar as vice chairmen.161  Each 
committee was rounded out by members of Zeku’s indigenous elite and a sprinkling of 
Han cadres. 
 In speeches given on its final day, the conference was declared a great “triumph,” 
an event “unprecedented in history.”162  A summary report notes that among the delegates 
were many who previously had been wary of the Party and its programs, including the 
elderly, “living Buddhas” (huofo), monks (lama), and women.  Now these same people 
were beginning to “understand the benefits of Chairman Mao and the CCP’s policies of 
national equality.  This has allowed them to obtain the right to be ‘masters of their own 
homes.’”163  In a speech by a Tibetan delegate, likely Wagya, the audience was reminded,  
We must take the affairs of Zeku County as our own. We should advocate for 
unity between the cadres and ourselves and exercise the right to be masters of our 
own homes. We must understand that only under the leadership of the Communist 
Party do we Tibetans enjoy political power. In the past, we did not have any 
power. Therefore, we must talk about how we lived in the past and how we are 
now masters of our own homes. We should convey this message to the tribes.164 
 
On December 5, 1953, almost exactly six months after sixty-one cadres had first 
pitched their tents on the banks of the Tséchu River, the Zeku Tibetan Autonomous 
                                                
161 ZCPG 3, 10-12.  ZCPC 3, 1, Zeku Xianzhi, 333. A report noted that seventeen of the twenty-one 
candidates for the county committee received the same number of votes.  This was deemed inappropriate 
and the procedure was therefore changed before electing the Political Consultative Committee.  The 
procedures themselves are not explained. 
 
162 ZCPG 4, 121. 
 
163 ZCPG 1, 11. 
 





County had been willed into being.  Before the end of the year, the Huangnan Tibetan 
Autonomous Region would also be established with Wagya as one of six vice-
chairmen.165 Zeku’s Tibetan pastoralists had finally become “masters of their own 
homes.”  Yet, while the construction foremen may have been the indigenous leadership— 
people like Wagya, Lhagyel, Serökyap, Lumbum, Tsintar and Lhakba— the architects 
and project managers of “Mao’s treasure house” were most certainly agents of the 
Chinese Communist Party.  And importantly, as Zhou Renshan had made clear in his 
1952 speech, national autonomy was not intended as a means to protect the feudal 
structure of pastoral society, but to gradually do away with it.  
From the Party’s perspective, the key to this transition was gaining the support of 
the masses.  The 1st Zeku County Representative Conference was declared the first major 
step toward that goal, a conference report summarizing, “The main success of the 
conference is having built a foundation among the masses.”166  In its work plan for 1954, 
also unveiled at the conference, the Party continued to stress unity but now began to turn 
its eyes on increasing pastoral production, raising the living standards of the pastoral 
masses, and building sub-county administrative organs.  While the work would continue 
to be mediated by the tribal leadership, who now made up the ostensive government of 
Zeku County, it would also provide the Party increased direct access to the masses. The 
process of de-imperializing the relationship between the Chinese state and the Amdo 
Plateau had begun.  In its place, the Party hoped to nurture a new generation of 
                                                
165 The Zeku County Party Committee would be officially established in February 1954, replacing the 
Zeku County Work Committee, which on December 1 had itself replaced the County Construction Work 
Group.  Guo Min served as secretary of all three committees, and Liu Desheng as the vice secretary. See 
ZGGCD QHSHNZZZZZ ZZCL, 33. 
 




indigenous leaders, drawn from among the masses, who, under the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party, would help lead the grasslands into a new era of prosperity, 








DOWN TO THE TRIBES: SOCIAL WELFARE, TAX COLLECTION, 
PATRIOTIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE DE-IMPERIALIZATION OF THE 
ZEKU GRASSLANDS 
 
On December 5, 1953, after just a three-month “preparatory period” and only six 
months since the Party had established its first permanent foothold on the grasslands 
southwest of Repgong, the Zeku Tibetan Autonomous County had been officially 
established.  At the 1st Zeku County Representative Conference, one delegate after 
another proclaimed that Zeku’s pastoral population had taken its first step towards 
becoming “masters of their own homes.”  Although representatives of the pre-Liberation 
tribal elite dominated the county government’s administrative organs, internal Party 
sources added that the meeting marked the first major initiative in building a “foundation 
among the masses.”1  As Zhou Renshan had made clear at the 1952 Pastoral Work 
Conference, despite its temporary alliance with Zeku’s indigenous leadership, the 
creation of the Zeku Tibetan Autonomous County was the basis upon which socialist 
democracy was to be built and national integration realized.  In the short term, it had 
essentially re-instituted and further formalized the subimperial relationships previously 
nurtured by the Ma Bufang regime.  In the longer term, however, the Party had begun to 
build the administrative capacity that it believed would overcome the limits of empire, 
replacing sub-imperial arrangements between the state and indigenous elites with a direct 
                                                




and deeply felt relationship between Party-state and society.  This of course depended on 
more than just marking county lines and building governing structures.  It necessitated 
altering epistemological frameworks, on arousing “patriotic consciousness,” and 
exchanging parochial identities and tribal loyalties for the expanded sense of belonging to 
a diverse yet unitary national body.  The formation of Zeku County and its governing 
committees was therefore intended as the first major institutional step in the de-
imperialization of the Zeku grasslands. 
However, despite the celebratory pronouncements that accompanied the 
conclusion of Zeku’s founding conference, as 1953 came to a close the plateau remained 
far from internally unified.  In spite of Ma Yuanxiang’s defeat the previous May, the 
region continued to be on high alert for both internal and external counterrevolutionary 
threats.2  On the conference’s closing day, delegates had been urged to “uncover rumors, 
trace [their] roots and extinguish [them], educate the pastoral masses to look out for 
enemy planes and report them immediately, [and] eliminate the [conditions] that produce 
bandits and spies.”3  Despite Director Zhou’s 1952 orders that monasteries remain off 
limits to security operations, in December 1953—the same month Zeku County was 
formally established— security forces (gong’anju paiyuan) were sent “into the 
monasteries and into the tribes” to investigate and obtain material on the “enemy’s 
situation” and “eliminate bandits, spies and all types of counterrevolutionaries.”  These 
                                                
2 ZKGK 3, 8.  For example, purported Ma Yuanxiang-affiliated counterrevolutionary activity prevented 
preparatory work from beginning in the Mongol territories to Zeku’s south until October 1953.  Even then, 
a preparatory committee could not be formed until June 1954, a full two years after a Henan Party 
Committee and Work Team had been first dispatched to the region.  In October 1954, the county was 
finally formally established as a Mongol autonomous region under the direct administration of the 
provincial government.  Not until 1959 would Henan become a county within Huangnan Prefecture. 
HNZZZZZGK 89.  See also Hennan Mengguzu Zizhixian Fangzhi Bianji Weiyuanhui, ed., Henan 
Mengguzu Zizhixian Zhi, 2 vols. (Lanzhou: Gansu Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), 73-77. 
 




operations were augmented by “armed work teams” (wuzhuang gongzuodui) deployed to 
mobilize the masses, “serve as sentries and patrol the mountains.”  According to 
secondary sources, “bandit activity” remained particularly serious among the Gönshül, 
Hor and Sonak Tribes.4   
It was against this backdrop that the Zeku County Party Committee submitted an 
ambitious 1954 work plan laying out its goals and priorities for the new year.  The plan 
itself contained nine section headings: 1) “Civil Administration,” referring to raising the 
quality of Han cadres and the training of indigenous Tibetan officials; 2) “State 
Building,” in particular establishing sub-county districts; 3) “Social Work,” which 
included resolving grassland disputes and dispensing social welfare; 4) “State Finance,” 
most significantly tax collection; 5) “Construction Work,” referring to the scientific 
development of the pastoral economy via everything from road building to grassland 
protection; 6) “Culture and Education Work,” which demanded Tibetan-language 
materials be acquired, teachers trained, schools built and students enticed to leave 
pastoral work for both “patriotic education” and the promotion of  the “awareness of 
Tibetan culture;” 7) “Health Care,” for both the pastoralists and their livestock; 8) 
“Industry and Commerce,” which mainly referred to guaranteeing grain supplies, fixing 
prices, eliminating the black market and setting up trading posts; and 9) “Public 
Security,” including promoting national unity, the management of an 1126-person self 
defense force and establishment of a Public Security Committee.  All of this was to be 
done under the principle of “proceeding cautiously and steadily,” and “on the foundation 
                                                




of national unity.”  In sum, the work plan was designed to  “launch patriotic education,” 
“develop production,” and “improve the People’s livelihoods.”5   
 
Back at the 1953’s inaugural Unity and Friendship Conference, Tongren County 
Party Secretary and Huangnan United Front Work Department Director Du Hua’an had 
announced that national unity was to be the core of all policies, a sentiment that was 
echoed three months later by Zeku Party Secretary Guo Min at the 1st Representative 
Conference.  Yet, as the plateau began to thaw in the spring of 1954, a slight but 
substantive alteration was made to this guiding formula.  Although unity and security 
would remain foremost concerns, the new maxim declared increased production to be the 
benchmark from which all tasks should now proceed.  None other than Gélek Gyatso, the 
former steward of Rongwo Monastery, brother to the Shartsang Lama and now vice-
chairman of Huangnan Prefecture, declared to a joint meeting of Zeku’s government and 
consultative committees, “In pastoral areas the development of pastoral production is the 
long-term center of work.  Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, all 
other work revolves around promoting the development of the pastoral economy.”6  In a 
sense, increasing productive capacities had become a necessary precondition for national 
unity rather than the reverse, as it had been imagined during the previous year.  As a 
philosophical point, this did not necessitate altering the basic foundations on which 
United Front work was formulated nor to the mass line methodologies of consultation 
                                                
5 ZCPC 2, 73-74. A draft version of the same document, contains additional information, such as plans for 
the Northwest Bureau Trading Company to establish three branches— a permanent one at Hor Monastery 
and two temporary trading posts elsewhere— so the tribes could more easily acquire grains.  This and other 
details are left out of the final draft.  See ZCPC 2, 75-88.  See also ZCPG 14, 11-17. 
 




and persuasion.  Just as with the establishment of national autonomous areas, economic 
growth was considered important not only for the material benefits it would bring the 
people and the state, but also for demonstrating the beneficence of CCP rule and thereby 
quickening the pace of national integration, referred to as raising “patriotic 
consciousness” (aiguo juewu).  As a practical matter, however, the elevation of 
production to a position above (albeit only slightly) national unity demanded an expanded 
state presence on the grasslands.  This entailed and was also almost certainly in part 
motivated by the desire to push beyond Zeku’s indigenous elite.  The “foundation among 
the masses” built at the 1st Representative Conference had been just that.  Now Party 
operatives would need to go deeper into the grasslands (shenru xiaxiang) and “down to 
the tribes” (xiaxiang buluo).  The process of de-imperialization was quickly entering its 
next phase. 
Work began in February 1954, when “at the request of the masses one after 
another five work groups were dispatched to the tribes in order to establish the foundation 
for district government administrations, lead pastoral production, investigate and become 
familiar with the internal conditions of the tribes and mediate disputes and other work.”7 
Each work team would be tasked with building one of five sub-county district (qu) 
administrations.  In the meantime, the work groups became the de facto sub-county 
governments responsible for the implementation of the year’s work plan. 
However, the Party was well aware that during this “transitional period” (guodu 
shiqi) before socialist transformation, the continued intercession and mediation of the 
indigenous elite remained vital.  In fact, instructions issued by the provincial government 
                                                
7 ZCPG 5, 76, ZCPC 8, 11. The five work teams were allocated as follows:  Hor, Gönshül (including 





reminded county leaders that the fundamental principles of the United Front were still in 
effect, stating emphatically, “[…] doing good work with the headmen (touren) is the 
number one requirement in guaranteeing the successful establishment of governing 
authorities.”  It noted that in the initial stages of state building in pastoral areas, all of the 
people, including tribal leaders, could be separated into one of three categories.  “In 
general, half have doubts, half have faith, and [a few] are negative and will oppose […].”  
Concerned that headmen often expressed enthusiasm but harbored anxieties, the 
provincial directive added that propaganda needed to be carried out first among the 
indigenous elites.  Having earned their support “in action” as well as in “words,” local 
leaders could then be more easily mobilized to visit the “tents” to reassure and educate 
the masses.  By paying close attention to propaganda work, assigning indigenous leaders 
to appropriate positions with real responsibility, and consulting with them in good faith, 
the directive insisted, “we can win over the majority and minimize resistance.”8   
Thus, for both practical and procedural reasons, before implementation plans 
would need to be cleared by the newly formed Zeku County “Joint Committee.”  Like the 
Tongren committee that had deliberated the establishment of Zeku County, the forty-two-
member Zeku Joint Committee consisted of both the county’s government and 
consultative committees. Chaired by Wagya under the supervision of Party Secretary Guo 
Min, the Joint Committee counted most of Zeku’s leading pre-Liberation figures as 
members.  As such, the Joint Committee essentially served as the venue through which 
the Party recruited the critical support of Zeku’s tribal leadership for its state and nation 
building efforts. 
                                                
8 ZCPG 7, 2-3. This directive was sent in response to the Hor Work Committee’s application to hold its 1st 




The Joint Committee would meet three times over the course of 1954.   At each, 
reports were delivered, directives issued, work tasks assigned, quotas and deadlines set, 
and propaganda spread.  However, the three meetings each revolved around a primary 
work task: district building, social welfare, and tax collection.  Each of these tasks— 
administration, public welfare, and resource extraction— are of course fundamental 
aspects of modern governance.  They also are indicative of a desire to form a far more 
direct and intrusive relationship between the state and society than had previously 
existed.  Although actual implementation would overlap, each of the campaigns will be 
discussed in the order of the Joint Committee meeting at which it took center stage. 
 
Down to the Tribes I: The Hor Work Group and the Founding of the 1st District 
Throughout 1954, the Hor Work Group would be the most active of the five, often 
serving as the vanguard for the implementation of new programs and initiatives.  On 
March 20, 1954 the work group arrived at Hor Monastery.  While its core task was 
founding a district government (yi jianqu wei zhu), under the principle of “avoiding the 
concept of doing only one thing at a time,” the work group was expected to 
simultaneously engage in other grassroots efforts meant to strengthen production and 
increase living standards.  This was to be mainly achieved through a combination of 
raising the productivity of animal husbandry while developing auxiliary or sideline 
economic activities (fuye).  Initially, efforts to strengthen the pastoral economy largely 
revolved around protecting livestock (baohu xumu gongzuo).  This included activities 




animal shelters, fencing pastures, and when available dispensing inoculations against 
animal diseases.9    
Sideline production included digging up yams, fungi, and herbs; collecting animal 
dung for fuel; producing animal bi-products such as milk, yogurt, and wool; and burning 
bones for fertilizer.10  In all, the Hor Work Group’s year-end report claims that sideline 
production activities earned the Hor’s five tsowa an income of 1.2 billion yuan (old 
currency).11  Of this, 161,940,000 yuan was earned through providing transport (most 
likely pack animals) and another twelve million was earned as manual labor (tugong) 
provided to the county and Hor Monastery.12   
While these tasks were all considered vitally important, they appear to have been 
largely coordinated within the tsowa.  On the other hand, the work assignments that 
would consume much of the Hor Work Group’s personal attention were the same tasks 
that would dominate the three Joint Committee meetings: social welfare, tax collection, 
and, initially, replacing the Hor’s loose tribal rule with a bureaucratic district 
government.  Unfortunately, far fewer details are available for the 1st Joint Committee 
meeting than the subsequent two.  The meeting was convened on May 12, but only after 
low turnout had forced it to be postponed several days.  Even then just eighteen of forty-
                                                
9 ZCPG 1, 21-23, 43-45. 
 
10 According to a report, in 1954 Lhagyel’s tsowa collected 6,000 jin of bones and Hor Monastery 3650 
jin, leaving the district just short of the 10,000 jin quota the preparatory committee had assigned.  ZCPG 1, 
27-28. 
 
11 This figure includes tasks such as cutting grass and killing wild animals, in this case, to sell to the state. 
The preparatory committee set fixed prices such as 10,000 yuan for 300 jin of yak dung and 30,000 yuan 
for 100 jin of cut grass. 
 




two committee members and six non-voting delegates were in attendance.13  In the “spirit 
of the [recent] Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Region Party Committee meeting,” it was 
stressed that district governments were the downward extension of the promise of 
nationality autonomy.  However, in a reversal from earlier in the year it was decided that 
only Hor District would be completed in 1954.  Plans to establish the other districts were 
now put off until the following year.14 
The process of establishing the 1st District, as Hor’s new administrative unit 
would become known, largely replicated the county-building efforts of the previous year, 
albeit at a level closer to the pastoral masses the Party hoped to win over.  Before a 
district government could be founded a preparatory meeting had to be convened and a 
preparatory committee chosen.  Propaganda would have to be spread, delegates carefully 
vetted, egos assuaged and balances of power accounted for.  After undisclosed 
difficulties, “[…] in consultation and discussion with middle and upper-level figures,” the 
work group reported, “[…] finally [we were able] to obtain their unanimous agreement, 
[and] produced a preliminary name list [of candidates] for the preparatory meeting.”15  
Leading up to the conference, the work group had discovered that enthusiasm for 
building the district was largely driven by the predicted material benefits that the literal 
construction of the district seat might bring.  Perhaps encouraged by the work group 
itself, delegates and members of the masses reportedly assumed that establishing a 
district government mean that a “vibrant and bustling” (fanhua reniao) settlement, 
                                                
13 The meeting was originally schedule for May 9.  Assuming the majority of the Han Chinese members of 
the committee were present, the percentage of indigenous Tibetan attendees was even lower.   
 
14 ZCPG 7, 91. Initially both the Hor and Méshül Work Committees had been instructed to establish 
districts by the end of the year.  By mid-March, however, these ambitions had already been scaled back. 
  




complete with a trading post, cooperative and grain station, would quickly appear in the 
vicinity of Hor Monastery.  Zeku’s pastoral population normally had to travel to 
neighboring counties to purchase grains and manufactured goods.  Now one elderly 
woman, a member of the Gaye (Ch.) herding group (quanzi) of Lhagyel’s Wönkhor 
Tsowa, allegedly exclaimed,  
We have seen that in Tongde the trading company sells everything.  It truly is 
convenient for herders to make purchases.  After establishing the district here, 
there will be a trading company; that will be very convenient for us.  We will be 
able to purchase products (tuchanpin) very quickly.16   
 
Others reportedly talked about the benefits of the district in more formulaic language, 
evoking the dual mantras of national unity and economic development.  Even 
representatives of the monastery allegedly felt that once the district was established 
banditry might be reduced or even disappear altogether.  As always, the veracity and 
sincerity of the claims is impossible to authenticate.  Yet in an internal report issued to its 
superiors, albeit one that perhaps reflects the outlook of the work group more so than 
those of the local population, it was reported, “Based on what we can see of the masses’ 
overall feelings toward the establishment of the district, although there are differing 
degrees of understanding, there is a common opinion: it is supportive and welcomes the 
quick establishment of a Hor district government.”17  
On July 18 the 1st District Preparatory Conference was convened.  At the 
gathering an eleven-member preparatory committee was chosen “in consultation with 
                                                
16 Ibid.  
 





tribal leaders, religious leaders and the masses.”18  The delegates reportedly expressed the 
desire to re-establish a “unity committee” so that the seventy-odd remaining disputes 
could be settled before the district was formally established.19  Additionally, committee 
members pledged to increase production above and beyond targets set by the prefecture 
and resolved to build ten animal pens and shelters and to train five livestock veterinary 
personnel.20  After the meeting’s conclusion, “the committee members went down to the 
tribes to explain [the policies] to the people.  [In this way] Everyone, including the 
important people got to know the benefits [of establishing] the district government.”21  
Despite the generally positive tone with which the 1st Preparatory Conference is 
described in the Hor Work Group’s report, a 1955 county committee directive issued to 
all five work groups declared that the Hor Work Group’s preparations had in fact been 
largely inadequate.  Meant to help the other four work groups avoid similar mistakes, the 
county committee alleged that the Hor Work Group had done a poor job of assessing the 
important political relationships within the tribe.  In other words, the wrong people had 
been made delegates and eventually preparatory committee members.  The other work 
groups were reminded, “before establishing the district [we] must assiduously investigate 
and understand the entire district’s situation, grasp the [amount of] prestige the chieftains 
have with the masses, and meticulously understand the situation of religion within the 
                                                
18 ZCPC 8, 11. 
 
19 ZCPG 1, 38. 
 
20 The prefecture had set targets of a 19% increase for sheep, 15% for cattle and 13% for horses.  The 
district preparatory committee now raised those targets to 25%, 17% and 15% respectively. It also appears 
that the number of planned animal pens was greatly increased.  A year-end report notes that there had been 
the intention to build seventy pens in the Hor’s Wönkhor Tsowa alone.  See ZCPG 1, 16, 21, 54. 
 




tribes.”22  It noted that the Hor Work Group’s grasp of the “situation of religion” had 
been particularly deficient.  As a result, unnecessary doubts had arisen in the minds of 
“ordinary religious figures.”  The directive specifically criticized the work group for 
failing to accurately discern the relationship between the Hor’s Nyingma and Gelukpa 
institutions as well as the difference between the Nyingma monastic community and lay 
Nyingma practitioners.23  It can be assumed that the county committee was not referring 
to issues of doctrine or practice but to political and social divisions that might negatively 
affect the establishment of the district, national unity and increased production. 
A more immediate concern, however, was the work group’s misreading of intra-
tribal political relationships.  In particular, it had failed to appoint Guanjia (Ch.), another 
of Wagya’s younger siblings, to the preparatory committee.  Although details are 
sketchy, it was evidently only after the meeting had adjourned and the delegates had 
returned home to implement its directives that work group members became aware of 
their misstep.  They were told of Guanjia’s displeasure and made to understand the 
degree to which his active and enthusiastic participation would be vital to the 
construction of the district and in gaining the cooperation of the masses. The county 
report quotes “some mid-level peoples” as saying, “In Hor if Guanjia is not given the 
                                                
22 ZCPC 8, 21.  
 
23 Ibid. The passage literally refers to “differences between the Red School [Nyingma] in the monasteries 
and the Red School in the tribes.” This apparently refers to the large number of Nyingma lay practitioners 
who did not join monasteries but instead remained engaged in pastoral production and— in the Party’s 
view— were part-time religious practitioners.  Hor Monastery is a Nyingma institution and the majority of 
the Hor practitioners were Nyingma adherents, although a sizeable minority followed Gelukpa teachings.  
See Pu Wencheng, 482. Although not elaborated upon, a separate county committee report notes that based 
on the experiences in Hor, when building sub-county administrations cadres must “investigate the religious 
beliefs of the tribe carefully and allocate the number of representatives appropriately.” ZCPG 7, 39.  
Overall, the primary material is surprisingly quiet on the subject of religion, spending far more attention on 





position of district leader it will be impossible to launch any work.”24  Rather than 
criticizing the feudal nature of pastoral society, however, the county report berates the 
work group for failing to properly assess objective conditions and therefore allocating 
positions poorly.   
Ultimately the work group was able to correct its mistake.  At the 2nd Preparatory 
Meeting, convened on September 9, Guanjia was indeed made leader of the committee. 
According to a report, not only was Guanjia “well satisfied,” but most of the Hor’s “mid-
level figures” were also pleased that their concerns had been taken into account.  United 
Front principles having been affirmed, it was reiterated that the upper and middle strata 
of society must be “consulted” and their “suggestions” sought after.  Otherwise mistakes 
would not only continue to be made but the negative consequences would multiply.25   
After the meeting, committee members and cadres went down to the tribes to 
“discuss the glory of being a representative.  In this manner,” the report declared, “thirty-
three tribal representatives, [plus] three monks (lama), four women, and four government 
functionaries were selected.”26  Finally, at the start of November 1954, a representative 
conference was convened and the 1st District was officially established.  An eleven-
person governing committee was chosen under District Leader Guanjia and Vice-leader 
                                                
24 ZCPC 8, 20-21. Instead of Guanjia, a man named Yinjia (Ch.) was originally selected district leader. 
ZCPG 7, 38. 
 
25 Ibid., 21. A second report claims that the second conference was instead convened on August 8.  See 
ZCPC 2, 97. 
 




Yangdan, a prominent leader of the Hor’s Xuhumang (Ch.) Tsowa.27  According to a 
county committee summary report, “People understood the purpose of establishing the 
district as exercising the right of being masters of their own homes.”28  This is not to 
suggest that Guanjia and Yangdan held ultimate authority within their district.  In fact, a 
major report on the establishment of the 1st District submitted under Guanjia and 
Yangdan’s names was clearly instead penned by the Hor Wok Group.29  However, 
neither does it follow that the two Hor headmen were simply stooges.  Instead, as the 
Guanjia ordeal demonstrates, they remained vital intermediaries between the Party-state 
and the pastoral masses and as such maintained a degree of authority and agency that 
should not be dismissed or overlooked. 
Through its experience establishing the 1st District, the county committee felt it 
had learned important lessons.  Yet despite internal rivalries, as a single-tribe district the 
conditions among the Hor were considered to be relatively simple.  By contrast, three of 
the four remaining districts were to consist of multiple tribes.  The county committee’s 
1955 report declared,   
                                                
27 The five-day conference began November 1.  According to the county committee report, forty-one of the 
forty-five delegates attended, representing each of the tsowa and from all classes and backgrounds.  It had 
been Yangdan who county leaders had liberally quoted the previous year as having accused Ma Bufang of 
exploiting Tibetans and sowing discord among the tribes (See Chapter 4).  Yangdan would continue to act 
as the key intermediary between the Party and the Xuhumang Tsowa.  It is possible that Yangdan was the 
Xuhumang Baihu, identified by Chen Qingying as Awang.  However, Awang is usually a transliteration of 
the common Tibetan name Ngawang. Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 246.    
 
28 ZCPG 7, 36.  
 
29 ZCPG 1, 26.  The “Hor Work Group March-July Work Report,” filed on August 2, 1954, before Guanjia 
had assumed his position, is identical to the first half of the Zeku County Hor 1st District People’s 
Government’s “1954 Work Summary Report,” dated December of that same year.  The latter was officially 




Last year we did not understand thoroughly how to build government 
administrations.  The experience reminds us that this year we should proceed 
cautiously and with steady steps when districts consist of two or three tribes, 
especially when the tribes are not on friendly terms with each other. […].  This is 
a complicated and challenging civil administrative task.  But we must do it well.30 
It was therefore determined that the other single-tribe district, Shawonar, should be 
completed by the end of May 1955.  Work on the three multi-tribe districts would then 
begin in June and end in December.  The methods were to be nearly identical to the 
process in Hor, which itself was modeled after the establishment of Zeku County.  The 
report noted that if “conditions make it impossible to finish on time,” work teams could 
apply for an extension.  Attesting to the difficult “conditions,” only Méshül District (now 
called Duofudan/Dopden and consisting of the Méshül, Köde Karing and Khéri Chunga 
Tribes) was in fact completed by the deadline. Two others were established over the 
course of 1956 and one, Haidun District (Gartsé and Shisa Tribes) would not be founded 
until 1957, only to be re-divided the following year, now as two people’s Communes.31   
Notably, when the single-tribe Shawonar District (then called Sairidan (Ch.)) was 
finally established in November 1956— a full year and a half after it had been slated for 
completion— the district committee consisted of thirty-six members.  Twenty-one of 
them were classified as belonging to “upper-level households” and eleven from “mid-
level households.”  Two more were monks and just two represented “lower-level 
households.”  Despite an emphasis on recruiting women that went back to 1953, only 
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three of the thirty-six delegates were female.32  And seven years after Liberation, the four 
Sairidan District leaders (quzhang fuzhang) were all members of the pre-Liberation 
elite.33   
 
From Tribal Leaders to County Leaders: Gélek Gyatso, the 2nd Joint Committee 
and Collaboration 
 
Far more illuminating than the brief description of the 1st Joint Committee 
meeting are a series of reports from the second meeting that illustrate policy priorities, 
methods of implementation, dynamics of leadership and the role of the indigenous elite 
during this still early period of state and nation building.  Set to begin on May 13, once 
again the start of the conference had to be delayed when less than half of the committee 
members arrived at the county seat on the appointed day.  When on May 23 the meeting 
finally did officially begin, just twenty-five committee members (fifteen from the 
government committee and ten from the consultative committee) took part, one of whom, 
a delegate from the Ködé Karing, left without permission on the conference’s first day.  
A report notes that preparations were poor, lodging inadequate, and food for the 
committee members and their horses insufficient.  In the end, however, the conference 
was declared a success.  The report proclaimed that the participants’ thinking was 
                                                
32 ZCPG 5, 37. One female representative was drawn from each of the three named socio-economic 
classes.  
 
33 This included the Shawonar Baihu Lhakba, who was not technically among the district chairmen but 
clearly maintained significant influence.  By this point he had lost his position as a vice-chairman of Zeku 





clarified, understanding improved, enthusiasm raised and incorrect attitudes rectified.34   
The implied corollary, however, was that thus far the indigenous headmen-cum-
committee members had failed to live up to the lofty pronouncements made the previous 
December at the 1st Zeku County Representative Conference.   
During the 2nd Joint Committee meetings, major speeches were delivered by 
Wagya, Lhakba, Guo Min and others.  However, it was Rongwo Monastery’s Gélek 
Gyatso, acting as vice-chairman of the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Region, who led 
much of the proceedings.  He opened the conference by reemphasizing now-familiar 
themes, for example declaring that national autonomy “was a happiness brought to us 
[Tibetans] by the CCP and Chairman Mao.”35  Later in the week patriotic spirit was 
raised a notch, when a man named Gujiasai (Ch.) arrived to address the committee 
members.  Presumably a Tibetan, Gujiasai had just returned from a tour of North Korea 
where he had spent two months as a member of the 3rd North Korea Greetings and 
Solicitude Delegation (chaoxian weiwentuan).  Gujiasai described the immense sacrifices 
the Korean people and the Chinese Volunteer Army had made in defense of the 
motherland and the masses. Although far from the frontlines, Gujiasai asserted that 
increasing pastoral production was inseparable from this ongoing struggle.  Comparing 
the American imperialists to the cruelty of Ma Bufang and Chiang Kaishek, Gujiasai 
                                                
34 ZCPG 5, 3-5.  A report declared that although the delay wasted several days of production time, “During 
the interim we researched many issues and prepared materials for the conference.”  Yet, transcripts dated 
May 13 to May 18 show that much of what was formally discussed from May 23 to 28 had already been 
worked out during these initial meetings.  Although I refer in this passage to the 2nd Joint Conference, here 
I do not distinguish between the interim period discussions for which detailed transcripts and reports exist, 
and the formal conference of which there are only summary reports.  
 




urged the committee members to relay his words to the tribes.36  Then, evoking Buddhist 
notions of compassion, he reminded the Tibetan committee members of the underlying 
importance of unity, declaring,  
We must build unity in this great spirit of self-sacrifice. If we don’t unite and 
work hard on production, how can we answer the volunteer army when they ask 
us? The main reason we read scripture is to seek goodness and become better. 
These [Buddhist] texts also talk about unity and mutual aid.  Then, why can’t we 
come together and help each other?37 
 
Gujiasai also reportedly reassured the committee members of the state’s commitment to 
religious freedom and promised that lingering grain supply issues would be resolved.  
Suggesting that counterrevolutionaries continued to receive aid from some quarters, he 
urged the attendees to do more to uncover spies.  Lastly, Gujiasai encouraged the Tibetan 
headmen to trust Han cadres as they would their elder brothers.38 
 Lhakba then gave what was described as a “captivating” eyewitness account of 
the changes he had witnessed on an official six-day visit to the provincial capital. 
Speaking “clearly and loudly,” and “gesturing wildly with his hands,” the Shawonar 
baihu described “a strange flour factory” in which machinery was used to turn grain into 
powder.  “Seeing it I was speechless,” he reportedly exclaimed.  Lhakba recounted being 
shuttled to mechanized lumber, wool, and milk factories, seeing tractors working in the 
fields (even being allowed to start a combustion engine), and visiting a nationality school 
where Tibetan students greeted him happily.  “I rode in cars to these places and to eat,” 
                                                
36 ZCPG 5, 58.  Gujiasai provided the committee with several grossly inflated statistics, claiming for 
example that 1.4 million American soldiers had been killed, “more than three times the 400,000 Tibetans 
living in Qinghai.”  Lhagyel also describes learning about the Resists America Support Korea Campaign 
while in Xining, after which he claims to have spread the news among the Hor.  See ZCPG 5, 55. 
 
37 Ibid., 59. 
 




he recalled.  “Anyway,” Lhakba excitedly told the crowd, “today’s Xining is completely 
different from the old Xining.”39  
All of this, of course, was meant to emphasize the benefits Zeku would accrue 
through the realization of national unity and the development of pastoral production. 
While it was loudly proclaimed that this promised prosperity was within reach, delegates 
were reminded that it was only achievable with the active and enthusiastic aid of a united 
indigenous leadership.  The Joint Committee was told that provincial leaders including 
Provincial Vice-Chairman Geshé Sherap Gyatso had urged Tibetan cadres (in Zeku 
referring largely to the indigenous elite) to actively work for the people and to not shirk 
responsibility by pleading ignorance, inexperience or illiteracy.40  Secretary Guo Min 
then stepped in, praising Lhakba’s report and the discussions that followed.  At the 
provincial meeting, Zeku had been specifically identified as among the most backward 
areas of the province.41  Now, armed with a chart Lhakba had brought from Xining, Guo 
warned delegates that Zeku’s pastoral sector was falling behind other areas of the 
province.  He further noted that while Zeku was a long way from the wonders Lhakba 
had seen in Xining, Xining was even further from Shanghai. “Therefore,” Secretary Guo 
concluded, “we must take more responsibilities and lead the people in improving pastoral 
production.”42  
                                                
39 ZGCK 5, 53. Lhakba was in Xining for a conference of prefectural and county-level chairmen and vice-
chairmen. According to another attendee, in all twenty-two chairmen and vice-chairmen from five 
prefectures (at the time still referred to as special regions) attended. 
 
40 ZCPG 5, 28. 
 
41 At the Provincial Conference, Haixi Prefecture in Qinghai’s far northwest and Zeku County had been 
singled out for being particularly underdeveloped ZCPG 5, 53.    
 




 With responsibility for the development of Zeku’s pastoral economy having been 
placed squarely on the shoulders of the indigenous elite, Gélek Gyatso began the next 
day’s proceedings by urging committee members to “arm yourselves” (wuzhuang ziji) 
with the methods of criticism and self-criticism.  At the provincial conference, county 
leaders and indigenous cadres had been encouraged to avail themselves to the corrective 
practice of criticism and self-criticism— methodologies embedded deep within the 
Chinese Communist Party’s operating principles.  This appears to have been in response 
to the perception that Tibetans were generally reticent to accept outside criticism and 
unwilling to make serious self-analyses of their own attitudes and work.43  Now Gélek 
Gyatso declared, 
I was ordered to come to Zeku to evaluate your work in the first half of 1954.  
Under the leadership of the CCP and Chairman Mao, we minority people have 
become masters of our own homes.  In these four years, what have we 
accomplished? In particular, what duties have the chairmen and county heads 
performed?  […].  I hope everyone will appreciate the spirit of criticism and self-
criticism.  This way we can discover our strengths and weaknesses, and improve 
ourselves and our work.44 
 
In his own speech to the committee, Chairman Wagya announced, “Through the 
education of the Chinese Communist Party we must take the responsibility of being the 
masters [of our own homes] and overcome shortcomings in our work.  We must equip 
                                                
43 ZCPG 5, 57. At one point Wagya reportedly remarked, “We county leaders and chairmen are all over 
forty years old. None of us are literate (budong wenhua) and we don’t understand criticism and self-
criticism.  In the future [I] hope the Han cadres will educate and help us.  Do not be afraid that we can’t 
handle it!”  Shisa Baihu Wande added, “Han cadres can take criticisms and make corrections, whereas we 
Tibetan cadres under the influence of feudal ideas can’t take criticisms.” ZCPG, 5, 54, 135, 136. 
 





ourselves through the methods of criticism and self-criticism.”45  Wagya therefore 
announced that each committee member would indeed make a self-criticism.46   
Among the first to go was Wagya’s younger brother Lhagyel, who began by 
remarking, “Today after listening to Chairman Gélek Gyatso, I am willing to evaluate my 
work.”  After noting that minorities had at long last become masters of their own homes, 
he rhetorically asked,  
However, have I exercised that right dutifully?  No, I have not.  The reason is that 
I am not educated and have not been able to get things done.  Have the Han cadres 
helped us enough? Yes they have.  I have nothing bad to say about them.  The 
problem is we minority cadres have not done enough.47 
 
 In turn, one after another committee members offered up their mea culpa. Serökyap 
confessed, “My political position is quite high, but I have not made much of 
contribution.”  He admitted to failing to attend a conference in the provincial capital and 
that unity was poor in his Gönshül Tribe where there had been an unelaborated religious 
dispute.48  Lhakba, who in his own report had described criticism and self-criticism as a 
“weapon” “similar to washing our faces everyday to cleanse ourselves,” announced that 
although he had been in the county seat for two months he had done little work.  By the 
same token, however, when he was in his home region, he disclosed, “I did not put my 
heart into my work.”  Having attended the provincial conference, Lhakba now declared 
that his awareness had been elevated and that he was determined to fix his ideological 
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46 ZCPG 5, 129. 
 
47 Ibid., 131.  Among the mistaken attitudes Lhagyel admitted committing was his insistence that the 
county seat be built in Hor. 
 
48 Serökyap mentions that religion had not been respected and that monks had been driven across the 




problems [sixiang shang de wenti] and improve his future work.49  In turn, several other 
committee members confessed that although they took a salary from the state, they did 
little actual work, were unclear of their duties, and admitted spending little time at the 
county seat.  Wande, baihu of the Shisa, noted that the county’s leadership was still not 
united, which trickled down into disputes between the masses.50 
 Implicitly underlying much of this conversation was a gulf between the 
indigenous elite and the Han cadres who had been sent into the region. That several of the 
committee members felt it necessary in their self-criticisms to proclaim that they held 
Han cadres in high regard, suggests that there was in fact simmering resentment and 
discord.  On multiple occasions, Wagya, Gélek Gyatso and others reminded the gathered 
headmen that Han cadres had left their “beloved homes and families” to come to Zeku to 
help Tibetans build their autonomous region and improve their lives.  Wagya purportedly 
emphasized, “They are not helping us with our work for their own benefit, but for the 
benefit of the minority nationalities.”51  
However, it is also clear that whether due to Han cadres’ usurpation of authority 
or a shirking of obligation on the part of the indigenous elites, much of the day-to-day 
work was being shouldered by the still smallish Han cadre force.  Yet, rather than blame 
Han cadres for failing to give local people real authority and position— for “building a 
home where they have no say” as the Northwest Bureau had put it52— Gélek Gyatso 
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urged the committee members to instead assume “full responsibility” for their 
autonomous region.  Citing his own experience, he recalled, “When I was serving as the 
chairman of Tongren County, I also had the tendency to rely on others.  I thought that 
there was the Party and the Han cadres and I did not have to be concerned.  […].  This is 
absolutely wrong.”53  Rather than depending on Secretary Guo, Gélek Gyatso insisted 
that Tibetan leaders embrace the challenge their official positions afforded them.  
Singling out several committee members by name, the vice-chairman again insisted that 
they not hide behind excuses of being uneducated, inexperienced or uncultured, 
remarking,  
The Ködé Karing chieftain (hongbu) has been appointed to lead the trade store.  
He feels that he does not know how to conduct business.  That is because he does 
not understand the greatness of the work.  Director Wande has just come to the 
county seat to serve as director of the pastoral office.  He must take this position, 
and moreover he must do a good job.  Director Chögyong, don’t fear the 
complexity of nationality work, boldly take up the responsibility.54 
 
Behind Gélek Gyatso’s remarks was the implication that the Tibetan headmen had 
indeed been acting more or less as figureheads, again as the Northwest Bureau had stated, 
with “position but no authority.”  Yet while the Northwest Bureau and Zhou Renshan had 
regularly blamed Han cadres for expressing chauvinistic attitudes, Gélek Gyatso 
criticized the passivity and parochialism of the indigenous elite.  Admitting that there was 
a palatable level of discontent on the grasslands— and implying that his own moral 
authority was suffering because of it—Lumbum confessed, “I don’t now what to do.  
Recently when I talk the masses do not listen.  They complain that the government does 
                                                                                                                                            
 






not work properly so what else can they do besides steal.”  Illustrating the gulf between 
the Party’s expectations of the indigenous elite-cum-committee members and those of 
local people, Lumbum reported that when he went back to the Gartsé, “They ask me what 
we are doing sitting in government [offices].”  Speaking more as an intermediary 
between the state and masses rather than a member of government, Lumbum went on to 
note that people have responded to the “leniency” of the regime not by working toward 
national unity but by purchasing weapons.  Giving the example of the Gönshül and his 
own Gartsé Tribe, Lumbum suggested that if action was not taken the situation could 
quickly turn dangerous.  Another committee member added that when the work groups 
went into the field, some of the masses did not tie up their dogs.  His meaning would 
have been clear to anyone familiar with the grasslands— the cadres were not welcome.  
He concluded, “It is because the government does not do what it says it will.”55   
In response to these types of comments, Gélek Gyatso reiterated that it was up to 
the indigenous Tibetan leadership— acting as representatives of their autonomous 
region— to implement the changes needed.  He proclaimed,  
The masses feel they should blame the People’s Government for not doing work 
well.  Of course, this is the responsibility of the People’s Government.  After all, 
who is the People’s Government?  It is the county leaders, chairmen and all the 
committee members at this conference.  Therefore whether the People’s 
g\Government does its work well or not, this is the responsibility of all of us.56   
 
Gélek Gyatso concluded by imploring the tribal leaders, “shoulder your responsibilities.  
Do not think of relying on Han cadres.”57 
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According to reports, Gujiasai’s testimony and Gelek Gyato’s criticisms in 
particular helped motivate the committee members to work harder in the future and 
propelled the meetings toward a successful conclusion.58  Admitting that intra-national 
unity indeed continued to be a problem, committee members reportedly pointed out that 
if the county chairmen and vice-chairmen themselves demonstrated unity, the other 
committee members would surely follow.  Then, “the masses would naturally unite 
together.”  Serökyap summarized the new spirit of the county leadership by purportedly 
proclaiming,  
Chairman Mao and the CCP gave me this glorious position, [I] must grasp it well. 
Yet, there are many errors and mistakes between and amongst the tribes. Even the 
monks (lama) of the monasteries are stirring up disunity. This conference has 
reminded me [of this], from now on I will definitely stay at the county seat, 
strengthen my self-analysis and do good work for people.59 
 
According to the meeting’s summary report, the other tribal leaders all expressed similar 
attitudes. Yet despite such assurances, the record of the indigenous committee members, 
whose active and enthusiastic leadership was considered to be of such crucial importance, 
continued to be spotty at best.  For example, Wande reportedly only attended the 
following summer’s full county committee meetings when Wagya personally went to 
escort him to the county seat.60  And during the same conference, a year after Gélek 
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Gyatso’s entreaties to take responsibility on their own shoulders, committee members had 
to be asked once again to move to the county seat “to live and work for the people.”61 
 
Nonetheless, the pointed exchange between Gélek Gyatso and Zeku’s tribal 
leadership was fairly unique.  Amid the reports and directives found in the county 
archives, Han cadres are consistently criticized for poor work methods and political 
consciousness.  On the other hand shortcomings among the Tibetan masses and leaders 
are generally excused as remnants of national exploitation and attributed to inadequate 
propaganda.  Yet here Gélek Gyatso was starkly critical of Zeku’s most powerful 
indigenous elites.  Some criticism was reserved for Han cadres, for example for failing to 
brief Tibetan department heads and not including Tibetan committee members in work 
meetings.   However, this was tempered by the admission that tribal leaders were often 
away from the county seat and generally disengaged from the day-to-day operations of 
government.62 
As the personal representative (and younger brother) of the Shartsang Lama and a 
member of the trio who had long exerted power over the greater Repgong region, perhaps 
Gélek Gyatso was one of the few people with both the prestige and position to speak to 
the gathered headmen in such a direct and critical manner.  Yet he was also acting as an 
agent of the Communist Party and Chinese state.  By most accounts, Gélek Gyatso would 
faithfully serve the Party for nearly two decades, maintaining his position even after most 
of his co-ethnic elites had been deposed, jailed and/or killed following the 1958 rebellion.   
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Tibetan committee members, Gélek Gyatso did note that mistakes are a natural outgrowth of work.  





Before then Gélek Gyatso had been perhaps the region’s leading indigenous elite 
advocate for the Party’s reform efforts, including cooperativization.  A monk since 
childhood, a year after addressing Zeku’s 2nd Joint Committee Gélek Gyatso reportedly 
broached the possibility of disrobing and applying for membership in the Chinese 
Communist Party.  Although he never was accepted into the Party, soon after Gélek 
Gyatso did in fact resume secular life.63   
From a nationalist perspective, Gélek Gyatso would seem to fall squarely into the 
category of collaborator.  However, the exchange at the 2nd Joint Committee meeting can 
also be seen in a different, less positivistic light.  Acting in his capacity as the vice-
chairman of Huangnan Prefecture, Gélek Gyatso was clearly pushing the Party’s United 
Front agenda that held the implementation of national autonomy to be the key integrative 
component of nation building.  However, as an indigenous headman himself (albeit with 
primarily religious rather than tribal prestige), Gélek Gyatso’s exhortation for Zeku’s 
tribal leaders to take personal responsibility for the affairs of their government can also 
be viewed as a genuine desire for Tibetans to carve out legitimate and sovereign space 
within the new political order.  Just as Wangchen Döndrup had sought to come to an 
accommodation with the new regime in which some semblance of an imperial 
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Gélek Gyatso had been admitted to the Guomindang in 1948.  In 1958, he married a Tibetan woman with 
whom he had two children.  Despite reentering secular life and his avowed interest in Party membership, 
throughout his government service Gélek Gyatso continued to be referred to as a “religious representative.” 
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Revolution.  Then, in 1967 he was “detained” by the military control committee as a “protective action” 
(baohu cuoshi).  Gélek Gyatso passed away in 1969, reportedly of natural causes.  He was only forty-nine.  
He would be rehabilitated in 1978.  Two years later the Huangnan Prefecture Committee held an official 
mourning for the former steward of Rongwo Monastery along with other departed members of the old 





relationship could be maintained, regional autonomy too offered the promise, no matter 
how fleeting, that Tibetans could remain “masters of their own homes,” even within the 
rapidly shrinking space allowed by the new nation state.  As both Tilly and Rana Mitter 
argue, collaboration is indeed a necessary component of all imperial formations.  What 
Gélek Gyatso may represent is the graying space between empire and nation (or in 
nationalist terms between collaborator and separatist) in which the old elite had to operate 
before such ambiguities and uneven temporalities were in a sense flattened by the 
demands of the nation-state. 
 
Down to the Tribes II: The 2nd Joint Committee and Social Welfare  
Having being reprimanded by Gélek Gyatso, the 2nd Joint Committee gave the 
gathered Tibetan headmen an opportunity to display their newfound commitment to unity 
and economic development.  The major substantive policy issue addressed at the 
meetings was the disbursement of livestock loans (xumu daikuan).  Along with direct 
emergency relief (shehui jiuji), welfare work, as the two programs were sometimes 
jointly referred, was considered to have several interlocking benefits.  Firstly, it would 
directly raise the living standards of the poorest of the pastoral masses.  Second, by 
infusing the grasslands with additional resources, in particular breeding animals, it would 
stimulate the overall pastoral economy.  With incomes up and animal ownership 
extended to formerly destitute households, social stability would be consolidated 
(presumably because there would be less inducement for banditry and animal wrestling). 
Moreover, the work itself— registering households, counting livestock, assessing 




foundation for the Party’s investigations into the “concrete conditions” of the grasslands 
and bring its cadres into direct contact with the pastoral masses.  Lastly, through the 
accumulated economic and social benefits state largess provided, the masses would come 
to understand the Party’s concern for their livelihoods, patriotic consciousness would 
rise, and Zeku’s Tibetan pastoralists would be gradually integrated— economically, 
politically and emotionally— into the nation-state.64 
While sporadic social welfare programs stretched back as far as the 1952 Pastoral 
Work Teams, they appear to have been conducted with little oversight or organization.65 
On January 15, 1954, in response to a directive from the prefecture committee, an 
intensified welfare effort was begun “in order to allow the bitterly poor pastoral masses to 
set up household production, […], [and] improve the living standards of the broad 
masses.”66  Initially four work groups were organized. Each was officially led by a 
Tibetan cadre while a Han cadre served as assistant group leader.  As per usual, after 
being sent down to the tribes, the work groups first “consulted” with local headmen to 
ease their apprehensions and ensure their understanding of welfare policies.  Then in 
discussions between the work group, tribal leaders and the heads of each tsowa, a seven 
to eleven-person welfare committee was organized (jiuji weiyuanhui, literally emergency 
relief committee) and tasked with producing a list of welfare candidates.  In the end, the 
welfare committees chose 323 households with 1,276 people to receive subsidies, or 
according to contemporary statistics 18% of the total county population of 17,020 
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residents.  Adhering to the principle of equal distribution (pingjun zhuyi), by virtue of 
having the largest population the Hor received by far the largest portion of the funds, ten 
times what was received by the county’s smaller tribes.67  It was determined that during 
earlier efforts many welfare recipients had not reinvested in production.  Therefore, 120 
million of the 150 million yuan welfare budget was specifically earmarked for animal 
purchases.  The remainder was dispensed to the desperately poor, including widows, 
orphans, the elderly and the infirmed, in the form of emergency grain subsidies.68 
A report by the Hor Work Group cited the example of Luba Yihe (Ch.), a 
“poverty-stricken herdsman” (pinku mumin) of the Detsang Tsowa, that surely represents 
the manner in which social welfare was envisioned improving both the livelihoods of the 
masses and their relationship to the Party-state.  It reads in full,  
During the period of the old society of the bandit Ma Bufang, [we] did not own a 
single head of cattle or sheep, so we were often starving, freezing, beaten and 
bullied.  After Liberation the Communist Party came, now my life is completely 
different than before.  In June 1953, the People’s Government loaned me two 
head of cattle, now a calf has been born.  This January the People’s Government 
again gave me a head of cattle [this time] as emergency relief.  Now in total I 
have four heads of cattle.  Before I did not eat butter nor drink milk.  Now I have 
both.  My heart cannot express [my happiness], I truly thank the Chinese 
Communist Party and Chairman Mao.  Everyone in our herding group responds to 
the call of the People’s Government, and enthusiastically takes action, digging up 
yams and pasturing the animals well.  Now the People’s Government has 
established a district for us, we are happy from the bottoms of our hearts.  In the 
future, when the government constructs buildings, I will certainly go and work, 
[and help] establish the district government [township].69 
 
                                                
67 The Hor received more than 36 million in aid, while the Shisa, Ködé Karing and Khéri Chunga received 
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68 ZCPC 2, 28-29; ZCPG 2, 29-30. According to the report, 5394.5 kg of grain was distributed to 156 
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household.  See also Zeku Xianzhi, 351. 
 




Yet, despite Luba Yihe’s and several similar testimonials, it is clear that in sum the 
program was considered to have been a failure.  Hoping to learn from the experiences of 
1952, at every level— work groups, tribal leaders, welfare committees and the masses— 
the centrality of propaganda to the successful implementation of the welfare program had 
been emphasized.  However, a work report concluded that like earlier efforts, the 1954 
program suffered from a lack of clarity on both the part of state representatives and the 
local population.  Moreover, a dearth of reliable data, the absence of a distribution 
system, and weak oversight meant that animals had often been given to unqualified 
recipients while the destitute had been left wanting, and too often management of the 
loan animals was substandard.  Work groups were said to have simply “discussed 
policies” (i.e. persuasion) while not seeking feedback (i.e. consultation).  As a result the 
cadres did not understand local conditions and were unable to draft the tsowa chieftains 
onto the welfare committees nor enlist their aid in spreading policies to the masses.70  
Therefore, some welfare recipients did not receive the total aid they were promised, while 
others complained about inequalities between tribal groupings.  Moreover, according to 
the report many of the indigenous elite felt that the welfare program offered them no 
personal benefit and therefore did not show enthusiasm for the work.  For example, 
having failed to properly consult with local leaders, the Sonak Work Group was forced to 
“persuade” them to actively participate in the program.  Thus, from the state’s 
perspective both the economic and the propagandistic value of welfare work had been 
largely squandered.  
                                                




In the spring of 1954, upper-levels demanded a renewed effort to maximize the 
benefits of social welfare.  Under the slogan “liberate production resources as the core, 
livelihood resources as supplementary” (jiefang shengchan ziliao weizhu, shenghuo ziliao 
weipu), animal loans were again to be emphasized over emergency relief.71  Production 
livestock (shengchan xumu) was to be dispensed to those households that had labor 
surpluses but did not possess enough animals to otherwise grow production.  By loaning 
breeding animals, the state hoped to ensure an immediate reinvestment in the pastoral 
economy through what was essentially a demand-side stimulus.  On the other hand, the 
state would continue to provide emergency relief in the form of direct subsidies of 
animals (defined as livelihood animals (shenghuo xumu)), grain and cash to households 
that did not have the labor resources needed to exploit additional livestock.72  
The major difference between the new program and earlier efforts was the 
abandonment of the principle of  “equal distribution.”  Instead, the guiding policy was to 
be “Focused Relief while Considering the Entirety” (zhongdian jiuji, yiban zhaogu, 
hereafter “Focused Relief”).  Under this principle, rather than spread a limited amount of 
resources thinly across the grasslands, select test sites would be prioritized.  In doing so, 
it was reasoned, benefits could be maximized, the process more easily monitored, and 
experiences gathered and shared.73  However, the policy of Focused Relief also meant 
that initially not all tribes and tsowa would receive equal or even proportional support 
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72 ZCPG 5, 64, 71, 130; ZCPC 6 84. ZCPG 5, 48, 50.  Loans were divided into “livestock protection loans” 
(baoxu diakuan) and “breeding livestock loans” (zhongxu daikuan).  According to Lhagyel, of the 230 
million yuan allocated for animal loans in 1954, 30% went to the former and 70% the latter.  Director Ge 
(see below) added that animal protection loans were to be returned at the end of the same year while 
breeding loans were not due for several years.  
 




from the state.  At the 2nd Joint Committee meeting, Gélek Gyatso reminded the gathered 
leaders that based on the principles of Focused Relief the prefecture had decided to 
allocate the majority of its loan budget to Jianzha and Tongren Counties, leaving Zeku 
with an already diminished piece of the welfare pie.74  Now, the Zeku County Joint 
Committee was being asked to choose one area of its already fragmented grasslands to 
receive substantial state subsidies to the disadvantage of the others.  Acknowledging that 
the policy brought with it the potential for discontent and disunity, Secretary Guo Min 
reminded the gathering, “all [committee] members must understand that these loans are 
in fact limited, [so] we have decided to focus distribution while [keeping] the entirety 
under consideration [...].”75   
Considering the explicit emphasis on national unity that had dominated work 
during the previous year, the switch to the principle of Focused Relief is representative of 
a subtle shift in the Party’s priorities.  Under the principle of Equal Distribution, national 
unity had been considered the basis of all work, even to the detriment of production.  
Now, Focused Relief reversed the equation.  Of course unity work could not be ignored.  
Guo Min made this clear, stating, “At the same time [Focused Relief is implemented], we 
should increase education, [we] do not want negative thoughts to arise in those who are 
not receiving loans.”76  Thus, propaganda would have to be effectively deployed so that 
the masses would understand that Focused Relief benefited the entire county, the entire 
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nation and ultimately each household.  This was mainly expressed through the dictum of 
“Mutual Support of Industry, Agriculture and Pastoralism” (gong, nong, mu huxiang 
chiyuan, hereafter “Mutual Support”).  In this formula, developing the overall pastoral 
economy would reap individual households indirect benefits through an integrated 
national economy.  Simply put, by producing hides, wool, meat and other animal 
products the pastoral regions would support industrialization, which in turn would allow 
for the increased agricultural output  that would provide pastoralists the much-needed 
grains they could not themselves produce.  As a member of the Joint Committee 
reportedly remarked, “If we don’t receive help from the workers and grain from peasants, 
there will be no progress in our pastoral region.  If we don’t provide high quality wool 
and skins to industry, they won’t be able to produce high-quality products, so we are 
interdependent.”77   
Keeping in mind the previous autumn’s stalemate over the placement of the 
county seat, the disbursement of state aid should have been a deeply divisive topic for the 
tribal leaders, each of whom it can be assumed would have been eager to funnel resources 
back to his bailiwick.  Instead, whether prompted by a genuine desire for unity and a 
commitment to the greater good or acting under the watchful eye of Gélek Gyatso and 
Guo Min, indigenous committee members went to great lengths to prove their heightened 
political consciousness.  After Gélek Gyatso officially announced the shift in policy, 
Director Ge (Ge Kezhang) of the Huangnan Prefecture Committee, who had personally 
traveled to Xining to learn about social welfare work, addressed the gathering.78  
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Immediately following Director Ge, according to the meeting’s abridged transcripts, 
Wagya declared his preference for locating the first focus site among either the Méshül or 
Shawonar Tribes.  Then, as per Director Ge’s purported suggestion, Wagya reluctantly 
added to the list the Ratsang Tsowa of his own Hor Tribe.  However, he preempted 
anticipated criticism by noting that the Ratsang’s close connection to his brother Lhagyel 
rendered it unacceptable.  Instead, the Hor qianhu invited the other committee members 
to weigh in, while suggesting still another possible site, this time within the Gartsé 
territories.79  Several speakers later, Lhagyel himself exclaimed, “We are [county] 
committee members and should always remember our responsibilities. We should not 
have the narrow-minded concept of working for each of our own relatives and friends.” 
Despite pointedly noting that Director Ge had recommended the Ratsang “because it 
would benefit production,” Lhagyel declared it to be an “inappropriate” focus site.  As if 
the decision was ultimately out of his hands, he then added, “However, it should be 
researched and discussed by all.  If everyone decides on the Hor or another tribe as the 
focus area, I have no objection.”80   
While it is impossible to know what kind of behind-the-scenes maneuvering may 
have predisposed the official discussions, it seems that the Hor committee members had 
laid the political cover necessitated by the joint demands of developing production and 
                                                                                                                                            
Ge nor An’s full name is given.  While either could be a relatively uncommon Chinese surname, it seems 
more likely that they were Tibetans whose names had been shortened to accord with Chinese practice.  In 
the same document some Tibetan office holders are identified by their full Sinicized Tibetan name, some 
by a shortened single-character name or both.  For example, Gélek Gyatso is referred to both as Ge Zhuxi 
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known figures such as Directors Ge and An. 
 
79 ZCPG 5, 48-49. Here the Ratsang is referred to as a herding group (quanzi).  Elsewhere, the Hor Work 
Group makes it clear that the Ratsang were one of the five “tribes” (buluo) of the Hor.  ZCPG 1, 22.  See 
also Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 244-245. 
 




national unity.  Although explicitly noting that the experts objectively preferred the 
Ratsang as the focus site, the Hor leadership had outwardly rejected nepotism and 
opportunism and instead agreed in principle that it should be elsewhere.  Among those 
expressing a preference for another focus site was Chögyong, a Hor committee member 
who in his indigenous capacity was himself baihu of the Ratsang Tsowa.81   
In a stark reversal from the earlier controversy over the county seat in which tribal 
leaders had quickly closed rank to block the ambitions of Wagya and the Hor, now one 
after another the remaining committee members endorsed the Ratsang site.  Citing 
Chögyong’s responsible leadership, for example, Vice-chairman Tsintar of the Méshül 
threw his support behind the Ratsang.  Luociri of the Wöngya agreed, claiming that his 
own experience was too limited for such a responsibility while expressing his assurance 
that the Ratsang would set a good example for future welfare work.  Although a non-
voting attendee, the Ködé Karing Lama also recommended Hor, arguing (and echoing an 
official talking point) that if loans were spread too thin their benefits would be lost.82  
Having proclaimed his tribe to be too small and without the expertise to host the program 
itself, Wande, baihu of the Shisa and director of the county pastoral office, also deferred 
to the Hor, while Gongbao (Ch.) of the Sonak pledge to support the majority’s decision.  
When no objections were raised to Vice-chairman Lumbum’s call for a vote, the Hor 
Ratsang Tsowa was adopted as the animal loan focus site.83   
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82 The lama is simply identified as the Ködé Karing Huofo (“living Buddha”). 
 
83 Ibid., 50-52. Although Gélek Gyatso expressed agreement with the decision to choose Ratsang as the 
primary animal loan site, he wondered out loud why the Shisa and Méshül had not been seriously 
considered, unilaterally declaring that they would be targeted when the next round of funding became 




The selection of the Ratsang is framed as a victory for national unity and 
increased production.  However, given the admitted reluctance of tribal elites to support 
the previous welfare campaign, it is also possible that many had little interest in a 
program that would seem to be of little personal benefit.  Moreover, considering the 
increased state presence that came along with animal loan and welfare work, many of the 
tribal leaders may have considered the promised economic stimulus to be a poor trade 
off.  After all, the Party admitted that in addition to spurring production, welfare work 
held the promise of raising patriotic consciousness and thereby undermining the tribal 
divisions upon which these headmen’s prestige and authority rested. 
Nonetheless, choosing a focus site was only the first step.  In the field the initial 
challenge was identifying recipients and distributing livestock loans in a manner that 
would maximize the economic and propagandistic benefits of a finite amount of 
resources.  To that end, the Hor Work Group first solicited suggestions and the “destitute 
households” (chipinhu) and “semi-destitute households” (banchipinhu) were singled out.  
Then, under the direction of Director Ge of the Huangnan Prefecture Committee, a loan 
committee (daikuan weiyuanhui) was formed to investigate the potential recipients, 
presumably to ensure they were indeed qualified and not benefiting from position or 
relationships as had allegedly occurred during earlier allocations of aid.  It may have been 
through Director Ge’s preliminary fieldwork that the Hor’s Ratsang Tsowa was first 
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identified as a possible focus site, the report confirming that the “Three Goods (sanhao) 
‘water, grass, [and] climate,’” were all readily available.84   
However, identifying qualified households was only half of the work.  Before 
distribution could begin, loan animals had to be acquired.  As far as can be told, the state 
was not infusing new livestock into the region.  Instead animals were to be reallocated 
from existing stocks.  However, the Three No’s expressly prohibited the redistribution of 
pastoral wealth, at least through coercive measures.  Therefore, at the same time that the 
loan committee was investigating potential recipients it was also tasked with mobilizing 
well-off pastoralists to sell their animals to the state, thereby guaranteeing a pool of 
available loan animals.85  Unsurprisingly, it would turn out that convincing wealthy 
households to sell livestock was more difficult than persuading poor households to accept 
loans.  A 1956 work plan would describe livestock purchases as the “most complex and 
delicate task of welfare work.”86 
Overall, the Hor Work Group reported positive results in this first experiment at 
“Focused Relief.”  One of the perceived benefits of the policy was that the leadership 
would be better able to oversee management of the loan animals, a crucial aspect said to 
have been neglected during previous attempts to distribute aid.87  The Party was 
convinced that the key to raising pastoral production was the rationalization of scientific 
                                                




86 ZCPG 7, 109. 
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animal management and herding practices.88  While some herdsman did prove themselves 
poor managers of their loan animals, others were praised for their attention to animal 
management.  For example, a herdsman named Buqie (Ch.) had turned an earlier loan of 
fifteen sheep into fourteen lambs.  The report approvingly noted that in spring he had 
built a three-meter tall pen to protect his investment.  In recognition of his success, Buqie 
was now loaned an additional twenty-five sheep.  Another herdsman was lauded for 
being a particularly good manager within his herding group.  As proof, it was reported 
that he had not lost a single animal. The loan committee itself was praised by the county 
for being instrumental in the successful execution of the test program.89  In total, the Hor 
Work Group would distribute 160 million yuan worth of animals as loans, helping sixty-
two impoverished households.90  According to the work group’s own assessment, 
“Through these loans, the broad pastoral masses saw the policy of ‘No Division and No 
Struggle’ in practice.  It further stimulated the activism of the masses and [their] 
enthusiasm for production.”91  As a result, some rich herdsmen were reportedly motivated 
to sell their animals and recipient households tended to manage their new livestock well.  
 
A more detailed account of welfare work is provided in a 1955 report issued by 
the county’s pastoral office.  This time “in accordance with the conditions within the 
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90 A report filed by Lhakba indicates that in total 167.16 million yuan was spent purchasing the 1,262 
female sheep that were loaned to the Hor Ratsang.  An additional 48.3 million was spent on 374 sheep for 
twenty Shisa households.  Each family received between ten and thirty sheep. ZCPG 5, 78.  
 





tribes,” the Wöngya, Shawonar and Sonak were chosen as 1955’s animal loan focus 
sites.92  Building on the previous year’s experiences, in the spring a Loan Work Group 
(daikuan gongzuozu) was sent from the prefecture to oversee the implementation of the 
program.  The work group first brought together local cadres to train them in policies and 
procedures.  Then, two new work groups were formed, each composed of a mixture of 
prefectural and county-level cadres, and sent to the Wöngya and Shawonar Tribes.   
Using the Shawonar as an example, the report detailed a three-stage pattern of 
loan work that can be summarized as: educate and consult, purchase and allocate, and re-
evaluate.93  Having come to a better understanding of climatic conditions and seasonal 
breeding patterns, work began in July when animals had regained their strength from the 
harsh winter.94  In the “first stage,” loan policies were actively spread through intensive 
propaganda efforts while loan candidates were simultaneously investigated.  Through 
“consultation” with tribal leaders, a list of potential welfare recipients was created.  
Members of the welfare committee and the government’s work group then split into 
small groups to visit each of the Shawonar’s herding groups (quanzi) to explain the 
program.  They were ordered to stress the “Three No’s and Two Benefits,”95 presumably 
to allay concerns among wealthier herdsmen, and to carefully investigate the households 
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that had been recommended by the tribe’s welfare committee.  Afterwards, the various 
small groups reconvened at a large gathering to “democratically discuss” their findings 
and finalize the loan recipient list.96  
Propaganda work complete, in the second stage animal purchases and 
disbursements were to proceed.  In order to acquire the necessary loan animals, purchases 
began a few days before the loans were due to be distributed.  However, this proved to be 
too complicated, although the report does not make clear what the specific difficulties 
might have been.  Therefore, midway through the period the work groups decided to 
conduct purchases and dispense loans side-by-side.  “In order to avoid animal deaths and 
chaos,” in Shawonar several purchase sites were chosen.  At each, indigenous elites 
announced the number of animals they would be selling.  Following this example, the 
masses were encouraged to do the same.  Evoking images of an open grassland livestock 
market, the report simple notes, “When the number of livestock that was going to be sold 
became equal to the amount to be loaned, the buying began.”97  Cadres were on hand to 
evaluate the process, register households, issue payments, and oversee the redistribution 
of animals.  In this manner not only could they check the credentials of the loan 
recipients but they could also guarantee that the funds were indeed being immediately 
converted into animal loans. 
Finally, in the third stage cadres re-evaluated the program, received feedback 
from the masses and reported to their superiors.  In addition, recipient households had to 
be encouraged to improve their animal management techniques to protect their 
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investments and thereby contribute to increased production.  In Shawonar, households 
that had received loans were therefore brought together in order to educate them in 
herding and animal protection methods.98  Yet despite stressing oversight of post-loan 
animal management as the key to maximizing the economic benefits of the program, this 
aspect of the work was reportedly the most often neglected.  For example, a 1956 welfare 
report alleged that cadres displayed the attitude of, “paying attention to distribution and 
not caring about production,” concluding, “In this area, our county has done a poor 
job.”99   
 Overall, the 1955 Welfare Work Report declared that the program went smoothly 
and that most loan recipients were satisfied.  Now calculated in the new currency, the 
report indicated that in all 3,655 female sheep with a total value of 47,001 yuan had been 
redistributed as animal loans.100  As would be expected, the report quoted several 
members of the masses enthusiastically lauding the program, for example comparing 
Chairman Mao and the CCP to parents providing for their children.101  Yet, the report 
also acknowledged that not all herdsmen were so effusive in their praise.  Although the 
distinction is only made indirectly, it is clear that the “bitterly poor herdsmen”— the loan 
recipients— were generally more approving than those expected to sell their animals to 
support the program.  For example, Huaxia (Ch.) from the Wöngya expressed confusion 
at what seemed to him the incongruous idea that to increase production he should reduce 
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his herd size, asking, “Did the People’s Government want me to increase the number of 
animals, or sell them?”  Another herdsman, Niri’er (Ch.), displayed his displeasure in 
more confrontational language that exposes the contradiction between volunteerism and 
commandism that lurked just below the surface.  According to the report, “When Zhuotai, 
a [Tibetan] cadre, went to Nire’er’s home to get sheep, Niri’er exclaimed, ‘You came to 
get sheep when no one was home.  You are just like Ma Bufang before.”  The report 
concludes, “From these two people we can see that although on the surface the sheep 
from Wöngya were sold voluntarily, actually [quotas] were allocated to the people.”102   
The Wöngya Work Group’s admission highlights a fundamental ambivalence 
lying at the point where United Front/mass line principles met policy implementation. 
Firstly, although it was continually stressed that local cadres needed to investigate, 
understand and account for the concrete conditions that existed in their localities, there 
was very limited space for those cadres to exercise innovation based on their findings.  
Instead policy was formulated at higher levels and sent downward for implementation.  In 
fact, time and again provincial, prefectural or county directives rebuke those below them 
for contradictorily a) not understanding the concrete conditions of the region in which 
they worked, and b) failing to implement policy as directed by their superiors.   
Secondly, cadres were expected to execute these policies and meet production 
quotas without reverting to coercion.  For example, it was emphasized that work group 
leaders, loan committees and well-off pastoralists must all clearly understand that the sale 
of livestock was strictly voluntary.  However, no contingency is found in the documents 
for the possibility that pastoralists would refuse to agree to sell sufficient animals to cover 
                                                




the promised loans.  Instead, it was assumed that propaganda would be enough; the 
unspoken corollary was that if there was an animal deficit it spoke not to deficiencies in 
the overall policy nor the backwardness of the indigenous elite, but to the poor 
propaganda work and political consciousness of the cadres involved.  The 1955 welfare 
report, for example, acknowledges that sheep were being purchased for just under market 
price and that many herdsmen were reluctant to sell female sheep that could otherwise 
provide their owners with offspring.  These were the very sheep the state wished to loan 
to the poorest households.103  In other cases, as noted below, preset quotas did have to be 
met.  Thus it is unsurprising that circumstantial evidence— occasionally made explicit— 
suggests that it was not uncommon for cadres to exert pressure on pastoralists, apparently 
often through the levying of fines (fakuan), to sell livestock to the state.104 
Nearly two years after the 2nd Joint Committee launched “Focused Relief,” and 
despite the propaganda work that went along with it, the 1956 welfare work plan would 
note that both native and outside cadres continued to lack a sufficient understanding of 
welfare policies.  As a consequence neither did the tribal leaders nor the masses.  In fact, 
the report contended that many local people still held on to the long discredited concept 
of “equal distribution.”105  Moreover, it conceded that many were still unconvinced that 
their lives could be improved through government programs.  Instead they insisted that 
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fate had already dealt them a poor hand, the reference to superstition itself an 
admonishment suggesting the poor implementation of propaganda work.   
Perhaps most alarming, however, was the case of Tibetan herdsman named 
Caidan (Ch.).  According to the 1955 welfare work report, “Caidan said in a pessimistic 
and disappointed tone, ‘If you want to distribute [my animals], then go ahead.  As long as 
there is enough left to feed and cloth me.  Sooner or later the herds will be divided 
anyway.’”106  Captured in Caidan’s words was an intrinsic understanding of the nature of 
the CCP’s policies in Amdo.  Although preaching the Three No’s, which explicitly 
prohibited the redistribution of wealth, the Party was not interested in permanently 
protecting the status quo.  Zhou Renshan had made this clear to the very cadres who were 
now leading the Party’s efforts in pastoral regions.  While in the short run indigenous 
elites and tribal structures were to be supported and relied upon, it was only through 
breaking down traditional economic and political relationships that the productive 
capacities of the grasslands could finally reach their potential.  Social welfare work was a 
step toward that eventual goal.  It allowed cadres the opportunity to investigate pastoral 
conditions on the ground, to register populations and animal numbers, and begin to build 
personal relationships with the pastoral masses.  For sure this process still had to be 
mediated through the pre-Liberation elite.  Yet in redistributing animals to the poorest of 
the grassland’s inhabitants, and it hoped simultaneously spurring production, the Party 
was attempting to expand its reach beyond the accommodation it had forged with the 
region’s paramount figures.  This hope was perhaps best expressed in a quote attributed 
to the Shawonar loan recipient Lirideng (Ch.) who allegedly proclaimed, “Chairman 
                                                




Mao’s concern for us poor people is even greater than a parent’s. I will take care of the 
loaned cattle and sheep with all my heart. I am a person who had fallen down, now I have 




Down to the Tribes III: The 3rd Joint Committee Meeting, Mutual Support and 
Patriotic Taxes 
Despite the fairly formulaic odes to Chairman Mao and the Party leadership that 
appear as headings on many Party and government documents, socialist dogma is only 
lightly sprinkled across Zeku’s mid-1950s archival materials.  Instead, at their core the 
CCP’s state and nation building efforts were eminently practical in nature, albeit a 
practicality embedded in certain underlying assumptions.108  In particular, it was 
understood that increasing living standards was the single most effective way to 
overcome the doubts and anxieties of the local population.  Social welfare was therefore 
one important component of an overall strategy to develop the productive capacities of 
the grasslands while integrating the local population into the state administratively and 
economically.  
However, in the end states are extractive entities.  Increasing production was not 
simply a matter of raising living standards.  The pastoral sector was also seen as an 
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108 In fact, in a set of 1955 materials sent by Qinghai Province to the Huangnan Prefecture People’s 
Representatives Committee, delegates were reminded, “Finally, while working in pastoral areas we must 
adopt the directive of ‘move cautiously and with steady steps.’  In other words, all work must be done in a 




integral (if subsidiary) part of an imagined integrated, industrialized socialist economy.  
While the state needed to acquire animals to support its animal loan programs, these 
resources were being immediately pumped back into the local economy.  In fact, it seems 
that the animals themselves were largely redistributed within the same tribes and perhaps 
even the same tsowa from which they came.  Whether to support state capacity itself or to 
funnel into the larger economy, the state also needed to be able to remove resources from 
the grasslands.  During the transitional period, it had two primary ways in which to do so: 
state purchases and taxation. 
Just as social welfare (or resource allocation) had been the main topic of 
discussion of the county’s 2nd Joint Committee, at the third meeting attention turned to 
the topic of resource extraction.  However, for the third straight time underwhelming 
attendance forced a several-day postponement.  When the 3rd Joint Committee was finally 
convened on September 7, only twenty-seven of the forty-two members of the two 
committees and thirteen observers were present.  As per usual, rather than directly 
blaming the missing committee members, the report concluded, “This shows that we have 
not done enough ideological education with the [committee] members and we have not 
maintained close contact with them.”109   
The meeting itself was timed to follow the 1st Qinghai Provincial People’s 
Representative Congress and Huangnan Prefecture’s own representative meetings.  In 
this way Wagya in particular, who had attended both, could “convey the spirit” of the two 
upper-level conferences— in essence personally transmitting the Party’s instructions 
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from the province through the prefecture, down to the county, and through the Joint 
Committee to the sub-county level.110  Once begun, Party Secretary Guo Min delivered a 
speech on the recently adopted state constitution.  Focusing on its protections for 
minority peoples, Guo described the constitution as an “‘amulet’ (hushingfu) protecting 
the People’s lives and property.”111  He compared the People’s Republic of China 
favorably to the segregation-era United States, where “the white race” (baizhong) earned 
30%-50% more than “the black race” (heizhong) for the same work and where the 
different nationalities could not attend the same schools.  Unlike the racism of capitalist 
nations, Guo told the committee, the PRC constitution guaranteed national equality, 
prohibited discrimination and national oppression, and inscribed into law the principle of 
national autonomy for minority people.112  Committee members were urged to study the 
constitution and spread its meaning to the masses.  As per usual, production tasks, 
grassland disputes, and welfare work were also discussed.113  
However, the emphasis of the meetings was on the procurement of animals and 
animal bi-products through taxation and voluntary sales.  While social welfare programs 
were considered to be a way to demonstrate the magnanimity of the Party and state, 
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taxation had the potential to do just the opposite.  Conscious that the extractive measures 
of the Ma Bufang regime had been among the principal causes of conflict between 
Xining and local peoples, at the meeting speakers sought to contrast Ma’s exploitive 
taxes from those of the new state. Taking his cue from higher levels, Wagya declared,  
Paying taxes to the state is the obligation of all the masses of the people. It is also 
the concrete manifestation of patriotism. During the period of Guomindang rule, 
their taxes were to enrich themselves.  On the contrary in the present period of the 
[rule of] the people, “[taxes] are acquired from the people and used for the 
people” (quzhi yumin, yongzhi yumin).114 
 
Wagya noted, for example, that it was the animal taxes and purchases that underwrote 
welfare work, which in turn promoted production and increased living standards.  He also 
declared that taxes supported national defense.  However, it was the “Mutual Support of 
Industry, Agriculture and Pastoralism,” first introduced at the 2nd Joint Committee 
meeting, that became the core principle under which both taxes and purchases were to be 
promoted.  Wagya explained,   
[…] there is a very intimate relationship between the livelihood of the people of 
our pastoral regions and the socialist industrialization of the country. For 
example, by using machines to carry out production like milking cows, shearing 
wool etc, pastoral production will develop faster, the mechanization of activities 
such as shearing wool will boost the development of animal husbandry and the 
lives of the people of pastoral regions will become better and better. At the same 
time, the people of our pastoral regions will also put a lot of effort into developing 
production, [and] providing sufficient raw materials such as hides and wool etc 
for industry and meats for city people and farm animals for agricultural regions.115 
 
                                                
114 ZCPG 5, 70. 
 
115 Ibid.  Despite purported “mutual support” for the three sectors, Wagya’s explanation implicitly 
recognizes the primacy of industry.  Presumably working off the Party’s script, he declared that the 
fundamental task during the transitional period is to “gradually develop our country from a backward 
agricultural country to an advanced socialist industrial country. When industrialization is obtained, the 
motherland will have a modernized national defense, and the imperialists will not dare come and invade us. 
With industry developed, agricultural and pastoralism will be supported, and the production and livelihoods 






Hoping to enlist the support of the gathered tribal leaders, Wagya therefore declared tax 
collection and animal purchase work to be a “glorious task,” insisting, “Therefore we 
must energetically promote the tax policies to the broad pastoral masses.”  He announced 
that the Huangnan Prefecture Committee had set a Zeku County purchase target of 802 
heads of cattle and 10,709 sheep.  The county committee then allotted specific quotas to 
each tribe based on their “specific conditions,” presumably referring to size and relative 
prosperity.116   
Next the committee members were divided into four small groups to “discuss and 
study” the methods for tax collection and animal purchases.117  More than anything, 
committee members were urged to lead by example, to accurately register their own 
livestock numbers, be the first to pay their taxes, and voluntarily sell surplus animals to 
the state.  They were reminded, “Only in this way can we raise the people’s 
consciousness and show them that we are serving the people.”  Citing a clause in the tax 
code, the report noted that those who paid their taxes voluntarily and truthfully, and 
encouraged others to do so as well, would receive praise and rewards.118  On the other 
hand, tribal leaders were told to hold mass meetings and criticize those who were 
unwilling to pay taxes or made inaccurate reports.  Importantly, however, at this time tax 
evasion was not treated as a criminal or counterrevolutionary offense.  Instead it was 
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considered a problem of education and awareness.  Cadres and local leaders were urged 
to use propaganda, not punishments, to raise the violator’s consciousness.119   
Having been made to understand the importance of “Mutual Support,” several of 
the tribal committee members reportedly pledged to sell their own animals to the state.  
For example, Luociri from the Wöngya immediately announced that he would sell twenty 
sheep and three heads of cattle.  Moreover, he promised to “return to his tribe” to 
encourage the masses to do the same.120  Hitting upon many of the program’s talking 
points, Yangdan, the Xuhumang headman and vice-secretary of the 1st District 
Preparatory Committee purportedly exclaimed, 
In the past one person the Bandit Ma enjoyed good fortune, now the People’s 
Government serves us people, just as our Hor Ratsang Tribe received lots of loans 
from the government this year, every year the government also sends lots of 
emergency relief funds, providing emergency relief to the bitterly poor herdsmen, 
we should pay taxes to the government, [it] is glorious.  This year I will certainly 
accurately report my livestock numbers.  And [I will] take responsibility to ensure 
that the Xuhumang Tribe’s livestock numbers are also accurately reported.”121 
 
In still another example of tax-paying, animal-selling zeal, the report claimed,  
[…] after the Ködé Karing committee member Dargyé returned to his tribe, he 
brought people together and told them about the lofty meaning of paying the 
animal tax and the mutual support of industry, agriculture and pastoralism.  
Before work began he registered all the households in the tribe in Tibetan and 
Chinese. In order to smoothly implement work and prevent bad elements doing 
harm, he organized a self-defense brigade and everyday sent them out to watch. 
He also personally lived with the work group and studied how to make animal 
purchases. And he mobilized people to sell their livestock to the country.122 
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Explicitly recognizing the continued role of the indigenous elite, this section of the report 
ends by noting that the Ködé Karing provided the state 75% more animals than the 
previous year, thus meeting their quota.  It exclaimed, “This success cannot be separated 
from Committee Member Dargyé’s enthusiastic work.”123   
However, statistical improvements mask a more mixed record of success.  A week 
after the 3rd Joint Committee meeting ended the Hor Work Group began animal tax 
collection and purchase work. They were instructed to one again split the work into three 
stages, this time described as: propaganda; investigation, registration and evaluation; and 
tax collection and animal purchase.124  On September 18 local leaders were first invited 
for “consultation” and “discussion” during which “we communicated the [tax collection] 
policies.”125  Then, “After reaching a consensus,” a three-day meeting was convened at 
Hor Monastery, attended by over eighty committee members and group leaders, as well 
as over one hundred members of the masses.  Several prominent leaders addressed the 
gathering, including County Committee Vice-secretary Lhagyel and his and Wagya’s 
nephew, Hor Monastery lama and Prefecture Consultation Committee Vice-Chairman 
Jikmé Sönam.126  The speakers, “one after another,” explained the relationship between 
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126 In a 1953 report described Jikmé Sönam as “relatively progressive,” comparing him favorably to his 
uncle Hor Qianhu Wagya.  A chart from February 1954 identifies a total of seven Hor lamas.  Three were 
specifically associated with Hor Monastery, including Jikmé Sönam, his younger brother the 4th Derdun 
Jinmei’esai (Ch.), and Luojia (Ch.).  The four others, one of whom was Lhagyel (Wönkhor Tsowa), were 
said to be in charge of the Nyingma practitioners of four of the Hor’s five tsowa. See chart on ZCPG 1, 13. 
The findings of these early investigations should be approached with some skepticism.  For example, 
according to Nian Zhihai and Bai Gengdeng there are in fact fourteen reincarnation lineages associated 




collecting animal taxes and the mutual support of the industrial, agricultural and pastoral 
sectors.127  Afterwards the participants were divided into small groups for “discussion.”  
Lhagyel then attempted to answer questions and dispel the doubts that came up during 
group discussion.  According to the report,  
The thinking of the meeting attendees having been straightened out (datongle), 
not a few committee members and group leaders exclaimed, “I myself will report 
accurate animal numbers, I will be responsible for educating the masses, [and 
they] will also report accurately.  I pledge to completely fulfill animal purchase 
and other tasks.”128  
 
In order to coordinate efforts, two people from each tsowa, one from Hor Monastery, and 
two members of the Hor Work Group were chosen to form a Tax Collection and Animal 
Purchase Deliberation Committee.  Wagya and Lhagyel’s brother Guanjia and the 
Ratsang Baihu Chögyong were selected to lead the thirteen-member committee.  With the 
“unified suggestions and agreement” of committee members, work group leaders, and the 
masses, the committee then decided on cattle and sheep prices “in accordance with our 
price regulations and local conditions.”129   
The meetings complete, cadres were divided into small groups and dispatched to 
the tsowa to communicate tax policies directly to the masses.  However, from this point 
the substantial logistical difficulties, exasperated by the break-neck pace of expectations, 
made themselves apparent.  The small groups were given only three days to complete the 
journey from Hor Monastery and back.  As a result, “because the tents were scattered,” 
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only one mass meeting could be held in each tsowa.  In the end, just 991 people— by the 
report’s estimates 19% of the total Hor population— attended one of these meetings.  
Among Lhagyel’s Wönkhor Tsowa, the largest of the five, it was reported that only two 
hundred and sixteen people attended the single mass meeting, thirty-nine of whom were 
children sent on behalf of their families.  The report thus concluded, “The propaganda 
work was very superficial.”130 
After the six-day propaganda stage ended, a six-day animal registration period 
began. Households were expected to voluntarily report the size of their herds.  The results 
were then compared to the previous year’s figures, the work groups seeking out 
inconsistencies.  However, hoping to avoid direct confrontation with the local population, 
when an incongruity did appear it was specifically left to the indigenous leadership to 
level criticisms and encourage households to report accurate livestock numbers.  Yet 
despite these procedures, in the end local headmen “still adopted the superstitious 
[method] of ‘oath-taking’ (chizhou), using it to determine if the reports were accurate or 
not.”  In recognition of the sensitivity of the campaign, the Hor Work Group noted that it 
neither approved nor disapproved what it otherwise clearly viewed as a heterodox 
practice. 
Finally, during the fifteen-day third stage (September 30-October 14), taxes were 
collected and herdsmen were mobilized to sell excess animals to the state.  However, the 
work ended up being far more complex than anticipated.  In retrospect, the report stated, 
preparations had been inadequate, work tasks had not been clearly defined, and many 
cadres had lacked sufficient knowledge of the tax collection policy.  In addition, the work 





group had been undermanned and the cadres it did have generally lacked the needed 
skills.  In particular, few of them spoke Tibetan, although the aid of two agents from the 
“trade company mobile small group” (maoyi gongsi liudong xiaozu), Zong Wenbing and 
Ma Abudu, were on-hand to help, as was Cheng Bowen of the Tongren Tax Bureau.  
Nonetheless, the work report remarked that numerous accounting errors were made and 
that some animals were lost in the accounting shuffle and not paid for.  This admittedly 
had left a poor impression with the masses.  Therefore, midway through the tax collection 
and purchase period it was decided that all animals were instead to be driven to Hor 
Monastery where the local committee and cadres could collect taxes and make purchases 
based on fixed prices.  In theory at least, if people thought prices were too low, they were 
free to refrain from selling their livestock.  The report claimed, “It was entirely up to the 
masses to sell or not.”131 
Despite what appears to have been a fairly chaotic process marked by poor 
coordination and unclear instructions, the Hor Work Group declared animal tax and 
purchase work to have been generally successful.  Compared to the previous year, its 
efforts resulted in reported increases in sheep of 68%, cattle 22%, and horses 16%.132  
Taxes collected in wool netted 9,748 jin more than 1953, representing a 36% increase.  
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Overall, the work group reported collecting 113,650,000 yuan worth of taxes from the 
Hor.133  It would not be unexpected for such a substantial increase in the state’s extractive 
demands to have been met by local opposition.  However, at least according to the work 
report, “By doing propaganda work alongside collecting taxes, we first strengthened the 
patriotism of the leaders and the masses, [and] made it clear that the reason the state 
collects taxes is: ‘acquire it from the People and use it for the People.’”134  Hor leaders 
such as Lhagyel and Yangdan were used as examples of indigenous elites who were said 
to have truthfully registered their herd numbers and educated the masses to do the same.  
Recalling his pledge at the 3rd Joint Committee, for example, it was claimed that under 
Yangdan’s active leadership the Xuhumang both accurately registered their livestock and 
paid taxes with great enthusiasm. 
On the one hand, direct taxation of local populations was a significant move 
toward a unitary method of governance.  However, as has been shown, the Party-state 
was still clearly dependent on the pre-Liberation elite, and not just in their capacities as 
county leaders but also as indigenous headmen with both the prestige and skills needed to 
mediate such a potentially explosive yet basic function of state-society relations.  In fact, 
under the heading “experiences and lessons,” the report re-emphasized many of the 
United Front themes of Zhou Renshan’s 1952’s instructions, declaring,  
Experience shows: in order to do work well in nationality regions [we] must 
firmly proceed from top to bottom.  First if [we] want local leaders to shoulder 
responsibility enthusiastically and to report accurately [we] must do a thorough 
job of consultation so they have command over policy, [and] encourage their 
                                                
133 Ibid., 24-25.  According to a 1954 work report, countywide 1,423,520,472 yuan worth of in-kind taxes 
were collected. This, however, only covered 27% of the county’s 1954 expenditures.  The difference was 
made up by state subsidies (buzhu). ZCPC 2, 69; ZCPG 10 38. 
 





enthusiasm to become “masters of their own homes.”  Only if the leaders shoulder 
responsibility enthusiastically and accurately report their own livestock numbers, 
can they act as an example and educate the masses to do so as well.  If problems 
arise in work we first must consult and study them with the leaders, after coming 
to a unanimous agreement, the [problems] will be corrected.135 
 
Yet, despite what was described as a generally successful tax collection effort, 
later reports admitted, “We recognize that our cadres’ insufficient understanding of 
policies and lack of propaganda work caused obstacles.”136  In particular, in 1955 the 
degree to which the previous year’s animal numbers had been underreported began to 
become clear.137  Unsurprisingly, self-reporting had proven inadequate.  A report noted, 
“For example, in the past they registered their animals by taking an oath, but actually 
they concealed animal numbers along with the tribal leaders.”138  Tribal elites were 
considered to be both the principal tax evaders and the key to collecting more accurate 
data.  Significantly, however, getting correct livestock figures from the tribal leadership 
was deemed not only important from a revenue standpoint, but also from a propaganda 
angle.  Therefore, Party leaders insisted that tribal leaders be encouraged to ask members 
of the masses to monitor their own reporting so as to demonstrate their full cooperation 
with the government and thereby “mobilize the people” to also truthfully pay their 
“patriotic animal taxes.”  A member of the Ködé Karing declared, “Before we did not 
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even register ourselves because our tribal leader did it for us. Now we understand the 
significance of paying taxes.”139   
Nonetheless, effectively taxing the pastoral economy would continue to be a 
problem for the Zeku county apparatus.  For example, at a county-level People’s 
Consultative Conference held in mid-1956, the Zeku County Tax Group felt it necessary 
to re-emphasize the dictum, “paying taxes is the glorious duty of all citizens.”  It 
continued, “Let’s talk about why we are collecting taxes. […].  In human history there are 
two types of tax systems; one is capitalist and one is socialist.  The former makes the 
people suffer while the latter represents benefits for the People.”  The tax group’s report 
went on to describe in detail the differences, concluding that in the old society, “the 
happiness of the ruling class was built on the suffering of the People.”  In comparison, in 
New China taxes “are from the people and for the people.”140   
 
In the opening paragraph of its yearly review, the Zeku County Committee’s 1954 
Work Report triumphantly announced, “Production has improved significantly since the 
December 1953 establishment of Zeku County.”  With increased production having been 
enshrined as 1954’s core task, the county committee could declare the year to have been 
an overall success.  Under the leadership of the CCP and the People’s Government, “and 
with the support of the whole body of the pastoral masses,” the report announced, “social 
order has been restored, national unity has been consolidated, production has been greatly 
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increased, and therefore the mass awareness of the people of all walks of life has 
risen.”141   
According to the report, despite an extremely cold winter, the past year had seen a 
25% increase in overall livestock numbers, far exceeding the 10% target set in the 1954 
work plan.  These numbers are of course impossible to authenticate and it seems certain 
that incomplete data and an improved tax collection program, if not outright over 
reporting, may account for at least some of the increase, particularly as they came on the 
heels of an almost 14% drop in total livestock numbers reported the previous year.142   
However, the County Committee attributed 1954’s rise in production mainly to a 
strengthened organizational capacity.  Having been sent down to the tribes, the report 
insisted, the cadre force came “to understand the seasonal patterns of the pastoral 
economy, allowing us to understand the nature of things, [and] to promptly correct and 
lead mass production.”143  A separate report emphasized improvements to “animal 
protection work,” concluding that the “tasks of increasing production and raising the 
living standards of the masses had been victoriously completed.”144 
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Other successes were also trumpeted, in particular the founding of the 1st District 
(Hor), which had furthered the aspirations of minority nationalities to become “masters of 
their own homes.”  More or less running down the list of tasks assigned in the 1954 work 
plan, the year-end review detailed progress in healthcare and education work, tax 
collection, social welfare, cadre training (including fifty-two Tibetan cadres) and sideline 
production.  It noted the number of predators killed, pens built, hides, wool, herbs and 
other grassland products purchased, winter feed cut and so forth.  In addition, three 
hundred fifteen grassland disputes had reportedly been resolved, including a serious 
conflict between the Hor and the Xibulang of Tongde County.145  In sum, the year-end 
report could claim that patriotic consciousness had been elevated, livelihoods improved 
and— through “mutual support of industry, agriculture and pastoralism”— the pastoral 
masses had taken a step toward being integrated into “the motherland” (zuguo).146 
Yet all had not gone as planned. The five work teams sent down to the tribes the 
previous spring had in fact met mixed results.  In their own year-end reports they 
admitted to being understaffed, undersupplied, and often ill prepared.  Several work 
groups reported having difficulties simply keeping up with the paper work, while all of 
them mentioned substandard living conditions, food shortages, and poor cadre quality.147  
Sickness appears to have been common and, as demonstrated by cases of “disunity 
between the cadres” and dereliction of duty, morale was often low.  Having gone to 
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purchase grain in Tongren County, for example, a cadre named Wang Yuan of the 
Méshül Work Group stayed half a month before returning to his post.148  The physical 
and mental hardships of being a Han cadre assigned to Zeku County in the mid-1950s 
should not be underestimated or overlooked.   
Moreover, although by year’s end the 1st District had been successful inaugurated, 
the county committee’s original plan to simultaneously establish Méshül District had not 
gotten off the ground.149  Although many disputes had been reportedly resolved, dozens 
of others continued to fester, such as a major conflict between the Méshül and Tongren’s 
Dowa Tribe.150  Overall production and tax revenue were reportedly up sharply.  Sheep 
targets had been exceeded while the cattle quota was narrowly missed.  However, only a 
third of the planned 1.5 million jin of feed had been cut, “So in the cold of last winter, 
many calves and lambs had died from a lack of grass.”151  In addition, rather than 
expanding educational opportunities, two of three “tent schools” had to be shuttered.152  
And while the Méshül Work Group claimed that 153 animal pens had been built within 
the three tribes under its supervision, the Hor work report admitted that none of the 
seventy shelters slated to be built among the Wönkhor Tsowa had been completed.  The 
reason provided was that the work group was still unable to negotiate the complex 
rivalries that divided the plateau, in this case preventing the physical fencing off of the 
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152 Ibid., 70.  These tent schools were established in 1952 by the pastoral work teams.  In 1954 the Hor and 





grasslands.153  Plus, despite assurances that demand would be met, the county continued 
to suffer from chronic grain shortages.  In order to make up the shortfall, the work groups 
began issuing “Grain Introduction Letters” (liangshi jieshaoxin) to be presented in 
neighboring counties.154  Like welfare work and tax collection, an added benefit was that 
cadres could register the pastoral population.  However, the Hor Work Report noted that 
despite the issuance of Grain Introduction Letters, “getting a more reliable [population] 
number for the entire district will require a long period of time.”155   
Thus, despite undeniable accomplishments, a report to the County Committee 
summarized, “In the process of our work, [we] did not investigate, research and grasp the 
concrete conditions in depth, [and we] lacked a sufficient understanding of procedures.  
Therefore there was not enough planning, [which led to] the appearance of chaos and 
passivity.”  Moreover, propaganda had been insufficient, “Therefore policies were not 
completely implemented properly.”  Instead, the County Committee confessed, “Among 
the tribes coercion (qiangpo) was sometimes employed.”156 
For 1955, production targets were set at relatively moderate increases of between 
9% for horses and 18% for sheep.  Scientific grasslands management was to be 
developed, animal loans expanded, vaccinations administered, pens built, grass cut, 
winter pastures readied, predators hunted, and grain supplies facilitated.  As noted, it was 
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154 ZCPG 5, 27.  The problem of procuring, storing, securing and allocating grain continued to plague 
Zeku’s leadership throughout the decade, forcing them to use the system of grain introduction letters.  See 
for example the 1955 summary report from the County Grain Office in which problems of planning, theft, 
oversight, hording, black markets, propaganda and transportation were discussed. ZCPG 13, 26-30.   
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also resolved that the four remaining districts should be built by the end of the year. 
However, just as the production increases of the previous year were credited to a better 
understanding of the patterns of the pastoral economy, ultimately all of this depended on 
getting accurate information— in Party parlance, “investigating concrete conditions”— 
and propagandizing the Party’s programs to the masses.157  In 1954, the Party had sent 
out work teams to build district governments, distribute welfare and collect taxes.  This 
had provided the Party its first sustained contact with the pastoral masses.  However, 
indigenous elites remained indispensable intermediaries between the state and society.  
This was true at both the county level— where the Joint Committee functioned as the 
forum through which the Party introduced policy— and at the local level, where work 
teams implemented policy through the mediation of indigenous elites.  The Méshül Work 
Group noted that to improve work in 1955, cadres had to be trained to take the next step, 
“to go into each tribe and tsowa, to become one with the masses and the committee 
members, to spread propaganda and education, to lead the masses in developing 
production, [and] strengthen unity.”158   
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EMPIRE IN ECLIPSE:  
MUTUAL AID, COOPERATIVIZATION AND SOCIALIST 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
In June of 1955 members of the Zeku County People’s Representative Committee 
gathered at the still unfinished county seat.1  There, delegates reviewed final reports from 
1954 and reassessed plans for the current year and beyond. With the benefit of the 
previous year’s experience, it was determined that tax collection efforts needed to be 
streamlined, while social welfare should continue according to the principle of “Focused 
Allocation” and paid for through voluntary livestock sales.2  Under the less than 
imaginative slogan “Earn More, Spend Less,” county leaders urged cadres to tighten 
financial oversight and reduce expenditures.  As before, grassland disputes were to be 
settled under the guidelines of “Mutual Respect and Mutual Accommodation,” and 
“Consider History and Consider the Whole Picture.”  Work Plans were issued for 
                                                
1 This was the 2nd Plenum of the 1st Zeku County Government Committee. Initial plans to build a 
permanent administrative center had quickly encountered logistical, managerial, technical and budgetary 
difficulties. Work was originally contracted to a private company from Xining.  The company, however, 
allegedly broke its agreement and responsibility had to be shifted to the government-run Qinghai 
Construction Company.  Work began in May 1954. Wagya was put in charge of acquiring materials and 
Guo Min managing the actual construction. However, coordination between Wagya and Guo Min’s areas 
of responsibilities was said to have been poor and both were accused of dictatorial tendencies.  This 
exacerbated communication problems between cadres and workers as well as between Han Chinese and 
Tibetan cadres, leading to inefficiencies and waste. Apparently it was not until the end of 1956 that the 
initial stages of work on the county seat were finally completed. For more details, see ZCPC 2, 35-48; 
ZCPC 15, 64; ZCPG 15, 122-123. 
 
2 ZCPG 15, 124. According to a report, cadres were having difficulty acquiring suficient animals to cover 
promised livestock loans.  Secretary Guo Min urged representatives to act quickly to purchase the required 




outstanding tasks ranging from establishing district-level governments, to resolving 
difficulties in acquiring and distributing grain supplies, and completing the construction 
of Zeku’s administrative center.3  Raising production of course remained the key concern.  
The committee reconfirmed the ambitious but relatively moderate year-end goal of 
increasing horses by 9%, cattle by 12% and sheep by 18%.  These gains were largely to 
be arrived at through improved “grasslands management”— referring to scientific 
grazing methods— and intensified efforts to protect livestock, including building shelters, 
cutting and storing winter grass, and inoculating animals against livestock disease.4   
Overall, the committee announced that since its founding Zeku had made 
significant progress.  Yet, as per usual the plaudits came with several caveats.  In 
particular, it was determined that some committee members (i.e. tribal leaders) were still 
hesitant to enthusiastically implement work assignments.  In fact, as had become routine, 
the majority of the delegates failed to arrive in Shadar at the appointed time, forcing the 
conference to be delayed several days.  The lateness was blamed on two serious grassland 
disputes— one between the Méshül and rivals in Tongren County and the other between 
the Gönshül and Xiahe’s Sangkhok Tribe— demonstrating the continued difficulty 
                                                
3 In order to transport materials needed to construct a county seat the county government ordered large 
numbers of pack animals requisitioned from the tribes.  The animals were to be used to transport wood to a 
cement factory and then the cement to the construction site. The Shisa Tribe was made responsible for 
providing 3,000 head of cattle and the Gartsé and Sonak Tribes 5,500, while the Hor, Shawonar and 
Wöngya were asked to provide logistical help by transporting grains and commodities. 
 
4 ZCPG 15 68-75.  Also on the agenda was developing Zeku’s healthcare and education capacities, 





promoting intra-nationality national unity.  When the meeting did convene, just under 
half of the expected one hundred nineteen delegates were in attendance.5   
However, criticism was not solely directed at the indigenous leadership.  
Authorities admitted that investigation into the “concrete conditions” of the Zeku 
grasslands was still inadequate, propaganda work insufficient, and Han chauvinism 
continued to harm the Party’s overall efforts.  As a result, work had not been planned 
well nor implemented properly, and cadres often resorted to coercion rather than the 
United Front principles of consultation and persuasion.  Han cadres were therefore urged 
to rededicate themselves to their tasks, acquire language skills, and to educate, cooperate 
with, and learn from local Tibetan cadres.6 
Before adjourning, the conference’s fifty-eight voting attendees reelected the 
county government committee.  Guo Min, Wagya and Lhagyel each received the 
delegates’ unanimous support, while Serökyap appeared on all but one ballot.7  There 
was, however, one significant leadership change.  For unclear reasons, Lhakba, the Sonak 
baihu who incidentally had given the conference’s opening speech, was removed from 
his position as the county’s fourth–ranking vice-chairman.  Conference reports would 
criticize Lhakba for openly challenging the Party’s commitment to the principle of 
national autonomy.   Declaring that decision-making was entirely in the hands of Han 
cadres, Lhakba had reportedly vented, “It does not matter if we become masters of our 
                                                
5 ZCPG 15 32-33. 1955 witnessed a noticeable increase in conflicts, including the eruption of several new 
disputes and the resurrection of several older ones.  See Chapter 4. 
 
6 ZCPG 15, 70-71.   
 




own homes or not!”  However, Lhakba’s outburst was said to have been a reaction to his 
demotion rather than its cause.8   
Generally speaking, both in terms of successes and setbacks, work appeared to be 
progressing almost naturally from the previous years.  Most noticeably, almost entirely 
absent from the June meeting’s reports were references to socialist transformation.  In 
Zeku, socialism had received its first sustained attention in mid-1954 at the county’s 2nd 
Political Consultative Conference.  However, at the time socialism remained a largely 
abstract concept and the process for achieving it was persistently unexplained.  Socialism 
meant unity, industrialization and prosperity.  It was the polar opposite of the exploitation 
and brutality of Chiang Kaishek and Ma Bufang.  It involved serving the people and 
benefiting the people, ending grassland disputes and increasing patriotism.  It 
necessitated guaranteeing grain supplies, regulating prices and eliminating the black 
market.  It depended on “correcting our old-fashioned ways of thinking from the old 
society,” after which “we can do our work well and march toward socialism and a happy 
life.”9   Most of all, at least in these pastoral regions, by mid-1955 socialism meant 
supporting the coalition of industry, agriculture and pastoralism, on which basis, Wagya 
announced, “[we can] slowly make the transition to socialism.”10  However, what 
socialism did not seem to mean, except maybe in the small print, was socialist 
transformation—redistributing wealth, assigning class labels, collectivizing production, 
and eliminating the authority of the pre-Liberation secular and religious elite.   
                                                
8 ZCPG 15, 33; ZCPG 15, 110.  At the time of his removal from the county committee, Lhakba was made 
head of the prefecture-level People’s Court.  Although technically a promotion, as demonstrated by his 
reaction, most likely this was a less influential posting.  Zeku Xianzhi, 527. 
 
9 ZCPC 14, 19. 
 




This was in stark contrast to Qinghai’s agricultural regions where for several 
years the Party had wavered between relatively gradual and more immediate programs of 
rural collectivization.  In fact, Qinghai’s land reform campaign had begun in 1951.  By 
the time Zeku’s Representative Committee met in June 1955, 876 basic-level Agricultural 
Production Cooperatives (APCs) had already been established across the province.11  Yet, 
in pastoral regions the “Three No’s” continued to guarantee that the wealth, prestige and 
position of the pre-Liberation elite would not be violated.  National struggle— not class 
struggle— remained Zeku’s operating principle. 
The one speech delivered at the June meetings that did discuss socialist 
transformation was a summary of 1954’s year-end meeting of the Qinghai Provincial 
People’s Representative Conference.  Declaring that the country was jointly traveling 
down the road to socialism, Qinghai Governor Sun Zuobing had announced,  
Constructing a socialist society is the common goal of all nationalities in our 
country. Only socialism can guarantee that every nationality can achieve a higher 
level of economic and cultural development.  Our country has the responsibility to 
help each and every nationality down this great road to happiness.12  
 
Yet, having established that socialism was the nation’s historic mission, “the one glorious 
path,” Governor Sun made it clear that historical circumstances dictated that each 
nationality would not reach socialism at the same pace nor via the same methods.  
Instead, as guaranteed under the state constitution, Sun told his audience that attention 
must be paid to the “special conditions” of each nationality.  Sun elaborated,  
That is to say, on the questions of when to implement socialist reforms and how to 
implement socialist reforms, it will be different because of the different conditions 
                                                
11 DDZGQH, vol.1, 56-59, 68-71. Along with much of China, agricultural cooperativization had begun in 
1952.  On APCs, see Craig Dietrich, People's China: A Brief History, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 86-89. 
 




of the development of each nationality.  In regards to this question, [we] must 
permit the masses of each nationality and the leaders among them to decide for 
themselves in due time, and proceed according to their wishes.13    
 
Six months later, the Zeku delegates, most of whom were pre-Liberation indigenous 
elites, were reassured, 
Unity is power; unity is happiness. Anything that goes against it will not be 
beneficial for the people but for our enemies. […].  The purpose of unity is to 
build one common harmonious family for all nationalities; the purpose of unity is 
to build a new Qinghai, a new Huangnan and a happy socialist society.14  
 
As of June 1955, the efficacy of nationality autonomy and the centrality of national unity, 
the foundations of the United Front, had been reaffirmed.  Socialist transformation would 
have to wait.15 
 
From National Struggle to Class Struggle: The National Pastoral Conference and 
Pastoral Investigation Work  
 As noted, it took six months for the “spirit” of the Qinghai Provincial People’s 
Representative Congress, convened over the last days of 1954, to be officially taken up at 
June 1955’s Zeku County Representative Committee Conference.  However, over the 
intervening months the national political climate had increasingly radicalized.  This came 
to a head at the end of July, when Mao Zedong forcibly broke the deadlock between 
proponents of gradual and immediate socialist transformation, coming down forcibly on 
the side of the latter.  Insisting that the masses were ready for collectivization, Mao called 
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for a “High Tide” of socialist transformation in the countryside.16  Throughout China, 
Party branches immediately began scrambling to establish Agricultural Productive 
Cooperatives.  By November, Qinghai’s eight hundred-plus APCs had risen to 2,057, 
doubling again to an astounding 4,028 by the end of the year.17 
However, it would not be until October 13 that the consequences of this 
radicalization began to manifest on the Zeku grasslands.  On that day, a directive sent by 
the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee reached the Huangnan prefectural leadership.  
Addressed to each of the province’s relevant Party Committees and work teams, the 
instructions announced that on July 21, a week before Mao’s pivotal speech, the CCP’s 
national-level United Front and Agricultural Work Departments had jointly convened a 
National Conference on Work in Pastoral Regions.  In September, provincial leaders had 
organized meetings in Xining to discuss and implement the Center’s orders.  Now a 
month later, instructions originating in Beijing were arriving in Huangnan Prefecture.18   
The provincial directive stipulated that prefectural officials conduct intensive 
investigations into the concrete conditions and productive capacities of Qinghai’s pastoral 
regions.  At least within internal Party communications, from the start the underlying 
objectives of the pastoral investigations were made unambiguously clear.  The work was 
meant to pave the way for the first phases of socialist transformation— the establishment 
                                                
16 It was during this closed-door speech that Mao famously criticized colleagues that favored a more 
cautious approach by remarking, “But some of our cadres are tottering along like a woman with bound feet, 
and constantly complaining, ‘you are going too fast.” Quoted in Dietrich 92. 
 
17 DDZGQH, vol. 1, 71. This sudden transformation mirrored what was occurring throughout much of 
China.  By November, the number of households nation-wide enrolled in APCs had doubled from 
seventeen million to nearly thirty-five million.  Under the “new High Tide,” announced that month, the 
number doubled again by year’s end.  In less than half a year, two-thirds of China’s 110 million agricultural 
households had been “socialized.”  See Macfarquar 15 and Dietrich 92. 
 




of Mutual Aid Teams (MATs) and Pastoral Production Cooperatives (PPCs).  Moreover, 
cadres were told, “This investigation should emphasize paying attention to class relations 
and the development of production.”19   For Zeku County, this marked a significant and 
sudden shift in guiding principles that had been reaffirmed as recently as the June 
meetings.  Up to this point, the nature of pastoral class relations had been a taboo subject.  
The focus instead had been on uniting all pastoral Tibetans in a broad alliance with the 
Party and integrating them into the multinational nation-state.  Now, not only was the 
question of class being broached, but explicit instructions were issued on how class 
divisions were to be determined.  Herdlords (muzhu), the pastoral equivalent of 
agricultural landlords, were to be identified and divided into three categories— upper, 
middle and lower herdlord— each based on three sets of criteria: number of sheep 
owned, amount of labor hired, and “degree of exploitation” (boxueliang).  Firstly, 
distinctions were to be made between households with over 1,100 sheep, those with over 
2,100 sheep, and those with over 3,100 sheep.  Secondly, herdlords were to be classified 
based on having employed one, two, or three or more non-family pastoral laborers.  
Lastly, the degree of exploitation was to be determined by the percentage of household 
income that was derived from hired labor.  Here the dividing lines were set at 50%, 60% 
and 70% and above.20  When determining class status all three indices had to be 
considered as an integrated whole, the lowest common denominator— in this case 
meaning the lowest degree of exploitation— being the final determinant.  The provincial 
instructions decreed, “If all three conditions are applicable, then the target can be 
                                                
19 ZCPC 6, 8. In semi-pastoral regions, caders were also to pay close attention to inter-nationality relations 
and the relationship between pastoral and agricultural areas. Italics mine. 
 
20 Ibid., 8-9.  Household members working for the state were not to be held against them in the 




considered a herdlord (muzhu duixiang); if of the [three] even one is not applicable, [then 
they] cannot be considered a herdlord.”  Despite assigning ostensibly objective criteria 
for calculating class status, a decidedly subjective and practical qualification was added.  
The Provincial Committee made it clear that it was “suitable to be lenient and unsuitable 
to be strict.”  In particular, herdlords were not to exceed 5% of any region’s pastoral 
households.21 
Even after herdlords had been identified, there were two schemas by which 
society could be further organized.  The first was to simply separate the herdlords from 
the herdsmen (mumin), creating two broad classes.  The latter could be further divided 
into hired laborers (mugong) and ordinary pastoralists. The second method was to 
separate pastoral society into three classes: herdlords, mid-level pastoralists (zhongdeng 
mumin), and poor pastoralists (pinku mumin).  Included within the ranks of the poor were 
hired laborers, destitute and semi-destitute (banchipin) households.22  By carefully 
following the instructions as laid out in its directive, the Qinghai Party Committee 
declared that a reliable and unified set of materials could be collected, collated and 
forwarded to national authorities.23 
Huangnan’s Party leaders were aware that the introduction of class categories into 
the grasslands had the potential to create serious disruptions and arouse local opposition.  
Therefore, it appears that the full implications of pastoral investigation work were not 
                                                
21 Ibid.  The 5% guideline was commonly used to delineate between the People and class enemies, 
suggesting that herdlords were being categorized as enemies of the people. 
 
22 Ibid., 9.  
 
23 Ibid., 8. It seems that these criteria did not remain stable.  A report from a 1957-investigation of the Hor 
Wönkhor Tsowa states that families with an average of less than three sheep per person were considered 
“destitute” (yiwusuoyou de chipin), four to thirty sheep “poor” (pinku), thirty-one to seventy as mid-level, 




immediately divulged to those outside Party ranks.  Unlike social welfare and tax 
collection campaigns, pastoral investigation work was therefore organized at the Party 
not governmental level.  Emphasizing the campaign’s delicacy, “especially as it 
concerned the question of class,” local Party secretaries were instructed to “personally 
take control of the investigations, [and] to implement [work] carefully.”24  Moreover, 
despite being directed to investigate class relations and class statuses, Party operatives 
were to stop well short of assigning class labels to individual households or redistributing 
property.  Instead, the Three No’s remained prominently in effect.  The rising waters of 
the High Tide had yet to inundate the high plateau.  Even so, the Party was clearly 
preparing for a not-too-distant point when class would become the operable category of 
social and political organization and socialist transformation could begin. 
 
Apparently heedless of the frigid weather that would have already begun to 
descend upon Amdo’s high altitude areas, Xining announced that the province’s pastoral 
investigation work would begin immediately.  Each of Qinghai’s six prefectures was 
ordered to choose three pastoral investigation focus sites, each ideally composed of 
around one hundred households.25  Work at the focus sites was to be completed by mid-
December, at which time reports would be submitted to the various prefectural Party 
committees.  The prefectures then had a mid-January deadline to assemble the collected 
data, integrate it with materials that had been gathered over the previous years, and send 
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them up to the provincial level.26  Unsurprisingly given the cooperation it had provided in 
previous campaigns, the Hor Xuhumang Tsowa was once again chosen as one of 
Huangnan’s three investigation sites.27   Unlike the 1954 debate over the welfare 
program’s focus sites, the decision to choose the Hor Xuhumang appears to have been 
made unilaterally without consulting Zeku’s indigenous leadership.  Instead, Party 
leaders met privately with the Hor’s leading figures, including the three brothers Wagya, 
Lhagyel and Guanjia, as well as Xuhumang headman Yangdan.  Within the Xuhumang, 
Yangdan’s own Ehuang (Ch.) herding group was selected as the initial investigation site.  
Only then were Zeku’s other indigenous leaders consulted, albeit fait accompli.  The 
Xuhumang Work Group reported that through meetings with the expanded tribal 
leadership, “thinking was straightened out, and [we] were able to obtain their unanimous 
agreement.”28  
On October 27, just two weeks after receiving the provincial directive, the 
Xuhumang Work Group “officially entered the tents” (zhengshi shenru zhangfang).  Not 
unlike previous campaigns, that same day Lhagyel called together a mass meeting.  To 
the over two hundred members of the Xuhumang Tsowa reported to have been in 
attendance, Lhagyel explained “the work team’s purpose in coming” and asked for their 
                                                
26 The Qinghai Provincial Committee had its own late-February deadline to compile the various province-
wide reports, draw up its conclusions and pass them on to Beijing.  The entire process was to take no longer 
than six months.  To help with the work, Xining announced that it was sending a small number of its own 
cadres into the field.  However, it also noted that these cadres would only be available for short periods of 
time.   
 
27 The two other Huangnan sites were in Jianzha and Tongren Counties. 
 





cooperation.29  As per provincial instructions, Party Secretary Guo Min was also on hand.  
According to the work team’s report, Secretary Guo sought to “persuade and educate the 
masses [and] dispel their apprehensions in order to create beneficial conditions in which 
work could be launched.”  The report notes that Guo, a native of the dry, terraced, loess 
plains of his native Shaanxi Province, also spoke to the pastoralists about animal winter 
protection work and other issues relating to pastoral production, tasks the Xuhumang 
Work Team were to simultaneously promote under the principle of consolidating work 
efforts.30 
On November 1, the work team arrived in Yangdan’s Ehuang Herding Group. 
With Yangdan personally leading “consultation and research work,” again a mass 
meeting was convened and the work team’s purpose explained.  In this way, the report 
claimed, the thinking and awareness of the masses began to rise and their apprehensions 
lessened.  However, despite these efforts, “doubts and concerns” remained.  Therefore, 
the work team was forced to double its propaganda efforts and resort to “persuasion.”  
Yet, the work team summarized, “Overall the results were good and the work went well.  
Generally speaking, our work went extremely smoothly.”31   
Extant reports from the Ehuang investigations are primarily concerned with 
demographic information and data on herd sizes.32  Among the Ehuang, and later within 
                                                
29 Ibid., 19.  The report does not indicate what “purpose” Lhagyel presented at the gathering. 
 
30 Ibid., 19, 34, 44. 
 
31 Ibid., 19. 
 
32 The Xuhumang Work Team reported that mortality rates among the Hor Tribe currently surpassed birth 
rates.  Primary blame for low birth rates was assigned to the alleged promiscuity of pastoral Tibetans and 
the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases. The reasons offered for high death rates seem to be more 




the Xuhumang’s Gari Tsowa Caibao Herding Group (Ch.), the work team gathered a 
decade’s worth of livestock figures (1946-1955).  It reported that as of 1955, the 
Ehuang’s twelve households owned a combined 1,317 animals (the vast majority being 
sheep and goats). This represented an impressive 18% increase from the previous year 
and an absolute ten-year increase of slightly over 30%.  However, the overall rise in 
animal numbers disguised what were often wild annual fluctuations.  For example, in 
1947 the Ehuang experienced a devastating 45% drop in its herd size that included the 
loss of over half of its sheep and 80% of its horses.33  Yet by the following year animal 
numbers had rebounded to near 1946 levels, levels that were eventually surpassed in 
1949.  With the exception of a bumper year in 1952, however, 1950-1953 witnessed a net 
loss of livestock.34  Even in 1954, for which the county committee had reported 25% 
across-the-board increases (see Chapter 4), the Ehuang saw only a 12% rise in its overall 
herd size.  Moreover, these gains were almost entirely in sheep, which the previous year 
had suffered enormous losses.35   
                                                                                                                                            
and postnatal care and general unsanitary living conditions.  High mortality rates were also blamed on the 
severe weather, extreme environment and high incidence of armed disputes. Surprisingly, the report did not 
offer theories to explain the imbalance between the male and female populations nor did it mention 
monasteries removing men from the lay population (and productive pursuits).  ZCPC 6, 11-12. See also 
ZCPC 6, 63. 
 
33 ZCPC 6, 24B.  Sheep populations dropped from 740 to 320 and horses from forty-nine to just ten. The 
data appears to have been compiled from figures collected by Tongren County starting in 1949 as well as 
the recollections of the herdsmen themselves. 
 
34 The work group reported a 52% increase in animals from 1951 to1952.  However this was followed by a 
38% decrease from the following year, which included the loss of 46% of the herding group’s sheep.  
Overall, it was not until 1954 that 1949’s numbers were again reached.  
 
35 ZCPC 6, 24B.  The Gari Caibao suffered similar but non-corresponding fluctuations.  For example, its 
largest decrease came in 1949 (32%).  In 1947, while the Ehuang’s herds were suffering devastating losses, 
the Caibao saw modest gains of around 8%.  After 1952, the Caobao’s livestock numbers maintained fairly 
regular growth of around 20% until it slowed to 5% in 1955.  The Caibao’s herd size was about 15% of the 
Ehuang’s, meaning that the numbers were more susceptible to small shifts.  The documents also admit that 




Not stopping at the collection of raw data, the report offered qualitative 
assessments of pastoral production practices.  For example, the work team detailed 
grazing patterns and associated animal diseases, going so far as to explain how increased 
attention to seasonal migration planning could reduce the incidence of epidemics. 
Overall, the work team determined that dramatic reductions in herd sizes were entirely 
preventable.  According to its assessment, poor “animal management,” in particular the 
failure to cut winter feed and repair shelters, accounted for the majority of animal 
deaths.36   
In some ways more revealing than the reports on Yangdan’s Ehuang Herding 
Group were subsequent investigations into the Xuhumang’s Caibao and Gongbao 
Herding Groups.  Although still frustratingly brief, they went beyond simply reporting on 
animal numbers and production methods to locating “existing forms of unity and mutual 
aid” and investigating class relations.37  In a short report filed on November 25, the 
Xuhumang Work Team identified several practices among the Gongbao that it 
recognized as primitive forms of mutual assistance.  For instance, herding cattle was 
identified as a joint responsibility shared by all of the Gongbao’s households.  Other 
forms of mutual aid included communal methods of moving encampments and sideline 
production practices such as milking cows, shearing sheep and pulling hair from yak.  For 
example, when it came time to pull yak hair, everyone had to help regardless of the 
number of animals a household possessed, receiving only meals from the animals’ 
                                                                                                                                            
continued to be a persistent problem.  In fact the work team criticized its own tables for not containing 
enough variables to make them particularly useful.  ZCPC 6, 17, 24B, 25. 
 
36 Ibid., 21-24.  
 




owners as compensation.  Similarly, everyone had to donate a day or two of labor to 
sheep washing and shearing.38 
 
Identifying and building off of these existing forms of mutual aid and cooperation 
lay at the heart of the Party’s transformation agenda.  Reports from the Caibao Herding 
Group, for example, noted that indigenous forms of mutual assistance had developed 
naturally to combat the difficult environmental conditions of the high plateau and 
mitigate damages from natural disasters.  Yet they were considered to be backwards and 
uneconomical.  Speaking specifically of communal methods of cattle grazing and moving 
encampments, the report emphasized,  
However, these forms of unity and mutual aid groups are formed spontaneously. 
[…].  [They] are based on the foundation of existing kinship and neighborliness.  
They are established voluntarily and without any material reward. But based on 
the [distribution of] manual labor it does not seem rational, from now on we need 
to strengthen our investigation and research on this type of unity and mutual aid 
organization, and when conditions improve and on the basis of voluntariness and 
mutual benefit, by experimenting with test sites, [we must] gradually create 
conditions in which [improvements] can be implemented and promoted.”39   
 
By rationalizing and improving traditional forms of mutual aid, pastoral production could 
be made to be more efficient, higher yielding, and more equitable, thus helping convince 
pastoralists of the benefits of still more advanced forms of communal production and 
eventually full socialist transformation.  This rationale fell squarely within mass 
line/United Front principles and procedures of consultation and persuasion and was itself 
                                                
38 Ibid.  In addition, those with no or few cattle had to help those with too many animals to be easily cared 
for.  In payment, the animal-less might receive a small wage.  
 




grounded in the Party’s foundational assumption that collective production was superior 
to individual household-based ownership.40   
The Caibao report did not limit itself to the investigation of mutual aid practices.   
It also analyzed local society in class terms, identifying the political economy of the 
grasslands as class-based system of exploitation dictated by the monopolization of 
ownership over the means of production.  In this formulation the old tribal elite, now 
increasingly referred to as herdlords, were equated with agrarian landlords.  Much as 
landlords exploited laborers and peasants through low wages, high rents, and high interest 
loans, herdlords similarly exploited herd laborers and pastoralists.  The report concluded 
that despite modest post-Liberation increases in the wages paid to laborers and a parallel 
reduction in rates charged by lenders, poor pastoralists remained mired in a spiral of debt 
and poverty.41   
The pastoral investigation report offered plenty of anecdotal evidence that in the 
eyes of Party operatives suggested a growing estrangement between the pastoral masses 
and the herdlord class that dominated the old grassland system.  In one of several 
examples documented by the Xuhumang Work Team, a member of the Caibao Herding 
Group was quoted complaining,  
                                                
40 On several occasions Mao Zedong had similarly argued that successful cooperativization was the best 
means of convincing peasants of the benefits of cooperativization.  See Dietrich, 86-87. 
 
41 ZCPC 6, 31. For example, investigators reported that in exchange for herding two hundred seventy 
sheep, long-term laborers (changgong) currently received eighteen yuan per year, plus one jacket, one belt, 
two pairs of animal skin shoes, one lambskin and three meals per day. The report claimed that this was 
double the compensation that laborers received prior to Liberation.  Part-time seasonal laborers, on the 
other hand, were paid solely in wool.  Pre-Liberation they had received five jin of raw wool per twenty-five 
sheep sheared— equal to approximately 0.5 yuan. After 1953 compensation had risen to one yuan per 
twenty sheep sheared.  Similar calculations were made for incomes derived from rented animals.  
Interestingly, a note inserted in a separate pen declares that the information on short-term employment was 




The government tells us to protect the grasslands in order to develop livestock.  
We are poor people without animals.  [We] only can rent livestock from others. If 
the grass is good the animals will fatten and produce more butter. [Yet,] in this 
case, the rich households will demand higher rents, [they] will not reduce them.42   
  
Along the same lines, the work team directly criticized several headmen-cum-county 
leaders for what were deemed exploitative practices.  For instance, another of Wagya’s 
brothers was denounced for issuing usurious loans.  His accuser, also a member of the 
Caibao Herding Group, reportedly declared, “Committee Member Jiehou Zhijia’s (Ch.) 
loans […] oppress those below.  [They] do not allow the recipient household to go out 
and earn a living.”  Instead, according to the accusations, the loan recipient found himself 
permanently indebted to the Hor headman.  A third member of the Caibao claimed that he 
had received a loan from still another committee member, referred to as Zhijiu (Ch.).  
According to the allegations, Zhijiu had surreptitiously loaned out aged yak and horses, 
animals that were no longer suitable for production.  However, tribal leaders— all of 
whom had been vested with government office— were purportedly unresponsive to 
requests that Zhijiu be forced to provide his accusers with productive animals.  “As a 
result,” according to the Xuhumang Work Team, loan recipients “feel that we ordered 
committee members to give non-productive animals.”43   
 For the Party, the key to the complaints was the masses’ willingness to challenge 
the exploitative practices and prerogatives of traditional elites.  In the context of the 
radicalized political environment, this was viewed as a sign that mass awareness and 
patriotic consciousness were developing.  While the degree to which in just three short 
years class-based identities had actually begun to dislodge more enduring forms of 
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identity is unknown, subsequent events would suggest that predictions of the imminent 
emergence of mass consciousness were at best overstated.  Nonetheless, by the end of 
1955 Zeku’s Party leaders were declaring, “the mass awareness of the pastoralists has 
significantly improved.”  Allegedly, this had led to the weakening of the bonds that tied 
pastoral masses to tribal elites.  The County Party Committee offered the example of 1st 
District leader Guanjia.  It had been discovered that Guanjia had falsely reported his herd 
numbers, presumably in an attempt to avoid animal taxes.  To the county Party 
leadership, however, more important than the accusation itself was the allegation that 
members of his own Hor Tribe had brought the headman’s transgressions to the state’s 
attention.44   
In another example, the county’s pastoral investigation report contended that 
common herders had begun to complain about the scales used by wealthy pastoralists to 
weigh butter given in repayment of loans.  According to the report, people “asked to 
make government scales the standard.  Some people [even] complained about the 
exploitation [of the herdlords].”45  Similarly, rather than relying on the traditional 
avenues of mediation, increasingly “the people want the government to step in and settle 
[grassland disputes] by law.”  The report added that while tribal leaders continued to 
administer the state’s laws, they did so only to ensure that their positions of authority did 
not become obsolete.  In still one more example, investigators asserted that herdlords 
previously had enjoyed the right to occupy pastures “without constraint.”  Now, however, 
the masses understood that this was “exploitative.”  Even the authority of Zeku’s three 
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powerful qianhu was no longer sacrosanct.  Speaking of the Gönshül qianhu, the report 
noted, “For example, county [Vice-] leader Serökyap did not obey the grassland 
regulations and as a result the people protested.  This kind of thing was not possible 
before Liberation.”46  The County Party Committee triumphantly concluded, “In the past, 
the pastoralists were subject to the orders of tribal leaders.  Now when the leaders speak, 
the pastoralists do not listen.”47 
The Party’s criticism was leveled not only at tribal leaders but also the monastic 
establishment.  In one case, a Xuhumang work group report alleged that in 1952 monks 
(lama) had given cattle to impoverished households— presumably as emergency relief 
given the catastrophic animals losses reported that year.  “At the time [the monks] said, 
‘These cattle are being given to you so that you can have food to eat.  There is no need to 
repay any amount of money or yogurt.’”  However, the following year what had been 
gifts reportedly turned into loans and remittance was demanded with interest.48  
Supporting its assertion that the religious establishment both exploited the masses and 
harmed production, the work team collected data on the amount each of the Xuhumang’s 
herding groups donated to religious institutions.  It discovered that not only was the 
monastic establishment draining needed resources out of the economy, but that it was 
                                                
46 Ibid.  A footnote to the report notes that for twice breaking grasslands regulations Serökyap was fined a 
total of 370 yuan.   
 
47 ZCPC 6, 67-68.  Of course, tribal leaders had complained of this phenomenon to Gélek Gyatso and Guo 
Min the previous year, implicitly arguing that by working on behalf of the Party they were losing their 
moral legitimacy in the eyes of their tribesmen.  ZKGK 5, 57.  See Chapter Five. 
 
48 ZCPC 6, 33. Allegedly, an indigenous committee member who had also provided free grain to poor 




actually receiving more in donations post-Liberation than it had prior to the Communist 
Party’s arrival, a discovery that could not have pleased Party leaders.49  
 
While tribal and monastic leaders had been collectively criticized in the past, as 
with Gélek Gyatso’s admonishment to 1954’s Joint Committee, this was ostensibly done 
in the spirit of improving political consciousness.  However, the reports generated from 
the Xuhumang investigations are perhaps the first indications of a calculated shift in 
official attitudes toward the pastoral elite.  Alongside the purported rise in mass 
consciousness, increasingly Zeku’s pre-Liberation elites were no longer being viewed in 
the now-familiar terms of the United Front, as victims of national exploitation.  Instead, 
tribal leaders were being re-categorized— albeit initially only in internal 
communications— as the owners of the grassland’s means of production and 
representatives of the pastoral exploiting class.   
That the Party was moving from a framework of inclusivity to exclusivity— from 
one that defined all Tibetans as an exploited nationality to identifying a few among them 
as enemies of the People— becomes evident in reports that began to emerge at the end of 
1955.  Suddenly terminologies that over the previous years had largely been absent from 
the Party’s rhetoric on state and nation building start to appear.  The Zeku County Party 
Committee’s preliminary pastoral investigation report, submitted to the prefecture on 
December 4, makes this shift clear.  The report describes pastoral society as “a feudal 
society with capitalist characteristics,” in which, “there is a lot of exploitation and class 
                                                
49 Ibid. According to the findings, the tsowa as a whole had donated two hundred jin of noodles, forty jin 
of yogurt, one hundred twenty jin of flour, one hundred forty-five sheep, sixty heads of cattle, thirteen 
horses and 2820 yuan in cash. Contrary to expectation, it was between 1953 and 1958 that Zeku witnessed 





oppression,” adding, “religious belief is especially strong.”50  While the assessment is not 
entirely new— for example, similar judgments had been made in the fall of 1953— the 
root cause of exploitation had changed in a fundamental way.  The paradigm of national 
exploitation, through which the Party had conceptualized the causes of social and 
economic inequities and backward modes of pastoral production, was now giving way to 
a formula that instead emphasized class exploitation.  Similarly, although national unity 
was still declared to be the foundation upon which the new society would be built, unity’s 
enemies were being redefined.  No longer were there gratuitous references to the 
oppression of the Ma Bufang regime, long the primary metonym for national 
exploitation.51  Instead, although still leveled discretely, by the start of 1956 the 
indigenous elite had begun to be singled out as the exploitative class and the primary 
barrier to economic development and national integration.52  
Perhaps the most direct evidence of the Party’s changing attitude toward 
indigenous elites appeared in the rhetoric surrounding grassland disputes.  Back in 1953, 
Zeku’s Party leaders had repeatedly cast grassland conflict as the manifestation of the 
predatory practices of Ma Bufang and his allies.  However, by mid-decade culpability 
                                                
50 ZCPC 6, 67.  This was a “partial report” (bufen).  The County Party Committee did not submit its final 
report until January 18, 1956, well after Xining’s mid-December deadline.  See ZCPC6 69-94.   
 
51 There are a couple of references to Ma Bufang in the county committee’s pastoral investigation report.  
However, in comparison to the central role he played in 1953 and 1954, Ma is no longer central to the 
Party’s rhetoric.  See for example ZCPC 6 87, 93. 
 
52 ZCPC 6, 68. For example, the report claimed that when a certain member of the Xuhumang was killed, 
his life was exchanged for eighty-one heads of cattle.  However, after “tribal leaders” received their share 
of the compensation, the family of the victim was left with only ten cattle.  In another example of the class-
based exploitation of the indigenous elite, it was alleged that in exchange for renting a pair of dzo (the 
offspring of a bull and a female yak), the animals’ owner was compensated with sixty jin of butter and 
thirty jin of meat.  At those prices, according to the Party Committee’s report, all of the butter produced by 
the borrowed animals would have to be repaid to the owner: “The renter can only keep a little bit of chura 




was being shifted onto the qianbaihu system itself.  Several years earlier, Zhou Renshan 
had predicted that grassland disputes would actually increase during the early period of 
Party rule.  Now, Zeku’s Party leaders confirmed Zhou’s warning, explaining,  
Over the years our Party has provided assistance and care to minority 
nationalities and [because of this] production has improved and livestock 
numbers have increased.  However, it has caused an increase in grassland 
disputes between and within the tribes and they are difficult to settle.53   
 
Significantly, it was alleged that this spike in grassland conflict was neither due to 
environmental hardships nor national exploitation.  Instead, employing language never 
before used in Zeku County, the Party Committee declared,  
The reason is due to the fact that class struggle during the transitional period is 
becoming more serious and complex.  Therefore, the small nationality ruling class 
(minzu tongzhi jieji) wants to maintain their dominant position and they create 
these disputes.  In addition, the reactionary elements are using religion to create 
conflict among the people and even armed fighting.54 
 
While the allegation that indigenous elites— ominously referred to here as the 
“nationality ruling class”— had been selfishly working against the realization of national 
unity is notable, it was not unfamiliar.  Again, two years prior Gélek Gyatso had made 
similar accusations.  However, now the purported obstructionism was being framed in a 
far more sinister light.  No longer was elite resistance a lingering residue of national 
exploitation and backwards thinking.  Instead, it was a manifestation of class struggle.  
For example, the County Party Committee alleged that while attending government 
meetings, tribal representatives would pledge to cooperate with work teams, but 
                                                
53 ZCPC 6, 78. Italics mine. 
 




“afterwards seal off the masses, and create lots of obstacles.”55  Lumbum, the Gartsé 
qianhu and vice-secretary of the Zeku County Consultative Committee, was singled out 
for warning members of his tribe to be wary of work teams snooping around their tents, 
asking their opinions, and collecting data on their animals.  Displaying a narrow tribal 
parochialism, Lumbum reportedly exhorted, “Don’t carelessly speak to outsiders about 
the internal affairs of our tribe.”56  Moreover, while the Party had long condemned poor 
work methods and attitudes among its cadre force for the deleterious effects they had on 
national unity and policy implementation, it was no longer outside bandits and spies 
alone who took advantage by spreading false rumors and sowing discord.  Now it was 
alleged that indigenous elites themselves were actively exploiting the Party’s own 
shortcomings in order to drive a wedge between the masses and the Party-state.  The 
report admitted, “When we see small problems we do not pay attention.  We fail to 
realize that the small problems are indeed the root of big problems,” adding, “As a result, 
the nationality ruling class uses it as an opportunity to create problems.”57   For example, 
herdlords were accused of exploiting “feudal privileges” and “certain defects” in the 
Party’s pastoral tax collection work to sew anxieties in the minds of common herders.58  
Yet, even while documenting cases of alleged class estrangement, the Party 
Committee simultaneously admitted that collectivization campaigns underway in 
                                                
55 ZCPC 11, 36-37.  Again, this was not a new criticism, having been raised back in 1953 and 1954 by 
Party leaders and Gélek Gyatso (see Chapters 4 and 5).  However, it was now being painted in a more 
pernicious manner. 
 
56 Ibid., 37.  This was specifically directed at those living in the dewa in the vicinity of Gartsé Monastery 
who, according to the this and other reports, often consisted of the elderly, week, infirmed and desperately 
poor. See ZCCC 11, 35-36. 
 
57 ZCPC 6, 78. The example of Serökyap’s flaunting of grassland regulations was once again provided. 
 




neighboring agricultural regions had already “raised doubts and concerns from the people 
of all classes toward our Party.”59  Common herdsmen were said to have only the most 
vague understanding of socialism’s goals.  Investigators quoted a member of the 
Xuhumang saying, “We have heard about the General Line at meetings, but we do not 
know what it means.”  A Hor Detsang herdsman added, “What is socialism?  I have only 
heard that we are going on the road to socialism.”  Reactions were decidedly more 
negative among the region’s two other “classes,” described here as middle and upper 
level pastoralists on the one hand and religious elements on the other.  For example, 
monks were said to have inquired with trepidation, “When socialism arrives everyone has 
to work and everyone will have food to eat.  But the monks at the monasteries chant 
prayers and do not work.  When socialism arrives will [we] have food to eat?”  Members 
of Hor Monastery allegedly asked Yangdan, “Will we have freedom of religion in the 
socialist society?”60  
Moreover, for the first time reports mention significant elite anxiety over the 
possibility of the imminent redistribution of wealth.  Investigations revealed, “In their 
hearts there has developed a fear of [property] division and a fear of [class] struggle.”  
For example, Chögyong, the Hor Ratsang Baihu who was now head of Zeku County’s 
People’s Court, purportedly proclaimed with foreboding, “[In agricultural regions] all of 
the land of the landlords has been redistributed.  When socialism arrives [in pastoral 
regions] the livestock of the wealthy herders like County Leader Wagya will also be 
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redistributed.”  Wagya himself was said to have asked Yangdan, “When you visited Inner 
Mongolia was it true that there was no “No Division, No Struggle?”61 
However, the Zeku County Party Committee continued to reserve the majority of 
its criticism for its own cadre force.  It insisted that poor work methods and attitudes 
“damaged the Party’s image” and hurt its efforts to unite with the masses. 62  More 
fundamentally, Party leaders were aware that to effectively replace the leadership of the 
pre-Liberation indigenous elite, a native cadre force had to be cultivated and put into 
positions of responsibility.  Yet, at the start of 1956 only seventy of Zeku’s two hundred 
eleven government cadres were from minority nationalities (sixty-three Tibetan and 
seven Hui).  Not only was this considered to be far too few, but the overall quality of the 
local cadres was reportedly poor.  Once again blame fell largely on the Han cadres who 
had been sent into the grasslands.  The pastoral investigation report, an internal Party 
document not likely seen by indigenous elites, alleged, 
First of all it is Han Chauvinism that deters them from training minority cadres.  
Many [Han] cadres fail to understand that the training of minority cadres is the 
consolidation of the relationship between the Party and the People.  Secondly, 
they look down upon minority cadres and do not employ them.  Thirdly, they do 
not see the [good] qualities of [minority] cadres and pay attention to them.  They 
like the progressive and loathe the backwards.  They do not help them [improve 
their] work.63 
 
In other words, on the eve of the launch of the pastoral cooperativization campaign, 
nationality autonomy— understood as local nationalities governing their own regions— 
                                                
61 Ibid., 75.  As mentioned earlier, the Three No’s were devised in Inner Mongolia under the leadership of 
its Party Secretary Ulanhu.  According to Bulag, in purely pastoral regions Ulanhu successfully defended 
the Three No’s through the Great Leap Forward and into the early 1960s.  Bulag, Mongols at China’s Edge, 
126. 
 
62 ZCPC 6, 88-89. 
 




was still being taken seriously.  The report concluded, “In the future, for the development 
of socialism we must train and employ minority nationality cadres, particularly local 
ones.”64  Until then, despite being increasingly cast as class enemies, the continued 
cooperation of the pre-Liberation elite remained vital. 
In order to assuage the concerns of all of Zeku’s classes, but in particular the 
tribal and monastic leaders, Zeku’s pastoral investigation report therefore pointedly 
reaffirmed the policies of the United Front.  Although issued at perhaps the most radical 
point of the nation-wide High Tide of socialist transformation, in its January 1956 report 
to the prefecture, county leaders pledged, 
On the foundation of continuing to implement the policies of “No Struggle, No 
Distribution, No Class Division” and “Mutual Benefit of Herdlord and Herd 
Laborers,” to put into practice nationality region autonomy, further strengthen 
unity between and within the nationalities, actively launch the mutual aid and 
cooperative campaign in pastoral regions, greatly increase livestock numbers, 
[and] assist the industrialization of the nation.65   
 
Cadres were reminded, “First of all we discuss it with the tribal leaders and seek their 
consent and [only] then implement a particular work task.  Experience has shown that 
this is a crucial part of work.”66  As before, education— not struggle, imprisonment or 
elimination— was prescribed as the remedy for ideological defects among what was 
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65 ZCPC 6, 76.  A slightly different version of this quotation appears in the December 4-draft of the 
investigation report.  Instead of launching mutual aid and cooperativization, cadres were to “actively launch 
a patriotic animal protection campaign” and aid both the nation’s industrialization and the socialization of 
agriculture.  The omission of references to mutual aid and collectivization lends credence to the argument 
that the collectivization campaign was not launched in Zeku until the first months of 1956.  See below.  
ZCPC 6, 66.  
 




increasingly being referred to as the “nationality ruling class.”67  Even when directly 
linked to grassland disputes, the Party Committee ordered that local elites not be removed 
from office.  Instead, “tribal leaders must organize meetings and straighten up their 
thinking.  Let them exercise becoming masters of their own homes and seek solutions.”68 
Nonetheless, it was becoming clear to all involved that the status quo would not 
last.  Had they been privy to it, most worrisome to Zeku’s pre-Liberation elite would 
perhaps have been a footnote to the Party Committee’s pastoral investigation report.  It 
claimed that impoverished members of the Wöngya Tribe were now asking for the 
redistribution of sheep and cattle, “causing tribal headmen to fear [class] struggle and fear 
division [of property].”69  In 1952 Zhou Renshan had promised his cadres that when the 
masses were ready for socialist transformation the old society would at last be swept 
away.  While it is impossible to determine if members of Zeku’s Tibetan masses were in 
fact requesting the redistribution of property, at the start of 1956 for the first time it was 
being alleged that that point might at last be approaching.70 
 
 
                                                
67 See for example, ZCPC 6, 87; ZCPC 11, 37; ZCPC, 16 48-49.  The accusations did contain an element 
of the corrective methodology of criticism and self-criticism displayed in Gélek Gyatso’s admonishments at 
the 1954 2nd Joint Committee Meeting.  For example, the report notes that people should learn from the 
lesson of the headman Duoji Nanmu Ji (Ch.).  Duoji Nanmu Ji, it was reported, had been a frequent violator 
of the grassland system.  Recently, however, he had made an open self-criticism and at the same time 
criticized other indigenous leaders.  ZCPC 11, 33.  
 
68 ZCPC 6, 79. 
 
69 ZCPC 6, 68. 
 
70 In Central Tibet, the “17-point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” signed in 1951, 
explicitly stated that old system would be maintained until Tibetans asked for socialist transformation.  No 
formal treaty was signed with Tibetans in other parts of the plateau (or any other ethnic group).  However, 
as demonstrated by Zhou Renshan’s 1952 speech, similar promises had been made in Amdo, even if there 




Subimperialism at the Crossroads: Mutual Aid and Cooperation 
For the residents of Zeku County, the most consequential development of 1955 
was surely the mid-summer decision reached at Beijing’s National Pastoral Conference to 
launch pastoral cooperativization.  However, Qinghai’s first pastoral Mutual Aid Teams 
actually had been established the previous year.  According to published sources, these 
experimental MATs were formed under the principle of voluntary participation and 
“developed upon the foundation [of existing] communal herding [practices] and 
cooperation in moving encampments.”  It would later be claimed that the trials showed 
that cooperativization “was of definite use in developing pastoral production, […] and 
was welcomed by the pastoral masses.”71  Whether genuinely impressed by the results of 
the experimental MATs or responding to political pressures, in September 1955,  
[…] under the influence of the High Tide of agricultural cooperativization in our 
province and across the country, the Qinghai Provincial Communist Party decided 
to experiment with pastoral production cooperatives in places where the work 
foundation was comparatively good.72 
  
Specifically, thirteen experimental cooperatives were established in Haiyan County, a 
mixed-nationality, mixed-economy region not far from the provincial capital.  By years 
end the Provincial Party Committee had extended the program, announcing, “if the 
conditions are right, pure pastoral regions can also experiment with pastoral 
cooperatives.”  Yet, far from rushing headlong into collectivization, four preconditions 
were set.  Local officials were told that there must be a foundation of existing mutual aid 
practices, national unity must be strong and social order stable, a nationality cadre force 
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72 DDZGQH, vol.1, 73. The decision to move from an “individual, private small production economy” to 
pastoral mutual aid cooperatives was announced in the “Summary Report of the 1st Pastoral Region [Party] 
Secretary Conference.”  This was almost certainly the same conference that launched the pastoral 




must have been developed, and the majority of the upper-level figures must be in 
agreement.73  Before long, eleven counties— including Huangnan’s Tongren and Jianzha 
Counties but not Zeku— had established experimental pastoral cooperatives.74 
In February 1956, as the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee was preparing to 
send its own pastoral investigation report to Beijing, provincial Party leaders convened a 
meeting to appraise the progress of these experimental pastoral cooperatives.  According 
to an official history,  
The conference confirmed that the method of realizing pastoral socialist 
transformation through pastoral cooperativization is absolutely correct. […].  
Carrying out cooperativization in pastoral regions is the decisive step in using 
peaceful methods as the basis to transform the relationship of pastoral production, 
eliminate the system of oppression, [and] eliminate feudal privileges and tribal 
separatist rule (buluo geju).”75 
   
In so many words, the Provincial Party Committee essentially changed Qinghai’s guiding 
principles toward pastoral regions.  No longer was national integration to be the primary 
mechanism for socialist transformation.  Now, socialist transformation was declared to be 
the primary means to achieve national integration. 
Nonetheless, it was still recognized that the full socialization of pastoral regions 
could not be achieved overnight. Despite the ongoing High Tide, the Qinghai Party 
Committee was quick to add that cooperativization must be realized gradually and on the 
basis of voluntary participation.  Cadres were warned, “the time period will be lengthy, 
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74 On January 15, 1956, Qinghai’s first PPC, the Dengta (Beacon) Pastoral Production Cooperative, was 
established in Xinghai County. QHSZXMZ, 70, 71.  See also Tongren Xianzhi, 268; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 
215.   
 




the pace will be steady, and the policies will be flexible.”76  Moreover, while the masses 
were to be the backbone of the new order (yikao mumin qunzhong), herdlords were not to 
be eliminated but instead reformed through “unity and education.”  In fact, provincial 
Party leaders were quick to reaffirm the Three No’s as well as the principle of religious 
freedom.  Nonetheless, back in 1952 Zhou Renshan had been unable to tell his audience 
when the old feudal system might be replaced by the new socialist society.  Now socialist 
transformation had a date.  According to the Qinghai Party Committee’s announcement, 
the partial socialist cooperativization (banshehuizhuyi hezuohua) of pastoral regions was 
to be complete by 1959.77 
Even before Xining’s February order made it official, a Zeku County Party 
Committee report indicates that promoting cooperative pastoral production had already 
been made the coming year’s central task.78  Submitted to Huangnan Prefecture on 
January 8, the report began by describing the general situation in Zeku County, including 
providing population and livestock figures, recounting state-building activities, and 
describing efforts to raise “mass awareness” and promote intra-national unity.  Under the 
Party’s correct policies, the report declared, both pastoral production and living standards 
had improved.  As predicted, these positive developments “caused the majority of the 
herdsmen and people of all strata to love and cherish the Party and its policies.”  As a 
result, it was alleged,  
In the wake of the reverberations from the High Tide in comprehensive socialist 
reforms and agricultural cooperativization [that are being implemented] 
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throughout the nation and in nearby agricultural regions, the broad herding masses 
have undergone an uneven rise in their class awareness […].79   
 
As proof, the report noted that in the past when a “tribal headman” mediated a dispute he 
was compensated for his efforts.  Now, the report claimed,  
[…] some of the masses raise [objections] to giving the headmen cattle or sheep, 
some raise [the possibility of] not discussing with the headmen the apportion [of 
work] within the tribe, [and] through education some have very quickly realized 
the benefits of moving toward mutual aid and cooperation.80   
 
The committee concluded that this development showed that many members of the 
masses were in favor of initiating socialist reforms and launching pastoral 
cooperativization. 
However, the County Party Committee’s report also acknowledged that due to the 
still incomplete establishment of Zeku’s sub-county autonomous administrations, levels 
of understanding and enthusiasm for cooperativization varied.  More specifically, it 
admitted that “mass awareness” was only well developed within the ranks of the Party 
and Communist Youth League.  Elsewhere, the prestige of the tribal leaders and 
influence of religion still ran deep.81  Considering that at the start of 1956, Zeku’s leaders 
could call on only eight Tibetan Party members and eleven Tibetan Youth League 
members, this is a startling admission.82  Yet, rather than suggesting that conditions were 
not yet ripe for socialist transition, the county committee declared cooperativization to be 
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82 At the beginning of 1956, Zeku County had a total of fifty-eight Communist Party members and seventy 
Communist Youth League members. By the end of the year, the numbers had risen to one hundred twenty-
seven and seventy-four respectively.  Of these just twenty-eight CCP and twelve CYL members were 




“the core of work.”  Obstacles to cooperativization must be “overcome” so that Zeku 
County could “victoriously complete the task of socialist reform.”83  In other words, at 
the start of 1956, the method to overcome the barriers to socialist transformation had 
become none other than socialist transformation.   
 
Following “the guiding principles of the Party Center and Mao Zedong,” the Zeku 
County Committee prepared a set of instructions that essentially provided a graded, 
gradual path to collectivization.  Firstly, the plan called for Zeku County’s 4,217 
households to be enrolled into four hundred Mutual Aid Teams, each consisting of 
approximately ten households.  Echoing provincial directives, the County Committee 
ordered that MATs “correct and improve” upon “existing forms of unity and mutual aid 
organizations found among the pastoral masses.”84  This almost certainly meant that 
MATs were to be formed out of existing herding groups, the pastoral equivalent of the 
“natural villages” that formed the basic level of cooperative production in agricultural 
regions.85  In short time, these four hundred MATs would be transformed into one 
hundred eighty-seven Pastoral Production Cooperatives with roughly twenty households 
each.  Eventually, approximately eighty High-level Cooperatives (HLCs) made up of 
roughly fifty families each would form the primary social, economic and political unit on 
the Zeku grasslands.86   
                                                
83 ZCPC 13, 3-4. 
 
84 Ibid., 4.  See also QHSZXMZ, 70. 
 
85 QHSZXMZ, 69.  MATs were described as “economic units essentially similar to the voluntary unity of 
the pastoralists’ familial relations.”  
 




The Zeku County Party Committee’s directive contained few specific instructions 
on how to organize MATs and cooperatives nor compensate members for their 
investment in material, animals and labor.  However, it did make clear its expectations 
for the pace of the campaign.  According to the January 1956 plans, cooperativization 
was to begin immediately.  During the first year, one thousand fifty-one households, or 
nearly one quarter of Zeku’s population, were slated to join MATs.  Of these, however, 
only about fifteen percent were to be year-round Mutual Aid Teams (changnian 
huzhuzu).  The remainder would be organized into more basic-level mutual aid 
organizations: seasonal MATs (jijie huzhuzu) and temporary MATs (linshi huzhuzu).87  
Although the committee’s instructions did not elaborate, the provincial gazetteer notes 
that year-round MATs were to be permanent units with strong leadership cores, 
“democratic management,” a basic production plan, a process to evaluate work and 
assign work points (pinggong jifen), and in some cases a year-round system of joint-
household herding (lianhu fangmu).  As would be expected, seasonal MATs would 
instead join together periodically to engage in seasonal cooperative work.  This might 
include herding in the summer and fall and lambing in the winter and spring.  Lastly, in 
temporary MATs herders would come together on a one-off basis to perform specific 
production tasks.88  
According to the work plan, full cooperativization would not be achieved until the 
mid-1960s.  Over the intervening years, the plan confidently proclaimed, membership in 
MATs would quickly climb from twenty-four percent of the pastoral population in 1956 
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88 QHSZXMZ, 69-70.  See also Zeku Xianzhi, 115. According to the provincial gazetteer, in 1957 Year-




to seventy percent two years later.  Zeku’s last pastoral households would not join year-
round MATs until 1960.  By that time, however, eighty-eight percent of households 
would have already moved past the stage of MATs and entered Pastoral Production 
Cooperatives.  In fact, the first full PPC was already planned for the first half of 1956.89  
It was envisioned that this inaugural cooperative would grow to ten in 1957, then forty-
five in 1958 and one hundred twelve in 1959.  By 1961, the county’s entire pastoral 
population was to have joined PPCs.  At that point the transition to High-level 
Cooperatives could begin.  Seven of these larger cooperatives were to be established that 
first year, nearly tripling to twenty in 1962.  Between 1963 and 1967 the entire county 
was to be enrolled in HLCs and the “gradual” cooperativization of Zeku County would be 
complete.90  Socialism will have arrived on the grasslands. 
 
 The Qinghai Provincial Party Committee declared that the primary purpose of 
cooperativization was to ensure that the “laboring masses of pastoral regions can 
overcome hardship, develop production and travel down the road to certain prosperity.”91  
However, only by demonstrating the benefits of collective production could Tibetan 
pastoralists be convinced to voluntarily join MATs and PPCs.  To this end, the Zeku 
County Party Committee was tasked with raising production by implementing a “plan to 
effectively use the grasslands.”  In addition to the usual instructions about protecting 
                                                
89 ZCPC 13, 5. The report suggests that if all went well, 2-3 more PPCs could be organized in the second 
half of 1956.  However they would be included in the following year’s statistics.  As shown below, two 
PPCs were in fact formed during the late spring, and several others were planned before cooperativization 
work was halted. 
 
90 Ibid., 5-6. Yearly production increase targets for the three traditional animals were relatively moderate: 
horses 7%, cattle 9%, and sheep and goats 16.5%.  Ibid., 7-8. 
 




livestock and improving grassland management, several new initiatives were introduced.  
These included an ambitious but vague plan to irrigate more than 600,000 mu of dry 
grassland (approximately 100,000 acres) through the construction of a system of 
reservoirs.  Likewise, the work plan estimated that by digging wells the plateau would be 
able to support and additional 50,000 head of livestock.92  In order to demonstrate to the 
masses the benefits of collective production, county leaders announced that over the next 
three years state-owned pastoral farms (guoying mufang) would be established in 
Gönshül, Sonak and Hor.93  The Party Committee also ordered a grassland management 
work station (caoyuan gonzuozhan) built at the county seat and eight pastoral technology 
guidance stations (xumu jishu zhidaozhan) placed at strategic locations.94 
Cooperativization, however, was more than a program of economic development.  
Taken to its logical conclusion, it also signaled the end of Zeku’s pre-Liberation 
economic, social and political order.  In fact, among the several anticipated “methods” by 
which cooperativization would increase grassland production, the first mentioned was, 
“Eliminating the grassland rights and all types of feudal privileges of the herdlord class 
and their representatives in the monasteries.”95  By replacing the exploitative practices of 
the past with communal ownership under the leadership of the Party, it was believed that 
                                                
92 Ibid., 8-9. The plan called for the construction of two mid-sized and fourteen smaller reservoirs. 
 
93 Ibid., 12.  On state-owned pastoral farms in Qinghai, see Zhang, Lei, and Tian, 264-288; QHSZXMZ, 
230-240.  
 
94 ZCPC 13, 12-13.  The former would make mechanized production tools available, for example to cut 
grass for winterfeed.  The latter would provide machinery to process animal bi-products.  In the end, 
mechanization of pastoral production did not begin until the mid-1960s.  See Zeku Xianzhi, 148. 
 




the full productive capacity of the grasslands would be harnessed.  By extension, the 
privileged positions of Zeku’s secular and religious elites would finally be terminated. 
Secondly, the Party Committee made it clear that cooperativization entailed 
“settling the nomads (dingju youmu).”  According to the plan, between 1956 and 1959, 
first the Ködé Karing then the Sonak, Hor, Méshül and Khéri Chunga Tribes would be 
“gradually” settled.  The following year, as the pastoral cooperativization campaign 
gained steam, the remaining five tribes would be permanently settled as well.  
Constraining the movement of mobile peoples has long been a preoccupation of 
sedentary states.  By reducing the mobility of Zeku’s pastoral population, Party leaders 
surely hoped to disrupt tribal identities, replacing them with bounded and regularized 
administrative organs not directly connected to tribal authorities.96  However, the 
decision to settle Zeku’s pastoralists was articulated largely in terms of rationalizing and 
improving production.  While the January plans offered only the vague reasoning that 
settlement would aid “economic and cultural construction,” instructions issued in August 
by Huangnan Prefecture directly connected settlement to both cooperativization and 
increased output.  The directive noted, “At the present in our prefecture the distinguishing 
characteristic of pastoral production in pastoral regions is the […] animals’ year-round 
dependency on natural nomadic movement.”97  This, however, put pastoralists at the 
mercy of the nature.  Although post-Liberation improvements to grazing methods and 
grassland management had reduced the “fragility and instability” of pastoral production, 
pastoralists still had to lead their animals on seasonal migrations, considered an 
                                                
96 See Peter C. Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in 
Early Modern Central Eurasia," International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998), especially 265-267.   
 




exceedingly “backward method of operating.”  These halfway measures, then, could 
reduce but not eliminate the ever-present threat of natural disasters.  Instead, the report 
continued, only through “unity and mutual aid, [will we have] the ability to overcome the 
limitations of manpower and resources, […] and have the strength to defeat natural 
disasters.”98  In cooperatives, settled pastoralists “using modern management methods,” 
could warehouse high quality grass and feed, build winter pens and store water.  
According to Party planners, this would allow for the age-old battle against the elements 
to be “basically eliminated.”99  Through cooperativization, the directive boldly 
pronounced, “Man can defeat nature.”100 
The third sea change introduced in the County Committee’s January 1956 report 
was perhaps the most dramatic.  Party leaders announced that Zeku County would 
become home to a large number of agricultural “immigrants” (yimin).  To both support 
the newcomers and to increase overall production, large portions of the grassland would 
simultaneously be brought under cultivation (kehuang).  According to the work plan, the 
first 5,000 immigrants would arrive in 1958.  These settlers, numbering nearly one-third 
of Zeku’s indigenous population, would be provided with 25,000 mu of land.  Over the 
                                                
98 Ibid.   
 
99 Ibid., 53. 
 
100 Ibid., 54.  The directive proclaimed, “convincing pastoralists that they can overcome nature is the most 
important and arduous task.” While the fate of the settlement campaign is unclear, it certainly fell well 
short of its goals.  Over the last decade, under the umbrella of the Western Development Campaign and in 
the name of economic progress and environmental protection, there has been a renewed attempt to 
sedentarize Amdo’s pastoralists.  Jarmila Ptackova is currently completing research on the effects of the 
campaign on Zeku’s pastoralists.  See Jarmila Ptackova, The Opening of the West Development Strategy 
and its Impact on the Life and Livelihood of the Tibetan Pastoralists: Resettlement of Tibetan Pastoralists 
in Zeku County as a Result of Implementation of Socioeconomic and Environmental Development 
Programs in Qinghai Provice, P.R.C. China. Ph.D. diss. Humboldt University, n.d.  There have been a 
number of articles, scholarly and otherwise, on the broader sedentarization efforts.  For an example of the 





next three years, an additional 5,000 settlers were slated to arrive annually.  Between 
1962-1964, this would increases from 10,000, to 20,000, and finally an astounding 
30,000 settlers per year.  Moreover, for each 5,000 immigrants, an additional 25,000 mu 
of grassland was to be cleared and devoted to agriculture.  Ultimately, over seven years 
100,000 agricultural migrants were expected to turn 500,000 mu of grassland, over 
82,000 acres, into farmland.  Simultaneously, plans were announced to introduce animals 
not normally suited for the high plateau, including chicken, ducks and pigs, along with 
mechanized agricultural equipment, “in order to suit the nation’s socialist construction 
and the demands of agricultural production.”101   
Even by the utopian standards of Maoist China the projections seem remarkable.  
They called for a six-fold increase in the population of the Zeku Tibetan Autonomous 
County, while turning five percent of the usable grassland— lying at an average elevation 
of nearly 12,000 feet above sea level— into farmland.  No mention is made in the work 
plan of the potential consequences to the pastoral economy, nor the indigenous Tibetan 
population that in a decade’s time would have become a small minority in its own 
autonomous county.  Elsewhere, however, the Zeku Party Committee acknowledged that 
preparing for agricultural settlement was “particularly discreet and particularly careful 
work.”102   On January 31, Party Secretary Guo Min personally “consulted” with several 
of Zeku’s leading indigenous figures, Wagya, Serökyap, Lumbum and the Wöngya’s 
Luociri, on the “question of immigration and land reclamation.”103  According to the 
                                                
101 ZCPC 13, 16.  
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report, Secretary Guo received the cautious support of the four headmen, who 
recommended sites within the territories of each of Zeku’s ten tribes suitable for 
agricultural settlement and development.104  Then, in concert with promoting pastoral 
cooperativization and production, work teams were instructed to investigate prospects for 
land reclamation, test soil quality, check the availability of water, research the viability of 
irrigation projects, report on housing conditions, and determine which crops might be 
best suited for the region.105  Yet, High Tide or not, Party leaders remained attuned to the 
sensitivity of the work.  In response to a proposal by the Gönshül Work Team to clear 
land in the vicinity of Gönshül Monastery, the County Committee instructed,  
Before clearing land, first obtain the agreement of the monastery and the tribal 
representatives.  Under the principle of not arousing disputes and stirring up the 
anxieties of members of all pastoral classes, they are permitted to clear and till the 
land, however [the work team] must completely grasp this principle.106 
 
In the end the immigration and agricultural reclamation plan was not carried out, 
certainly not with the speed nor numbers put forth in the 1956 directive.  In March 1959, 
during the heyday of the Great Leap Forward, Zeku’s first agricultural settlers did finally 
arrive.  However, instead of the proposed five thousand immigrants,  
Zeku County Party and government leaders, county cadres and the masses from 
the vicinity gathered at a meeting [at which they] enthusiastically welcomed to 
Zeku County the first group of 1,006 members of the Henan Province Pingyu 
County Support the Border Region Youth Shock Brigade (zhibian qingnian 
tujidui) to join in socialist construction.107   
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105 Ibid., 127-128. 
 
106 Ibid., 129. 
 
107 Zeku Xianzhi, 148.  According to the gazetteer, the immigrants ranged from seventeen to forty-nine 
years of age. Greg Rohlf notes that Qinghai’s youth volunteers were organized by the Communist Youth 
League (under future Party Secretary Hu Yaobang) as agricultural immigrants to support the 





The following day these Han Chinese activists were sent to the Batang Grasslands, a 
region within the Hor territories said to have relatively good soil, water and climactic 
conditions.108  Under the battle cry of “mobilize production, militarize organization, 
democratize daily life,” over the next month one hundred hectares of grassland were 
reportedly cleared and sewed.109  However, due to a combination of frost, hail and rodent 
infestation, two-thirds of the crops subsequently failed.  In March of the following year, a 
second group of Henanese joined the Batang settlement, bringing the total number of 
agricultural immigrants to 2,046.  However, by summer more than a quarter of the 
settlers had already deserted (taoyi).  In fall 1961, with the Great Leap Forward now in 
full retreat, the program was officially ended.110  The Zeku County Gazetteer does not 
                                                                                                                                            
of “youth volunteer land reclamation teams” were settled, the focus was to feed the region’s other new 
residents, many of whom had been sent to find and exploit Qinghai’s natural resources, especially in the 
Chaidam Basin “where hills of gold and seas of oil were believed hidden beneath the rocky, arid 
landscape.”  According to a history of Qinghai’s pastoral sector, these land reclamation projects seriously 
damaged the grasslands and hurt production.  For example, in the Henan Mongolian Autonomous County, 
in 1959 livestock birthrates fell by 18-57%.  That same year the entire province reportedly lost 1,500,000 
heads of livestock.  However, given the dual catastrophes of the Amdo Rebellion and the Great Leap 
Forward, it seems highly doubtful that agricultural reclamation was the sole or even primary culprit.  See 
Rohlf, 455-463; Zhang, Lei, and Tian, 124-125. 
 
108 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 33-34.  In July 1956, the Batang State Pastoral Farm was established with an 
investment of 74,890 yuan.   
 
109 Zeku Xianzhi, 149, 151.  Shengchan zhandouhua, zuzhi junshihua, shenghua minzhuhua. Thirty-three 
hectares were planted with “barley and similar grains.”  The other sixty-six hectares was only crudely 
cleared and dibbled with seedlings.  
 
110 Ibid., 149-150.  The second group was from Henan’s Shangcha County.  In Zeku, preparations to end 
the program had begun as early as July 1961.  By then, 1417 hectares of land had been cleared and planted.  
In all, 1315 men and 731 women took part in the program.  According to Rohlf, by 1962 all of Qinghai’s 
youth farms had been shut down.  The primary reason was that they did not produce enough grain to 




again mention agricultural settlement until 1971, when twenty agricultural families from 
Qinghai’s Ledu County moved to what was then known as Hor Commune.111 
 
With its plan in place, from January 24-February 3, 1956, county leaders 
convened a Joint Meeting of the Zeku County People’s Government and Consultative 
Committees.  There, Wagya reported on the decision to launch pastoral cooperativization.  
Representatives were issued “specific assignments for the construction of mutual aid 
teams and cooperatives” after which individual work teams were ordered to go into the 
field and draw up specific proposals.112  Based on these reports, county leaders soon 
submitted a recommendation to prefectural authorities that “preliminary arrangements be 
made to test mutual aid and cooperation work among the Hor and Méshül Tribes.”113   
On April 2, the Huangnan Prefecture Party Committee finally issued its reply.  
While prefectural leaders praised Zeku’s initiative, they reproached county officials for 
presenting a proposal that “lacked clear guiding principles and suggestions for dealing 
with concrete problems.”114  While the “specific principle of [establishing] experimental 
areas” (shiban diqu) was deemed correct, Huangnan worried that if cooperativization was 
                                                
111 Ibid., 148-150.  In 1995, nearly forty years after the Party Committee announced its plans to import 
100,000 immigrants and open 82,000 acres to agriculture, Zeku County had a population of under 50,000 
(80% Tibetan) and only 61,000 acres of agricultural land.  Zeku Xianzhi, 1, 151-152, 
 
112 Ibid., 17.  For example, the Sonak Work Team’s proposal, which apparently was not adopted, included 
plans to establish fifteen MATs by the end of August, three of which would be year-round MATs, and a 
PPC by year’s end.  ZCPG 1, 155, 158. See also the Shisa work plan in ZCPG 1, 150-151. 
 
113 ZCPC 7, 40. Unfortunately, the County Committee’s proposal is not found among the archival 
materials. 
 
114 Ibid., 40-41. The Prefecture Committee remarked that throughout Huangnan but especially in Zeku 
County, plans had not been comprehensive enough.  Zeku County was instructed to follow the guidelines 
set forth by Provincial Party Secretary Gao Feng under the slogan, “Thoroughly Plan, Strengthen 




implemented incorrectly it could cause disruptions to production and national unity.  For 
example, it noted that too little attention had been paid to sensitive issues such as how 
cooperative shares were to be valued and how dividends were to be distributed. 
Therefore, “taking production as the core, [and] the pastoralists’ existing unity and 
mutual aid organizations as the foundation,” work teams were told to study indigenous 
mutual aid practices while simultaneously introducing the concept of pastoral 
cooperatives, a process summarized as, “Study a bit, propagandize a bit, come to 
understand a group, organize a group.”115  Huangnan also expressed unhappiness with the 
County Committee’s proposed timetable.  Despite insisting that the campaign proceed 
according to Zeku’s “concrete conditions,” the Prefecture Party Committee asserted that 
forty-five days was in fact ample time to lay the necessary groundwork for pastoral 
cooperatives.116 
On April 28, the Zeku County Party Committee forwarded the prefecture’s 
instructions to “relevant Party members.”  By then, preliminary preparatory work had 
already been initiated within the Hor and Ködé Karing Tribes.117  The County Party 
Committee would later report that “through a month of arduous work,” the Ködé Karing 
Work Team identified the Huanquhu Tsowa (Ch.) as a suitable target for 
                                                
115 Ibid., 41. 
 
116 Ibid., 42-43. According to the instructions, during the first twenty days work teams should spread 
propaganda, collect information, mobilize the masses, and “informally introduce the cooperatives.”  The 
following fifteen days would then be set aside for “discussing and resolving specific problems.”  Over the 
final ten days, production tasks should be organized and any outstanding issues settled.  
 
117 Ibid., 44. Although the original plan proposed establishing test sites among the Hor and Méshül Tribes, 





cooperativization.118  According to its investigation, the Huanquhu had previously been 
among Ködé Karing’s most affluent tsowa.  However, in 1937 forces loyal to Ma Bufang 
attacked the Huanquhu’s encampments, killing several members and plundering much of 
its material wealth.  Twenty years later, the majority of the Huanquhu’s forty-seven 
households were reported to be destitute or semi-destitute.  The remainder were classified 
as mid-level households.  No herdlords or rich pastoralists were identified.119   
On May 3, the Zeku County Party Committee submitted the Ködé Karing Work 
Team’s findings to the Huangnan Prefecture Committee.  The report declared that 
through the extensive propaganda efforts of the work team, the masses had not only come 
to understand the benefits of cooperativization but also had begun to voluntarily 
experiment with various forms of collective production.  Accordingly, on the basis of 
existing unity and mutual aid, ten households were now prepared to “freely and 
voluntarily” form a cooperative.120  The report predicted that after this first experimental 
cooperative was established, others would come to see the benefits of collectivization and 
                                                
118 ZCPC 7, 54.  The Huanquhu appear to be what Chen Qingying transliterates as the Huaquehu Tsowa.  
According to Chen, in 1958 the Huaquhu had approximately 200 members in over forty households under a 
headman named Huacejia (Ch.). Chen Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 260. 
 
119 Ibid., 51. 
 
120 Ibid., 51-2, 54. Within the ten households were thirty-nine individuals (eighteen males and twenty-one 
females), nineteen of whom were said to be engaged in production (laodongli).  Investigators found that 
three families had between 70-80 sheep and around thirty head of cattle each, while the other seven each 
had between five and fifteen sheep and cattle combined.  An appendix contains the completed “Year-round 
Mutual Aid Group Registration Forms” for the ten Huanquhu households.  Each lists information on the 
household’s “economic situation” as measured by livestock numbers and tents.  Data on the “household 
situation,” including the name and education level of the head of the household, his sex (it was always a 
male), religion (generally left blank), nationality, and his political position if any. The age and sex of each 





wish to join as well.121  However, despite these positive developments, the County Party 
Committee noted that organizational efforts within the Ködé Karing were hampered by a 
lack of qualified local leaders.  Therefore, the work team was instructed to identify and 
actively develop suitable candidates for membership in the Communist Party and 
Communist Youth League.122 
Meanwhile, the Hor Experimental Pastoral Production Cooperative Work Team 
had begun preparatory work on what would become Zeku’s first PPC.  This time 
investigators chose the Xuhumang’s Duobai (Ch.) Herding Group as their test site. 
According to its report, first among the Duobai’s qualifications was a stable social order 
marked by the absence of ongoing grassland disputes.  Secondly, the work group claimed 
that twenty-eight days of propaganda and preparatory work had raised the awareness of 
the masses and produced an environment in which many of the Duobai were willing to 
voluntarily “proceed down the path of mutual aid and cooperation.” Thirdly, within the 
Duobai the work group identified a leadership core (lingdao gugan) consisting of two 
Communist Youth League members, three candidates preparing to join the Party, and six 
local “activists” (jijifenzi).  Lastly, other than a single lower mid-level family, the 
remainder of the Duobai were all classified as poor households.”123  As such, on April 20 
the Hor Work Group submitted plans to the Zeku County Party Committee for the 
                                                
121 Ibid., 52. Similar conditions were reported in the neighboring Kuojia Tsowa (Ch.) where seven 
households were preparing to form a Year-round MAT.  Chen Qingying, who transliterates the tsowa as 
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not among the heads of households listed on MAT registrations forms.  See ZCPC 7, 53, 66-73; Chen 
Qingying, Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo, 260. 
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establishment of Zeku County’s first experimental PPC, Guanghui (Glory) Cooperative.  
Once again demonstrating the thin line between commandism and volunteerism, it was 
reported, “under the principle of voluntariness and mutual benefit, and on the foundation 
of existing mutual aid groups […], [we] decided on eighteen families from among [the 
Duobai herding group] as targets to form the cooperative.”124   
Despite the still rising High Tide of socialist transformation, in pastoral regions 
the Three No’s Policy continued to proscribe the assignment of class labels.  However, as 
demonstrated by both the Huanquhu and Duobai reports, not only were class distinctions 
being made in internal Party communications, but class had become an integral 
component of the cooperativization campaign.  In its own work plan, the Sonak Work 
Team made the correlation between class base and cooperativization explicitly clear.  
Cadres were told, “In building [Mutual Aid] Teams and Cooperatives […], it is especially 
important to rely on the poor pastoralists.  Because their lives are filled with hardship, 
they have a pressing need to organize [cooperatives].”125  In this sense, cooperativization 
was an extension of earlier policies that considered improving the material condition of 
the masses a central means of state and nation building.  Other than the one lower mid-
level household, the Hor Work Team noted that the rest of the Duobai had all previously 
been beneficiaries of state-allocated loans and emergency relief programs.  This was 
deemed an important consideration in assessing the Duobai’s suitability for 
cooperativization.126  In fact, the Prefecture Committee would specifically instruct Zeku 
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125 ZCPG 1, 156. 
 




County to provide animal loans to poor households that joined experimental 
cooperatives.127  From its inception, the Party’s welfare program had been as much a 
nation-building effort designed to develop national unity and patriotic consciousness as 
an attempt to increase production and state capacity.  Similarly, cooperativization was a 
radical campaign of economic and social reform, but it was also the continuance of long-
standing efforts to undermine tribal division and integrate the Zeku grasslands into the 
new nation-state. 
As per the prefecture’s instructions, the time period allotted the Hor Work Team 
to implement this transformation was both truncated and prescribed.  First from April 27-
May 1, a four-day preparatory conference was to be held at which attendees would 
“research and discuss the selection of a five-person preparatory leadership group.” 
Unsurprisingly, this was not to be an open election.  Instead, attendees were expected to 
confirm five Tibetan candidates pre-selected in consultation with the work team.128  
Leaders having been officially chosen, next the cooperative’s regulations and methods of 
organization would be discussed.  Among them, most important and sensitive was the 
issue of how to transform privately owned animals into cooperative shares.  Then from 
May 5-7, a three-day follow-up meeting would be held to resolve outstanding issues.  
Finally, from May 10-15, a Cooperative Registration Conference (jianshe baoming 
dahui) was to be convened.  At this enlarged meeting, herdsmen could register to 
voluntarily join the experimental cooperative.  With the cooperative’s membership 
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128 ZCPC 7, 79.  The leadership was to be made up of a cooperative leader (shezhang) named Ponong, 
vice-leader Lashi Zeben, a Communist Youth League branch secretary (name unclear), and a pastoral 
production director (suozhang) and vice-director named Gao’a Jia and Cailao respectively (all names 




formed, the leadership would be officially confirmed, animal prices set, and shares 
divided among the members accordingly.  Finally, manual labor would be organized and 
work tasks allocated.129  At this point, the Prefecture Committee’s forty-five day 
preparatory period would have been exhausted.  If all had gone according to plan, the 
County Party Committee reported to the prefecture, the masses would have chosen to 
voluntarily join the cooperative with the approval of tribal headmen.  If so, the Guanghui 
Experimental Cooperative could be officially founded.130 
On May 22, a month after receiving the Hor Work Group’s report and a week 
after the cooperative’s proposed inauguration, the Huangnan Prefecture Party Committee 
belatedly issued its reply.  Framed as “suggestions,” prefectural leaders expressed general 
agreement with the proposal to establish Guanghui Cooperative.  However, Party leaders 
were well aware of the project’s potential to cause significant disruption and opposition.  
Therefore, Huangnan emphasized that propaganda work would be crucial in “minimizing 
social resistance.”  On the one hand, work teams were instructed to continue to highlight 
the foundational principles of national unity, the Three No’s and Two Benefits, and 
freedom of religion.  On the other, cadres were ordered to stress that the underlying 
purpose of cooperativization was increasing production and improving the living 
standards of the pastoral masses.131  Finally, under the slogan “Enter Voluntarily and 
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Leave Freely” (rushe ziyuan, tuishe ziyou), cadres were told to stress the non-compulsory 
nature of cooperativization.132   
Although poor pastoralists had been identified as cooperativization’s core 
constituency, Huangnan instructed work teams to “unite with all who you can unite.”133 
In other words, indigenous tribal and religious leaders were not to be excluded based on 
class considerations.  Instead, prefecture leaders understood that if cooperativization was 
to be achieved peacefully and voluntarily, the assistance of the wealthy and influential 
pre-Liberation leadership remained vital.  For example, the Ködé Karing Work Group 
reported that its mutual aid and cooperation efforts had been greatly aided by the active 
support of the Huanquhu headman and “influential elders.”134  However, the Huanquhu 
experience may have been more the exception than the rule.  As the Party itself 
acknowledged, cooperativization was inimical to the economic and political interests of 
these indigenous elites.  In fact, the prefecture noted that most of the opposition to 
cooperativization had come from “the upper stratum, religious circles, [and] rich 
households.”  Yet rather than openly condemn elite obstruction and resistance as a 
manifestation of class struggle, Party leaders again stressed the importance of 
propaganda, 
The spreading of cooperativization policies must be wide and comprehensive, 
deep, [and] clear so as to resolve doubts in the thinking of the masses of all social 
stratums, [and] to convince all of the masses, especially nationality 
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representatives and religious leaders[,] to trust the Party and the People’s 
Government to uphold the Party’s policies.135  
 
In a now familiar refrain, the Prefecture Committee instructed that propaganda work be 
firstly directed at “nationality representatives,” in order to, “straighten out their thinking, 
educate them about the [cooperativization] policies, cause division among them, [and] 
obtain their active support or neutrality.”136  Despite having been increasingly viewed as 
the exploitive class and primary barrier to socialist transformation, the indigenous elite 
simultaneously remained indispensable to the implementation of socialist reforms. 
At the heart of the Party’s efforts to woo the support of indigenous elites to its 
cooperativization campaign lay the “Two Benefits.”  Ostensibly promising to promote the 
mutual benefit of herdlord and herd laborer, the Two Benefits had been introduced in 
1954 as a counterbalance to the Three No’s.  While the Three No’s guaranteed the 
economic and political security of the pre-Liberation elite, conversely the Two Benefits 
had been mainly “a policy to aid poor pastoralists develop production,” for example by 
pressuring wealthy herdsmen to reduce rents and interest.137  Now, however, “mutual 
benefit” (huyi) was being trumpeted as a way to allay the fears of the indigenous elite.  In 
the context of cooperativization, mutual benefit specifically referred to the question of 
how to divvy up shares in the new collectives.  The Prefecture Party Committee advised 
that the “equitable resolution of the question of mutual benefit,” was key to the 
“consolidation of mutual aid and cooperativization.”  In turn, implementing an effective 
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and accepted system of allotting shares and distributing dividends (rugu fenhong) was 
declared to be the key to mutual benefit.138  Moreover, cadres were ordered to stress the 
policy of “Entering Voluntarily and Leaving Freely.”139  In other words, if 
cooperativization was to ultimately succeed without resorting to coercion, wealthy 
households would have to be convinced to voluntarily bring themselves and their 
livestock into the new collective organizations.  To do so, they needed to be assured that 
their investment would be honored and their participation was provisional.  
However, the question of setting animal values, converting them to shares and 
dispensing dividends, remained a persistent problem.  Although the Party had experience 
with agricultural cooperativization, pastoral regions presented at least two new 
complications.  Firstly, unlike the majority of the landlords, in pastoral regions where the 
Three No’s continued to protect property from redistribution, the herdlords still 
prominently maintained their positions of wealth and prestige.  Secondly, as the directive 
plainly remarked, “Animals are not the same as land.”  Livestock was not simply a raw 
material to be exploited, divided, and sold.  Instead, animals produced valuable secondary 
commodities such a wool and milk.  Moreover, animals were living creatures that 
reproduced and died. “Therefore,” the prefecture admitted, “the question of assigning 
shares is a complex problem.”140   
Unfortunately, the primary materials offer few clues about how the new MATs 
and cooperatives were internally organized or how the issue of animal shares and 
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dividends was ultimately resolved.  According to secondary sources, basic-level pastoral 
cooperatives were semi-socialist in nature, marked by ownership of individual shares but 
collective management of the cooperative’s resources.  Members retained ownership over 
the animals they had contributed and received compensation based on the number of 
shares held.  If a member wished to leave the cooperative, he or she theoretically would 
be able to take his or her animals and freely withdraw.  The animals of herdlords were to 
be obtained through a policy of “peaceful purchase” (heping goumai) by which animals 
would be turned into shares.141  However, the Huangnan Prefecture Party Committee only 
offered the vague advice that the issue be handled, “in accordance with the principles of 
voluntarism and mutual benefit and on the basis of strengthening inter-national and intra-
national unity.”142   
 
 
Between the United Front and Socialist Transformation: Retreat and Consolidation 
With the High Tide still rising all around them, in late spring Zeku County’s first 
PPC, the Guanghui Experimental Pastoral Cooperative, was formally established.  Soon 
after, the Ködé Karing Work Team founded a second cooperative as well as eight 
MATs.143  However, by then Xining had already begun to concede that its pastoral 
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cooperativization campaign had overreached.  Even while endorsing the decision to form 
Hor’s Guanghui Cooperative, in its May 22 directive the Huangnan Prefecture Party 
Committee reported that the provincial authorities had ordered, “the implementation of 
pastoral cooperatives in pastoral regions temporarily halted.”144  No specific reason for 
the reversal was given other than to admit that it was in response to “current conditions.”  
However, implicitly acknowledging that the cooperativization campaign had sparked 
local resistance, the provincial directive added that authorities should “refuse to dissolve” 
(buyu jiesan) existing cooperatives but instead “consolidate and rectify” them.  The Zeku 
County Party Committee was told to “thoroughly investigate actual conditions” (chedi 
jinxing modi) and promote the development of mutual aid teams according to the 
“principles of voluntariness and mutual benefit, in order to lay the future foundation for 
experimental cooperatives.”145   
Taken as a whole, the directive was political shorthand for an admission that the 
transition from basic-level MATs to full cooperatives had been too rash.146  This in turn 
had caused a rift to develop between the Party and local society, in particular indigenous 
elites.  Speaking of mistakes made in the pastoral cooperativization campaign, an official 
history of Qinghai Province would summarize, “herdlords and headmen had antagonistic 
feelings, [they] generally feared changing the existing system, feared losing privileges, 
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[and] feared religion disappearing in [people’s] hearts.”147  However, resistance to 
cooperativization was not confined to elites.  It was admitted that the masses still did not 
understand the benefits of pastoral cooperatives and therefore “all types of anxieties 
existed.”  Yet, rather than proceeding according to these realities, cadres had often 
resorted to coercion, thereby violating the principle of volunteerism.  As a result, it was 
reported that many pastoral households had sought to leave the new collectives.148   
In response to the serious setbacks the cooperativization campaign had admittedly 
helped create, provincial leaders launched a province-wide reassessment of nationality 
work.  On June 24, the Zeku County Party Committee convened a Nationality and 
Religious Personage Conference “to inspect United Front work” and collect the opinions 
of Qinghai’s indigenous leadership.149  Days earlier, Qinghai’s Communist Party 
establishment had gathered in Xining for its 2nd Provincial Representative Party 
Congress.  There it was announced that where conditions warranted pastoral 
cooperativization could proceed as planned.  However, Party leaders acknowledged that 
the social conditions and nationality relations of pastoral regions were particularly 
complex.  Therefore, in more “backward” areas where work conditions had proved most 
difficult and results most unsatisfactory, no timetable was set for the resumption of 
collectivization.  Instead, delegates were warned to “avoid the occurrence of leftist 
tendencies” (i.e. establishing cooperatives before conditions were ripe).  Cadres were 
reminded that socialist reforms could only be implemented through “consultation” and 
                                                
147 DDZGQH, vol. 1, 74. 
 
148 Ibid.  Although this analysis comes from an official history written within a different political context 
(1991), as described below the overall assessment is repeatedly confirmed by contemporary sources.  See 
for example ZCPC 16, 46. 
 




with “the agreement of nationality and religious representatives and the herding masses.”  
As always, winning over the pre-Liberation elite remained key.  Rather than resorting to 
coercion or struggle, the policy toward “herdlord class elements”— itself a pejorative 
term— was to “unite, educate, and reform.”  Reaffirming the United Front promise of 
gradual socialist transformation proclaimed by Governor Sun Zuobing at the end of 1954, 
it was declared, “If contradictions still exist in their thoughts, then [we] must wait, when 
consultations are successful, that is when [we] can start work.”150   
Zeku clearly fell into the category of a backward region where work had 
encountered significant difficulties.  As recently as March 1956, Guo Min had been 
reconfirmed as Zeku’s Party Secretary, a position he had effectively held since his 
September 1953 arrival.  However, in the aftermath of the Party Congress, Guo was 
suddenly transferred out of the county.151  In his place Hu Zilin, a Han cadre from Hubei 
Province, was named new County Party Secretary.  Simultaneously, a Hualong native 
named Könchok was appointed first vice-secretary of the County Party Committee, 
making him the first Tibetan to serve in Zeku County’s Party leadership.152   
For the rest of 1956 and 1957, rather than dramatic social transformation, the 
Party concentrated on consolidating its position on the grasslands.  Collectivization had 
admittedly damaged both production and relations between the Party and Zeku’s Tibetan 
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population.  While cadres continued to propagandize mutual aid and cooperation, now the 
core of their work was to stabilize and develop production, complete sub-county 
administrations and strengthen organization by enlisting indigenous Tibetan government 
cadres and Party members.153  However, the Party’s efforts were complicated by a series 
of natural disasters that over the course of 1956 continued to grow in magnitude.  Early 
frost the previous year had already made for a difficult winter and spring.  By mid-
summer, persistent drought conditions had combined with insect and rodent infestation to 
devastate the grasslands.154  With grass scarce and animals weak, herdsmen were leading 
their livestock into fall and winter pastures early, creating a land rush (qiangmu) that 
often precipitated grassland disputes.  To make matters worse, during the July breeding 
season, a serious outbreak of hoof and mouth disease appeared in Gartsé, killing two 
hundred heads of cattle and two thousand sheep before spreading throughout the county 
and across its borders.155   
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Given the dire conditions, cadres warned of a potentially disastrous winter and 
spring, marked by a drop in production and the eruption of violent conflicts.156  However, 
blame was not limited to the whims of the natural world.  As framed by investigators, it 
also had a class dimension.  For example, cadres alleged that in Gartsé, “there are still 
some among the nationality and religious representatives who in order to protect their 
feudal rule and privileges, obstruct the implementation of policy.”  When grassland 
regulations were transgressed, “it was always caused by the headmen and those with lots 
of animals.  In this year’s crisis they first blamed other tribes for eating the grass, in 
reality they did the same.”157  Gartsé Qianhu Lumbum was singled out for “taking the 
lead in the destruction of the grassland system.”158  Elsewhere, Luojia (Ch.) a reincarnate 
lama associated with Hor Monastery, was accused of using the disaster conditions to 
promote superstition and reap financial gain.  According to reports, the Nyingma lama 
had proclaimed, “This year there has been drought, it is heaven’s will (tianyi).  If you do 
not chant sutra there will be big snows in October and November.”  As a result, Luojia 
was said to have received 10,000 yuan in religious offerings.159  Other indigenous 
headmen were similarly criticized.  For example, Gönshül District chief Zhibu (Ch.) 
reportedly displayed his own recalcitrance by insisting that he would be willing to spread 
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the Party’s propaganda only after it successfully resolved outstanding disputes and 
problems.  Shawo, district leader of the Sonak, was faulted for failing to lead the masses 
in building animal enclosures.  Rather than acting as if he was master of his own home, 
Shawo was accused of displaying a “guest-like attitude.”160   
The criticism of Shawo’s guest-like behavior, however, serves to underscore the 
inherent tensions that lay at the heart of the Party’s program of socialist transformation 
and nation building.  On the one hand, the Party was avowedly hostile toward indigenous 
elites even as it continued to rely on them to meet its short-term aims.  On the other, 
making Tibetans masters of their own home, a process indigenous elites were expected to 
actively lead, ultimately meant depriving those same elites of their wealth and positions 
of authority.  These contradictions were laid bare in an early-1957 investigation into 
Lhagyel’s Hor Wönkhor Tsowa.  The report found that in the years since Liberation 
wealthy pastoralists had only modestly reduced the rents they charged for animals while 
offering herdlords similarly small increases in wages.  As such, the report concluded that 
the relationship between herdlords and the pastoral masses continued to be characterized 
by class exploitation and the systematic indebtedness and impoverishment of the pastoral 
masses.161  This allegedly led one herdsman to remark, “It is the same as in the time of 
Ma Bufang, there hasn’t been the smallest change.  In order for us to survive we have no 
other means other than [borrowing animals].  [We] urgently request the government do 
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what it can to lower rents.”162   Moreover, the current system allegedly limited the 
productive capacities of the grasslands.  Wealthy households were said to live 
expensively and provide significant support to religious institutions while personally 
producing little and enjoying light tax responsibilities.  The report continued, “As a result 
of this backward production relationship, the development of new productive capacities is 
constrained,” concluding, “the input and production capabilities of the herdlords are very 
small, this is the present situation.”163   
However, within the boundaries they had set for themselves, Party leaders 
admitted that they could do little to force wealthy pastoralists to change their ways.  The 
United Front strategy of nation building was partially predicated on the assumption that 
the masses’ patriotic awareness would rise as living standards improved.  
Simultaneously, the pre-Liberation elite’s grip over society would loosen.  Yet, according 
to the Party’s own assessment, wages remained low and rents high.  It noted, “the masses 
fear County Leader Wagya and the other nationality headmen, [and] do not dare to speak 
[against them].”164  However, neither could the Party of the proletariat aggressively step 
in on their behalf.  In fact, the collectivization campaign had been a reminder of the 
potential pitfalls of advancing too hastily.  The Wönkhor report explained,  
Generally speaking, because of doubts about the “No Struggle, No 
Division, No Class Delineation” and “Two Benefits of the Herd Laborers and 
Herdlords” policies, particularly since the launch of pastoral experimental 
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production cooperatives in the winter of 1955, fear of [class] struggle and 
[property] division has increased even more.165   
 
As a result, wealthy households were less inclined to take care of their herds, preferring 
to spend what they could while they could.  In the process a tremendous amount of 
resources had allegedly been wasted.  An example was made of Wagya himself, who in 
1955 had reportedly spent over 20,000 yuan on his son’s wedding preparations.166  The 
Huangnan Prefecture Party Committee therefore reminded its subordinates that 
pressuring wealthy households to “voluntarily” reduce rents and raise wages could easily 
backfire.  Even openly praising wealthy herders who had voluntarily reduced rents could 
raise “unnecessary anxieties” about the durability of the Three No’s and “give enemies an 
opportunity to instigate disharmony and sow destruction.”167   
 
That “serious problems” existed between the Party and Zeku’s Tibetan population 
was openly admitted at the start of 1957.  From February 5-23, the Zeku County Party 
Committee launched a “comprehensive” internal investigation of its nationality and 
United Front work, along with “other non-proletarian behavior.”  As part of the inquiry, 
“important nationality cadres” including Wagya, Lumbum, Tsintar, Chögyong, and Jikmé 
Sönam were invited to attend a meeting of the Zeku County Party Committee.  There the 
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Tibetan headmen and lamas purportedly “educated” Party leaders about the actual 
conditions of minority work.168   
On March 3, the investigation’s results were released in a blistering report that 
excoriated the leadership of former Party Secretary Guo Min.  Guo was accused of failing 
to implement democracy, strengthen collective leadership, or listen to the opinions of the 
masses.  Instead, he allegedly relied on a couple of trusted comrades while treating others 
abusively.  This had hurt the unity of the Party Committee and caused serious 
shortcomings in its work.  Most notably, the report contended that Guo had rarely “gone 
down to the tribes.”  As a result, the former Party secretary had failed to accurately 
analyze concrete conditions.  In a judgment that almost certainly alluded to the previous 
year’s pastoral cooperativization campaign, instead Guo was accused of resorting to 
“subjective and prejudicial methods.”  As a result, many cadres at the county-level and 
below purportedly adopted Guo’s negligent practices and attitudes, leading to 
“subjectivism in thought [a leftist tendency] and bureaucratism in work [a rightist 
tendency].”169  On top of this, it was reported that cadre morale was dangerously low.  
Feeling abandoned on a forlorn corner of the Tibetan Plateau with little hope of career 
advancement, many cadres did not conscientiously carry out their work assignments.  The 
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report warned that rather than fortifying themselves with revolutionary fervor, instead 
these cadres often sedated themselves with alcohol.170 
Unsurprisingly, these organizational failings had led to the improper 
implementation of United Front and nationality policy.  Investigators discovered that 
expressions of Han chauvinism were rampant.  For example, it was common for outsiders 
to “discriminate against nationality cadres.”  Tibetan cadres were often treated as 
translators rather than equals, while “the important and useful knowledge of minority 
cadres was ignored, [and] their opinions were not listened to sufficiently.”171  The report 
concluded that this led many outside cadres to ignore the “special characteristics” of the 
nationality region and to consider the slogan “to become masters of their own homes” to 
be nothing more than empty rhetoric.  In turn, many among Zeku’s indigenous leaders, 
cadres and masses had become dissatisfied with the Party and suspicious of its platform.  
For example, it was reported that Vice-secretary Serökyap had simply upped and left 
(banzou) while Hor District leader Guanjia had offered to resign his position and return 
whatever salary he had earned.  Back in December 1953, the Chinese Communist Party 
had established Zeku County with the declaration that the Tibetan masses had at last 
become “masters of their own homes.”  Now, echoing Lhakba’s sentiments from July 
1955, local Tibetan cadres told inspectors, “Tibetans do the housework, [but] the Han are 
the masters.”172   
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Even as the new Party Committee lamented the damage Guo Min and his cadres 
had done to nationality relations and the Party’s prestige, it reported that repairs were 
already underway through a renewed commitment to cadre training and a reemphasis on 
national autonomy.173  In May, the Huangnan Prefecture Party Committee ordered newly 
installed Zeku County Party Committee Vice-secretary Li Chunfan to investigate the 
situation in the Hor and Sairidan/Serdeü (Shawonar Tribe) Districts.174  Li reported that 
after mediating a grassland dispute between the Hor and a rival in Tongde County, he 
spent five days among the two tribes in order “to understand and help implement work.”  
Based on this short visit with just sixteen households, Vice-secretary Li made several 
specific recommendations on how to mitigate ongoing damage brought on by a second 
year of drought, cold and disease.  He suggested that part of the problem was the 
superstitious fatalism of the masses, insisting that scientific management methods could 
be used to stabilize production and increase yields.  With fifty days remaining before 
animals could be moved to summer pasture, the Shaanxi native recommended an all-out 
effort to marshal all available human resources to “go down to the tribes” to “exhaust all 
methods, and to strengthen animal protection through the spring [of 1958].”  Specifically, 
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he advocated mobilizing the masses to build wells, irrigate dry grasslands, and eliminate 
rodents and other grassland pests.175   
On the issue of mutual aid and cooperation, Li argued that animal losses incurred 
over the past year had actually been due to a combination of factors including disease, 
drought and poor herding management.  According to Li, each was a long-standing 
problem that pre-dated collectivization.  However, because the natural disasters had come 
in the wake of the mutual aid and cooperativization campaign, it had given rise to doubts 
in the minds of the masses.  Particularly within groups in which management had been 
poor and animal deaths many, there emerged a sentiment that collective forms of 
ownership “are not as good as individual herding (dan’gan).”  Li added that herdsmen 
often feared that after entering a cooperative they would no longer have freedom to chant 
sutras, ride horses, drink milk, eat meat or even marry the spouse of their choice.  On the 
other hand, he reported that some had come to the equally dangerous conclusion that after 
their animals became the property of the cooperative, members could “eat until their 
stomachs were full, it does not matter if you work or not, or produce or not.”  However, 
Li noted that it was the pre-Liberation elite who still harbored the most serious doubts 
about collectivization.  Some district leaders, for example, feared that cooperativization 
signaled the end of religious freedom.  Others worried that they would be pressured to 
divide their animals into shares at artificially fixed prices.  In conclusion, Li reported that 
these widespread fears had not only damaged production but also continued to cause a 
widening estrangement between the Party and the masses.  Li’s remedy, unsurprisingly, 
was not a change in policy but strengthening political work within the cadre ranks and 
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deepening propaganda efforts among the masses.  This would, according to Vice-
secretary Li, “cause misgivings to be eliminated and production to be developed.”176   
As Li Chunfan’s report suggests, going into the latter half of 1957 the Party 
remained committed to socialist transformation.  Yet, within the cadre force significant 
work defects remained and among the masses serious doubts persisted about the wisdom 
of a dramatic move from household production to larger forms of communal ownership.  
However, the most persistent indigenous critics were the ones who were both expected to 
lead the transition and stood to loose the most from socialist reforms, the pre-Liberation 
religious and secular elite.  When in July 1957 the nation-wide Anti-rightist Campaign 
was launched in Huangnan Prefecture, the Party Committee singled out Han cadres who 
displayed bureaucratism, subjectivism, factionalism, Han chauvinism and capitalist or 
anti-Party sentiment as targets for rectification.177  Although the period is often associated 
with a shift to a more hardline nationality policy that stressed the dangers of local 
nationalism over Han chauvinism, the prefecture’s rectification campaign work plan did 
not mention the former.178  Instead, “during the anti-rightist struggle,” the Party 
Committee declared, “[we must] avoid the religious and nationality questions.” Anyone 
                                                
176 Ibid., 45. As per normal, Li assigned the bulk of the blame to local cadres. Li asserted that out of a 
group of twenty cadres, including four district leaders and two district Party Committee secretaries, not one 
truly understood the Party’s policy on mutual aid and cooperation.  He criticized cadres for spending an 
inordinate amount of time in meetings rather than in the field.  Both the Zeku County Committee and 
Huangnan Prefecture expressed general agreement with Li’s findings, including his central concerns 
regarding strengthening cadre education and mass propaganda.  However, they did note that because Li and 
his team only visited sixteen families, it was far from comprehensive.  See ZCPC 17, 39-41. 
 
177 ZCPC 20, 2-3.   
 
178 Moseley, 24-25; Dreyer 150-153; Robert Barnett, "The Babas Are Dead: Street Talk and Contemporary 
Views of Leaders in Tibet," in Proceedings of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, ed. Elliot 
Sperling (Bloomington: University of Indiana, Forthcoming); 7-8; Melvyn C. Goldstein, Dawei Sherap, 
and William R. Siebenschuh, A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntso 





breaking this prohibition was to be reported to the Prefecture and Provincial Party 
Committees.179  
The United Front had yet to work its magic, to replace what was once an imperial 
relationship between the state and local elites with a direct compact between the pastoral 
masses and their class allies of all nationalities under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  A 1957 work plan submitted by the Duofudan/Topden District 
Committee (Méshül, Ködé Karing and Khéri Chunga Tribes), made this quite clear.  In 
addition to laying the groundwork for cooperatives and mutual aid groups and mobilizing 
the usual array of production tasks, three sub-district township governments were to be 
established “in order to promptly resolve internal and external disputes, promote unity, 
and improve production leadership.”180  To head the new administrative organs, the 
district committee nominated four of its members and the head of the local self-defense 
brigade, noting, “these four people have unquestioned prestige within the tribes.”  
Unsurprisingly, all were members of the Pre-Liberation elite.181  Although by then 
entering the twilight of the “transitional period,” tribal structures and pre-national 
loyalties had not given way to either mass consciousness or patriotic awareness.  In a 
sense, on the eve of socialist transformation Zeku remained a subimperial entity. 
 
In October 1957, the Qinghai Party Committee received permission from Beijing 
to restart its experimental pastoral cooperativization campaign.  The following month 
                                                
179 ZCPC 20, 5. 
 
180 ZCPG 1, 70-75. The plan set targets for the amount of winterfeed cut, bones collected, animal pens 
built and wolves killed.  In addition, each sub-district/tribe was told to construct a primary school and train 
a veterinarian. 
 




Xining announced a long-term strategy for completing pastoral cooperativization.  Based 
on lessons learned during the previous campaign, it was predicted that in the most 
backward regions, full socialist transformation might take a decade or longer.182   The 
Zeku County Party Committee responded by claiming that due to corrections in its work 
since the departure of Guo Min, many among the masses were now asking to form 
MATs.  Allegedly, some had even organized themselves into self-styled mutual aid 
groups.  On this foundation, the County Party Committee announced plans to establish 
ten MATs, three PPCs and one joint state-private pastoral farm by spring of 1958.  
However, the Party Committee noted that among both the pastoral elite and the masses 
serious anxieties toward cooperativization still existed.  Repeating instructions issued at 
the start of 1956, it therefore warned, “the pace will be steady, the time period will be 
lengthy, and the policies will be flexible.”183  However, whether or not the committee’s 
relatively modest goals could have formed a cornerstone for gradual socialist 
transformation would soon become a moot point.  Rather than a gradual and voluntary 
transformation between empire and nation, the Zeku grasslands, and indeed all of Amdo, 
would soon be forcibly integrated into the socialist nation-state.
                                                
182 DDZGQH, vol. 1, 75.  The plan divided Qinghai into three categories.  In regions where a good 
foundation had already been laid, socialist transformation was to be completed within the 2nd Five-year plan 
(1958-1962).  A second group of areas were to begin by experimenting with cooperatives and state farms.  
No timetable is given for completion.  For the third category, where preparations were just being made and 
conditions were still far from developed, socialist transformation was not expected to be completed until 
the still-distant 3rd Five-year Plan “or even a bit longer.”  Presumably Zeku would be in the latter category.  
It is not clear if the source was referring to the 3rd Five-Year Plan as it was originally imagined (1963-1967) 
or as it was eventually implemented (1966-1970). 
 






THE 1958 AMDO REBELLION AND THE END OF EMPIRE 
 
 
On the evening of July 5, 1958, one hundred twenty-four members of Zeku’s 
Wöngya Tribe descended upon the Qiaofudan (Chöten) District headquarters, killing 
District Secretary Zhang Daosheng and six of his cadres.1  With a cache of newly 
captured weapons, including a small number of handguns and rifles, a machine gun, 
twenty grenades and 1,980 rounds of ammunition, the insurgents then launched a surprise 
attack against a PLA reconnaissance squad.  Almost five years to the day that Geyong 
and his detachment of revolutionaries had arrived on the Shadar grasslands, determined 
to make the Tibetan pastoralists “masters of their own home,” Zeku County had erupted 
into open revolt.  Before it could be “pacified,” Chinese sources contend, more than 
4,600 Tibetans— almost a quarter of the Zeku’s population— would participate in a 
“counterrevolutionary armed rebellion.”2  
 
The full story of the 1958 Amdo Rebellion has yet to be told.  However, in both 
Tibetan and state remembrances, rather than the Liberation of 1949, is the 1958 Rebellion 
that serves as the moment of historical rupture between the old society and the new.  
While the precise sequence of events and specific grievances that led to the rebellion are 
not entirely clear, a narrative has emerged in which anti-state violence arose in direct 
                                                
1 The district was composed of the Wöngya and Sonak Tribes. 
 




reaction to the implementation of collectivization and what is referred to as “democratic 
reforms”— here essentially referring to the elimination of the political and economic 
privileges of the pre-Liberation secular and monastic elite.  However, it is useful to note 
that in Amdo the most radical period of collectivization occurred after, not before, the 
start of the rebellion.  In fact, under the policy of  “Strike and Reform” (bianda biangai), 
it was during the “pacification” of the rebellion that democratic reforms were fully 
implemented and socialist transformation completed.3  Moreover, the Amdo Rebellion 
did not occur in geographic isolation.  Already in 1955, parts of Kham had risen in 
revolt.4  By 1956, the uprising had spread to southern Gansu and northern Sichuan and 
threatened to spill into southeastern Qinghai.5  In July, insurgents from Gannan 
reportedly crossed into Huangnan’s Henan County where they instigated an uprising 
among segments of the region’s Mongol inhabitants.  Although quickly defeated, in its 
wake “a small number of reactionary nationality religious leaders […] carrying large 
sums of money” allegedly traveled to Central Tibet.  According to uncorroborated 
Chinese sources, they soon returned to Eastern Amdo with weapons and instructions to 
incite rebellion.6   
                                                
3 QHSZXMZ, 75; DDZGQH, vol. 1, 75; Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, "Huangnan Diqu Pingxi Paoluan, 
Fadong Qunzhong Kaizhang Suku Yundong Qingkuang De Baogao," in MZZJGZWJHJ, [Zhonggong 
Qinghai Shengwei Tongzhanbu] (n.p., [1959]), 1046. 
 
4 On the Khampa Rebellion see Carole McGranahan, Arrested Histories : Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of 
a Forgotten War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 67-88; Shakya, Dragon in the Lands of the Snows, 
136-144.  
 
5 QHSZJSZ, 514.  The Party responded in part by organizing “influential religious leaders” to join 
provincial-level government work teams that were dispatched to Yushu, Guolou (Golok) and Huangnan 
Prefectures to educate basic-level cadres, the masses and religious elements about the Party’s policies on 
religious freedom and collectivization.   
 
6 HNZZZZZGK, 96-98; Tongren Xianzhi, 698-699; QHSZJSZ, 514; Deng Liqun et al., eds., Dangdai 




In late 1957, uprisings again flared within the Gansu-Qinghai-Sichuan 
borderlands, the same region that only four years earlier had served as the base of Ma 
Yuanxiang and Ma Liang’s anti-CCP insurgency.  The following March, Tibetan rebels 
once more moved into Huangnan Prefecture, this time crossing from Gannan into 
southeastern Tongren County.  On April 2, members of Repgong’s Dowa and Awa Téu 
Tribes along with five hundred of these outside insurgents reportedly attacked Tongren’s 
5th District administrative headquarters, killing fifty-seven cadres, soldiers and 
militiamen.7  The revolt quickly spread, reaching its first apotheosis in late April when a 
Salar named Han Yinu led a three-day siege of Xunhua’s county seat.8   
By the end of the month much of eastern Amdo was in a state of general 
rebellion.9  On April 30, citing uprisings among more than ten of Huangnan’s tribes as 
well as revolts in Xunhua County and Golok, Yushu and Hainan Prefectures, the 
Provincial Party Committee announced, “This is a counterrevolutionary armed rebellion, 
                                                                                                                                            
Chubanshe, 1996) (Hereafter DDQHJS), 156.  The Dangdai Qinghai Jianshi asserts, “The instigation and 
support of Tibet’s upper-level reactionary clique was an important factor leading to the rebellion.”  It is 
unclear what, if any, evidence there is to support the claim that the Amdo Rebellion was planned or 
encouraged by authorities in Lhasa.  However, in contemporary explanations there is no mention of a 
connection to the government of the 14th Dalai Lama, which at the time was still cooperating with Chinese 
authorities.  Instead, this accusation appears to have only been made in the years after the 1959 Lhasa 
Rebellion and the flight of the Dalai Lama and his government into exile. 
 
7 Tongren’s 5th District lies on Zeku’s northeastern border. 
 
8 HNZZZZZGK, 98-99; Wei Cong, 47, 600; QHSZJSZ, 519.  In Xunhua, violence broke out on April 17 
when members of the Tibetan Gancha Tribe attacked their district seat, killing three cadres.  On April 23, 
3,000 rebels led by Han Yinu surrounded Jianshui Township.  However, the attackers were unable to pierce 
the county seat’s walls.  Two days later, PLA troops forded the Yellow River and lifted the siege.  On April 
29, with his village now surrounded, Han Yinu committed suicide. Salar informants report that over three 
hundred Salars were killed in the ensuing mop-up campaign (personal communications).  Tibetans of 
Xunhua, Tongren and Wangchen Döndrup’s Nangra Tribe of Jianzha reportedly also took part in the siege. 
 
9 Chinese sources state that between April and June, rebellion broke out in Huangnan Prefecture’s Tongren, 
Jianzha, Zeku, and Henan Counties and Hainan Prefecture’s Gonghe, Guide, Tongde and Xinghai 





a long-term conspiracy, planed [and] organized to destroy national unity, oppose 
socialism, oppose the People’s Government, [and] oppose the CCP.”10  A July report by 
the Huangnan Prefecture Party Committee left zero ambiguity as to whom the Party held 
responsible.  Rongwo Monastery’s Shartsang Lama, Zongqianhu Gyelwo Dorjé, and the 
Rongwo Nangso Trashi Namgyel— the men who since the fall of 1949 had been among 
the chief conduits of Party rule over the Huangnan region— were accused of being the 
“plot’s chief conspirators, [and] organizational leaders.”11  The report declared that 
Rongwo Monastery was the rebellion’s “command center,” the region’s other 
monasteries acted as its outposts, and the “resolutely anti-reform herdlords, landlords and 
upper and mid-level reactionary nationality and religious [figures] are the backbone [of 
the rebellion].”  According to the Party Committee, “the purpose was to stand in the way 
of socialist reforms, [and] continue to defend their evil feudal rule and feudal 
exploitation.”12  The experiment in subimperialism had come to an end.  The pre-
Liberation elite had become counterrevolutionaries. 
 
Speaking Bitterness: From Herdlords to Counterrevolutionaries 
To this point, Zeku had been somewhat shielded but certainly not immune to the 
vacillating political winds that for the past decade had blown across China and over the 
                                                
10 QHSZDSJ, 237. 
 
11 Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, 1045.  A forth-named chief conspirator named Aorijia (Ch.) was a 
relative of Trashi Namgyel.  According to the prefecture gazetteer, he had served as the Rongwo Nangso 
from 1942-1947.  In 1956, Aorijia was appointed head of the Tongren County government. This narrative 
does not accord to Trashi Namgyel’s recollections.  His short autobiography does not mention of Aorijia.  
Instead Trashi Namgyel simply states that in 1946 he became nangso after the death of his brother Jikmé 
Topgyé.  Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1086; Zhaxi Anjia, 243-244. 
 
12 Ibid., 1045-1046. For the manner in which the Shartsang Lama was used in the subsequent propaganda 




Qinghai Plateau.  Between 1953 and 1956, socialist transformation had gone from a 
vague notion that was to be reached in the indeterminate but presumably distant future to 
a concrete goal that was to be achieved in just a few short years.  Yet almost immediately 
after it had been launched, Zeku’s pastoral cooperativization campaign was suspended. 
Revolutionary impatience had outpaced the United Front principles of gradualism and 
voluntarism.  Subjectivism had undermined the objective investigation of the concrete 
conditions of minority regions.  Particularly in Qinghai’s vast pastoral regions, where 
economic conditions were considered to be the most backward and the nationality 
situation to be the most complex, it seemed that Party leaders had learned a valuable 
lesson.  Over the following year and a half, Qinghai’s existing pastoral cooperatives were 
downsized, management reorganized and political work ostensibly rectified.  Chinese 
sources claim that these adjustments had led to dramatic increases in production and 
incomes.  When in November 1957 the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee met to re-
launch the pastoral cooperativization campaign, it made clear that collectivization should 
proceed according to the comparative moderation of 1957, not the radicalism of 1955-
1956’s High Tide.  In fact, Party leaders warned that in the most undeveloped areas 
complete socialist transformation might take a decade or even longer.13   
In line with Xining’s instructions, at the end of 1957 the Zeku County Party 
Committee announced the relatively modest goal of establishing ten MATs and three 
pastoral production cooperatives by the end of the coming spring.14  Perhaps more 
important, despite its aggressive posturing during the pastoral investigation work and 
                                                
13 QHSZXMZ, 72.  
 





subsequent High Tide, the county committee continued to affirm United Front principles 
and procedures.  The Three No’s remained in effect.  Class struggle had not been carried 
out, wealth had not been redistributed, and class labels had not been assigned.  Most 
noticeably, at the start of 1958 one hundred thirty-six people identified as belonging to 
Zeku’s “nationality and religious upper strata”— or by the state’s reckoning 51% of the 
pre-Liberation elite— continued to hold positions on the Zeku County Government 
Committee, Consultative Committee or in other state organs.15  In other words, as Zhou 
Renshan had now long ago proclaimed, national integration and socialist transformation 
were still to be achieved through an “organic transformation” in which “the old gradually 
weakens [and] the new gradually takes root.” 16   
However, this renewed commitment to gradualism and voluntarism would be 
short lived.  In January 1958, the Qinghai Party Committee met once again.  Now, 
instead of an open-ended timeline based on the concrete conditions of each region, under 
the increasingly radical demands of the emerging Great Leap Forward, provincial leaders 
suddenly ordered pastoral collectivization to be completed within five years.17  It was not 
until March 23 that newly appointed Zeku County Party Secretary Chen Ming convened 
                                                
15 Zeku Xianzhi, 306.  
 
16 “Zhou Renshan Tongzhi,” 636; Zhou Renshan, 647. 
 
17 DDZGQH, vol. 1, 75; QHSZXMZ, 72; QHSZDSJ, 234.  The decision was made at the 2nd Plenum of the 
5th Qinghai Party Committee.  In a series of three reports, the meeting announced the launch of the Great 
Leap Forward in industry, agriculture, and pastoralism.  At the plenum, former Provincial Party Secretary 
and Governor Sun Zuobing, who at the end of 1954 had argued that socialist transformation in minority 
regions must proceed according to the wishes of local people, was purged for “anti-Party anti-socialist 






a meeting of 264 cadres to launch Zeku’s Great Leap Forward.18  However, almost 
immediately the plans had to be suspended.  On April 2, a day before the Zeku 
conference ended, just across the border in Tongren County the first salvo in the Amdo 
Rebellion had been launched.19  With tensions rising in Huangnan Prefecture and beyond, 
on April 17 the County Party Committee released a “Zeku County War Preparation Work 
Plan” and established a War Preparedness Work Headquarters.20  That same day, Zeku’s 
county-level public security bureau confiscated the property (caichan) of one hundred 
forty-nine herdlords and rich pastoralists.  Within days, work teams were reorganized as 
“armed work teams” (wugongzuodui)—“one man, one horse, one gun”— and all of 
Zeku’s districts were ordered to “strengthen reconnaissance of the enemy’s positions.”21  
Although the July Wöngya Incident is the first specific example of anti-state 
violence reported in Zeku County, sources suggest that as early as May various 
unspecified acts of sedition had occurred within its borders.22  On June 16, whether in 
response to incidences of rebellion or as a preemptory strike against Zeku’s “feudal” 
power structure, the Zeku County Party Committee announced that efforts to seize 
                                                
18 Zeku Xianzhi, 286.   
 
19 HNZZZZZGK, 98-99. According to official statistics, twenty-five villages, townships and tribes, with a 
total of 11,000 participants, took part in Tongren’s rebellion.  Before being put down on June 9, a total of 
ninety-three cadres and soldiers were reported killed. 
 
20 Zeku Xianzhi, 19. Hu Zilin was named commander and Li Chunfan, Könchok and a third cadre, Nan 
Yongxun, were appointed vice-commanders.  Chen Ming was appointed head of the general political 
committee (zongzhengzhi weiyuan). 
 
21 Ibid.  The Party Committee ordered that outwardly work should proceed as usual. Cadres were to 
continue to consult with local headmen who would maintain their government positions.  However, 
internally the now-armed cadres were told to scout the enemies’ positions and evaluate developments 
within the tribes. 
 
22 For example, arrests of Zeku’s indigenous leadership began in June (See below).  See also Zhonggong 





weapons and round up counterrevolutionaries and evildoers within the Gartsé, Shisa and 
Sonak Tribes were “basically complete.”  However, troops were only now moving into 
position against rebels within the Gönshül Tribe and Dopden District (Méshül, Ködé 
Karing, and Khéri Chunga).  Once these operations were complete, the report noted, the 
Hor and Shawonar “problems” would too be resolved.  The County Party Committee 
predicted that by the end of June “rebellion pacification work” would be completed.23 
However, it was not enough that victory over the “counterrevolutionaries and 
evildoers” be achieved on the battlefield.  The Party demanded that “their surrender be 
brought about politically” as well.  Therefore, the Prefecture Party Committee ordered 
that once a locality had been pacified armed-work teams were to “enter the villages, tents 
and monasteries, to fully arouse the agricultural and pastoral masses and the monasteries’ 
poor monks, [and] launch a powerful and dynamic Speak Bitterness Campaign” (suku 
yundong).24  Long a stable of land reform and other political campaigns, Speaking 
Bitterness was a time-tested mass line methodology in which members of the masses 
would be encouraged to publicly recount the exploitation and humiliation of the old 
society, thereby arousing class consciousness and class hatred.  In the process, class 
enemies would be identified, made to confess, dispossessed of their wealth, and in some 
cases physically assaulted or even killed.  In Huangnan, during Speak Bitterness struggle 
sessions cadres were told to stress the question of who in fact benefited from the 
rebellion.  The correct answer, of course, was not the herding masses but the pre-
Liberation elite.  Through Speaking Bitterness, it was presumed that the Party would be 
                                                
23 ZCPC 24, 7. 
 





able to enlist the aid of the masses in uncovering hidden enemies and destroying their 
“feudal power.”  In place of the old system of political and economic exploitation, the 
prefecture committee explained, cooperatives would be established and “the absolute 
dominance and political authority of the laboring peasants and pastoral masses would be 
established.”25  In mid-July, the Provincial Party Committee convened a meeting of 
pastoral region Party secretaries at which provincial leaders confirmed the centrality of 
“Speak Bitterness struggle, in order to completely smash the herdlords, headmen and 
other feudal powers, [and] comprehensively implement cooperativization.” 26 
Echoing higher-level instructions, Zeku County’s Party leadership also insisted 
that military might alone “cannot completely defeat the power of feudal rule.”  Instead 
the masses had to be made to recognize the “ugly face of the feudal nationality and 
religious ruling power.”27  Therefore, immediately after being brought back under state 
control each district was to launch a Speak Bitterness Campaign.  The purpose was to 
“instigate the masses to expose the truth of the rebellion, [and] through a comparison of 
the old and new societies, recount the exploitation of the reactionary headmen and 
evildoers, [and] the hardships of the oppressed people.”28  Cadres were ordered to first 
uncover the facts about the rebellion itself.  In the process the “reactionary headmen, 
counterrevolutionaries, and evildoer criminals would be exposed.” Then, 
                                                
25 Ibid. By mid-July, the Prefecture Party Committee would report that across Huangnan over one thousand 
Speak Bitterness Meetings had been conducted with a total attendance of over 75,000 people.  Over six 
hundred targets were purportedly subjected to the criticism of over 40,000 accusers. 
 
26 QHSZDSJ, 240.  At the meeting, Party leaders specifically approved Huangnan Prefecture’s 
simultaneous implementation of military pacification and cooperativization. 
 
27 ZCPC 24, 7-8. 
 





In accordance with our county’s specific conditions, in general [the masses should 
be made] to speak of the bitterness of the old society, speak of the bitterness of 
the reactionary headmen and upper-level religious figures, speak of the bitterness 
of the counterrevolutionaries and evildoers, [and] speak of the bitterness of the 
reactionary weapons (sic).  And [cadres must] grasp the method of comparing the 
old and new society, inspire and educate the masses, [and] cause them to 
genuinely understand the greatness of the new society and evilness of the old 
society.  From this [we can] resolutely and confidently go down the path of 
cooperativization.29 
 
The county committee declared that penalties meted out to those exposed through the 
campaign could range from fines, to “reform through labor,” and imprisonment.  In some 
cases, the “blood debt” (xuechai) owed to the masses could even be execution.30   
The campaign was not only meant to break the political and psychological power 
of the pre-Liberation elite.  It also aimed to “cripple the economic foundation of the 
feudal class” and pave the way for socialist transformation.31  The hope was that the 
masses would be sufficiently incited “to confiscate all of the property of the reactionary 
herdlords and reactionary headmen.”  Therefore, the Party Committee ordered that all 
rents and obligations owed to the herdlord class be forgiven.  In order to visually 
demonstrate that the hardships of the past would not return, each district was ordered to 
gather leases and rental agreements and “burn them in front of the masses.” The 
“expropriated and cleansed” wealth of the pre-Liberation elite would then be turned over 
to the cooperatives where it would become “the collective property of the pastoral 
masses.”  Recognizing the potential for resistance, the Party Committee ordered that 
                                                
29 Ibid., 8. 
 
30 ZCPC 24, 21-22. In the case of outright murder, the instructions reason, “For those reactionary herdlords 
and headmen who took advantage of their power to kill without cause, if [we] do not execute them it will 
not appease the indignation of the people.”   
 





reactionary class elements protect their herds and not kill their animals, “otherwise 
punishments would be increased.”32  
 It was in this context of open attacks on Zeku’s indigenous tribal leadership and 
religious institutions, that on July 5— a month into Zeku’s Speak Bitterness Campaign 
and three months after rebellion had first erupted elsewhere in Huangnan Prefecture— 
members of the Wöngya Tribe raided the Qiaofudan District headquarters and killed the 
seven cadres.  The next morning, soldiers of the PLA’s 55th Regiment 163rd Division 
routed two hundred Wöngya insurgents.  The survivors fled into Guinan County where 
on July 8 they were surrounded and captured.33  A week later, the Huangnan Party 
Committee declared that “open rebellion [and] determinedly resistant enemies” had been 
“militarily eliminated.”34  By late August, a total of 29,257 people— nearly double 
Zeku’s entire population— had reportedly attended some two hundred thirty Speak 
Bitterness Meetings.  At these struggle sessions, three hundred twenty-six “reactionary 
headmen and evildoers were criticized and denounced.”  One hundred twenty-five would 
subsequently be punished “according to law,” presumably meaning imprisonment, while 
fifty-nine were sentenced to supervised labor.35 
                                                
32 Ibid., 22. That owners did kill their animals rather than give them to the cooperatives is confirmed in the 
archival sources.  For example see ZCPC30 209. 
 
33 Zeku Xianzhi, 411; HNZZZZZGK, 101.  For a slightly different narrative that stresses the Wöngya’s 
participation in a larger insurrection centered in Guinan County, see QHSZJSZ, 525. 
 
34 Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, 1046. 
 
35 ZCPC 24, 2. According to reports issued immedialy following the rebellion, 2463 people belonged to the 
feudal ruling elite (fengjian shili), or 13% of the county’s total population.  As of August, however, just 
under 20% (326 people) had become targets of Speak Bitterness Struggle Meetings.  This number of 
potential class enemies is far higher than provided elsewhere for different periods, perhaps a testament to 
the radicalized political environment.  For example, as noted below the Zeku Xianzhi states that there were 





Since the founding of Zeku County, the Three No’s (No Class Struggle, No 
Distribution of Property, and No Class Delineation) had guaranteed the economic and 
political privileges of the pre-Liberation elite.  Now, the Speak Bitterness Campaign 
signaled the nullification of what for all intents and purposes had served as the 
subimperial compact between the indigenous leadership and the Party-state.  This was 
confirmed on August 1, when the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee ordered that class 
labels at last be extended to pastoral regions.  Pastoral households were to be divided into 
four broad classes: herdlords, rich pastoralists, mid-level pastoralists and poor 
pastoralists.  Class status was then to be determined according to wealth (calculated by 
the number of animals owned) and degree of exploitation (determined by a variety of 
factors including the amount of paid and forced labor employed, the number of animals 
loaned, the rate of interest charged, and the “degree of domination”).  In addition, a 
target’s pre-Liberation social and political status was to be taken into consideration.  
Therefore, regardless of actual current economic standing, as “representatives of the 
herdlord class” tribal leaders and upper-level religious figures were determined to be 
complicit in the maintenance of the grassland’s feudal system of exploitation.36   
According to the Party’s own statistics, prior to the rebellion there were a total of 
two hundred and sixty-five “nationality and religious upper-level figures” in Zeku 
County.  Of these, one hundred and thirty-six served in government organs, including the 
thirty-nine members of the county representative committee, sixteen members of the 
county government committee, thirty-two members of the consultative committee, five 
                                                





county-level cadres, and thirty-four district-level officials.37  In the wake of the rebellion, 
one hundred twenty-nine of the one hundred thirty-six indigenous elite members of the 
county government were taken into custody (daibu).  In addition, each of the county’s ten 
monastic institutions was shuttered (qudi) and forty-two of the region’s fifty-one 
reincarnate lamas were forcibly disrobed (beipo huansu).38  By late August, according to 
contemporary reports, three hundred nine of Zeku’s seven hundred seventy-four monks 
(40%) had already “put on trousers” (chuan kuzi).39  Ultimately, five hundred sixty-four 
monks were reportedly made to leave the monasteries and “return to production.”40 
Noting that mistakes had been made when delineating class status, in October 
1959 the County Party Committee would issue orders limiting herdlords to approximately 
3% of the population and rich pastoralists to 5%.  Yet, in 1960, three hundred and 
seventeen of the county’s 4,495 households (7%) still carried the herdlord label, while 
another two hundred and forty-two households were designated wealthy pastoralists.  By 
then, the middle pastoralist class had been further divided into two categories totaling a 
combined 38% of the population (1,704 households).  The remaining 49% of Zeku’s 
                                                
37 In addition, forty-four held positions in prefecture-level bodies (often concurrently), including Wagya, 
his nephew Jikmé Sönam, and Lhakba, and twenty monastic representatives served on the Prefectural 
Buddhist Consultative Committee. 
 
38 Zeku Xianzhi, 306. Although it is generally assumed that monasteries were closed during the democratic 
reforms of 1958 and then physically demolished during the Cultural Revolution, Pu Wencheng reports that 
in 1958 several of Zeku’s monasteries were either damaged or demolished while others were destroyed 
“after 1958.”  Similarly, Nian and Bai distinguish between monasteries that were closed (guanbi) (the vast 
majority), those that were partially destroyed (yixie pohuai), and those that were demolished (jieti). 
 
39 ZCPC 24, 6.   
 
40 Zeku Xianzhi, 306. The County Party Committee would also report that by the end of summer 64% of 
Zeku’s male population had “cut [their] braids [and] shaved [their] heads,” and 49% of women had cut 




households were considered to be either poor pastoralists or wage laborers.41  While it is 
difficult to get a firm idea of how deep Zeku’s purges went beyond the secular elite and 
monastic community, in 1961, during a period of relative moderation that accompanied 
the ebbing of the Great Leap Forward, six hundred seventy-three nationality cadres, 
members of the masses, and religious personages were rehabilitated, five monasteries 
were reportedly reopened, and eighty-seven monks were allowed to re-enter these 
monasteries.  Simultaneously, twenty-two members of the old monastic and secular elite, 
including Lhagyel and Tsintar, were brought back into prefectural and county-level 
positions.42  However, during the Cultural Revolution and follow-up campaigns many of 
these rehabilitated figures would become victims anew.43 
 
With the power of the pre-Liberation elite all but broken, at long last Zeku’s full 
transition to socialism could proceed.  On May 7 the Provincial Party Committee had 
again changed the timetable for pastoral cooperativization.  Now, full socialist 
transformation was to be completed by year’s end.  Back in fall of 1957, Qinghai could 
count only forty-five basic-level pastoral production cooperatives.44  Under the policy of 
“Strike and Reform,” by the end of May 1958, 75% of the pastoral population of 
                                                
41 Ibid., 415. Countywide eight hundred fifty-four people were considered members of the five black 
categories: three hundred seventy-nine herdlords, three hundred three rich peasants, one hundred three 
counterrevolutionaries and sixty-nine evildoers.  According to this source, no one belonged to the fifth 
category, “rightists.” 
 
42 Ibid., 306. 
 
43 For very brief overviews of Zeku’s 1964-1965 Socialist Education Campaign, the Cultural Revolution 
and the follow-up Campaign to Cleanse Class Ranks and One Hit Three Anti Campaign, see Zeku Xianzhi, 
309. 
 





Qinghai’s Hainan, Haixi and Haibei Prefectures had reportedly been enrolled onto 1,014 
cooperatives.  On June 2, the Qinghai Daily declared that Hainan Prefecture had 
“basically achieved cooperativization.”45  One month later, Tongren County also 
announced that its pastoral population had been completely enrolled in high-level 
cooperatives.46 
Under these pressures, by the end of August Zeku’s 19,208 residents and 692,009 
heads of livestock had reportedly been collectivized onto sixty-four cooperatives and 
seven pastoral farms.47  In September, in conjunction with the great wave of 
communization then sweeping across China, the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee 
announced that the province’s entire pastoral population should immediately be enrolled 
onto People’s Communes.48  Almost overnight, Zeku’s sixty-four pastoral cooperatives 
were reorganized as seven People’s Communes.49  By the end of the month it could be 
announced that the Zeku grasslands had been completely socialized.  With appeasing the 
                                                
45 QHSZXMZ, 72. 
 
46 Tongren Xianzhi, 269. 
 
47 ZCPC 24, 5. Albeit from a period in which statistical reporting is considered to be particularly 
unreliable, the County Party Committee reported that eighteen permanent settlements had been established, 
1080 enclosures had been constructed, 950,000 jin of grass had been cut, 3,697 mu of land had been 
cleared, and fifteen irrigation canals been built, bringing life to 29,835 mu of grassland.   
 
48 On November 6, Qinghai’s pastoral communization would be declared complete. DDZGJS 142; 
QHSZXMZ, 76; Zeku Xianzhi, 115. 
 
49 The communes were: Hor, Duofudun/Topden (Méshül, Khödé Karing, Kéri Chunga), Shadar (formerly 
Qiaofudan/Chöten District made up of the Sonak and Wöngya Tribes), Duohemao/Dokarmo (Gonsul), 
Qiakeri/Chakor (Gartsé), Ningxiu/Nyingshük/ (Tib. nying phyul, formerly Serdeü District of the 
Shawonar), and Youhao (Friendship) Commune (Shisa and five former Gönshül cooperatives).  In 
December, four of the communes were divided in two while Qiakeri and Youhao Communes were 
combined into the Dongfeng Commune (East Wind), making a total of ten People’s Communes. In 
accordance with the nation-wide retrenchment from GLF radicalism, in September 1961 what were then six 
communes were reorganized as seven xiang-level governments, largely mimicking the pre-Great Leap 
districts.  The former production teams of the GLF-era People’s Communes were now turned into fifty-





pre-Liberation elite no longer a concern, all of the animals of the “herdlords and 
headmen” were appropriated by the communes.50  Remarkably, even after class struggle 
had been brought to the fore, class labels had been assigned, and the wealth of the pre-
Liberation elite appropriated, Party communiqués occasionally continued to make 
passing reference to the Three No’s.  Less surprisingly, national autonomy remained a 
guiding principle in Zeku County and elsewhere.  However, now, instead of making 
Tibetans master of their own homes, the goal was for “the laboring pastoral masses to 
become masters of their own homes.”51 
Finally, on October 6 in what has been called one of Huangnan Prefecture’s three 
“main battles,” 2,200 members of the Shawonar (virtually the whole tribe) reportedly 
rose in rebellion.52  Led by a trio of headmen, the Shawonar insurgents killed twenty-four 
cadres and captured seventy-four rifles, three machine guns, eighty-two hand grenades, 
7,650 rounds of ammunition, and currency and goods worth nearly 30,000 yuan.53  Three 
days later the insurgents ambushed five “armed cadres” from Tongde and twenty-seven 
militiamen from far-off Huangzhong County.54  PLA units were quickly re-dispatched to 
                                                
50 Animals of herdlords and tribal leaders accused of participating in the rebellion were confiscated while 
those not alleged to have rebelled reportedly received compensation.  However, given that nearly all of the 
pre-Liberation elite were accused of counterrevolutionary crimes, it is unclear how many of the latter might 
have existed.  Zeku Xianzhi, 115.  See also QHSZXMZ, 75-76; DDZGJS, 143. 
 
51 ZCPC 24, 7.  Italics added.  See also Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, 1052 
 
52 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1032-1033.  The other two battles were a two-month confrontation with Mongols in 
Henan County and a June battle in Tongren County against an array of rebels from Tongren, Xunhua and 
Gannan Prefecture. According to Chen Qinging, in 1958 the Shawonar had a population of 2489 people. 
Zhongguo Zangzu Buluo 262. 
 
53 Among the dead was the assistant chief of the local public security bureau, Dangzeng’eri (Ch.).  
Presumably a Tibetan, the sources note that he was disemboweled, his eyes were gouged out, and his hands 
and feet were chopped off before being thrown in a ditch.  Zeku Xianzhi, 412; HNZZZZZGK, 101.   
 




the region, and several weeks and seven battles later the Shawonar insurrection was 
extinguished.55  Yet in both Zeku and Henan Counties, springtime brought a new round 
of anti-state activity and military responses.  Official narratives claim that under constant 
military pressure and simultaneous political efforts, “bit by bit [the rebels] surrendered.”  
Nevertheless, it was not until the latter half of 1960 that Huangnan Prefecture could be 
proclaimed entirely pacified.56 
 
Narratives and Counter-narratives: Rebellion, Rehabilitation, Nation and Empire  
 
In Chinese sources, the “democratic reforms” of 1958 are celebrated as the 
moment of historical rupture; the point that the Amdo Plateau jettisoned its backward, 
feudal past and fully entered the modern nation-state.  This is particularly the case in 
pastoral regions, where nation building had been deemed most difficult and progress had 
been most protracted.  While the tusi of Qinghai’s agricultural regions had been 
administratively eliminated (gaitu guiliu) well before 1949, “the Tibetan qianbaihu of the 
pastoral regions […] did not exit history’s stage until the Democratic Reforms after the 
founding of New China.” 57  Of course this statement is not entirely accurate.  By the 
mid-1950s the qianbaihu system had been formally superseded by a system of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
55 Zeku Xianzhi, 20, 412; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1032-1033; HNZZZZZGK, 101-102.   
 
56 HNZZZZZGK, 102.  The provincial military gazetteer breaks the Amdo Rebellion into three phases.  The 
first, from April through October 1958, coincides with what is generally assumed to be the main period of 
open rebellion.  The second period, from October 1958 through 1959, saw the assemblage of smaller 
groups of rebels, allegedly influenced by the March 1959 rebellion in Central Tibet.  The third phase, from 
the start of 1960 through October of 1962, was again centered in southeastern Amdo (Huangnan, Hainan, 
Guoluo and especially Yushu Prefectures).  QHSZJSZ, 519-525. 
 




autonomous regional administrations.  Yet, these new governing institutions continued to 
be headed by tribal and religious elites.  Operating in parallel as government 
functionaries and through the charisma of their pre-Liberation positions, these figures 
continued to act in subimperial fashion as the primary interface between the state and 
local society.  Ignoring grumblings from within its own ranks, Party leaders such as Zhou 
Renshan defended this arrangement by arguing that as long as national exploitation 
remained the primary contradiction the Party’s United Front policies were themselves a 
“social reform” suited for the unique conditions of minority regions.  Zhou insisted that 
through the careful implementation of the principles of national autonomy, both mass 
consciousness and patriotic consciousness would gradually develop.  Eventually the 
parochial and superstitious attitudes that undergirded the feudal domination of tribal 
headmen and monastic institutions would disappear and the masses themselves would 
demand democratic and socialist reforms.  Through this process, Amdo’s pastoral 
population would be gradually, voluntarily and “organically” integrated into the still new 
nation-state.  In essence, the transition from empire to nation would be brought to its 
successful completion.  
Nonetheless, the tenets of the United Front were not to go uncontested. 
Throughout the 1950s, this commitment to gradualism was at constant odds with a 
revolutionary impatience that demanded immediate socialist transformation and national 
integration.  In 1958, under the indivisibly linked catalysts of the Great Leap Forward and 
the Amdo Rebellion, the contest was decisively resolved in favor of the latter.  After 
nearly a decade of temporizing, in one fell swoop the qianbaihu system had been 




Bitterness struggle, [we] have completely defeated feudal influences, brought about 
pastoral socialist reforms, [and] caused the laboring peasants and pastoralists to 
completely achieve [their] Liberation from feudal rule.”58  Almost half a century later, the 
Zeku County Gazetteer would maintain a similarly unambiguous position toward the 
elimination of the pre-Liberation order,  
Economically, the establishment of the People’s Communes fundamentally 
eradicated the feudal herdlord economic system, [and] abolished the domination 
of the grasslands by the herdlords and headmen, […].  Politically, [it] 
extinguished the qianbaihu hereditary system and [the] class oppression of the 
pastoralist, […], establishing the political power of the laboring people.  [It] 
eliminated the religious monasteries’ illegal courts, jails and punishments, 
interference with civil lawsuits, interference with marriage freedom, oppression 
and discrimination against women and interference with cultural and educational 
institutions.  [It] eradicated the system of the private accumulation of production 
capital and usurious loans, forced labor etc.  [It] ended the monastic [practice] of 
forcing the masses to become monks, [it] ended the obstacles to production 
[created] by the religious activities of the monasteries and the violation of 
nationality policy and decrees.59   
 
In celebratory fashion, the gazetteer concludes, “This was an earth-shaking social 
transformation[;] with the force of a thunderbolt the shackles of feudal rule had been 
smashed.” 
Central to this narrative is the claim that the democratic reforms were 
implemented at the behest of the laboring masses.  According to a 1963 draft history of 
Huangnan Prefecture, during the mid-1950s a folksong had spread across Zeku’s 
grasslands.  Herdsmen could allegedly been heard singing, 
Everyday the sun shines upon us  
Yet we still feel bitterly cold 
Why is this? 
                                                
58 Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, 1047.  In 2009, an official history of Huangnan Prefecture would make 
a similar claim.  See HNZZZZZGK, 105. 
 





Because in the sky traces of clouds remain  
Everyday Chairman Mao holds us close 
But we are still poor 
Why is this? 
Because above us the headmen still ride60  
 
The draft history claimed that this verse, “completely reflected the hopes of the broad 
masses of the laboring pastoralists to speedily cast off exploitation [and] oppression.”  
Even in the midst of the rebellion, the Party alleged, “Because the political consciousness 
of the laboring masses had risen, the reactionaries have already been completely isolated, 
it truly [is a case] of being opposed by the masses and deserted by friends.”61  More 
surprisingly, decades later Chinese sources would continue to insist that the rebellion had 
exposed the “sharpening contradiction between the needs of the pastoralists and the 
herdlord class’ attempt to continuously protect [their] feudal serf system and feudal 
privileges.”  Using language that would seem more at place in the 1960s than the 1990s, a 
1996 history of Qinghai maintains, “The basic reason for this rebellion was the existence 
of class struggle.”62  Yet rhetoric aside, the old system had been swept off “history’s 
stage” not by an aroused herding masses brimming with class consciousness but by a 
Communist Party determined to erase difference by dragging the grasslands into a 
singular, socialist present.  Rather than an “organic transformation” in which “the old 
gradually weakens [and] the new gradually takes root,” democratic reform was achieved 
through force.  
                                                
60 Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou Gaikuang Bianji Weiyuanhui, Qinghai Sheng Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou 
Gai Kuang (Chu Gao) (NP: Huangnan Zangzu Zizhizhou Gaikuang Bianji Weiyuanhui, 1963), 48. 
 
61 Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, 1048. 
 





Evidence of the violence of Amdo’s democratic reforms is littered throughout 
official Chinese sources. 63  In Zeku County the arrests began as early as June 1958.  
Among those imprisoned that summer was the Gartsé qianhu Lumbum, the Gönshül 
qianhu Serökyap, and the Shawonar baihu Lhakba.  By autumn of the following year 
both Serökyap and Lhakba had died in prison.  In September 1958, Jikmé Sönam, the Hor 
Monastery lama and nephew of Wagya and Lhagyel, was also taken into custody.  In 
November 1960, he passed away of an unspecified illness while incarcerated in Xining.  
A year earlier, two of Hor Monastery’s other lamas, including the aforementioned Luojia, 
had also perished.64  Lumbum remained imprisoned until 1967 when he was released for 
medical treatment.  Soon after, he too succumbed to his ailments.65 
While not all of Zeku’s pre-Liberation elites perished in prison, seemingly all of 
them were deposed and arrested.  When the rebellion broke out Tsintar, the Méshül 
“monk official” and baihu, had been studying in the provincial capital.  Nonetheless, 
upon his return to Zeku he was arrested as a counterrevolutionary.  In late 1961, Tsintar 
was among many who had their cases reexamined.  He was released and subsequently 
reinstated to a government office.  However, during 1964’s Four Clean-up Campaign 
Tsintar was “sent down to the countryside to do manual labor.”  Then during the Cultural 
                                                
63 A quick glance through the local gazetteers shows an inordinate amount of lives ending between 1959 
and 1961, nearly all after being subjected to some sort of incarceration. See for example Guinan Xianzhi 
Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, Guinan Xian Zhi (Xi'an Shi: San Qin Chubanshe, 1996), 448-452; Tongde Xian 
Difangzhi Bianweihui, Tongde Xian Zhi, (Beijing Shi: Minzu Chubanshe, 1999), 482-487.  Likewise, Nian 
Zhihai and Bai Gengdeng’s overview of Qinghai’s Tibetan monasteries shows the lives of numerous 
incarnate lamas ending during these years, a fact that could not have been lost on the editors nor their 
readership.   
 
64 Nian and Bai, 299. The third was the Zhoucang (Ch.) Lama. 
 





Revolution he was “persecuted and made to reform through labor.”  Tsintar would pass 
away at home in 1974.66  After being seized during the first wave of arrests, in 1961 
Lhagyel was also released from imprisonment.  The following year the Wönkhor baihu 
was reappointed a county vice-secretary.  However, during the Cultural Revolution 
Lhagyel was branded a counterrevolutionary and subjected to criticism and struggle.67   
Unlike Zeku’s other headmen-cum-county leaders, Wagya weathered the initial 
storm of arrests.  In fact, in recognition of his aid in limiting the spread of the rebellion 
within his Hor Tribe, Wagya received a commendation from the county government and 
was subsequently appointed acting head of Huangnan Prefecture.  However, not even the 
Wagya— for decades the Zeku region’s most powerful figure— could escape the 
spiraling circle of violence.  In November 1959, he too was arrested.  When he was 
released four years later, Wagya was returned to his Hor territories not as qianhu or 
county leader, but to do “supervised manual labor” on a production team.  During the 
Cultural Revolution Wagya was labeled a member of the “Four Black Categories” and 
like so many others subjected to criticism and struggle.68 
The purges, of course, stretched far beyond Zeku County.  According to publicly 
available statistics, in Qinghai alone between 1958 and 1959 an astonishing fifty-two 
                                                
66 Ibid., 528. 
 
67 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1549. 
 
68 Zeku Xianzhi, 531.  In December 1959, along with a host of Qinghai’s influential pre-Liberation elites, 
Wagya was dismissed from his position as a member of the Provincial People’s Government Committee.  





thousand people were arrested for participating in the rebellion.69  Assuming that the vast 
majority of those accused of involvement in a Tibetan-led uprising were Tibetan, as much 
as ten percent of Qinghai’s Tibetan population may have been incarcerated.70  Among 
them was the Nangra headman Wangchen Döndrup.  In the early 1930s he had survived 
insurrections against Ma Bufang’s Xining regime and in the early 1950s against the CCP.  
However, in 1958 elements of his Nangra Tribe again rebelled against state authority.  
Despite allegedly having not personally participated in the rebellion, Wangchen Döndrup 
was quickly arrested and stripped of his positions atop the Jianzha County government.  
Although released after a few months, Wangchen Döndrup died the following March, 
reportedly from illness.  He was fifty-five.71  If Wangchen Döndrup represents the 
struggle to preserve imperial space within the confines of the nation-state, his death, 
symbolically at least, marks the closure of that space and the forced integration of the 
Tibetan Plateau into the new Chinese state.  Lanzhou Jia, the Dongsheng headman who 
prior to Liberation had been associated with the “Guide Prince” Ma Yuanhai and who 
had briefly joined the Nangra insurrection, was arrested in July 1958.  According to his 
own written testament, he spent the next twenty years either in jail or on a labor reform 
farm.72   
                                                
69 DDQHJS, 162-163.  I have been told that the Dangdai Qinghai Jianshi was banned after it was 
discovered that it contained these figures.  They do not appear in the full version of Dangdai Zhongguo de 
Qinghai.  Personal communication.  
 
70 This is based on a 1957 population of 513,415.  Notably, by 1964 the Tibetan population of Qinghai had 
officially dropped to 422,662, a remarkable 18% decrease.  See Qinghaisheng Renkou Pucha Bangongshi, 
ed., Qinghai Zangzu Renkou (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1994), 17. 
 
71 Jianzha Xianzhi, 686. 
 





Of the men accused of being the backbone of the rebellion in the Huangnan 
region— the 7th Shartsang Lama Kelden Trinlé Lungtok, Gélek Gyatso, Zongqianhu 
Gyelwo Dorjé, and the Rongwo Nangso Trashi Namgyel— only Trashi Namgyel would 
survive to tell his own story.73  In early 1958, as the uprising spread from Gannan 
Prefecture into the Repgong region, members of Zongqianhu Dorjé’s Gyelwo Tribe 
allegedly joined the insurrection.  In June, he was taken into custody.  A full eighteen 
years later, Gyelwo Dorjé would die while still incarcerated.74  According to Stevenson, 
the cause was “complications (probably pneumonia) resulting from mistreatment during 
political campaigns.”75  The 7th Shartsang Lama fared no better.  Despite purportedly 
having released two letters pleading with Repgong’s population to not rebel, he was 
accused of personally instigating the uprising, his monastery serving as its 
“headquarters.”76  Like Gyelwo Dorjé, the Shartsang Rinpoche would spend his final two 
decades in prison, finally passing away in November 1978.77   
                                                
73 QHSZDSJ, 242.  Trashi Namgyel’s post-1958 fate is unclear. His short autobiographical account covers 
only the early Liberation period and briefly his reform-era activities.  Given this silence, particularly 
considering that Trashi Namgyel was accused of being one of the three masterminds behind the 1958 revolt 
in Huangnan, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that he did not suffer in its aftermath and again during the 
Cultural Revolution.  His official biographic blurb in the Qinghai Gazetteer simply states that in 1959 he 
was wrongly punished, adding that throughout he never lost faith in the Party.  After the “smashing of the 
Gang of Four” through his death in 1998, Trashi Namgyel would serve as a leading member of the 
provincial consultative committee.  Zhaxi Anjia, 243-255; QHSZRWZ, 264-265.   
 
74 Tongren Xianzhi, 1092. 
 
75 Stevenson, 17. 
 
76 Zhonggong Huangnan Zhouwei, 1045-1047. According to Zhao Qingyang and the Shartsang Lama’s 
nephew Dorjé, in the first of two letters the Shartsang Rinpoche wrote, “The greatness of the Chinese 
Communist Party is like heaven and earth, it is the people’s savior, [you] must not rebel.” Dorjé was almost 
certainly purged.  A footnote to the submission tacitly acknowledges that Zhou was also purged in 1958 
and rehabilitated after 1978. Duojie and Zhao, 102. 
 
77 Tongren Xianzhi, 1086, 1095; Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1546. Aorijia, Huangnan’s fourth “chief conspirator,” 





Even the Shartsang Lama’s brother Gélek Gyatso could escape persecution for 
only so long.  The former steward of Rongwo Monastery remained a vice-chairman of 
the Huangnan Prefecture Committee until November 1965.  A month earlier, he had 
finally been implicated in the 1958 Rebellion.  At the height of the Cultural Revolution, 
Gelek Gélek Gyatso was “detained” by the military as a “protective action” (baohu 
cuoshi).  He passed away two years later at the age of forty-nine.  Although ostensibly 
dying from natural causes, in the context of the Cultural Revolution and his later 
posthumous rehabilitation, it seems likely that Gelek Gélek Gyatso too became a 
permanent victim of the revolution.78  
There were of course thousands of others, most of whom remain nameless.  We 
know about the fate of the above figures because their plights have been recorded in 
state-sponsored histories.  The irony is that they are included in these volumes not 
because of the counterrevolutionary crimes for which they had been accused but because 
they were ultimately cleared of culpability, politically rehabilitated (often posthumously), 
and reaffirmed as “patriotic democratic figures” or “patriotic religious figures.”79  In 
1977, Wagya became the first of Huangnan’s pre-Liberation elites to be exonerated.  
Soon after, Lhagyel also reappeared.  Both brothers would go on to serve in largely 
sinecure but symbolically important posts on the Huangnan Prefecture Consultative 
                                                
78 Zhao Qingyang, “Ji Yiweii yu Dang,” 155. Another indigenous leader who seems to have escaped 
persecution in the immediate aftermath of the 1958 Rebellion was the Mongol “female prince” Trashi 
Tsering.  However, at the start of the Cultural Revolution she was labeled a “rightist.”  By October 1966, 
she too was dead.  Huangnan Zhouzhi, 1535. Hennan Mengguzu Zizhixian Fangzhi Bianji Weiyuanhui, 
ed., Henan Mengguzu Zizhixian Zhi, 2 vols. (Lanzhou: Gansu Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), 944. Dhondup 
and Diemberger. 
 
79 The vast majority of figures depicted in the short biographies recorded in the “Notable Persons” (renwu) 
chapter of difangzhi are presented as heroic figures.  Less common are the stories of major anti-Party 
enemies such as Ma Yuanhai.  On occasion, non-rehabilitated leaders of the 1958 Rebellion, such as the 





Committee, Lhagyel until his death in 1986 and Wagya as a committee vice-chairman 
until his 1991 retirement.  Wagya, who in 1932 had become qianhu of the Hor, passed 
away in 1995 at the age of ninety-one.80   
It was not until after 1978’s Third Plenum of the 11th Party Committee— the 
event that has come to signal the dawn of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform Era— that the 
wholesale reversal of the 1958 verdicts began.  Wagya and Lhagyel were among the 
lucky ones.  Many, including Lumbum, Lhakba, Jikmé Sönam, and Serökyap, had to be 
rehabilitated posthumously.81  In 1980, Huangnan Prefecture held a special memorial to 
honor the 7th Shartsang Lama Kelden Trinlé Lungtok Gyatso, his brother the former 
monastery steward Gélek Gyatso, and Repgong Zongqianhu Gyelwo Dorjé.82   
In and of itself, the political rehabilitation of these figures is not particularly 
noteworthy.  One of the first tasks of the post-Mao regime was the mass rehabilitation of 
those persecuted during the political campaigns of the Maoist period.  In Qinghai it was 
ultimately determined that of the fifty-two thousand people arrested for 
counterrevolutionary activity, an astounding forty-four thousand (84%) had either been 
wrongly incarcerated or of unproven culpability.83  Yet, despite exonerating the vast 
                                                
80 Zeku Xianzhi, 529-531. 
 
81 Ibid.,  Between 1979-1981, each of these figures had his official verdict reversed. 
 
82 Huangnan Zhouzhi, 847-848, 1537-1539; Stevenson 15-16; Zhao Qingyang, “Ji Yiwei yu Dang,” 155.   
 
83 DDQHJS, 162-163. Two explanations are provided.  Firstly, “mistaken methods” were blamed for 
mixing up contradictions among the people (non-antagonistic) and contradictions between the people and 
the enemy (counterrevolutionary contradictions) (lianglei butong xingzhi de maodun).  Secondly, it has 
been admitted that in some regions a desire for revenge among cadres and soldiers played a significant role 
in the state’s oversized response. This was described as a “serious violation of policy.”  The source does 
not make clear when these rehabilitations occurred.  It seems likely that many people were cleared in 1961, 
although like Lhagyel and Tsintar a large number may have been persecuted again during the Cultural 





majority of the alleged participants, the verdict on the Amdo Rebellion itself was not 
similarly reversed.  Instead, the uprising continues to be considered a “armed 
counterrevolutionary rebellion” planned and instigated by “each tribes’ qianhu, baihu and 
the leading monks of the monasteries” in order to protect their economic interests and 
political authority.84  
On the surface, this treatment of the memory of the Amdo Rebellion is not unlike 
the Party’s post-Mao verdict on the Cultural Revolution.  Mao’s successors declared the 
Cultural Revolution to have been a great catastrophe while simultaneously absolving the 
vast majority of participants from blame.  In their place, a small number of evil schemers 
have been assigned responsibility for the society-wide crimes of the period.85  It has been 
convincingly argued that establishing this narrative was deemed necessary in order to 
heal the wounds of a deeply scarred nation while simultaneously shoring up the 
legitimacy of the post-Mao regime.86  Although the degree to which the post-Mao 
Cultural Revolution narrative has achieved its objectives is far from clear, the one thing it 
                                                
84 QHSZJSZ, 513-514.  
 
85 As both Susanne Wiegelin-Schwiedrik and Lowell Dittmer show, although 1981’s resolution “On Some 
Questions Regarding the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC” is considered to be the 
defining statement on the Maoist past, their have been several nuanced but substantive shifts in years since. 
Nonetheless, a dominant overarching narrative still exists in which blame is attached to the Gang of Four 
and a small group of collaborators for the “ten years of disaster.” Lowell Dittmer, "Learning from Trauma: 
The Cultural Revolution in Post-Mao Politics," in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. 
William A. Joseph, Christine Wong, and David Zweig, Harvard Contemporary China Series (Cambridge, 
MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University, 1991); ———, "Rethinking China’s Cultural 
Revolution Amid Reform," in China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution : Master Narratives and 
Post-Mao Counternarratives, ed. Woei Lien Chong, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). 
 
86 See Anita Chan; Dittmer; Wieglin-Schwiedrzik; Guobin Yang; Jonathan Unger, "The Cultural 
Revolution at the Grass Roots," review of The Cultural Revolution as History by Joseph Esherick, Paul G. 





did not need to do among the Han majority was repair the narrative of nationhood itself.87  
In Amdo, the rebellion is similarly blamed on a small number of counterrevolutionary 
conspirators.  However, whether committed by the state or non-state actors, the violence 
of 1958 severed the Party’s own fragile narrative of national integration, its discursive 
mechanism for transforming a loose constellation of imperial subjects into an integral 
national body.  
This disconnect is well represented by literary-historical projects of the 1980s and 
1990s, especially in the reengaged effort to produce wenshi ziliao.  In Qinghai, the first 
four volumes of the provincial wenshi ziliao collection (Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji) 
were published between 1963-1965.  These editions were dominated by tales of the 
cruelty of the old society, the exploitation of the Ma Bufang regime, and stories of valor 
and martyrdom of the Red Army’s Western Route Army during its Long March traversal 
of the South Qinghai Plateau.  This accorded with Premier Zhou Enlai’s 1959 temporal 
and topical guidelines for wenshi ziliao compilation.88  However, when taken in the 
context of the political atmosphere of the early 1960s, the contents of the Qinghai wenshi 
ziliao take on more nuanced connotations.  By 1963 the pre-Liberation elite had been 
purged.  Many languished in jails.  Many others were dead.  A year earlier, Mao Zedong 
had effectively declared that national oppression did not exist.  Instead, the Chairman 
                                                
87 Wieglin-Schwiedrzik argues that the Party has been unable to create a “master-narrative” for post-1949 
history, and in particular, “The CCP leadership has already lost control over what people knew about CCP 
history during the Cultural Revolution” (1075).  See also the contributions to the special edition of The 
China Review 5, no. 2 (2005) edited by Guobin Yang and Ming-Bao Yue, and the edited volume by Ching 
Kwan Lee and Guobin Yang, eds., Re-Envisioning the Chinese Revolution : The Politics and Poetics of 
Collective Memories in Reform China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
 
88 These themes were common to the first wave of wenshi ziliao production when the majority of the 
submissions concerned political and military affairs and were often penned by officials of the former Qing, 





famously insisted, “In the final analysis, a national struggle is a question of class 
struggle.”  The United Front Work Department was quickly criticized for  
“capitulationism” in minority work and its leadership purged.89  As such, there was no 
urge and no need to acknowledge much less stress efforts at national rapprochement as 
represented by United Front collusion with pre-Liberation elites.90  Thus, in the early 
wenshi ziliao these fallen figures are not so much vilified as they are absent, virtually 
stricken from the historical record.91  Likewise, the entire transitional period of class 
conciliation is not depicted in this first wave of wenshi ziliao publication.  Instead, 
Liberation is represented as a point in time, not a period of transition to nationhood and 
socialism but of their successful and immediate realization.92  To evoke a religious 
metaphor, Liberation becomes something of a sudden Enlightenment rather than the 
                                                
89 Cited in Wen-lin Chu, "Peiping’s Nationality Policy in the Cultural Revolution," Issues and Studies 8/9 
(1969): 28.  This sea change occurred at September’s 10th Plenum of the 8th Party Committee, where a 
recently resurgent Mao had exhorted his colleagues to “never forget class struggle.”  The submission of the 
10th Panchen Lama’s “70,000-Character Petition,” which criticized the CCP’s recent policies in Tibetan 
regions, was at least partially what raised Mao’s ire.  Before the end of the month, long-time UFWD 
director Li Weihan was dismissed from office.  The Panchen Lama would live under custody from 1964-
1978.  See Barnett, “Preface,” xix-xx; Chu Wen-lin 20-22; Dreyer, China’s Forty Million, 191-198; George 
Moseley, "China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question," The China Quarterly, no. 24 
(1965): 15-19. 
 
90 Looking at China’s northeast provinces, Martin Fromm argues that these initial wenshi ziliao efforts 
were part of a post-Great Leap Forward effort under Zhou Enlai to rebuild the early-1950s United Front, 
particularly with intellectuals and businessmen who could be instrumental in recovery efforts.  
Unsurprisingly, in Qinghai— where rebellion had only recently been pacified— there was no similar effort 
to reengage the United Front through the compilation of wenshi ziliao.  Fromm 3-4. 
 
91 Members of the old elite do appear in a few of these stories.  For example Rongwo Monastery’s Gélek 
Gyatso dictates a story about Ma Bufang’s oppression of Tongren’s Ya’ang Buluo (Ch.).  In another 
example, Qieben Jia (Ch.), son of the qianhu of one of the Eight Lake Tribes, tells his father’s story.  
However, once again the focus is on the oppression of the Ma regime. Gelang Jiacuo, "Ma Bufang Zhenya 
Tonren Lancai Jianwen," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuangji 2 (1964): 103-105; Qieben Jia, "Xinghai Aquhu 
Buluo Qianhu Xiangsongmu Fajia Shi," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao Xuangji 3 (1964), 109-120.  
 
92 For example, the above-mentioned Qieben Jia simply notes, “However, the people are after all masters 
of society, not long after, Ma Bufang fell from power, [he] fled in panic into exile, On September 5, 1949 
Qinghai’s Liberation was announced, my wild and arrogant pipe dream, was destroyed along with it.” 





gradual path advocated by many Buddhist traditions, represented here by the United 
Front. 
 When wenshi ziliao production started up again at the beginning of the post-Mao 
period, the political atmosphere and thus goals of history writing had of course changed 
markedly.  Amidst this general reorientation was a recognition that relations between the 
nationalities had been seriously damaged, not just by the physical mistreatment of non-
Han peoples, but, as demonstrated by changes to the contents of wenshi ziliao collections, 
by the violence done to the narrative of Liberation itself.93  In other words, part of the 
newly reengaged project of (re)writing local histories into a national history was 
reestablishing the terms under which ethnically non-Chinese regions were integrated into 
the modern nation-state.  In order to do this, the Party had to bring back those people who 
were most representative of this connection, physically when possible, posthumously 
when not.94 
                                                
93 According to Fromm, among the explicit goals of early post-Mao wenshi ziliao production was “to re-
enlist the trust and support of a broad-based united front.”  He is not specifically speaking of national 
minorities but a more general reengagement with society that could “demonstrate the new leaderships 
commitment to objective inquiry, inclusivity and attentiveness to the diversity of people’s actual 
experiences, while containing those experiences within a unified, coherent narrative that would 
simultaneously affirm the legitimacy of the post-Mao reforms and re-assert the Party’s continuous lineage 
as modernizer and liberator of China.”  Fromm 4.  Annie Chang reports that initially the allowable subject 
matter was broadened to include topics on post-1949 government and society.  She notes that early volumes 
included a heavy dose of Cultural Revolution testimonials.  In 1982, the guidelines were again 
reconfigured, with the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966) now serving as the temporal limit for 
inclusion. Annie K. Chang, "The 'Went Ziliao' Collection of the Center for Chinese Studies Library, 
University of California, Berkeley," Twentieth-Century China 26, no. 1 (2000), 105. 
 
94 When in 1979 the first post-Mao Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao volume was published, it was relatively 
abbreviated, containing just four articles totaling forty-one pages.  This is in contrast to the first four 
volumes from the early 1960s that averaged almost 14 entries and 115 pages.  The first three submissions to 
that 1979 volume follow a familiar formula.  The fourth, however, is an overview of Ta’ersi Monastery 
(Tib. Kumbum).  The article is surprisingly free of political rhetoric, until a concluding passage makes an 
almost mechanical reference to the monastery’s historical legacy of class oppression.  Moreover, the 
passage includes information on the post-Liberation period, something that is almost completely absent 
from the original four volumes.  See Wang Jianping, "Qinghai Ta'ersi Shilue," Qinghai Wenshi Ziliao 
Xuangji 5 (1979): 18-41.  The first biographical submission of an indigenous leader, the great educator 




In this re-conceptualized narrative, the early-Liberation period goes from 
nonexistent to pivotal.  Now, it is the interval in which the CCP, working within the 
framework of the United Front, does the necessary propaganda work to convince 
indigenous elites that Ma Bufang was responsible for sowing discord between the 
nationalities while contrasting Ma’s rule with the CCP’s nationality policy.  Members of 
the upper strata, now conscious of their own culpability in national oppression, have 
epiphanies of their own.  Suddenly, if still not quite full of class consciousness then 
brimming with class remorse, they become agents of the CCP’s efforts toward national 
reconciliation while personally devoting themselves to serving rather than exploiting their 
co-ethnics.95  Meanwhile, the experiences of hardy early cadres, the missionaries of the 
socialist state, and their first minority converts are valorized.  In fact, it is often the 
surviving old cadres and United Front figures themselves— pre-Liberation elites such as 
Wagya, Lhagyel, Trashi Namgyel and Lanzhou Jia, and cadres including Zhao Qingyang, 
Deng Jinsheng, Geyong and Dorjé—that pen or dictate the submissions.96  In the process, 
their own roles in state and nation building are often emphasized, perhaps even 
embellished.  In a manner of speaking, Liberation goes from being a moment in time— 
an end of history— to part of the historical process of building the new socialist, nation-
                                                                                                                                            
honor of the 40th Anniversary of Qinghai’s Liberation (1989) an entire volume is largely dedicated to 
United Front figures. 
 
95 See for example the story Wagya’s conversion in Qing Yang, 165-166.  Other examples include Gelek 
Gélek Gyatso in Zhao Qingyang, “Ji Yiwei yu Dang,”151; Wangchen Döndrup in Zhao Qingyang, “Yiwei 
Jingli,” 200-201; Trashi Namgyel in Zhaxi Anjia, 243-255; and Henan County’s Trashi Tsering in Cairang, 
"Hennan Qinwang Zhaxi Cairang Jianshu," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 160-162; and Guo Shuhua, 
"Jiefang Chuqi De Zhaxi Cairang," Huangnan Wenshi Ziliao 2 (1994): 266-268. 
 
96 Upon being politically rehabilitated, many of these figures were given sinecure posts on local 
consultative committees, the organs tasked with wenshi ziliao production.  Several of the Huangnan 
submissions were dictated by pre-Liberation elites and recorded by Zhao Qingyang (aka Qing Yang, Zhao 




state.  In this sense, the second wave of wenshi ziliao production helps establish what can 
be though of as Qinghai’s post-Mao normative narrative of Liberation. 
However, while this post-Mao narrative seeks to discursively reestablish the 
initial terms of cooperation between the Party-state and Amdo’s pre-Liberation elite, it 
does little to resolve the central problem that prior to 1958 had vexed Qinghai’s Party 
establishment; how to convince its non-Chinese population that they had a stake in a 
multinational, socialist (now increasingly post-socialist), Han-dominated nation-state.  
After all, resurrecting the symbols of 1950s accommodation does little to achieve this 
goal because that period was itself intended to be transitory.  Bringing back figures 
originally meant to serve as bridges between empire and nation does not resolve the 
quandary because the mechanisms of transformation are no longer intact.  While the 
United Front Work Department continues to play a primary role in developing and 
implementing nationality policy, the dynamism and transformative potential with which 
the concept of the United Front was once imbued has long since disappeared.  Similarly, 
national autonomy remains the law of the land.  However, rather than serving as an 
instrument of national unity, it may instead have helped to essentialize and 
institutionalize difference.  Instead of reinforcing state legitimacy by encouraging a sense 
of shared sovereignty within a multiethnic nation-state, national autonomy may have 
come to represent the failure of ethnic aspirations and national sovereignty unrealized.97   
                                                
97 Political scientists such as Ted Gurr and Kjell-Åke Nordquist have argued that granting regional 
autonomy to minority populations can serve as a “conflict-solving mechanism” by giving minority groups a 
stake in the larger multiethnic nation-state and thereby suppressing secessionist demands.  Others, 
including Svante Cornell, have countered that by “locking into place historical differences between 
groups,” “Autonomous regions, by their very nature, are conducive to secessionism.”  See Svante E. 
Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective," World 





In other words, it is far from clear that this post-Mao narrative creates a 
convincing argument for national unity.  Instead, it may actually expose fissures in the 
state’s narrative of national integration.  The story of the Amdo Rebellion remains 
indivisibly intertwined with both collectivization and the democratic reforms, each of 
which continues to be lauded as a monumental victory that led to the full integration of 
the Amdo Plateau.  This is in spite of the violence through which the democratic reforms 
were achieved; a violence that the Party itself admits was largely dispensed 
indiscriminately and disproportionately.  And this is despite the Party’s own concession 
that collectivization— in particular the People’s Communes but also at nearly every 
previous point— was improperly implemented.98  Yet even after acknowledging these 
missteps, the 1996 Qinghai history summarizes, “Overall and in the main, this reform 
was a socialist reform with important content, it was a democratic reform, it actively 
resulted in the complete liberation and social development of the minority 
nationalities.”99  However, having implicitly admitted that the United Front strategy of a 
gradual and organic transformation had failed, no effective argument is provided to 
explain integration beyond references to largely nullified policies of a bygone era.   
This is not to argue that the 1958 Rebellion (or the state’s response) was or was 
not justified.  Nor is it to suggest that Amdo’s pre-Liberation social and political system 
was equitable or preferable, or that the subimperial relationships struck between the 
newly established Party-state and Amdo’s indigenous leadership were ultimately tenable.  
Instead, it is to point out the rupture in the transition from empire to nation that socialist 
                                                
98 For example see QHSZXMZ, 68-76. 
 




transformation and the democratic reforms represent.  This aporia could not be repaired 
through the rehabilitation of those accused of participation in the rebellion because it 
does not repair the rupture itself.  Having failed to establish a basis of organic legitimacy 
— and here lies the central paradox of the Party’s nation building project— the CCP was 
compelled to rely on what Soviet historian Mark Beissinger has referred to as “coerced 
legitimacy.”100  Simply put, in Amdo empire was eliminated before the process of de-
imperialization and nationalization was completed. 
Moreover, lurking just below the surface of the Party’s post-Mao narrative lies a 
potentially powerful counter-narrative.  It tells a tale not of the peaceful rise of national 
consciousness temporarily disrupted by a last-ditch effort to preserve the old order, but 
instead one of steady resistance.  In fact, in Chinese sources the Amdo Rebellion is 
depicted not as a singular uprising but as five-years of sustained insurrection lasting from 
1958-1962.101  As noted, these sources also directly link the revolt in Qinghai to the 
Kham Rebellion of 1955-1956.  Furthermore, according to the recollections of people 
such as Trashi Namgyel as well as inexplicit admissions dotted across both the archival 
and secondary material, security operations against “bandits” and Ma Bufang remnants in 
                                                
100 Speaking of the failure of the Soviet Union’s efforts at national integration, Beissinger writes, “The 
Soviet regime did much more than simply occupy territories; rather, it was driven to engage in policies 
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of support through coerced legitimacy.” Mark R. Beissinger, "The Demise of an Empire-State:  Identity, 
Legitimacy and the Deconstruction of the Soviet Politics," in The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism : The 
Nation-State at Bay? ed. Crawford Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 101-102. 
 
101 QHSZJSZ, 519.  On this subject, the provincial military gazetteer could not be clearer, declaring, 
“Under the leadership of the Lanzhou Military Region and the Qinghai Communist Party Committee, […], 
from April 1958 to March 1962, rebellion pacification troops completely pacified the Qinghai region’s 





Huangnan continued at least into 1954.102  Going back further, the Ma Yuanxiang 
Rebellion, which with considerable indigenous support had its base in this same Gansu-
Qinghai-Sichuan borderlands, was not defeated until mid-1953.  Thus, following the 
Chinese state’s own submersed narrative, a line can be drawn from the Guomindang 
influenced uprisings of 1950-1953 straight through to the Amdo Rebellion of 1958-1962.  
Suddenly, the narrative of steady state and nation building momentarily disrupted by the 
1958 Rebellion gives way to an alternate possibility; thirteen years of consistent if 
uneven opposition to the new regime.  With the Cultural Revolution following close 
behind, we are left with a relatively recent period of nation building that only really 
began in the post-Mao period.  If so, it is no surprise that in Amdo the Party’s strategy of 
national reconciliation through rehabilitation falls flat. 
Of course, the Party does not rely solely on its post-Mao narrative to convince 
Amdo Tibetans of their inclusion in the Chinese nation.  For example, since 2000 the 
Great Western Development Campaign (xibu da kaifa) has directed large-scale 
investment into western China in an attempt to develop its economy, raise living 
standards and reduce regional disparity.  In the process, the Party hopes to strengthen 
state legitimacy and in particular the loyalty of the region’s non-Han inhabitants.103  Yet, 
several studies have shown that the CCP’s efforts to “buy Tibetans’ love” have at best 
                                                
102 Zhaxi Anjia, 244; ZCPG 4, 124; Zeku Xianzhi, 382. For instance, during a 1954 operation to “surround 
and annihilate remnant bandits,” Trashi Namgyel claims to have served as a guide and aid for “bandit 
annihilation corps, Party work teams and a Public Security Bureau section chief sent to organize a tribal 
self-defense units.” 
 
103 David Goodman has written two useful if now dated articles.  On the Great Western Development 
Campaign in Qinghai, see “Qinghai and the Emergence of the West.” For a more general discussion of the 
campaign, including its role as an instrument of state and nation building, see “Campaign to Open Up the 





born mixed results.104  In fact, six decades after the CCP first declared Qinghai Liberated 
and almost exactly fifty years from the outbreak of the Amdo Rebellion, there is no better 
evidence of the uneven integration of Tibetan regions into the Chinese nation-state than 
Tibetan Uprising of 2008.  While the violence that erupted in Lhasa during March of that 
year and quickly spread to both Amdo and Kham was fueled by specific grievances, I 
contend that at its heart is a continued inability to convince Tibetans of their full 
membership in the modern Chinese nation-state.  It is far from clear that the Party’s 
1950s United Front strategy of organic transformation could have ultimately succeeded.  
However, in its place the Party has been unable to articulate a convincing alternative 
narrative of national integration.   
More than a century ago, the French theorist Ernest Renan presciently highlighted 
the importance that both narrative and memory play in the creation and consolidation of 
nations.  Renan referred to a nation as “a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling 
of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in 
the future.  It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible 
fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.”105  Yet, as 
Renan notes, this memory of a common past that allows for us today to desire a common 
tomorrow requires that we “forget” the violence—both physical and epistemological— 
                                                
104 Ben Hillman, "Money Can't Buy Tibetans' Love," Far Eastern Economic Review April 4, 2008.  For 
critical overviews of the political, economic and cultural consequences of the policies of the reform era on 
ethnically Tibetan regions of China, see Barnett and Akiner; Blondeau and Buffetrille; Andrew Martin 
Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet : Challenges of Recent Economic Growth, 
(Copenhagen: NIAS, 2005); Ashild  Kolas and Monika P. Thowsen, On the Margins of Tibet : Cultural 
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that accompanies all transitions to nationhood.106  To put it bluntly, in Amdo the violence 
of integration, represented most starkly but not exclusively by 1958, has not been 
forgotten.107 
Tilly, Barkey and others have pointed out that while empires often expand 
through military conquest, and although the maintenance of empire frequently requires at 
least the threat of force, coercion itself is not a defining element of empire.  Arguably, it 
is only in the twentieth century that the concept of empire has become so closely 
associated with exploitation, domination and by extension the perception of 
illegitimacy.108  In the post-imperial world in which we now live, where the “perception 
of exploitation is more important than the objective fact of empire,” many Tibetan 
inhabitants of Amdo and beyond may have developed what Beissinger terms “empire-
consciousness.”109  Carol McGranahan thus asserts, “From the perspective of Tibet, the 
PRC can and should be understood as an imperial power.”110  Yet, as Adeeb Khalid asks, 
                                                
106 Ibid., 45. 
 
107 The events of 1958 are not only still within living memory, but individual remembrances have also 
been preserved in at least two recent Tibetan-language books, both published in Xining by underground 
presses.  Several contacts have told me that a number of similar unpublished manuscripts circulate within 
Amdo’s intellectual circles.  See Nags-tshang Nus-blos-bris, Nags Tshang Zi Lu'i Skyid Sdug. (Zi-ling: 
Mtsho-snong Zi-ling par khang, 2007); Bya-mdo Rin-bzan, Nga'i Pha Yul Dang Zhi Bzhi Bcings Grol 
([Xining]: s.n., 2008). 
 
108 Ronald Suny writes, “Empire is not merely a form of polity but also a value-laden appellation that as 
late as the nineteenth century (and even in some usages into our own) was thought of as a sublime form of 
political existence […] but that at the beginning of the twenty-first century casts doubt about the legitimacy 
of a polity and even predicts its eventual, indeed inevitable, demise.”  In “Empire Strikes Out,” 26-27. 
Lieven, 6-7;  Pagden, “Imperialism, Liberalism,” 437.   
 
109 Beissinger, “Persisting Ambiguity,” 155.  According to the author, “The most important dimension in 
any imperial situation is perception:  whether politics and policies are accepted as ‘ours’ or rejected as 
‘theirs.’  Thius implies both a well-developed sense of separate group identity and a recognition of the 
illegitimacy of the existing polity’s authority.” See also Beissinger, “Demise of an Empire-State,” 98.   
 





“Where does empire end and other forms of nonrepresentative or authoritarian polities 
begin?”  In fact, both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China 
exercised/exercise levels and levers of “effective control over sovereignty” unimaginable 
to their imperial forbearers.  Speaking of the USSR, Khalid argues that it acted more akin 
to “the activist, interventionist state that seeks to sculpt its citizenry in an ideal image” 
than an empire.111   Although it is tempting to view the People’s Republic of China as the 
modern-day version of the Chinese empire, perhaps it too should be viewed as a new type 
of polity.  If Tibetans have come consider the PRC to be an imperial formation, this may 
not be a confirmation of empire so much as evidence of the failure of the nation.
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ed. Ann Laura  Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Perdue Peter C. (Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 












DDQHJS: Dangdai Qinghai Jianshi 
DDZGQH: Dangdai Zhongguo de Qinghai 
GDXWSZL: Guidexian Wenshi Ziliao 
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APPENDIX A  
ZEKU’S TRIBES AND LEADERSHIP CA. 19531 
                                                
1 Adapted from ZCPG 1, 2 
 
2 See Chapter 5 n. 27. 
 
3 See Chapter 4 n. 116. 
Tribe/Tsowa Headman’s Name Indigenous Position 
   
Hor Wagya Qianhu 
“      Wönkhor Tsowa Lhagyel Baihu / Reincarnate Lama 
“      Wönkhor Tsowa Guanjia (Ch.) ? 
“      Ratsang Tsowa Chögyong Baihu 
“      Xuhumang (Ch.) Yangdan (Ch.)2 ? 
Gönshül Serökyap Qianhu 
Gartsé Lumbum Qianhu 
Méshül Tsintar Baihu / “Monk Official” 
“ Lama Bum Baihu 
Shawonar Lhakba Baihu 
Wöngya Shawo Baihu 
“ Luociri (Ch.)3 ? 
Sonak Gongbao (Ch.) Baihu 
Shisa Wande (Ch.) Baihu 
Ködé Karing Dargyé Baihu 







THL — PINYIN — WYLIE CONVERSION CHART 
 
THL Simplified Pinyin Wylie Tibetan Notes 
    
Awar Téu Awari Tiewu  a bar the ‘u Repgong Tribe 
Batang Batang ‘ba ‘thang State pastoral farm  
Chakor Qiakeri cha  skor Zeku District 




Chöten Qiaofudan mchod rten Zeku District 
Chögyong Chujun / Qieshijun / 
Qishijun 
 
chos sgyong Hor Latsang Tsowa 
Baihu 




Dargyé Darjie dar rgyas Lingya Baihu (Xunhua) 
Dargyé Tarijia/ Jie Tajia/ Jiehou 
Tajia/ Jiege Danjia 
 
dar rgyas Ködé Karing Baihu 
(Rongchen) Dodé Bum (Longqin) Duodai Ben rong chen mdo sde ‘bum  Son of Lhajé Draknawa 
Dokarmo Duohemao rdo dkar mo Zeku District 
Dorjé Duojie rdor rje Nephew of 7th Shartsang 
Lama 
 
Dowa Duowa mdo ba Tongren Tribe/District 
Gartsé Guanshize mgar rtse Zeku/Repgong Tribe 
Gélek Gyatso Gelei Jiacuo dge legs rgya mtsho Rongwo Steward 
Gengya Ganjia rgan gya Labrang Tribe 
Gyelwo Dorjé Jiawu Duoji rgyal bo rdor rje Repgong Zongqianhu 
Gönshül Guanxiu mgon shul Zeku Tribe 
Hor Heri hor Zeku Tribe 
Jamyang Norbu Jiamuyang Nuori ‘jam dbyang nor bu Ch. Huang Xiang 
Jikmé Sönam Jiumai Suonan/ Jiumei/ 
Jinmei Suonan/ Jiumai 
Suonanmu 
 
‘jigs med bsod nams Nephew of Wagya and 
Hor Monastery Lama 




Jikmé Topgyé Jiumai Duojie ‘jigs med stob rgyas Trashi Namgyel’s elder 
brother and predecessor 
 
Kangtsé Welzang Gangcha Huabao Zang rkang tsha’i dpal bzang Kangtsé Zongqianhu 
Kelden Trinlé Lungtok 
Gyatso 
Luozang Chenli Lunduo 
Jiacuo 
skal ldan 'phrin las lung 
rtogs rgya mtsho 
Full religious name of 
the 7th Shartsang Lama 
 
Khéri Chunga Keliqina khe ris chu nga Zeku Tribe 
Ködé Karing Gudegelang/rang ko’u sde ka ring Zeku Tribe 
Könchok Guanque dkon mchog Tibetan cadre from 
Hualong 
 
Könchok Gyeltsen Guanque Jiancan dkon mchog rgyal 
mtshan 
Yuan-era guoshi and 
nangso 
 
Künga Peljor Gengga Huanjue kun dga’ dpal ‘byor Henan Mongol Prince 
(qinwang) 
 
Lama Bum Lama Ben bla ma ‘bum Méshül Baihu 
Langtsang Langcang glang tshang Repgong Tribe 
Lhagyel Lajia lha rgyal Hor Baihu and Wagya’s 
brother 
 
Lhakba Laba lhag ba Shawonar Baihu 
Lharjé Draknawa Lajie Zhiwana / Lazha 
Zhiwana  
lha rje brag sna ba Progenitor of the 
Rongwo Nangso lineage 
 
Linggya Langjia gling rgya Xunhua Tribe 
Lodrö Senggé Luozhi Sengge blo gros seng ge Grandson of Lhajé 
Draknawa 
Lumbum Lengben klu ‘bum Qianhu of the Gartsé 
Lutsang Lucang klu tsang Guinan Tribe/Hor 
Tsowa 
 
Méshül Maixiu dme shul Zeku Tribe 
Myikya Nishijia myi skya Showanar Tsowa 
Nangra Angla snang ra Chentsa Tribe of 
Wagchen Dondrup 
Nangso Angsuo nang so  
Nyingshük Ningxiu/ nying phyul Zeku District 
Pakpa Lama Basiba phags pa Yuan Imperial Preceptor 
Ratsang Lacang ra tshang Hor Tsowa 
Repgong Rigong reb gong  
 
Rongwo Déchen    













(Rongwo) Samten  
     Rinchen 
Longwu Sengdan 
Renqing 
rong bo bsam gtan rin 
chen 
Founder of Rongwo 
Monastery 
 
Sakyil Tabéhu Saji Dabaihu sa kyil ta bé hu Patron of Dodé Bum 
Sangkhok Sangke bsang khog Labrang Tribe 
Serökyap Sai’ershenjia gser ‘od skyaps Gönshül Qianhu 
Shadar Shaderi bya dar River/Region in Zeku 
where county seat is 
located 
 
Shawo Xiawu sha bo Wöngya Baihu 
Shawonar Xiawuna sha bo nar Zeku Tribe 
Shar Kelden Gyatso Xiaricang Gedan Jiacuo shar skal ldan rgya 
mtsho 
 
1st Shartsang Lama 
Shartsang Lama Sharicang shar tshang Lineage of the seat holder 
of Rongwo Monastery 
 
Shisa Xibusha dpyi sa Zeku Tribe 
Sokru Suhurui sog ru Repgong village 
Sonak Suonaihe So nag Zeku Tribe 
Sönam Bum Suonan Ben bsod nams ‘bum 19th C. Gonshul Qianhu 
Topden Duofudun stops lden Region/district within 
Zeku’s Méshül territories 
 
Trashi Namgyel Zhaxi Anjia bkra shis rnam rgyal Last Rongwo Nangso 
Trashi Tséring Zhaxi Carang bkra shis tshe ring Last Mongol qinwang 
Tséring Gyel Cairen Jia tshe ring rgyal Last county leader of pre-
Liberation Tongren County 
 
Tséchu Zequ rtse chu River in Zeku 
Tsékhok Zeku rtse khog  
Tsézhung Zexiong rtse gzhung  
Tsintar Cengtairi tsin thar Méshül “monk official”  
Wagya Wajia ba gya Hor Qianhu 
Wangchen Döndrup Xiangqian dbang chen don grub Nangra Qianhu 
Wöngya Wangjia bon brgya Zeku Tribe 
Wönkhor Hongkeri dpon khor Hor tsowa  
 
